THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL

ERROL E. HARRIS

The Spirit of Hegel

Errol E. Harris

Humanities Press
New Jersey

First published 1993 by Humanities Press International, Inc.,
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716

© Errol E. Harris, 1993

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Harris, Errol E.
The spirit of Hegel / Errol E. Harris.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–391–03759–5
1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1830. I. Title.
B2948.H17 1993
193—dc20 92–8650
CIP

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without written permission from the publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Preface		vii
Acknowledgments		xi
1	Introduction: The Contemporary Importance of Hegel's Philosophy	1
2	Seminal Ideas in the Thought of the Young Hegel	20
3	Hegel's Voyage of Discovery	35
4	Marxist Interpretations of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*	44
5	Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic	67
6	Hegel on Identity (A Reply to Siemens)	82
7	The Philosophy of Nature in Hegel's System	93
8	Hegel's Realism and the Philosophy of Nature	107
9	Hegel and the Natural Sciences	118
10	The *Naturphilosophie* Updated	141
11	From Nature to Spirit	155
12	Objective Concept and Objective Spirit: The Theory of Action	177
13	Sovereignty, International Relations, and War	195
14	Absolute Spirit in History	208
15	Hegel as Christian Philosopher	223
16	All Philosophy is *Religionsphilosophie*	234
17	Appendix: Hegel and Whitehead	247

Select Bibliography 259
Index 263

Preface

Most of the essays in this book have appeared in the past in various journals or as chapters contributed to anthologies. But all of them have been revised and in part rewritten, in the attempt to improve them and, so far as possible, to bring them up to date. Some are new and have been written especially for this volume to fill gaps and maintain some degree of continuity between the various aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Others were written some time ago, but have never before been published.

My motive for republishing so many papers under one cover is that together they address almost every facet of Hegel's thought (excepting only his Aesthetic); and, although interest in and study of Hegel has been virtually central to my philosophical thinking ever since I decided to make the subject my life's work, I have hitherto published only one book, *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, about the work of a philosopher who, with Spinoza, has been my main inspiration. Having published the book on the Logic, what appears between these covers on that subject is somewhat attenuated, but references to the structure of the dialectic, and to special points made in the Logic are frequent enough throughout the rest of the book.

The reason why I have never attempted more than one book on Hegel in the past is largely that I have always had an aversion, except in special circumstances, to writing books about other men's philosophy instead of trying to develop and express my own. Other philosophers have made their own case and should not need commentators to restate it for them, although there is some justification for explaining to the relatively uninitiated theories the authors of which have expressed themselves obscurely, and for clarifying and defending doctrines that have been persistently misinterpreted. The essays included in this book will, I hope, revive interest in Hegel's system, which, until very recently, has been under a cloud, and persuade readers that his thought is, so far from being out of date, directly relevant to the needs of the present day.

Apart from what I have said in the opening chapter, Hegel's philosophy is today more important and ought to have become more topical than it has ever been. The reason is that contemporary physicists have come to the conclusion that the physical world is a single seamless and indivisible whole, in which every entity, every event, and every process is inseparably

connected with every other. The convergence of evidence upon this conclusion comes from a great variety of sources and is most impressive. But it was Hegel, more than a century earlier, who declared that the truth is the whole, and that the whole is only what it is in truth as the outcome of a systematic development. This he held to apply at once to reality and to the thought about it, to Nature as well as to Spirit. The concept of system is central to his thinking and the dynamic principle which operates throughout, the dialectic, follows directly from the way in which he understood and expounded the nature of system. All this, at least by implication, has reappeared in recent years in works and reflections written by scientists.

Contemporary philosophy has until now been either the direct consequence of, or a reaction against, the presuppositions of the science of the seventeenth century, which conceived the world as a machine, composed of crassly material atoms acting upon one another by impressed or intrinsic forces. The immediate results were an empiricist epistemology and a materialistic metaphysic, which have dominated philosophical thinking in the West ever since Francis Bacon, either as the accepted canon, or as the butt of criticism.

Today, however, a new physics demands a new metaphysics and a new logic, neither of which is provided whether by current empiricist doctrines or by Phenomenologist and Existentialist critiques, much less by the latently nihilistic Deconstructionism that has been spawned in reaction to them. The holism of contemporary science, not only in physics but also in biology, is implicitly denied in the latent presuppositions of modern formal symbolic logic, which, powerful as it is in certain restricted spheres, cannot respond to the basic requirements of the new physics. What is needed today is a return to dialectical thinking, purified of materialist prejudices (to which Marxists have been prone, and which are simply the precipitate from Newtonian science), and if this is to be forthcoming a closer study of Hegel would obviously be very fruitful.

How Hegel succeeded in anticipating this holistic development can be explained only by the influence upon him of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling (not to mention Spinoza), who reached the idea of the whole from the unity of the knowing subject, and thence imposed it upon the object known. Kant's notions of synthetic unity and later of teleology led to the development by his successors of a philosophy of Identity, from which the dialectic and Hegel's conception of the truth as the whole ensued. The science of the day gave little or no premonition of any such idea, although seeds of the concept were planted by the theory of Evolution (in which the implication of ecological interdependence is latent) shortly after Hegel's death. Meanwhile, his prescience enabled him to envisage an idea of Nature that was, for

his time, altogether revolutionary, and has not been properly understood until our own day.

Of all this I have said little in the essays here presented, because I have expatiated on these topics at length in other works, more especially in *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, in *Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical Thinking*, and in *Cosmos and Anthropos*, where the direct reference to Hegel is minimal, even if his influence on my thinking must be fairly apparent. The fact, however, that this particular importance and relevance of Hegel's thought is not emphasized in this volume should not allow his extraordinary perceptiveness to be overlooked, and that is why I mention it here.

The fact that the essays here presented were originally composed at widely separated dates, extending over a long period (the earliest was first conceived in 1935), has resulted in some repetition in later chapters of points made earlier. They are virtually all points of fundamental importance which merit emphasis, and so I have decided to let them stand, for they are all essential to the argument and reiteration can do no harm.

E. E. H.
High Wray,
May 1992.

Acknowledgments

Thanks for permission to reprint material in Chapters 1, 10, and 15 are due to *The Owl of Minerva*; in Chapters 8 and 17 to the State University Press of New York; in Chapters 6 and 7 to the *Review of Metaphysics*; in Chapter 9 to Kluwer Academic; and in Chapter 11 to Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Material in Chapters 4, 12, and 13 has previously been published by Humanities Press.

1
Introduction: The Contemporary Importance of Hegel's Philosophy

THE HEGEL REVIVAL

In the early decades of this century, in professional philosophical circles the world over, Hegel would most likely have been hailed as the greatest figure in the history of Western thought since Aristotle. Despite some violent criticisms and reactions, his influence was very much alive on the continent of Europe, British philosophy was dominated by the Hegelian idealistic school, and in America prominent figures, as widely differing in their views as Josiah Royce and John Dewey, had been deeply influenced by his thought. For the past half-century a very different attitude towards Hegel's philosophy has been prevalent, at least in the English-speaking world. Professional philosophers, if they have mentioned Hegel's name at all, have done so only *soto voce*, or else with derision; and although his great German predecessor, Kant, has always been held in veneration, Hegel has been deliberately and contemptuously rejected.

Now a revival of Hegel studies, although a comparatively recent phenomenon, has occurred, and today one sees new papers on Hegel successively appearing in print, a veritable spate of new editions of his works and new translations into English, and quite a stream of commentaries coming almost daily off the presses. In Europe and America there are thriving Hegel Societies, and even in Britain one is growing in stature, centered in Oxford, of all unlikely places, where not long since Hegelians were regarded as peculiar eccentrics. But this revival is for the most part scholastic in its general character. Writers translate, expound, and comment on Hegel's works, but few as yet seem to adopt and apply his ideas.

Nevertheless I believe that we have more to learn from Hegel today than from almost any other modern philosopher (excepting, perhaps, only Spinoza), and that his system is more consistent with the implications of

modern science, and comes nearer to the truth, than any philosophy that has appeared since his day. To return to it, therefore, should be very instructive and enlightening. The reason why it is important to us at the present time to pay some heed to Hegel's teachings is not so much that they express a spirit characteristic of our own day—rather the contrary—but that the contemporary bewilderment, the prevalent moral and political confusion, the widespread problems and pitfalls among which our age has gone astray, were in many cases anticipated and explained by Hegel, who provided guiding threads for the solution of many of our difficulties.

There are, of course, more ways than one of estimating the importance of any past thinker. It may be assessed in terms of the continuing influence of his thought on contemporary schools, whether positive or negative, or it may be considered from the point of view of practice: how much in our moral or political outlook is due to the thinker's doctrine? Sometimes modern practices have been inspired by a great thinker whose works and influence have long been forgotten (how many advocates of free enterprise, for instance, consciously acknowledge the influence of Adam Smith?). In either of these ways Hegel's philosophy might be considered important today. His continuing influence can be traced in the work of contemporary Existentialists, such as Heidegger and Sartre, and especially in that of Merleau-Ponty (even though it is not always admitted). All Marxist thinking, that has until recently bulked large on the modern scene, bears the mark, in its insistence on dialectic, as well as in many other respects, of Hegelian influence. Many political commentators have traced back to Hegel not only the theory and practice of Communism, but also of its opposite extreme, Nazism (in both cases, I believe, altogether mistakenly). But it is not in these ways that I intend to characterize the contemporary importance of Hegel's thought.

Yet another way in which a philosopher's work can be relevant to modern conditions (one that is, perhaps, common to Plato and Aristotle along with Spinoza and Hegel) is its bearing on the outlook and beliefs, as well as on the problems and practices, of the modern age, by way of commentary and criticism (consider, for instance, Plato's critique of democracy and its relevance to American politics today). In this respect, Hegel's thought is highly significant, if only because his insights so often penetrate far ahead of his own time and foreshadow later ideas and conditions, with a ring almost of prophecy. We can find in his writings anticipations of Darwin and Freud, and even of some aspects of modern physics. Yet, again, in this introduction, it is not to such anticipations that I want to draw attention, but rather to Hegel's main philosophical ideas as a contrast and counter to some attitudes that are very prevalent today and are typical

of modern Western society, and which, with their consequent practices, pose for us some of our most intractable problems.

MODERN MATERIALISM AND IRRATIONALISM

Certain contemporary intellectual trends sprang originally, in part at least, from reactions to the thought of Hegel, or that of his followers. These are the movements, so prominent at the present time, that are antipathetic to rationalism, to systematic thinking, and to idealism. Marxism may be included among them to the extent that it is anti-idealistic, despite the close relation between Hegel and Marx in some other respects. It will be remembered that Marx declared Hegel to be standing on his head, and claimed to have rectified that derangement by keeping his own feet firmly on the ground. Marxism has many facets and contains many, sometimes incompatible, ingredients, the implications of which cannot be discussed here, but some salient features may be noticed for the effect they have had on the modern outlook.

Repudiating the priority Hegel gave to spirit, Marx espoused a form of materialism (*pace* some critics and commentators), interpreted in the sphere of social activity as economic determinism. According to his teaching, everything human beings do, their social organization, their intellectual pursuits and doctrines, their moral attitudes and religious beliefs, are all determined by economic conditions arising out of the prevailing methods of material production. Society is held to be organized in classes according to economic interests, the owners of the means of production always being the dominant class, who exploit the labor of an underprivileged proletariat.

It follows from this that religion, morality, philosophy, political theory, and all other products of the intellect in an organized society, are mere expressions of the material interests of the ruling class, together constituting an ideology, relative to the economic structure of the society and the form of material production characteristic of it, but (apart from these) without any objective value or truth. Consciousness and its products, this doctrine implies, are merely epiphenomenal, symptomatic only of economic forces and conditions. Human conscious individuality is thus seen as a product of the socio-political order, as determined by its economic structure. Personality is subordinated to social requirements, and class interests, identified with those of the administration, are given precedence over individual welfare. Social relations, therefore, are always understood in terms of class struggle, and, as the behavior and beliefs of each class are determined by economic factors rather than by reason, the struggle can only be regarded as violent confrontation, never as a negotiable conflict of interests that might

be rationally and peaceably resolved. The aim of a strict Marxist in a capitalist society, then, can consistently only be the violent overthrow of the existing order, and his preferred methods are disruptive, even if on occasion cooperation and conciliation may temporarily be adopted if they serve the main purpose of gaining power.

On the other side, capitalist society, while it gives lip service to a political doctrine of liberal democracy, tends all too easily to degenerate into authoritarianism. If, through popular support for left-wing parties, democratic procedures result in a socialist regime, as they did in Chile in 1973, capitalist interests are all too apt to engineer a coup to restore "stability" in the form of a military dictatorship, or some other type of fascist government. In this manner, the doctrines of the Marxist are given plausibility and the methods he adopts in practice substantive pretext. At least, so it was until Mikhail Gorbachev changed the face of Communism and, by departing from the traditional interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, transformed the international scene.

Translated to the sphere of international relations, the traditional interpretation readily engendered the belief, and with good ground, that eventual world war between the capitalist West and the Communist East was inevitable, a war that until now has been held in check only by a balance of nuclear terror (dubbed "deterrence," or more candidly described as mutual assured destruction, and appropriately acronymized as MAD). For the moment, however, it is not this intolerable situation on which I intend to dwell, nor on the extent to which it may (or may not) have been mitigated by the introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. It is the fruit of more deep-seated conceptual implications of Marxism, on the one hand, and (for different reasons) non-Marxism, on the other, and these are more germane to my purpose.

The Marxist doctrine of ideology has been largely responsible for a prevalent attitude of radical relativism towards both morality and speculation, which, for contrasting and complementary reasons, has been reinforced from other quarters, to which I shall presently return: for example, the so-called scientific attitude that demands value-free judgments and has led sociologists to the conclusion that all moral codes are relative to the culture and period in which they occur. The general consequence of these influences has been that moral values tend to be decried and moral principles overruled in deference to the demands of political expediency, and, when disputes arise, confrontation tends to take precedence over negotiation and conciliation. Lip service may be given to the principle of respect for persons in democratic societies, but in practice and general outlook the manipulation of people and business "success" is generally viewed as the paramount priority.

Another source of the modern reaction against reason and system has been Existentialism, sometimes linked with Marxism (as for Sartre), sometimes with Nazism (as for Heidegger), at other times aligned with quite different political persuasions, or preferably with none. Once again, it is a many-sided doctrine to which I cannot here, and shall not attempt to, do full justice. I am concerned more with the popular effect that it has had, through its literary ventures as much as through the speculative writings of its more eminent votaries.

While Hegel taught that the real is the rational, structured as a single complex system, the typical Existentialist attitude is that the world proves, under analysis, to be chaotic and absurd—a milieu into which we find ourselves "thrown" irrelevantly and irrespective of our choice: no proclaimed doctrine can give any assurance of truth, human conduct is for the most part simply conformist, ridiculous, and self-stultifying, or else selfish, dissident, and hypocritical (inauthentic), and political action is oppressive and frustrating to the human spirit. All we can rely upon is the reality of our own self-conscious, free, inner existence. The social order restricts and regiments this free personality and the events of history torture and destroy it. It is only in free, self-determined choice that the person finds him or her self. Our proper destiny, therefore, is to break loose from all restrictive rules (none of which ever have objective validity) and from the shackles of an imposed tradition, and to live freely by our own authentic decision and action. This is and can be authentic only so far as it is self-motivated and aware of its own freedom, not because it moves according to any set, so-called rational, principle. The act of choice is, therefore, arbitrary—the mark and assurance of its freedom. The general (but by no means invariable) tendency of the Existentialist outlook is consequently antiestablishment, antiauthoritarian, antisystematic, opposed to all determinate principle, and ultimately anarchical.

A third form of reaction against speculative reason is Empiricism, taking the shape, in the present day, of Analytic philosophy. Here any constructive role for reason is repudiated and it is viewed as merely instrumental. Logic becomes purely analytic (tautological) and formal, regarded as a powerful tool, but incapable of deducing new factual information either a priori or from empirical premises. Factual knowledge about the world, it is declared, can be acquired only through sense-experience, and can thus be provided only by the natural sciences. Philosophy, accordingly, is restricted to clarification of language, with the formulation of logical principles and the construction of logical algorithms. It can offer no positive doctrine nor construct any practical precepts. Metaphysics is banned as an improper and unsound mode of fabricating what is essentially meaningless, or else no better than ideology.

Analytic philosophy, by and large, is thus antimetaphysical and antimoralistic. The old idea that morality is founded upon reason runs counter to its conception of reason as purely instrumental. Moral precepts and principles are held to be noncognitive; they are prescriptive rules, not descriptive assertions, and the ends to which they prescribe the means are chosen, not on rational grounds, but simply in accordance with sentiments felt intuitively by the individual, whether or not they are suggested by cultural tradition. The ultimate choice, once again, is arbitrary, and any rules of conduct that emerge are relative to arbitrarily selected ends. Neither the analytic nor the existentialist philosopher, in the capacity of philosopher, will presume to advocate moral objectives. The field of choice is left open, and rational guidance, when at all relevant, is given a subsidiary role. Reason, as Hume maintained, is, and must remain, the slave of the passions.

In sum, all three of these philosophical trends foster the belief in moral relativism. The analytic offers no guidance in practice, the existentialist advocates arbitrary choice, and Marxism appeals to class interests resorting to confrontation and force, any supporting argument ranking as mere propaganda. It is not surprising, therefore, that the contemporary scene has, for decades, been characterized by the confusion of voices, intransigeant attitudes, the indiscriminate resort to violence (often apparently senseless), widespread revolt against established authority, the general abandonment of traditional forms, and even the advocacy of anarchism. The resulting prospect is far from attractive, and, even if some recent political developments are more encouraging, confusion still threatens, and current conflicts, difficult of resolution, still hold the potentiality of wider conflagration. With instruments of destruction such as are now available in the hands of irresponsible and unbridled agents, the future for mankind remains darkly forboding. Little wonder that modern youth are bewildered and dismayed as they contemplate their prospects and that they resort to psychedelic drugs for consolation and refuge.

Before turning to Hegel attention must be drawn to yet another feature of the present intellectual climate tending in the same direction as those already indicated. Both Marxism and Analytic philosophy claim to have adopted what is generally (but anachronistically) termed "the scientific attitude." It is anachronistic because it retains the view typical of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science, which is no longer espoused by contemporary physics. In this view, the objective world is a purely material mechanical complex, external and closed to mind, which the scientific observer regards, as it were, from the outside. Scientific observation is held to be entirely unprejudiced, recording solely what it finds as given, uninfluenced by any personal or subjective inclination of the observer. All scientific theory must then be value-free. This attitude, in its effects on the social

sciences, in particular anthropology and sociology, treats evaluation as a psychological phenomenon, and finds values always dependent upon and wholly relative to the culture in which they are judged. No universal objective standards can in this way be identified or established. The scientific attitude to value, accordingly, is necessarily relativistic—it will depend entirely upon the period and the social order. From this it follows, for those who reflect, that there can be no unconditional obligation upon anybody to observe moral rules (for what may be approved at one time and in one culture, may be condemned at another time and in another social milieu).

While current doctrines conduce in this way to moral relativism and the scepticism that results from it, and outlaw metaphysics as ideology (similarly relative and subjective), science remains apparently the one secure source of theoretical truth unscathed by potential scepticism. But now the Phenomenologist and the Existentialist (in the persons of Husserl and Heidegger) have impugned even the objectivity of the empirical sciences. Husserl in *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, and Heidegger in *Holzwege*, have argued that science is a selective abstraction from a more originary and subjective consciousness, relative to a particular professional group, who adapt its findings, and restrict its outlook, to the needs and objectives of their special research. A similar conclusion issues from the views of Karl Popper (who contends that scientific hypotheses are conjectures that can be falsified by observation, but never confirmed), and also those of Thomas Kuhn (who subjects all science to a "paradigm" relative to the historical period), and the more historicist followers of R. G. Collingwood (for whom the absolute presuppositions of science cannot be questioned, or proved, but are simply adopted in the historical period they characterize). These doctrines culminate in the somewhat extreme and subjective assessment of scientific hypotheses advocated by Paul Feyerabend (who assimilates science to art and makes it the product of creative imagination). The much vaunted objectivity of science has thus been undermined, and no objective criterion of truth can be found for any discipline; for contemporary trends, both in science and philosophy, have dissolved away every measure of objectivity, with a consequent devaluation not only of morality but of truth itself.

Concurrently, humankind at the present time faces numerous seemingly intractable problems that threaten its very survival on the planet. The life-giving resources of the earth are rapidly being exhausted and destroyed. Mechanization and industrialization require profligate consumption of energy, that not only creates an uncomfortable shortage of that fundamentally necessary commodity but, as a side effect, results in widespread pollution of air and water. The burning of fossil fuels increases the greenhouse effect of the atmosphere, raising the average temperature of the planet and

threatening cataclysmic climatic changes besides a rise in the level of the oceans that will submerge large populated areas. The unrestrained destruction of tropical rain forests enhances these effects, reducing the absorption of carbon dioxide by vegetation and depleting one of the main sources of atmospheric oxygen, essential not only to the production of energy but to life itself. The destruction of the ozone layer progressively exposes living things to lethal ultraviolet radiation at a pace that is becoming irreversible. Meanwhile, as long as the stockpiles of nuclear weapons held by the superpowers remain (to say nothing of suspected proliferation), the risk of accidental catastrophe persists; and the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes presents the question, still unanswered, how to dispose of mounting (potentially lethal) radioactive waste.

We habitually look to the scientist to find solutions for such problems, referring them, along with the accompanying political issues, to "think tanks" of experts. But the very advance of science, and the solutions proposed in its name, either exacerbate the existing difficulties or create new ones. In truth, the problems are not simply scientific, nor are the questions raised simply how to counteract pollution, how to create or conserve energy, how to deploy or to limit the use of nuclear weapons, or how to survive nuclear attack. The really critical issues are questions of value and priority. We have to ask whether our present convenience and gain are more important than the survival of future generations. Is the development of nuclear power (whether it is used for peaceful or belligerent purposes), with its accompanying risks of leukemia, birth defects, and violent disaster, morally admissible as an economic expedient? Is nuclear war a tolerable instrument of national policy, even as a so-called deterrent? These are ethical, not merely scientific, questions, and the answers require reference to standards of value. Moreover, they concern global issues affecting all mankind, so the standards must apply universally and must be objective. But contemporary science and philosophy have deprived us of all belief in objective standards at the time when we are most sorely in need of them.

THE HEGELIAN ANTIDOTE

What has Hegel to do with all this? Prima facie very little, for these predicaments were not, and could not have been, anticipated in the early nineteenth century, nor could Hegel have known, or foretold, modern philosophical teachings precisely as they have appeared in our time. But in his writings he does provide a comprehensive framework in the light of which we can assess these modern positions, and he lays down general principles that can help us to solve problems which arise out of them.

Moreover, in one way, Hegel did anticipate much of the philosophical thinking of our own time. Most of the insights of positive value that contemporary schools have attained Hegel had already expressed. Some Existentialist writers owe them directly to Hegel's influence, and philosophers of other schools, who are innocent of any Hegelian scholarship, have only repeated in a half-baked and half-hearted way, what Hegel had long since maintained as one side, or one facet, of a more complex truth.

For instance, virtually all contemporary Analytic philosophy is an exercise and an apotheosis of what Hegel called the Understanding, with a detailed elaboration of its products. This, Hegel insisted, was an essential and indispensable phase in the development of consciousness and a necessary aspect of all developed knowledge. But it was, for him, only one aspect, and it did not in itself constitute the most complete or the highest development of systematic thinking. Of course, Hegel could hardly have anticipated the extraordinary developments subsequently made of symbolic logic (a discipline he found singularly uncongenial and tended to despise); but the limitations placed upon rational thinking by analytic methods were quite clear to him, and he recognized their dangers, as contemporary writers have not. He also foretold the consequences of remaining fixed and stuck within those limits.

Again, the inwardness and subjective self-certainty of the human spirit Hegel saw as an inescapable and fundamental element of reality. The importance assigned to it by Existentialism would not, therefore, have surprised him, nor would he have denied it. But he knew it to be essentially correlative to, and actually vitally dependent upon, an objectivity that was equally real and important, even if it also, in a significant but different relationship, was an essential product of thought. Other idealists, as well as Phenomenologists and Existentialists, rather tend to decry, and often fail adequately to explain, this necessary objective character of reality, but Hegel always insisted upon it and made the necessity of its actuality intelligible. Equally he opposed and castigated the fault that Marx mistakenly accuses him of committing: volatilizing away the concrete reality of things into abstract ideas (what he often decried as *Hirngespinste*).

The intolerance of rigid laws and the appeal to violence, the drift to anarchy, the revolt of youth (how far justified and how far misguided), the immersion of the mind in materialist categories—all these find a place and an explanation in Hegel's system.[1] In accordance with the principles of his dialectic, each is transcended and its conflicts and contradictions resolved. Even the absurdities that the Existentialists find so implacable, Hegel recognized as inherently characteristic of the experienced world. Nevertheless, he saw that, through those very absurdities, the mind can be driven on to higher achievements and more lucid self-awareness.

Although he called himself, and is always regarded as, an idealist, Hegel was just as much a realist. He never did and never intended to deny the actuality of the material world, nor to derive its being from the contents of finite thinking. The roots of the mind, for him, lie in Nature, in spatio-temporal, material, self-external existence, which can never be thought or explained away. But because mind does arise in organic and natural beings, the nature of material reality is, and must be, such that it *can* produce self-consciousness. Of Nature he writes: "God does not remain petrified and dead; the very stones cry out and raise themselves to Spirit."[2] What is petrified and dead could not raise itself to spirit unless spirit were already immanent in its very being. Hegel realized that our self-awareness is never reducible to any mindless mechanism, and that every attempt so to reduce it is self-stultifying.[3] Yet equally, its existence is inexplicable as a mere external accompaniment of a material mechanical body. Hegel solves the problem of body-mind dualism, refuting both materialism and subjectivism, by seeing the material world as a first and inevitable manifestation of Spirit itself (the Idea in other-being), which progressively, through a dialectical process, develops itself out of material into organic forms, and through these to its own self-conscious self-affirmation. His whole philosophy is an attempt to demonstrate this development in extenso.

Hegel insists that every reality is at once both an external actuality and a form (as well as an object) of mind, more or less adequate to its ultimate nature, or Concept; and every phase of consciousness, which is a manifestation (or activity, *energeia*) of the Concept, has its embodiment (*Gestaltung*) in the external observable world. The process of development is dialectical—that is, it is essentially a process of thought; for dialectic is the opposition of complementary ideas one to another, and the reconciliation of that opposition. If, on scrutiny, one finds that a material process answers to the same description, it is evidence that the dynamic principle, which belongs explicitly to thought, is also implicitly at work in the material process. Dialectical Materialism is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, if it posits a materialism in which the principle of development is not that of consciousness (for it could not then be dialectical). The failure to notice this contradiction is the fundamental error of Marxism.

Hegel was well aware that physical process, like all other, is indeed dialectical. Dialectic, he declared to be "the principle of all movement, all life, and all activity in the actual world" (*Enc.*, 81 *Zusatz*). And for this very reason he held that its inner essence is fully revealed only in the ultimate outcome of the dialectical movement, which discloses its proper nature. The final result of the process is that which throughout has been bringing itself to fruition, that which has been immanent in every immature phase, and which, when it finally emerges reveals itself as the completely and

absolutely self-conscious mind—subject, not merely substance. Hence, it is not Hegel who stands on his head, but Marx and Engels, who cut off the head, and then imagine that the decapitated torso of the dialectic is still capable of life and movement. So they miss the significance and implication for evolution of their own self-conscious reflection. That should spawn mere ideology if their own theory is to be believed; but if this were so, the theory must be false.

Once self-conscious mind is recognized as the outcome and essential principle of the whole process, the ultimate explanation of each more primitive and partial phase must be sought in its relation to self-consciousness. Here the central tenet of Existentialism is vindicated, while its one-sidedness and limitation is avoided. Further, the dialectical process is throughout a progressive conquest of opposition and contradiction. First, opposition and contrast are seen as necessary for the mutual definition of finite entities. This is the virtue of Analytic philosophy and the work of the Understanding, which distinguishes, divides, separates differences, defines, and delimits, with the utmost precision, and sets each exclusive element in contrast with every other. It is an essential and valuable phase of the process. But in and by itself it cannot be final; for next we must recognize that the opposites which contradict each other are at the same time dependent upon one another and upon the opposition for their definition and for their own intrinsic nature. This is what mere analysis overlooks and where it falls short and becomes misleading. Finally, the mutual dependence and involvement of the opposed moments is made a stepping-stone to the resolution of the conflict, preserving what is valid on both sides and abolishing the contradiction, now seen to be only apparent and specious. Taken in isolation, either side of such opposition tends to contradict itself and become its own opposite (an example selected at random: social anarchy, permitting unlimited license, leads directly to complete dictatorship, for when no rules of conduct are accepted by consensus force prevails and any concerted action must be arbitrarily imposed). Seen as stark conflict, the opposition is a source of frustration (the imposition of "law and order" restricts freedom, yet the permission of anarchy leads to confusion); but once the interdependence of the opposite moments is recognized (law and order enforced as a means to protect civil rights) reconciliation becomes possible, the frustration is relieved, and the contradiction resolved.

Thus we are led to see that absurdity (the result of taking a partial aspect to be the whole) is an essential ingredient in the process of dialectical advance, and to understand the frustration to which it leads; but also we are given the key to the resolution of the contradiction by which it is occasioned, and the way is pointed to a higher satisfaction. It is the goad of successive contradictions that drives the mind to further progress, so that the dialectic continues

towards the self-realization of spirit, in which knowledge is all-embracing as well as self-reflective, and action issuing from it is free and self-determined. This self-realization is the achievement of reason; not the merely abstract, analyzing ratiocination of the understanding, but the self-conscious thinking activity of mind, sublating and transforming all its functions, including feeling and action. It is no merely formal calculation, but the dialectical process of development, evolving a concrete comprehension that embraces the entire activity of spirit. There is obviously an ultimate value in this consummation, and if all the conflicts and absurdities of life and reality are seen in relation to it, as stages in the development towards it, the absurdity ceases to be ultimate but appears as a merely temporary and provisional (if necessary) phase; and the sense of frustration and futility that it had momentarily produced is removed.

Hegel's philosophy provides an objective standard of both truth and value, a goal for human endeavor, a method of progress and achievement, and the foundation of an ethic. The goal is the full realization of self-conscious mind; the method is rational self-reflective thinking, developing order and system through a dialectical process and generating a wholeness of life in feeling, belief, understanding, and action; and the basis of morality is recognition of and respect for the freedom and self-creative capacity of human personality as the embodiment of self-conscious spirit. This respect for rational self-realizing personality is the categorical imperative that disposes of every taint of relativism, however much that may be suggested by differences among cultures or the sentiments of individuals. In it the claim to authenticity of self-determined choice is admitted and the demand for freedom is met. But the choice is rational, not arbitrary, and the freedom is self-regulation, not license.

Hegel regarded social order as the expression of this self-determinate freedom, in which the prescription of law is only the obverse of a free conscience. But he realized, what T. H. Green later expressed so aptly, that "no man can make a conscience for himself; he needs a society to make it for him." Morality is after all only the regulation of human relationships, and common recognition of rights is of its essence. Thus the state and the social order, for Hegel, become the objective expression of the popular will and conscience, and law and order is seen as the means to satisfactory living, the medium in which freedom is attained.

He puts the appeal to force in its right place and gives it its proper function: the protection of human rights and the enforcement of just laws. Anarchy is excluded, but the freedom perversely sought through anarchy is admitted, and is found in mutual cooperation. Service of the community is its condition, and that again is the dictate of reason, not merely the outcome of economic and material production (although that too has its place in the

system and is not overlooked, for it is in response to material needs that reason acts).

When it comes to international politics we must, today, go beyond Hegel, while still applying the principles of his philosophy to present problems. What Hegel had to say about this subject was sound enough for his own time, but since his day the whole aspect and setting of international affairs have radically altered. As far as he went Hegel was entirely right, and what he says of sovereignty and international relations holds good even to this day. In a world of sovereign powers the ultimate arbiter is, and can only be, war, and the state of war is the natural relationship between sovereign states, primarily concerned about their national security. That is the source of our present predicament, for with the advent of nuclear and other modern weapons, war has become intolerable as an instrument of policy. Yet it is still so used. The remedy lies in the recognition of the universal and overwhelming common interest of contemporary nations in the solution of global problems, and in giving predominance to the effort to develop international institutions to represent this interest. If then Hegel's principles, as applied within the state, were transferred to such international institutions, the solution of the problem of world peace would be at hand. But for cogent reasons, arising out of the prevailing conditions in his day, Hegel believed no such development to be possible; and we today are too blinkered by what we conceive as our national interests to see any clear way forward. So we strive to maintain a balance of power, generating an unregulated and uncontrollable arms race that perpetuates a climate of tension in the relations between sovereign independencies which our technology and our nuclear armory have rendered obsolete.

Equally, Hegel's teaching has relevant bearing upon other major predicaments that we face today. He conceived Nature as at once the manifestation, in its extended and evolutionary structure, of the Idea—its external embodiment. It is, for him, the germ and origin of self-conscious spirit, generating itself out of physical, chemical, and organic natural forms. The relation of humanity to nature is dialectical. Human beings with their self-conscious capacity, knowledge, and morality, their politics, art, religion, and philosophy, are the dialectical product of natural processes, with which the development of consciousness is continuous. In the dialectical system what results at the end is "the truth of" what has gone before, and provides the explanatory principle in the light of which the earlier stages must be understood. It follows, therefore, that problems of conservation and the use of natural resources must be approached from the viewpoint of moral requirements and in the philosophical setting hitherto outlined. Nature as the cradle of spirit cannot be separated from the life and self-reflection of the mind. It cannot be viewed simply as a neutral material realm, alien to the

mind, to be subdued and exploited in the interests of mankind, as if they were independent of it. For it is the very matrix of the life that it supports, of the consciousness it generates, and the society which that consciousness constructs. Nature and humanity constitute a single dialectical whole in relation to which human society must be seen as a kingdom of ends, the undivided interest of which is to maintain the integrity of the world which the human race inhabits. To do so becomes a moral responsibility, and man's relation to nature is ethical, not just biological or technical (although it is both of these as well). All this implicitly follows from what Hegel sets out, even though he could not have stated it explicitly in detail, because the questions to be faced in our day were not yet evident and could hardly seem relevant in his. But he does provide the key to the solution of our problems if we develop the implications of his system with respect to them, demanding a new outlook on Nature, a revitalized moral and philosophical approach.

These are not the only ways in which Hegelian principles are relevant to characteristic attitudes of the modern age and the tensions to which they give rise. Hegel never overlooked the facts that make relativism plausible. He understood and insisted upon the element of contingency in the world, the wanton diversity of belief and opinion, the chance that bedevils and frustrates finite purposes in human affairs.[4] He insisted likewise that this was but the necessary opposite moment of an absolute rational necessity which establishes the objective and universal standard both of value and of truth. This universal is the principle of the whole, and the necessity of its prevalent potency is not a rigid necessity imposed by abstract formal logic, by mathematical or mechanical laws, but the universal necessity of holism, which permits, and even requires, relevant variations in its operation. It is the universal self-identical Idea, which, to be absolute, must differentiate itself in infinite particular diverse forms and processes in Nature, in consciousness, and in history. It is in the course of this self-differentiation that the relativism and contingency has its place; but the holistic principle always prevails and ultimately dominates. It is universally immanent in all its diverse self-differentiations. Hence its effect is what Hegel calls "the cunning of reason," the pervasive influence of the whole, which one way or another brings order out of chaos.

Thus is the foundation laid of an objectivity and a standard of value by reference to which we might address the problems and frustrations besetting our own generation. That would require the application to social and political practice, as well as to our conception of nature and our attitude to the environment, of Hegelian principles. The objective standard is the free self-determination of the whole, expressing itself in and through self-conscious personality, whose comprehensive grasp cannot exclude the integral relation of the individual to the social whole, nor its organic

relationship to the natural world. So in Hegel's philosophy the perverse and one-sided tendencies of the modern world, often in mutual conflict, find their place, and the perplexities and confusions they occasion find their solution.

RESPONSE TO CRITICS

Against the imposing structure that Hegel erected critics have brought formidable arguments, and I shall conclude with a very brief glance and short reply to some of them.

Hegel has been accused of incipient Fascism. His much vaunted freedom that is so often mentioned turns out, say the critics, to be freedom merely to do what one is told by an all-powerful state, which Hegel actually deified saying that its history was "the march of God upon Earth." Admittedly the metaphor is somewhat ill-advised, but it is only a metaphor, and one misinterpreted more often than not. What Hegel actually wrote could as well be translated "God's way with the world." He could consistently have said of the behavior of any natural or human agent that it was the march of God upon Earth, for he held dialectic to be the principle of all movement and all life—dialectic which is the activity of Spirit, the immanence of the Absolute in all its partial forms. Of these the state is, perhaps (certainly, it was in Hegel's day) the most spectacular in the world. But he might just as well have said the same of animal instinct, or of personal genius.

Hegel knew as well as Hobbes that the power of the sovereign state is unchallengeable by any private individual, and that any such challenge can succeed only if and when it can enlist in its support the mass of popular approval, which is itself the source of the state's power. Like Rousseau, Hegel was well aware that the source of political power is the popular will and that the problem of political organization is to find adequate institutional forms for its expression. Freedom is not to be found in uncontrolled license, in mob rule, or in civil strife. Such conditions are the negation and destruction of free action. Opportunities to act fruitfully and satisfactorily are only to be had in conditions of ordered cooperation through which a community of persons pursue ends that they value and can enjoy in common. The external forms of such organized cooperation are social and political institutions, and the structure of their integration and coordination is the system and regulation of the body politic.

Accordingly, law and order are the complement of free conscience, and the state is in principle (whether it is in practice in any particular case) the political machinery for the realization of freedom—meaning by that the ability to accomplish worthwhile ends. What Hegel does in his political philosophy is not so much to advocate a particular form of constitution

(much less one involving absolute submission to authority), but rather to analyze and make intelligible the principles according to which social and political forms—the family, the economic society, and the institutions of government—become the vehicles of the rational, self-determining spirit of human kind.

Another criticism comes from a different quarter. Hegel's principle of explanation is confessedly teleological, and, it may be said, teleology as an explanatory principle has been finally rejected and made obsolete by modern science. Science with its empirical method (it has been maintained by Bertrand Russell) is to be preferred to any merely a priori argument, however subtle or ingenious. Much could be said in comment on this position. Hegel would even have accepted the general spirit of Russell's remark, for he had little respect for merely subtle and ingenious ratiocination. But I shall content myself here simply with declaring the main contention of the criticism to be false. The science that rejects teleology is no longer modern; it became obsolete in the early years of the twentieth century. It is the mechanistic science of Newton and Laplace, which today has given place to that of Einstein, Planck, and Heisenberg.

Teleology, moreover, is an ambiguous term. It may mean the explanation of all natural processes as consciously purposive, like human action; or it may mean explanation of all natural forms and events as serving human (or divine) purposes. In neither of these senses is it an acceptable scientific concept and in both of them it was strenuously rejected by Hegel. He did, however, explain how it has arisen from partial and faulty notions. There is another more legitimate sense of teleology, in which Hegel's philosophy may rightly be said to be teleological. That is determination of the part by the organizing principle of the whole to which it belongs. And, as that principle manifests itself in a dialectical scale of developing forms, explanation of the potential in terms of the actual, of the primitive in terms of the more mature form into which it evolves, becomes legitimate. In this sense contemporary science is as teleological as Hegel's *Wissenschaft*, for relativity theory requires the explanation of all motion in terms of the space-time manifold and the stresses produced in it by the overall distribution of matter in the universe—of the part in terms of the whole; quantum physics explains particles in terms of the energy, or wave, system; and biology, becoming progressively more organismic, explains metabolism in terms of the total organism, and the life and activity of the individual in terms of the ecosystem.

In the domain of psychology, if time and space permitted, even more might be said in admiration of Hegel's astonishing modernity, of his anticipations of Behaviorism and Freudianism, as well as of much contemporary philosophical psychology and his correction of their errors and

imbalances. The early part of his *Geistesphilosophie* is a mine of prophetic insights, and offers one of the best and most satisfactory treatments of the body-mind relation problem.[5]

Another frequent criticism of Hegel is of his sweeping declaration that "the real is the rational and the rational is the real." This, it is said, is palpably false, and in the sphere of morals and politics it is especially pernicious, because it is a plain invitation to complacency and the toleration of glaring injustices. The aphorism, no doubt, is somewhat obscure, but the criticism rests on misunderstanding. We have seen that Hegel did not take "rational" to mean merely mathematically exact, or neatly arranged, or even precisely fitting. What is rational (for him) is nothing static and fixed; it is no mere self-consistency or analytic tautology. He would scornfully have denied that the real was rational in any of these senses. For him the real is rational because of the immanence of the whole in every part, every phase, and every feature of it. Its principle of movement and development is dialectic, which is the principle par excellence of the movement of reason. To say that the real is rational is not to say that everything is exactly as it ought and has it in it to be—although, in one sense, it is to say that also. It means that everything is potentially, and has in it to become more and more rational; and, because that is the very nature of all reality, everything in that potentiality is what it ought to be—that is, potentially complete. The dictum does not deny the need for effort towards improvement and (in society, for example) reform. It asserts the necessity for, and inevitability of, that effort, its inherence in the essential character of life and mind, and its immanence in every form of reality, which is rational only in virtue of it.

For Hegel, spirit is absolute restlessness, constant nisus and movement, pure dynamism. Its rationality is what makes it so. To be rational is to press ceaselessly onward towards the full realization of spirit, to strive constantly to overcome opposition, to resolve conflict and contradiction. This urge is the essence of the real. That the real is rational means that it cannot rest in confusion, disorder, injustice, or absurdity; it must constantly move in the direction of wholeness, of consciousness and mind, which is perpetual activity, the continuing exercise of freedom in the endeavor to become more free, more rational, and to realize the whole of its potential. That, when it is realized, would be no static unchangeable fixity. The Absolute cannot be "the night in which all cows are black." It is the dynamic process of the dialectic reflected (as Hegel constantly says) into itself—become aware of itself—pure self-conscious activity, *noēsis noēseōs*, the activity of God.

Some may think this is to give Hegel too easy a victory over his critics, especially over such thinkers as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Is not this

assurance that the real is the rational mere wishful thinking? Did Hegel not assume too confident a knowledge of the Absolute? Surely this is something we simply cannot claim; and if we cannot, then we cannot be so sure that the real and the rational are what Hegel says they are. Can we, moreover, in the face of the confusion, conflict, cynicism, oppression, and injustice, so evident throughout history and so prevalent in the contemporary world, seriously maintain that humanity (let alone the whole of reality) is pressing "ceaselessly onwards towards the full realization of spirit"?

Indeed, the contemporary prospect seems scarcely to warrant such metaphysical optimism. Nevertheless, it remains true that the constant urge of self-conscious mind is towards repudiating and combating these evils, however little success appears to attend its efforts; and the urge is precisely the prompting of reason. Moreover, the very disavowal by the critic of Hegelian confidence in the supremacy of reason is itself evidence of self-criticism, of that self-reflection and self-awareness that Hegel maintains is the special characteristic of mind. It is in this self-knowledge that he holds rationality to consist. He it was, in particular, in his criticism of Kant, who pointed out that to recognize a limitation, even a limitation in one's own thinking, is ipso facto to have passed beyond that limitation and to have transcended the finite position which it represents. To recognize a limit is to posit a beyond, to reveal and generate an opposition; and that is precisely the movement of the dialectic, the implication of which is the immanence of that whole, that end and objective, which is the drive or (to use a Spinozistic term) the *conatus* of the movement. Finally, it is in the last resort only the immanence of developing self-awareness in all reality that can make it intelligible to us, and only the implications of wholeness and completeness in intelligibility that, in the end, is the prior condition of that self-awareness and its ultimate emergence from the natural process. This self-awareness is undeniably present in ourselves, and what it inevitably implies must, therefore, be acknowledged. What Hegel maintained was no more nor less than these implications, which he set himself explicitly to develop. Declaring his endeavors to be insufficient, or proclaiming them to be arrogant or simply unsuccessful, does not release us from involvement in the very dialectic that he espoused, or the obligation to pursue it to its end.

Notes

1. Cf. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, C (BB), B III, 582–95. Here Hegel demonstrates the revulsion of absolute freedom into complete anarchy and, by the same revulsion, into tyranny, violence, and terror. Cf. also *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, 234 *Zusatz*, 396 *Zusatz*; 38 *Zusatz*, 99 *Zusatz*.
2. *Encyclopaedia*, 247 *Zusatz*.

3. *Encyclopaedia*, 20, 381 *Zusatz*, and 389 and *Zusatz*. Also, Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Fifth Essay and Appendix.
4. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 145 *Zusatz*, 209 *Zusatz*; *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Introduction.
5. See Chaps. 9 and 10 below.

2
Seminal Ideas in the Thought of the Young Hegel

Early Traces

Hegel's philosophical system is one of the most comprehensive and complete theoretical structures ever conceived, comparable, perhaps, only with that of Aristotle. In the last chapter I drew upon it sparsely, no more than was necessary to serve the purpose of illustrating its contemporary relevance. What follows is a series of reflections on the work of the philosopher as his ideas developed and as they relate to one another within the mature system. I shall begin with the writings of his youth, after he had completed his theological studies in Tübingen and before he had entered upon his career as a university teacher.

The problem with which he was early concerned was one that had troubled thinkers from time immemorial, the competing claims of faith and reason, one still persisting today as that of the relation between religion and science. Are they incompatible, as some (like Bertrand Russell) have believed, or can they be reconciled? In his youthful writings, Hegel wrestled with this question and, in the course of his thinking about it, and his reflection upon the work of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries in its bearing upon his central problem, the outlines of his later system gradually began to take shape.

Science, in Hegel's day, was a word with a somewhat different connotation from that which it bears nowadays. *Wissenschaft*, for him (as for his immediate predecessor, Fichte) meant philosophical knowledge rather than empirical science, as we understand it, although the sciences of nature would have been recognized as holding some place within it. They were considered (at least by Hegel in his later years) to constitute a determinate stage in the development of consciousness, prior and leading up to what he later came to call Absolute Knowing (or *Wissenschaft*). It was not until his more mature system evolved that this became apparent, but from the very beginning Hegel was convinced that there was no irreconcilable

conflict between reason (in the form of *Wissenschaft*) and religious faith; and he tried from the first to demonstrate their coincidence. As he did so, other seminal concepts precipitated out from his meditation upon this overarching problem, and I shall begin by trying to trace the emergence of some of the more important.

The germs of ideas to be developed later in his more mature philosophy are already detectable in Hegel's early theological papers, some of them written in Bern during his employment as *Hofmeister* with Hauptmann von Steiger. The distinctions of understanding from reason, of the abstract from the concrete universal, of false from true infinity, begin here to make their appearance. Also the notions of absolute Idea and absolute Spirit are beginning to take shape, and the need is being felt for the resolution of conflicts between opposing concepts, with their reconciliation and ultimate unification.

The purpose of the present chapter is briefly to trace the development of these ideas in Hegel's youthful reflections, in particular his efforts to find a way of resolving the conflict between religious faith and philosophical speculation, the need for which he felt very deeply because of his early training in theology and the aspirations towards intellectual, artistic, and political freedom that he and his fellow students entertained.

INFLUENCES

The chief influences on the thought of the young theological student graduating from Tübingen in 1793 were the ideas inspiring the French Revolution and the ferment of the Enlightenment. The old orthodoxy in religion had been called in question and subjected to criticism. Kant had declared that the world had entered upon the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. "Religion, through her holiness, and Law, through its majesty," he wrote, "generally seek to exempt themselves from it. But then they arouse justified suspicion against themselves and can make no claim to genuine respect, which reason allows only to what has been able to withstand her free and open examination."[1] Thus is reason made the ultimate arbiter, and Hegel, from the outset, was prepared to admit no other. The conflict which inevitably arose between its claim to supremacy and those of faith and revelation must naturally have exercised the mind of the student of theology sincerely seeking light and inner harmony.

Despite Kant's uncompromising pronouncement, his later dispensation was to deny knowledge to make room for faith, while still maintaining the claim of reason to legitimize this self-abnegation, first on the ground that its natural object, the unconditioned, and its ideal of absolute perfection lay beyond the limits of human experience, in an unchartered sea of obscurity on which the best efforts of reason achieved only shipwreck; and next

because practical reason was itself unshakably assured of its own freedom and the categorical imperative that it imposed, the unconditional obligation to obey which warranted confident postulation of a benevolent deity who could guarantee human immortality and the eventual attainment of happiness in proportion to desert. The soul, its immortality, and God were, for Kant, the objects of faith and his constraint upon knowledge served the twofold purpose of exempting these objects from attack by scientific argument, while still securing for faith a justifiable rational underpinning.

That the young Hegel was impressed by this way of resolving the problem is evident from his early papers on *The Life of Jesus* and *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*,[2] but further problems remained, his struggle with which drew him away from the position of Kant and revealed to him Kant's shortcomings.

The orthodoxies of religion impugned by the rationalism of the Enlightenment were found wanting not only for their disagreement with scientific discovery, but also because of their demand for submission to an authority external to one's own judgment and the imposition of rules of conduct and ritual observances irrespective of the observer's inner feelings or self-determined commitment. The practice and precept of the Churches, indeed, seemed to many (for instance, to Voltaire) to run counter to genuine and compassionate moral intuition. To Hegel, whose early classical education had fired him with an intense admiration for the beauty and harmony (as he saw it) of ancient Greek life, contemporary religion appeared, in contrast, as an alien imposition, revolt against which had begun with the Reformation, and had been reinforced by the Enlightenment. Thinkers like Rousseau had drawn attention to the tensions and anomalies of contemporary society, in league with organized religion, and their encroachments upon the free spirit of man; and Hegel, who from the first was a historical thinker, asked himself as Rousseau had done how this could have come about, and what in Western civilization had smothered the ingenuous freedom of Greek politics and religion, diverting the desirable course of historical development.

Further, Jacobi and others who were influenced by Kant acclaimed faith in religion and repudiated reason as incapable of grasping the content of dogma or comprehending the object of worship. What concerned Hegel was the nature and meaning of this content, for a faith without significant content was obviously worthless, and one the content of which was accepted on authority, without knowledge or understanding of its meaning by the believer, was no better. The claim of religion is to reveal the ultimate truth, but, as Hegel wrote in 1795, ". . . every church holds that nothing is so easy to find as truth: the only thing necessary is to memorize one of its catechisms."[3] To accept as truth, however, what is merely learned mechani-

cally by rote is of little value if the content of what is learnt is not understood, or if it has no intrinsic validity, even if it is accompanied by religious emotion. At a later date, in his introduction to H. Fr. W. Hinrich's *Die Religion im inneren Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft* (1822), Hegel wrote:

> Religion . . . becomes and should become a matter of feeling . . . only it is quite a different matter whether a content such as God, Truth, freedom, as simply felt, is supposed to have its warrant in feeling, or whether, on the contrary, such an objective content possesses its own inherent validity before it enters into one's heart and feeling. . . . (A. V. Miller's translation)[4]

The problems exercising the mind of the young Hegel, then, were: (i) What is the intrinsic content and meaning validating religious faith? (ii) What is the proper relation between that meaning and the conviction and feeling that it evokes? (iii) How and why have the feeling element and the content become divorced in contemporary life? The question by what criterion we judge the validity of the content he did not explicitly raise, because from the very outset he identified human religious propensities with rational capacity, as he wrote in *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*:

> But however much dominion is ascribed to sense, man still does not cease to be a rational being; or at any rate, his nature always necessarily has religious feeling as one of its *higher* needs.[5]

Religion for him in this paper, as well as in *The Life of Jesus*, is identified with rational morality of the Kantian type. The one and only admissible authority is reason, for what is imposed from without can have no genuine moral or religious validity for the subject on whom it is so imposed. To whatever motive such external authority appeals would be (could only be), in Kantian terms, heteronomous, and accordingly at best amoral. Hegel lays persistent stress upon the necessity for a wholeness of life, the principle of which he soon took to be love, implying and requiring a unity of subject and object, which later came to be identified as the Idea, the Truth which is one with God.

In his early thinking, therefore, we find Hegel struggling to clarify to himself the conception of deity, and the relation between faith and knowledge. He is deeply disturbed by the contrast and contradiction between Jesus' religion of love and the externality and positivity (as he calls it) of organized Christianity, which, he feels, alienates man from God. So he comes to wrestle with the questions of the relation between finite and infinite and of that between the individual and the universal, both in life and in morality on the one hand, and in knowledge and logic, on the other. The solution finally reached lay in the conception of the whole (*das Ganze*) the seed of which, implanted by Kant, is already beginning to germinate in these early writings.

THE UNDERSTANDING

The central intrinsic content of religion is belief in and worship of God. But how is God to be conceived and what is the true nature of deity? The Judaic conception, Hegel recounts, was of a heavenly king, the Lord, who had made a covenant with his people, their part of which was to observe his law as he had dictated it to his prophet Moses. This law specified every detail of practical and political life, and the lawgiver was an external power to be obeyed through fear of penalty or expectation of reward rather than from devotion and love. The covenant was conceived on the pattern of a civil contract which adjusts the conflicting rights and claims of self-seeking parties, and there is little or no suggestion of inner reverence, deriving from rational conviction, for a self-imposed moral law, or loving devotion to an ideal of goodness. This imposition of an external command by a dominating ruler is what Hegel called "positivity"; and the conception of God and of morality, taken over (he argues, for historical reasons which need not be detailed here) by Christianity from Judaism, he rejects as deadening to the human spirit, as the direct opposite of the willing dedication to a rationally accepted standard by citizens freely united in a self-determining community.

In the early manuscripts Hegel contrasts this positivity with Jesus' teaching of unforced love and communion, and he tries to explain how in the course of historical evolution it became distorted and "positive" by the demand of Christ's followers for submission to his commandment, because he was God's son, through whom the doctrine had been revealed, rather than from inner conviction and belief in its beauty and goodness for its own sake. In later years, Hegel correlates the conception of God as Lord with a dialectical phase in the development of the Concept, that of Essence. To identify God as (Supreme) Being (*Wesen*), considered simply as essence (the inner dynamic or vitality of things) is, he says, to consider God as irresistible power, as the almighty Lord.[6] The defect of such a conception, he continues, is that it does not give finite spirit its due, but holds it fast in finitude, and this is precisely the effect of "positivity," to which objection is so strenuously made in the early manuscripts.

The objection is, in effect, to the separation in such positivity of the objective element in religion—God, the object of worship, and the law as an external injunction—from the subjective aspect—the feeling and will of the worshiper and rational acceptance of the moral requirement.

At first Hegel adopted Kant's view of religion centered upon morality and founded essentially on the moral law as the necessary expression of human reason.[7] Because the spontaneous self-determination of reason required recognition of the categorical imperative, the precept of morality and the subjective determination of reason seemed to be fused. The conception

of God, as the supreme and omnipotent being, then became a legitimate postulate to make obedience to the moral requirement feasible and to ensure just reward for compliance. But Hegel soon came to see even this as inadequate, and as incompatible with Jesus' exhortation to love your neighbor, to self-identification with others, the loving concern for all persons which makes law irrelevant and duty otiose. This is the true union of subject and object in feeling and action, in which no distinction is made between one's own rights and interests and those of one's fellows.

As an unconscious, natural expression of the human spirit, this unity of self with other and of personal with socio-political life was realized, Hegel felt, in the Greek city-state; but it was utterly absent from the Hebrew theocracy, and it was lost to Christianity through the amalgamation of the Roman Empire and the Christian Church.

In civil society, Hegel tells us, duties arise out of rights, and if no moral obligation to respect them is acknowledged by the subject, they have to be enforced.[8] The conception of rights here is that current throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, according to which they are regarded as naturally inherent in individual persons as such, antecedently to any civil order. Only Spinoza and Rousseau provided any exception to the prevalence of this conception during that period. The young Hegel inclined towards Rousseau and found the individualism of the Natural Rights theory uncongenial, being at odds with the classical ideal he so admired. But at this stage he sees it as typical of the secular order; and the identification of church and state, consequent upon the adoption by Constantine of Christianity as the official religion of Rome, reconverted religious and moral precepts into legal impositions. But every person has an inalienable right to his (or her) own convictions and to the recognition and self-imposition of moral duties, which, as such, can never be enforced by the state, whose external power can appeal only to secular and unworthy motives.

Moreover, civil rights arise from the state's function of ensuring the security of the property and persons of its citizens; and property by its very name implies individualism and claims against others. Respect for the rights of others in this regard is contractual from motives of reciprocity and not from those of love or a sense of community.

Thus devotion to an ideal of moral perfection cannot be the aim (still less the effect) of civil legislation.[9] It may be realized in small religious communities, but as soon as they expand to include large numbers of adherents, who cannot in the nature of the case be personally intimate, the imposition of rules assumes a legal character and ceases *pro tanto* to be genuinely moral. So both Catholic and Protestant Churches have reverted to the statehood which was formerly typical of the Judaic theocracy, and positivity has replaced the simple faith and the unforced love of the true religion taught by Jesus.

Hegel was not, however, content to investigate only the historical causes of the diremption between subject and object. Although he habitually thought *sub specie historiae*, his fundamental approach was always philosophical, and he sought a logical and phenomenological explanation of the separation of subject and object at the same time. This he found in the nature of reflective thinking, which, in the human mind, supervenes upon naive experience and distinguishes humankind from the beasts. However, it operates in political and moral thinking as much as it does in speculation and theory, to divide and dissever, with drastic effects on social attitudes as well as on religious imagery.

In the manuscripts of 1795 and 1799 the account given of reflective thinking is not systematic, but the idea is used, the character and effects of such thinking are taken for granted, possibly revealing the influence of Jacobi, because here Hegel makes no distinction between understanding and reason, speaking of the Concept as if it were merely abstract and not, as he later came to present it, the concrete universal. At this stage the place of the concrete universal is taken by life, as the dynamic whole which differentiates itself without sacrificing its coherent unity. For instance, in *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*, he writes:

> Understanding and reason may claim to sit in judgement on everything; they really pretend that everything should be intellectual and rational. . . . Intellectualistic people believe that their words are true when they address feeling, imagination and religious needs in intellectualistic terms; they cannot conceive why their truth is resisted, why they preach to deaf ears.[10]

Two pages further on he speaks of the inadequacy of the "method of using general concepts" and of raising "questions about the truth of religion in *abstraction* from the manners and characteristics of the nations and epochs [which believe it]." No distinction is made among intellectualism, understanding, and reason, the method of using general concepts, all of which are examples of abstract thinking that separates the elements fused in feeling, imagination, and religion.

In *The Spirit of Christianity*, when he criticizes the morality of external rules and restrictions, Hegel speaks of the alleged universal principle as a concept, the unity of which is "only apparent" and quite different from "a living bond," or "living unity." The latter, he says, "never has the force of a universal opposed to a particular."[11] Reflective thinking, we are told, partitions life and distinguishes within it finite from infinite.[12] The apprehension of Jesus' relation to God "as a piece of knowledge" is contrasted with its apprehension by faith (once again recalling Jacobi). Knowledge, Hegel writes, posits two natures of different kinds, and "those who

posit this absolute difference and yet still require us to think of these absolutes as one in their inmost relationship do not dismiss the intellect on the ground that they are asserting a truth outside its scope." Those who deny the unity are said to "save the intellect" and to "elevate the intellect, absolute division, destruction of life, to the pinnacle of spirit."[13]

From these passages it is clear that reflective thinking, intellect, understanding, by whatever name you prefer to call it, is the faculty of abstraction, which distinguishes, partitions, and separates, holding the distincta apart. Its principle is the abstract universal opposed to the particular. Such thinking holds asunder subject and predicate and is opposed to faith and life in which they are fused into one.

This critique of the understanding is developed further in the Jena writings of 1801–1803, and appears as the source of the distinction between faith and reason itself. In the *Differenzschrift* Hegel expounds at length the nature and operation of the intellect, in contrast to speculative reason, and the effects of its reflective activity. It is, he says, the faculty of setting limits, that is, of delimiting, distinguishing, and defining concepts and entities, making one the negative of another and holding them in fixed opposition. The resulting dichotomies are the occasion for philosophy, which strives to relate and to reconcile the opposites, its nisus being towards a comprehensive wholeness. The intellect attempts to achieve this, in imitation of reason, by accumulating finites ad nauseam, but the aggregation never produces anything beyond the finite, only an endless succession of finitudes. Here we see emerging the contrast between the false and the true infinites, which later comes to play so prominent and significant a part in the Logic.

Meanwhile, in the course of intellectual history, the effect of finite thinking characteristic of the understanding, is the interminable antitheses which arise between matter and spirit, body and soul, intellect and faith, necessity and freedom; between sense and thought, nature and intelligence, absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity. These opposites are held in rigid and fixed contraposition by the intellect, but they originate in the unity of the Absolute, in life and reason, which seeks to resolve the contradictions, cancel the fixedness of the opposition, and embrace both moments in a single unity.

This attempt to nullify the dichotomy, however, shocks the intellect, which holds fast to its fixed separations, but it assumes the role of reason and in the guise of reflection becomes philosophical. It retains the ideal of reason, but projects it beyond the scope of intelligence and knowledge, to set up a fresh dichotomy between finite and infinite. But this opposition destroys both of the antithetical moments, the finite because the positing of the infinite in principle cancels it out, the infinite because, as opposed to the

finite, it is limited and becomes merely another finite entity. So the course of the history of philosophy is marked out in Empiricism and the Critical Philosophy of Kant, in which (as also in the work of Reinhold) the principle of thinking is taken to be identity, but not concrete "absolute" identity, only abstract identity exclusive of difference. So thought becomes opposed to its object (or "application") which figures as a sheer manifold, or matter, existing externally and independently, a material (thing-in-itself) which no thought can ever penetrate.

Although Hegel does not say so here, it is clear that he is tilting against the Kantian philosophy in which sensuous intuition is opposed to conceptual thinking, the thing-in-itself to the phenomenon. The former is then regarded as a product of pure thinking and the thing-in-itself becomes a noumenon, something thought by reason but beyond the bounds of knowledge (for to think, according to Kant, is not to know). As the unconditioned it is the goal of reason, but it is beyond finite experience, and as the object of religion it is consigned to faith.

At the same time, Hegel points out, common sense (*der gesunder Menschenverstand*) is a less sophisticated form of understanding, which seizes on isolated "truths" that seem certain to it only because it dimly senses their connection with the ultimate whole; yet it keeps them isolated and elevates each of them into an indefeasible certainty, because so far as it is mere understanding it fails to grasp their essential interdependence and ultimate unity. These "truths" are adequate for the practical purposes of daily life, but fade into insignificance when seen by speculative reason as what they really are, mere facets, or moments, of a more fundamental and comprehensive whole. Common sense cannot understand this, confusing the contingent with the essential; so it disapproves of reason and tends to pillory and persecute it. Yet behind this distaste for reason is the dimly felt presentiment of the Absolute inspiring and legitimating the truths of common sense. This feeling, Hegel says, is faith, which is opposed by reflection to knowledge. It is reputed to be the highest form of consciousness, but it is not recognized as reason, which it essentially is.

Faith and knowledge thus come into opposition and the synthesis which speculation makes is rejected by the understanding as a desecration of the divine, because speculation makes the synthesis in the name of reason, which the intellect arrogates to itself, and which the devotees of faith disparage as the faculty restricted to knowledge of the finite. Moreover, identifying faith (which is held sacred) with rationality is regarded as assimilating it to the profane.

Glauben und Wissen more directly sets out Hegel's criticism of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi as expressions of this dichotomy, which (as he puts it) "because the antithesis is absolute, the sphere of the eternal is

the incalculable, the inconceivable, the empty—an incognizable God beyond the boundary stakes of reason."[14] For reason is restricted to the realm of the finite which remains absolutely opposed to the infinite. For this kind of philosophy, Hegel avers, "the Absolute [is] an emptiness of reason, a fixed realm of the incomprehensible, of a faith which is in itself non-rational, but which is called rational because the reason that is restricted to its absolute opposite recognizes something higher above itself from which it is self-excluded."[15] This, he says, is "the culture of reflection raised to a system." But this philosophy is the culmination of culture (*Bildung*) as such, in which consciousness has stressed first objectivity in the dogmatisms of pre-Kantian thought and then subjectivity in the critical revolution of the Kantians. We have, however, already found that opposition of finite to infinite destroys both, canceling and nullifying the opposition in consequence, and plunges the spirit into "the pure night of infinity," representing the "Good Friday of speculation," from the infinite grief of which the positive truth of the absolute Idea is born. So the end of *Glauben und Wissen* prefigures that of the *Phenomenology*.

The opposition of faith to reason is thus the work of the understanding, and the conflict stimulates a demand for speculative philosophy to find a way to their reconciliation. For one cannot live with the dichotomy. A finite understanding in the place of reason posits oppositions in every walk of life, in politics between the rights of individuals as well as between government and the governed, in morality between duty and inclination, in knowledge between sense and intellect, in art between feeling and form, and in religion between reason and revelation. It is the last of these with which we have been concerned, and the human mind cannot rest in a faith that violates its intellectual demand for truth and rationality nor acquiesce in a belief the object of which is utterly incomprehensible. In the words of a contemporary writer, "To ask men to live in two such irreconcilable worlds is to imperil the possibility of the wholeness of life which is our need."[16]

The Concrete Universal

In his youth Hegel felt this need most acutely. Its fulfillment, he thought, had been attained in the civilization of Greece and was to be found in the religion preached by Jesus of Nazareth. But he believed that the first could not endure because the unity of life among the Greeks was merely unconscious and naive, and reason could not achieve its aim until the constituent moments of the whole had been distinguished and set in fullest contrast. In his own words: ". . . totality at the highest pitch of living energy (*in der höchsten Lebendigkeit*) is only possible through its own reestablishment out of the deepest fission."[17] The second was misunderstood and frustrated by the

outlook of Judaism and the positivity of later Christianity, due in part to historical circumstances and in part to the attitude of the finite intellect.

At first Hegel sought the reconciliation in the notions of life and love. In love all severances are annulled; there is no discrimination between persons or conflict of interests; self is identified with other and all welfare is communal. Hence there is no tension between law and desire, or between duty and inclination. In love all virtues are but modifications of one living spirit.[18] Subject and object are at one. Love is the single expression of the divine energy that is life, and life is the undivided whole of dynamic power, which, though it dissipates itself into a myriad channels, is a whole in each and every one of them and claims them all as its own self—as the branches of a tree all belong to the single organism. "Living things . . . are essences, even if they are separate, and their unity is still a unity of essence. What is a contradiction in the realm of the dead is not one in the realm of life."[19] And the two ideas merge:

> Since love is a unification of life, it presupposes division, a development of life, a developed many-sidedness of life. The more variegated the manifold in which life is alive, the more the places in which it can be reunified; the more places in which it can sense itself, the deeper does love become. The more extended the multiplicity of the relations and feelings of the lovers and the more deeply love is concentrated, the more exclusive it is and the more indifferent to the [separate] life of other persons. Its joy communes with every other life and recognizes it. . . .[20]

Hegel continued to reflect upon and to develop the implications of the idea of life in the fragment of 1800 (called by its editor "Fragment of a System"). Here he notes the essential character in life of organization, a totality differentiated into a multiplicity of parts (each of which is itself an organized multiplicity), which nevertheless have their being solely in union, yet also as mutually distinct. The multiplicity and the unity are opposite aspects yet are mutually inseparable and interdependent. Life itself is one whole of this nature and all its parts are such wholes. Hegel then says, "We may call infinite life a spirit in contrast with the abstract multiplicity, for spirit is the living unity of the manifold if it is contrasted with the manifold as spirit's configuration (*Gestalt*—embodiment) and not as mere dead multiplicity separated from life."[21]

Here we see the generation in Hegel's thought of the Idea or concrete universal, implicit in organic system. This Idea, embodied and become aware of itself as the universal immanent in all nature and life, is absolute Spirit.

The notions of life and love as first envisaged, however, proved insufficient. Love devoid of intelligence easily runs astray and degenerates into mere sentimentality,[22] and life without self-consciousness is no better than

blind instinct. Some twenty-two years later Hegel expressed more overtly his realization of these inadequacies:

> That the natural feeling . . . is a feeling of the divine, even this is not implied in the feeling as natural; the divine is only in and for the spirit and . . . the life of the spirit is not from Nature, but is twice born. When feeling is said to constitute the fundamental character of man's nature, then he is put on the same level as the animal. . . .[23]

Further, love and happiness only reach their true fruition when united with and in the highest knowledge. Hegel's criticism of Eudaemonism, in the introduction to *Glauben und Wissen* culminates with the statement:

> It does not matter whether we wish to apprehend the highest being from the side of its ideality or from the side of its reality; if the highest bliss is the highest idea, then rational action and highest enjoyment, ideality and reality, are equally contained in it and are identical. Every philosophy sets forth nothing else but the construction of highest bliss as Idea.[24]

This is the ultimate source and locus of the reconciliation between faith and reason. The understanding separates them and holds them in mutual conflict because it sees reason as the cognition and classification of finite particulars which are separated from and only contingently subsumed under abstract universals. So the ultimate infinity which it seeks, the absolute and infinite universal, is set beyond the reach of this understanding reason and is left to a transcendent faith in a transcendent divinity. But the concrete whole which is self-aware and self-specifying has its particulars in itself (as Hegel later came to assert, and even in these early writings has already anticipated)[25] and is the absolute which unifies and reconciles the opposites. Faith must have a content, and one that is valid in its own right. What is believed must be believed as the truth, and must be truth. That, indeed, Augustine had identified with God centuries before, and Hegel, writing in his foreword to Hinrich says, "Faith is the consciousness and the absolute conviction of the truth of Reason presented in the form of picture-thinking. . . ."

Reason and faith finally prove to be the same. Their content is identical. The difference between religion and philosophy (as we discover at the end of the *Phenomenology*) is one of form only, they have the same content—namely, Truth. And the truth is the whole, which expresses itself adequately only as system,[26] in which all oppositions (including that between faith and reason) are eventually reconciled.

In Hegel's mature philosophy, the conception of wholeness is fundamental and is the key to all problems. The synthesis of opposites, of which commentators make so much, is only secondary, and the triadic structure of the dialectic is quite incidental. As Hegel himself says in the

Preface to the *Phenomenology* and at the end of the Greater Logic, the triadic form can be reduced to a mere formalism which loses the essential character of dialectical movement. That movement is the self-generation of the whole immanent in its own partial and inadequate moments, by which what is lacking (but always implicit) in the part is called up and set over against the complement that had excluded it, in order to combine with it in a more concrete unity. This continuous and reiterated synthesis of antithetical moments is the dialectical process through which the whole produces itself, and in its final phases it becomes self-conscious as Ego (identified as Concept), and conscious of itself as no other than the self-generation of this self-awareness, which has been immanent throughout the process.

The absolute self-awareness, or *noēsis noēseōs*, is, as for Aristotle, both truth and God. But religious faith and worship envisages this truth only in symbolic form and in the medium of *Vorstellung*, or imagery. To become fully itself it must be made explicit by reason, not simply through the analytic understanding, to whose "rationalism" it seems incredible, or at best incomprehensible, but by the intellectual intuition which can grasp, in one single apprehension, the whole articulated system built up through the dialectical series of its phases and moments. This intellectual intuition is the absolute Idea, which is the content of the Absolute's self-awareness.

Such intuition is the true form and supplies the real self-validating content of faith, and it is as much mysticism as knowledge, but a mysticism in which the mystery has been solved. This doctrine, inchoate in the early writings, is stated explicitly in the Logic:

> . . . there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding, simply because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding, whereas the mystical (as synonymous with the speculative) is the concrete unity of those determinations which for the understanding only rank as true in their separation and opposition. . . . However, as we have seen, abstract intellectual thinking is so far from being either ultimate or stable that it persistently evinces a tendency to dissolve itself and revert into its opposite. The truly reasonable, on the other hand, consists precisely in embracing the opposites within itself as ideal moments. All reason is thus at the same time to be regarded as mystical, which is only so much as to say that it goes beyond the understanding and by no means that it cannot be grasped by thought or is incomprehensible.[27]

GERMINATING CONCEPTS

What in the mature system emerge as the contrast between understanding and speculative reason, the false as opposed to the true infinite, the reconciliation of opposites in a self-differentiating system for which internal difference is as essential as unity, and the concrete universal as a systematic

whole, are concepts here seen germinating in the early theological writings and the Jena papers.

Reason is not at first distinguished from understanding and reflection, and all three, as if they were the same, are castigated as abstract thinking. But Hegel soon enough realizes that what at first he simply eulogizes as love and life (for the most part regarded as inseparable) is reason implicitly (as he later contends) at work in sentiment and feeling. His consideration of the organic character of life leads him to the idea of a differentiated and self-differentiating organized whole, which becomes for him the paradigm of system. This idea is inherited from Kant, who adumbrates it in his third Critique, and from Schelling, who draws attention to it in the introduction of *Ideen zu eine Philosophie der Natur*. In such a system, Hegel comes to see, each finite element is defined by what it excludes, by its other, and for that very reason must combine with what negates it in order to constitute a more adequate whole. The finite, constantly demanding supplementation by what limits and defines it, he then realizes, will perpetually go over into its other, posit another finite, and then another, generating the false infinite, which Hegel has already discerned as the work of the understanding. The true infinite is later to be recognized as identical with the whole, which is the truth. So the dialectical movement begins to take shape and its goal is seen to be the concrete universal holding its particulars within itself—the absolute Idea.

Notes

1. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Axi n: "*Unser Zeitalter ist das eigentliche Zeitalter der Kritik, der sich alles unterwerfen muß. Religion, durch ihre Heiligkeit, und Gesetzgebung, durch ihre Majestät, wollen sich gemeinlich derselben entziehen. Aber alsdann erregen sie gerechten Verdacht wider sich and können auf unverstellte Achtung nicht Anspruch machen, die die Vernunft nur demjenigen bewilligt, was ihre freie und öffentliche Prüfung hat aushalten können.*"
2. See H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907), trans. by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner as *Hegel's Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
3. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, p. 204; trans. Knox, p. 134.
4. F. Weiss, *Beyond Epistemology*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), Appendix, p. 240.
5. Knox, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 144.
6. *Enzyklopädie*, 112 *Zusatz*: "*Betrachten wir Gott nur als das Wesen schlechthin und bleiben wir dabei stehen, so wissen wir ihn nur erst als die allgemeine, widerstandslose Macht oder, anders ausgedruckt, als den Herrn.*"
7. Cf. *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*, Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 153: ". . . the aim and essence of all true religion, our religion included is human morality . . ." (Knox, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 68).
8. Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 173; Knox, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 95.

9. Cf. Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 178.
10. Op. cit., Nohl, p. 142.
11. Op. cit., Nohl, pp. 294–95.
12. Op. cit., Nohl, p. 310.
13. Ibid., p. 311.
14. *Gesammelte Werke, Band* 4 (Hamburg: Buchner und Pöggler, 1968), p. 319.
15. Ibid., p. 320.
16. C. E. Raven, *Science, Religion and the Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 19.
17. *Differenzschrift*, in *Gesammelte Werke, Band* 4, p. 13f.
18. Cf. *The Spirit of Christianity*, Nohl, p. 293.
19. Ibid., pp. 308–9.
20. Ibid., p. 322.
21. Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 347.
22. Cf. *Phenomenology*, Preface, trans. Sir James Baillie, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1910–1966) p. 81; trans. A. V. Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 10.
23. Foreword to Hinrich, 1822; Weiss, *Beyond Epistemology*, p. 238.
24. *Gesammelte Werke, Band* 4, p. 318.
25. Cf. *The Spirit of Christianity*, pp. 306, 308–9, cited above.
26. *Phenomenology*, Preface, trans. Baillie, p. 81; trans. Miller, p. 11.
27. *Enzyklopädie*, 82 *Zusatz*.

3
Hegel's Voyage of Discovery

THE *PHENOMENOLOGY*

After he had moved to Jena in 1801, Hegel contributed several important articles to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, which he coedited with Schelling, some of them almost of book length. Among these the best known are "The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System" (the *Differenzschrift*), "Faith and Knowledge or the Philosophy of Reflection" (*Glauben und Wissen*), and "On Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law." In the course of lecturing he sketched out what later developed into the major parts of his mature philosophical system, the Jena system of Logic and Metaphysics and the *Realphilosophie* (1804–1805). But his most momentous work, the *Phenomenology*, virtually completed in the following year on the night before Napoleon's victory in the Battle of Jena, was published in 1807.

DISPUTED QUESTIONS

There has been much discussion about Hegel's intention in writing the *Phenomenology*. Is it a philosophy of history? Is it an account of the development of the individual mind (possibly autobiographical)? Is it the introduction to the system of philosophy Hegel planned to elaborate? Or is it that system itself in its complete range? There are good and clear reasons why each of these questions must be answered in the negative, albeit with qualifications.

The opening sections of the work make it obvious that Hegel is not philosophizing about history, but is examining the primary phases of the development of consciousness—or rather, allowing them to examine themselves. On the other hand, the sections which follow, those numbered B IV and succeeding, suggest much more strongly that Hegel has in mind periods and intellectual movements in the history of thought. The later sections, under the heading of Spirit, while still appearing to be philosophical reflections upon historical phenomena, take us into ethics as much as into social and political theory; and the final sections on Religion and Absolute Knowledge give the impression that a complete philosophical treatment of experience has been given and that the total system is being

rounded off. Yet this can hardly be correct, for absolute knowing is presented as what is still to come, as something that has to be expounded further, in the form of *Wissenschaft*. That conclusion is reinforced in the Preface, which was written after the main work had been completed. How, then, is the *Phenomenology* as a whole to be regarded?

A further question arises whether the method of exposition in the *Phenomenology* is dialectical, in the same way as the later presentation of the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, which is explicitly declared to be dialectical. Several commentators have decided that it is not. In that case, how does the earlier work relate to the later? On all these matters perhaps the soundest and most instructive commentator is Jean Hyppolite,[1] but I shall not recount his views, which the reader can consult independently; I shall simply state my own judgments and the reasons that have induced me to form them.

THE STARTING POINT

The primary question that Hegel faced was: How, and with what should Philosophy begin? It was a question he stated explicitly only at a later stage, at the beginning of the Greater Logic, but clearly at the time when he was contemplating setting out a complete system (as the earlier fragments of 1796–97 and 1800 bear witness) this question must have been exercising his mind. To begin with any principle or concept itself unexamined, something simply taken for granted, or, as he himself expressed it, as if shot out of a pistol, he immediately saw to be impermissible, and in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* he firmly states that this cannot be done, ". . . a so-called basic proposition or principle of philosophy, if true, is also false, just because it is *only* a principle. It is therefore easy to refute it" (Miller's translation).

If, then, one may not begin simply by accepting a principle, or by assuming some truth taken to be basic, whatever beginning we adopt must make no presuppositions whatever. Is this possible? Hegel was not the first, nor was he the last, philosopher to face up to this demand. Descartes had sought to meet it by rejecting every opinion in any way susceptible of doubt (i.e., in effect, making presuppositions that could be questioned); and the conclusion to which he came, that the one indubitable proposition was *cogito, ergo sum*, became the implicit starting point of philosophy for all his successors. Spinoza, perhaps influenced by Descartes's own argument in the third Meditation, saw at once that this self-certainty was inseparable from the Ontological Argument, and that the indubitable proposition was the assertion of the existence of God, as the all-inclusive, absolutely infinite Substance. Leibniz developed both these positions, seeing the indubitable Ego as a monad reflecting in its own perceptions (more or less distinctly) the

entire universe of monads (i.e., what Spinoza had identified as God-or-Substance), of which the clear and distinct perception was attained only in the Monad of monads, God himself. For Kant, the center and source of all a priori knowledge, and the origin of the possibility of any object of experience whatever, was the original transcendental unity of apperception lodged in the "I think," the *cogito* disclosed by Descartes.

Pursuing Kant's critical method and seeking to make his transcendental Idealism self-consistent, Fichte derived all knowledge and all reality from the self-conscious unity of the Ego,

$$I = I.$$

But Schelling perceived that this derivation, while it might serve for the knowledge of physical things, as objects brought under the categories of the Understanding, could not do justice to organic nature, which as even Kant had admitted, in the Critique of Teleological Judgement, required the application of an idea of reason (although he regarded its function only as regulative). For Schelling organization required an organizing principle, or Concept, on which its existence, not simply our representation of it, depended. So he concluded that from this Concept the reality of nature, as an organic being, followed, just as necessarily as knowledge and the faculties of the mind followed from the spontaneous self-objectification of the Ego. He proceeded to unite subject and object in one Absolute that was itself indifferently both—an Absolute which differentiated itself spontaneously into the forms of nature as well as of mind.

Hegel at first welcomed this escape from the confines of subjective idealism; but, as the course of British Empiricism from Locke to Hume had taught him (as it had taught Kant), one could not begin from objective nature without making unwarranted and unsustainable presuppositions about the nature and veridicality of our experience. Nor could one legitimately derive the manifold objects of experience from an analytical identity, I = I. To absorb the whole of experience and nature into an identity establishing an "indifference point" (as Schelling proposed) was equally unacceptable to Hegel, as postulating a "night in which all cows are black." So how should he proceed?

THE BACCHANALIAN REVEL

He early realized that Kant's presumption to criticize reason was to elevate the prisoner in the dock on to the judge's bench, for by what criterion could reason be criticized other than its own? Possibly this realization gave Hegel the idea that as consciousness is always self-transcendent and self-reflective, the only legitimate method was, so to speak, to give consciousness its head, to observe the form (*Gestaltung*) in which it appears[2]

and the criterion of its own claim to truth which, as it were, it instinctively adopts, allowing it to criticize itself by discovering whether that criterion is adequate to its own claims. So he begins with the bland presumption of certainty commonly made by sense, permitting its own implications to lead it into self-contradiction and thence to self-correction in perception and understanding. From there on the dialectic takes its own self-dictating course, each form, as it proves insufficient and fails to fulfill its own pretensions, evokes and turns into its opposite, and then unites with it to actualize a new and more promising configuration. Hegel represents the process in the image of "the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose."

This, after all, has been the characteristic method of philosophy since Socrates, who is depicted by Plato not as contradicting his interlocutors but as eliciting from them, by continued questioning, the implications of their answers until they contradict themselves and the definitions proffered demand modification. So too, the recognized way to examine a philosophical theory is to lay bare the consequences to which it leads on its own assumptions in order to discover whether they are self-consistent. As each is found wanting, it drops out, like the Bacchanalian reveler, and another is set up in its place which can reconcile the conflicting elements and remove the contradictions.

What is it that drives and motivates the Bacchanalian revel, how and why does it occur? Hegel gives the answer in the next paragraph: ". . . the method is nothing other than the structure of the whole set out in its pure essentiality" (Miller, unfortunately, unlike Baillie, omits the words "of the whole" in his translation). The exposition of the structure in its pure essentiality, Hegel says, is the task of Logic. But the important point to notice is that the structure of the whole is system, and system involves a principle of organization that determines the nature and the relations of the parts, so that any one, taken in isolation, both owes its intrinsic character to its place in the whole and contradicts it by assuming self-sufficiency. That is why it evokes and turns into its own opposite, and that is why it must unite with its other to advance in approximation to its truth, or concept. The drive is the immanence of the whole in every part, condemning it to insufficiency by its own standard if it pretends to independence, demanding its complementation by what it seeks to exclude (yet what defines and determines its intrinsic being), and superseding it by a more complete and comprehensive structure.

Accordingly, each form of consciousness as it appears proves to be unstable. It is drunken, like the Bacchanalian reveler, so it falls to the ground (a phrase on which Hegel later plays with profound effect in the

Logic[3]). It is replaced by another configuration, in fact, by its opposite, which fares no better, until both are united in a more harmonious whole. Here their opposition is overcome, they are reconciled and the conflict is annulled. So Hegel can say that the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose.

Answers to Disputed Questions

The exposition of the structure in its pure essentiality is Logic; but logic is *Wissenschaft*, and that is reached only at the end of the *Phenomenology*. *Wissenschaft* is aware of itself (*für sich*); but at the beginning of the *Phenomenology* the structure of the whole is only implicit (*an sich*), and makes itself felt only through the self-contradiction of the inadequate form of consciousness that appears, through its reversion into its opposite, and its supersession. Consciousness, prescribing its own criterion, conducts its own criticism, in the course of which it traces out its own development. This occurs at once in the individual mind (and thus is both autobiographical and general) and in the social context, without which there is no individual mind. For, as consciousness itself reveals, in its transition to self-consciousness, every self (or ego) requires opposition to and eventual recognition of an other. Consequently, while it is essentially the unfolding of the structure of the whole, phenomenology has an inevitable temporal parameter and is at once systematic and historical. As Hegel puts it in the final chapter:

> Time is the Concept which is actual, and presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just as long it does not grasp its pure concept, that is, extinguish time.

Only at the end of the *Phenomenology* does spirit grasp its pure concept, prior to that it is simply presented to consciousness in the form of intuition (or perceptual imagery), hence it is temporal and historical; but as soon as it grasps its own concept it extinguishes time and can proceed in speculative philosophy, as logic, to set out the structure of the whole (or the truth) as *Wissenschaft*.

The succession of appearances in consciousness, moreover, the succession of forms, or configurations assumed by consciousness, the entire content of the *Phenomenology*, is thus seen to be the propaedeutic of absolute knowing, in which the whole will be set out in its pure essentiality. Hence it is the introduction to the philosophical system.

The Concept which exists in actuality (*Dasein*), however, is not only consciousness in the form of intuition, but concurrently it is what has felicitously been called "the external world," which, as Hegel tells us in the *Encyclopaedia*,[4] is not only external to the mind but also to itself—it is

spatio-temporally extended. And when consciousness comprehends its own concept and realizes that it is the whole become aware of itself, it recognizes this objective world, its other, as identical with itself. It is what has brought itself to consciousness in and as the Ego. To sense-perception and to the understanding the objective world appears alien and external, but speculative reason discovers it to be its own self-manifestation brought to consciousness of itself through its own spontaneous activity.

It has already in part transpired, and will later become more explicit, that the externality of the spatio-temporal world is itself spurious and self-contradictory. Extensionality proves to be only a partial appearance, adumbrating, yet contradicting wholeness. Hence the whole, immanent in the external actuality, negates it and asserts itself, first in chemical affinity and then in organismic unity, while organism in its turn is sublated in sentience and becomes conscious of its surround and of itself. The living body is apprehended by the mind as the seat and locus of its subjectivity, and the center of its sentience. It thus becomes the epitome of the whole of Nature, which it brings to consciousness and comprehends in an all-embracing experience.

The whole of Nature, embodying its own dialectic of development, is consequently revealed as the Idea (the whole, which is the Truth) in "other-being," and, as Nature, it becomes the object of knowledge, the subject of which is spirit, into which Nature has flowered through its own dialectic, organism issuing in sentience (or soul).[5] Subject and object are, therefore, identical, the former being what the latter has become through the dialectical process in which they are successive moments. Both are the whole at different levels of the scale in which that whole differentiates itself and through which it brings itself to consciousness of itself.

The forms of consciousness which represent the structure of the whole are thus preceded by natural forms, no less dialectically related. But none of this is realized until it is raised to the level of absolute knowing, and it cannot elevate itself to that level except through the forms of consciousness which begin with sense and perceptual cognition. Even so, it is only at the stage of reason that reflection upon perceptual experience gives rise to empirical science offering the first systematic conception of the world. Reflection then goes beyond the observation of nature, to include social custom, to give rise to morality, to contemplate the relation between man and Nature, the place of humanity in the universe at large, generating art and religion.

Philosophy is the further reflection upon all this, upon common experience, empirical science, art, morality, and religion, and, for Hegel, its first phase is Phenomenology. That, in consequence, proves to be at once the introduction to the system as *Wissenschaft* and itself (inasmuch as it brings

the whole to consciousness of itself) the presentation of that whole in its dialectical expansion. There is thus a sense in which the *Phenomenology* does cover the entire field of philosophy, but only in a preliminary phase, and also a sense in which it is, although it is not only, the first part of the system.

Philosophy cannot begin as *Wissenschaft*, because consciousness first has to develop until it has reached the level of absolute knowing, but in the course of that development, so far as the forms of experience are simply those in which it appears, they are what they are only for us, not for themselves. And they are not even for us, until we reflect upon them. When we do, consciousness is reflecting upon itself and criticizes itself, or rather recognizes and acknowledges the implicit criticism that its dialectical evolution involves. Consequently, Philosophy begins in the guise of phenomenology plotting the course of development up to absolute knowing. Once that has been reached and is the current configuration in which consciousness appears, philosophizing can proceed to Logic and what follows in the *Encyclopaedia* as *Wissenschaft*.

To reach this point Hegel must himself have explored the various levels of conscious understanding and reflection, detecting them in the periods of history and in the systems of philosophy by which the historical epochs were characterized. Upon the account that he gives of them he brings to bear the whole of his copious cultural background. He explores the relations that they bear one to another and discerns the dialectic linking them in succession. The result is the *Phenomenology*, which he might well describe as his voyage of discovery, the bourn of which is the philosophical system he forthwith proceeded to elaborate—the system which he declares to be the truth in its proper form:

> The true shape in which the truth exists can only be the scientific system thereof . . .
> The truth is the whole. But the whole is only its essence fulfilled through its development. It has to be said of the Absolute that it is essentially result, that only at the end is it what it is in truth . . .
> Among the many consequences that flow from what has been said, this can be emphasized, that knowledge is actual and can be expounded only as science, or as system. . . .

Although this is written in the Preface, it is the conclusion to which we are brought at the end of the *Phenomenology*. Yet the whole work is itself the exposition of a dialectical system. The dialectic, while acknowledged throughout, is not formally stated nor is it explicitly or conceptually expounded. That is still to come in the Logic. In the *Phenomenology* the dialectic is as yet only implicit. As Hegel explains later, in the Preface to the *Science of Logic*, in life the categories have already been put to use; and in the Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia*, he writes that "thinking in the guise

of feeling, faith or generalized image (*Vorstellung*), has not been inactive" (Wallace's translation). The successive forms of consciousness embody these varieties; they are examples of what Schelling had declared to be forms of the embodiment of the infinite in the finite.

Those who say, therefore, that the dialectic, as it appears in the Logic, is not operative in the *Phenomenology* are mistaken, and they seem to have overlooked what Hegel has written, both in the Preface to that work and at the conclusion of the Greater Logic about the triadic structure of the dialectic: that it is inessential, and should not be overemphasized at the expense of the function of the negative, to which it is incidental. The phenomenological forms are not always arranged in tight triads, but that does not exempt them from the dialectic which reveals the inadequacy of each in turn to its own nature and its failure to fulfill its own claims, as well as to the demands of the whole in short, its failure to correspond to its concept. The movement throughout is dialectical, but the formal exposition of the dialectic comes only with the Logic.

While the *Phenomenology* was gestating in Hegel's mind, and when he committed it to paper and delivered it to the publisher, he was aware that it would lead up to what would become his projected system of philosophy (already sketched out in the Jena Logic, Metaphysics, and *Realphilosophie*). But it was not until many years afterwards that he fully appreciated their proper interrelation. He set it out quite explicitly in the Introduction to the Greater Logic, and by the time he came to revise the *Phenomenology* in the last year of his life (1831) he saw that it was not so much an introduction to the system as a propaedeutic to it, as the generation of the philosophical form of consciousness, absolute knowing. So he canceled the subtitle that he had originally given the work. That it was also, in a sense, the whole system in provisional form, does not contradict the assertion that it is only the propaedeutic. For throughout the dialectic each major phase anticipates and presents its successors proleptically, each is at once both a moment in, and the whole of, the system. The principle of this essential ambiguity is set forth by Hegel in the Doctrine of the Concept in the Logic, where it applies specifically to every category.[6] It is the same whole that is immanent in each and all of its differences, every one of which is a stage in its *Sichselbstwerden*.

Notes

1. See Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1974).
2. Husserl's phenomenological method has this in common with Hegel's, but differs in that Husserl professes merely to inspect or observe what appears in consciousness, suspending all the assumptions characteristic of the natural atti-

tude. He acknowledges no intrinsic self-criticism of what so appears, and denies any dialectical structure.

3. Cf. the Doctrine of Essence, *Science of Logic*, Book II, Chap. 3; *Encyclopaedia*, 120.
4. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 247.
5. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 388 et seq.
6. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 160–63.

4
Marxist Interpretations of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Limitation of the Subject Matter

To discuss the *Phenomenology* with any degree of adequacy would require one or more large tomes. The scope of the work is so vast, its content is so varied, and it presents itself in so many different aspects, that it is impossible to do anything like full justice to it in a single manageable chapter. Moreover, many distinguished scholars have commented on it at length, in fact, it is usually the work most favored by commentators who set out to interpret Hegel, and what I might be able to add to their contributions is unlikely to be further instructive. It would not even be practicable to consider very much of the secondary literature on the *Phenomenology* in a short space, and as it is so prolific more advantage may be gained by considering just one, nowadays neither uncommon nor unimportant, interpretation: that adopted by Marx and his contemporary followers. Even with this limitation, I propose to discuss only three major writers, apart from Marx himself. Further, it should be noted that the interpretation I intend to criticize is not confined to Marxists, although it is generally typical of them and is derived, for the most part, from them.

I shall contest chiefly two apparently contrasting positions which are nevertheless closely connected. One is that Hegel, though laying the foundation for Marx's historical materialism, erred in adhering to a form of transcendental idealism. The other is that Hegel himself adopted a quasi-materialistic and atheistic stance in the *Phenomenology*, and is thus the progenitor of Marxism. The first is developed by Georg Lukács, and is also supported by Theodor Adorno, but it is Marx's own view and is followed by others of like mind. The second is put forward by Alexandre Kojève; it goes back to Feuerbach and is common to several contemporary writers, among them Michael Kosok. It is to Lukács and Kojève that I shall chiefly

direct my comments, making some reference also to Adorno. It is possible to give some plausibility to either of these two interpretations, but I shall argue that they are based on misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and sometimes even travesty of Hegel's thought.

First, however, in order to ward off red herrings, it may be as well to anticipate and reject forthwith a possible identification of what I am about to maintain with so-called right-wing Hegelianism. Obviously I am, in what follows, opposing views held by those who are not improperly classed as left-wing Hegelians, a label attached to Marx himself as well as to others contemporary with him. What one should identify as right-wing Hegelianism, however, is highly doubtful. The British Idealists are not inappropriately described as Hegelians, but it would be most inept to classify such men as T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, or R. L. Nettleship as "right wing," especially if the description is given a political flavor. In spite of their philosophical disagreement with the Utilitarians, they were essentially liberal thinkers. In any case such labels are very misleading, for not even all Utilitarians were liberal. Bentham, for instance, in his legal and political theory was decidedly conservative, and very far from Hegelian. The extreme right in contemporary politics sometimes claims descent from Hegel, but only by grossly misrepresenting his teaching, and opponents of the right, who become, in consequence, Hegel's detractors, are prone to father upon him (as they do also on Plato[1]) totalitarian doctrines and the recommendation of totalitarian practices. Sir Karl Popper's skill at misrepresentation has gathered Plato, Aristotle, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx into one disconcerted group of incongruous bedfellows.[2] It can hardly be these who represent right-wing Hegelianism!

If there is such a position as right-wing Hegelianism at all it must be one that makes the complementary error to that of some of the Marxists—namely the oversight of Hegel's insistence on the moment of difference essential to every synthetic unity. This is the aspect of divergence, disparity, idiosyncracy, and (negative) freedom without which any social communion falls into insufferable totalitarianism, any moral precept into insupportable bigotry, any theological doctrine into dogmatic intolerance (or else impenetrable mystification), and any philosophical theory into an inscrutable monistic night in which all cows are black. Marxists (e.g., Adorno) tend to accuse Hegel himself of a doctrine such as would result from such an oversight, while others pay insufficient attention to the opposite moment in the dialectic.

If my own position is to be given any label at all, I should prefer it to be called Hegelian centralism, which may indeed be a pleonasm, for centrality here is simply what I take to be Hegelianism accurately interpreted, shifted neither to the right nor to the left by overlooking essential moments and

indispensable principles of dialectical thinking. It was Hegel before all who condemned one-sidedness and insisted on the complementarity of opposite moments in every whole, and in all sound doctrine. Only if one neglects one side at the expense of the other does one become right or left wing.

LUKÁCS AND THE YOUNG HEGEL

Georg Lukács wrote *Der junge Hegel*[3] in 1938 when he was a member of the Philosophical Institute of the Soviet Academy. His earlier work, *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein*, had defended the view that the origins of Marx's thought were to be traced back to Hegel, a thesis which excited the disapproval of official Communism and was pronounced deviationist. In keeping with his own teaching that the duty of every loyal Communist was to accept the decision of the Party as the supreme expression of proletarian consciousness, Lukács renounced his published work. When the early *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of Marx were later discovered, revealing the truth of Lukács's earlier contentions, he could then no longer lay claim to priority. He was, however, thenceforth with greater security, able to point to Marx's own written authority for a repetition of the earlier theme in *Der junge Hegel*.

The discerning reader, however, will find traces in the book of more than just a claim for Hegel's priority in certain respects as the originator of historicism in philosophy and of economic realism. As one reads one can hardly resist the suspicion that the author's real intention is to emphasize the greatness and soundness of Hegel's genius at the expense of Marxian criticism. That, of course, is not the professed or overt purport of the book; but it is indeed odd that a writer who is obviously capable of appreciating Hegel and, in many of the most important aspects of his thought, of interpreting him accurately, can seriously juxtapose sound and penetrating exposition with so many palpable misrepresentations and specious criticisms. The latter, surely, are not Lukács's own views so much as his faithful report, quotation, and paraphrase of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, made ostensibly with approval, but placed side by side with his own perspicacious renderings of Hegel's meaning, as if purposely to reveal the futility of the accepted Marxist attitude to the great progenitor of dialectics. Constantly Lukács enlists Marx's and Engels's support for his own eulogy of Hegel, as if to keep on the right side of the official line, but the quoted passages are usually concessions tacked on to some adverse criticism that is so obviously unwarranted as to discredit itself almost on sight.

A book written by a Marxist to vindicate Hegel against fascist interpretation is not especially surprising, one that defends him against critics (like Karl Popper) who accuse him of totalitarianism might be a little more unexpected, but not entirely incredible—for Positivism and its associates, as

much as bourgeois liberals and fascists, are all anathema to Marxists. But for the avowed Marxist to present Hegel as in important respects a precursor of Marx, to deny any tendency in him to Romanticism, and to excuse his Idealism as an inevitable consequence of the social backwardness of the Germany of his day, is surely quite remarkable; the more so in that the method of presentation almost puts one in mind of the technique of Samuel Butler in *The Fair Haven*, where the doctrine professedly attacked is so cogently stated and its refutation so tamely advocated and so clearly vulnerable that the astute reader will accept the former and treat the latter with derision.

Nobody would wish to suggest that Marx's own doctrines were derisory, but his criticisms of Hegel were often extraordinarily obtuse and blinkered, based as they were on a gross misunderstanding of Hegel's "Idealism." This misunderstanding is inherited by Adorno, and Lukács repeats the criticisms, usually in Marx's own words, while at the same time he makes it clear that he himself fully understands just those features of the dialectic which make Marx's criticism inapplicable and inept. In important respects Hegel did anticipate Marx, although Marx's sociological and economic analysis of capitalism is certainly, and not surprisingly, an advance on what could be expected in Hegel's day. Here Marx occupied the historical vantage point of a later stage in the development of industrial Europe and of economic theory. His work in this respect is brilliant and epoch making and no one should seek to belittle it. But could he have grasped, as Lukács apparently does, the essential *realism* of Hegel's thought, Marx might have recognized more clearly, not only the seeds in Hegel's philosophy of his own sociohistorical analysis, but also the limitations and errors of historical materialism.

Lukács traces the development of Hegel's thought from the early days in Bern, when his sentiments were strongly republican and he sought a reestablishment of the classical unity of individual and society realized (as he believed) in the polis of ancient Greece. He then shows how Hegel, during his stay in Frankfurt, became aware of the utopianism of this hope. Here Hegel went through an intellectual crisis, during which his historical insight into the thought and politics of ancient Greece and Rome was deepened, as well as of the rise of Christianity and medieval Europe. In the later period the source of frustration and corruption was seen as "positivity," the hardening, objectivizing, and externalization of religious devotion into a code of legal and moral sanctions imposed from without. Wrestling with the contradictions, historical and cultural, which he encountered in his attempts to understand the decline of the ancient civilizations and to find a solution to modern tensions, Hegel began to develop his dialectical method.

Lukács for the most part discounts the influence of Fichte upon Hegel in this process, probably because he wishes to emphasize Hegel's historicism,

alleging that only at a relatively late stage did he become concerned about logical and epistemological questions. With respect to the period of Hegel's development that Lukács is considering here, he may well be right. But the influence of Herder, who is not mentioned by Lukács, might not have been inconsiderable. There can be little doubt that when Hegel did become interested in epistemological problems, through his reaction to Kant and Fichte, he found the seeds of his dialectical procedure in the *Wissenschaftslehre* even more than in the antinomies of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic. Adorno, on the other hand, as we shall presently see, attributes the ultimate error of Hegel's philosophy to his adoption of Fichte's Transcendental Idealism.

Lukács seeks to establish that in his early so-called theological phase Hegel, though regarding religion as the highest expression of man's spiritual activity, was actually, in effect, anti-Christian and antitheological. When, at the end of the next stage in Jena, he restored religion in the *Phenomenology* to a predominant position as the penultimate phase of Spirit, he is alleged to have fallen into a contradiction between his criticism of religion, in agreement with the writers of the Enlightenment, and his resort to it as the reconciliation of conflicts inherent in civil (i.e., capitalist) society. To the dialectical significance of all this I shall return presently. What Lukács overlooks is the possibility of criticizing certain aspects of religion (qua cultus, ritual, mythos, and the like) while recognizing without contradiction the significance and truth of a conceptual content that it presents in symbolic form.

When we come to the Jena period we find Hegel, in collaboration with Schelling, leading the attack on the subjective idealism of Kant and Fichte, and experimenting with Schelling's ideas and terminology in the attempt to evolve his own version of idealism. Schelling's concepts prove unsatisfactory to Hegel and are eventually sharply criticized. He then abandons them in favor of his own much more fundamental, more highly developed, and more fruitful dialectical method. So we are brought to the *Phenomenology*, to which Lukács devotes some seventy pages, analyzing and interpreting its structure.

The main theses that Lukács advocates are (i) that Hegel was essentially a historical thinker, and indeed the first, who sought to explain ethical, religious, and philosophical concepts as emerging from and conditioned by sociocultural forms. He was able, in consequence, to recognize the necessity and merits of doctrines like those of the Enlightenment and of Kant, as well as to understand the reasons for their failure and shortcomings. (ii) He became aware of the contradictions involved in the historical process and so realized the need to establish a dialectical method of deduction answering to the dialectic in the objective reality. (iii) He was assisted in so doing by his recognition of the importance of economics and his study of the classical

English economic theorists (especially Adam Smith). Thus he was able to represent the emergence of modern individualism, through the dialectic of labor and mercantile exchange, that generated contemporary bourgeois society.

In all this Hegel is presented as the genuine forerunner of Marx. Where he allegedly falls short is in his idealism and his consequent insistence upon the importance of religion. But that, we are told, is a necessary result of the backwardness of the social and economic conditions in the Germany of Hegel's day, in which he could find no exemplification or prospect of any reconciliation of the conflicts (of which he was clearly aware) arising from the bourgeois society which had triumphed with the French Revolution. Accordingly, he sought the solution of these conflicts in a liberated Germany under the Napoleonic system (which he came to admire after his revulsion against Robespierre's despotism and the Terror). And when that failed him, he resorted to an idealistic metaphysical solution. Some critics allege that he ultimately found this embodied in the state of Prussia; but Lukács, quite properly, rejects this misconception, and maintains that Hegel saw Prussia merely as the standing historical example of the contradictions whose resolution he sought.

By contrast, we shall find Kojève, when we turn to him, concluding that Hegel believed Napoleon's victory at Jena and his own philosophy, as set out in the *Phenomenology* (which explains and expounds its true significance), to mark the end of history and its final achievement in the nation-state, on the one hand, and Absolute Knowledge, on the other.

In the main, and so far as he goes, Lukács presents a sound view of Hegel's development and approach to philosophy. Hegel undoubtedly was a historical thinker, and was the first to see philosophical theories not simply as abstract ideas to be defended or refuted in isolation but as historical outgrowths from, and conceptual expressions of, cultural forms historically and dialectically related. These are what he came to call the configurations of consciousness. He was consequently the first to elaborate the history of philosophy as a scientific discipline (in the peculiarly Hegelian, that is dialectical, sense of "scientific"). He was led, as a result, to distill from his view of the progress of human consciousness, the dialectical principles and categories implicit in and determinant of that process; and so to develop a system of dialectical logic, which was at the same time the theoretical framework of every other branch of philosophy. More accurately, it was the structural basis of a system embracing all reality and reflective thought, one which embodied and actualized the conceptual principle (what Hegel called the Idea) in appropriately different contexts.

Lukács correctly appreciates the nature and importance of Hegel's historicism, recognizing its profound difference from historical relativism, in that

it is a dialectical progression towards an ultimate consummation. He acknowledges the significance of Hegel's elaboration of dialectical logic; but he follows (one may say parrots) Marx in persistently alleging that Hegel has the whole business inverted and standing on its head. He objects to Hegel's conclusion as mystifying and illusory, but excuses it as an inevitable consequence of historical (economic and political) circumstances—the backwardness of the Germany of the time, the milieu in which Hegel lived, thought, and wrote.

The essential feature of the dialectic, the preservation of the earlier phases in the later in which they are annulled (*aufgehoben*), Lukács hails as one of Hegel's most inspired and original contributions, and his signal advance beyond Schelling. It is (he asserts) by the application of this principle that Hegel refuses utterly to reject the cathartic atheism and materialism of the Enlightenment, and sees it as a necessary phase in the historical process developing modern bourgeois society and its appropriate form of consciousness. This Lukács approves and eulogizes. So far he has a clearer insight into Hegel's dialectic than Marx himself, who certainly learned thoroughly enough the lesson of historicism and the embodiment of ideological constructs in material and social forms. What Marx failed to see was the significance and the efficacy of this Hegelian principle of *Aufhebung* in Hegel's professed idealism, which he (Marx) so uncompromisingly rejects; and Lukács falls obediently into line, representing Hegel's idealism as an unfortunate but unavoidable aberration resulting from the social conditions of the day.

Following Marx, Lukács repeatedly alleges that Hegel, at the conclusion of his system, eliminates the objective and existent by reabsorbing it into Spirit. In this way he is able to reinstate religion (which he had criticized earlier) and to represent it as the medium of reconciliation of social conflicts, for which he could, in actual fact, find no solution. Marx, likewise, accuses Hegel of inconsistency. The history (Marx alleges) which the absolute Spirit engenders, is only an appearance, because Spirit becomes conscious of itself only in philosophy; hence the history exists "only in consciousness, in the opinion and conception of the philosopher, i.e. in the speculative imagination."[4] Hegel's ultimate problem, Marx declares, is a false problem:

> The task, therefore, is to surmount the *object of* consciousness. *Objectivity* as such is regarded as an *alienated* human relationship which does not correspond to the *essence of man*, to self-consciousness. The *reappropriation* of the objective essence of man, begotten in the form of alienation as something alien, therefore, not only is the annulment of *alienation*, but of *objectivity* as well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a *non-objective, spiritual* being.[5]

Without considering whether this is a fair and accurate presentation of Hegel's position, but taking it simply at face value, one has only to apply Hegel's principle of *Aufheben* to see that Marx has reached a false conclusion. If alienation and objectivity are annulled in self-consciousness, they are also preserved. What is *aufgehoben* in spirit is not thereby utterly abolished but is at the same time and in the same act retained and transformed.[6] Subject is the truth of substance, knowledge is the truth of the objective world. Theory, however, does not therefore annihilate objective reality, it confirms its objectivity, establishes its truth, and itself it is the self-knowledge of the real. Can Marx and Lukács in consistency allege anything other of Marxist doctrine? Does it not itself pose as the truth and consummation of the historical process? Consequently, is the fact not *aufgehoben* in the theory without abolishing the historical reality, as Marx would contend that capitalism is *aufgehoben* in socialism, without the abolition and annulment of all the economic progress that industrial capitalism represents.

But, of course, Marx's representation of Hegel's theory is neither fair nor accurate. History, for Hegel, as we shall observe anon, by no means exists only in the philosopher's imagination; nor is "objectivity as such" regarded as "an alienated human relationship which does not correspond to the essence of man." The contrary is rather the case, for the essence of man is (though not without qualification) objective spirit: society, the state, *die Gemeinde*, in fact, in a very definite sense, history itself. In short, precisely what Marx himself wished to maintain is what Hegel emphatically asserts.

In later writings Marx did much to mollify the materialist and determinist strands in his theory of history and of society; but he never retracted his explicit criticisms of Hegel, neither those I have quoted nor others in *A Contribution to the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law*, in *The German Ideology*, and in *Capital*. In spite of this, Marx remains throughout a thinker saturated with Hegelian concepts, devoted to the dialectical procedure in theorizing, and convinced of the dialectical structure of nature and history. My quarrel with him here is simply with his misinterpretation of the Concept from which, throughout his career, he never fully dissociated himself. In fact, my contention is that had Marx understood Hegel aright he would have found in him much that he (Marx) was seeking, including a basis for socialism that would not have led his followers astray into totalitarian repression of human liberty.

Whether failure to acknowledge the consequences in the dialectic of *Aufhebung* is a mere blind spot in the Marxist eye or is deliberate perversity, or whether, in Lukács's case, it is a mere concession to an orthodoxy he secretly rejects, it has wide-reaching implications for the Marxist critique.

Closely connected with the conception of *Aufheben* is that of teleology.

And here again Lukács deals admirably with Hegel's dialectical approach to teleology, only in the end to miss the main point. He distinguishes correctly between the old untenable conception of the term and the Marxist one, which he believes Hegel to have anticipated. The old idea is of a purpose imposed from without on natural forms and fulfilled by them, ultimately for the benefit of humankind—a purpose attributed to God. This had already been rejected in the seventeenth century by Hobbes and Spinoza (Hobbes, the materialist, and Spinoza, reputed by Marxists to be an atheist). Kant had pronounced teleology to be a regulative idea, but denied its constitutive validity. This, however, was no solution to the problem presented by purposiveness in a world alleged to be governed solely by efficient causation.

Marx is said to have solved this problem by identifying teleological activity solely with human purposiveness, which is itself causally explicable and operates within the sphere of natural causal laws. Hegel is held to have anticipated this approach by developing the dialectics of teleology through that of human labor: the fabrication of tools and the utilization of natural causal laws to effect human ends. Human purpose, we are told, is thus located within the overall causal network. If this is a correct account of Marx, it is not, as we shall see, a sufficient account of Hegel, and Lukács is aware of the difference; for even after reporting Lenin's praise for Hegel's treatment of teleology in the Logic as sublating and preserving mechanism and chemism (this is said to represent man's subjugation of material nature, utilizing natural causal laws), he ends by lamenting what he sees as Hegel's surrender to the old idea of teleology by subordinating everything to spirit and elevating end above means. Once again we find here sound interpretation juxtaposed with myopic misrepresentation.

The restriction of teleology to human purpose is at best shortsighted. Conscious intentional action is but one example at a highly developed level of teleological activity, for it is intelligible only through its end and purpose, and that purpose is always the fulfillment of a design, or the completion of a whole. But teleology covers a much wider range.[7]

Hegel grasped quite clearly that teleology is the operation and immanence of the whole in the part, of the outcome of process in every developing phase. It is the immanence of the whole that constitutes the potentiality of the part (or of the lower stage in a development) and that accounts for what is preserved in *Aufhebung*, as well as for what is annulled. As Hegel declares, and Lukács approves, the truth is the whole; but not as an abstract formula, nor yet merely as a finished and separate result. It is the whole inclusive of and sublating all its moments, all its parts, all its prior immature forms and phases. It is at once end and process. If Hegel elevates end above means, therefore, it is not at the expense of the means, which are *aufgehoben* and preserved in the realization of what is their own true essence. Spirit does not

abolish matter or the forms of Nature, it actualizes their potentialities and fulfills their essential being.

It follows that causation, which is taken up into teleology, cannot be the superior principle, as Marx more than suggests. Causation, as merely efficient and finite, is no adequate explanation, and establishes no intelligible origin; for every finite cause itself calls for explanation and every causal origin must itself have a cause. Efficient causation, therefore, involves the spurious infinite, which is endlessly finite. Only the truly infinite totality, which determines and governs the finite moments within it, can provide an adequate principle of explanation, or a genuine source of origination. For this reason efficient causation alone must always degenerate into the spurious infinite; but explanation of the part in terms of the whole and of process in terms of its outcome (a procedure which Marx explicitly advocates and Lukács approvingly quotes) *is* teleological explanation; and all developmental process is similarly teleological. For this reason, and this alone, all development is dialectical.

Apart from the immanence of the whole in each phase no dialectic operates. It is solely this immanence that forces the finite over into its opposite, unites the two, and generates their reconciliation. If the finite could exist in isolation, if it really were independent and self-supporting (as it is assumed to be by the understanding), it would remain fixed and static and no dialectical movement would ensue. But because it is not thus isolable and independent, the attempt to treat it as such breaks down in self-contradiction, the resolution of which is possible only dialectically, through the development of that immanent whole, and the reinstatement of the hitherto omitted other, whose neglect has occasioned the breakdown. This is the nature of dialectic, which is essentially and inevitably teleological. It is throughout and always the explanation and making intelligible of the immature and partial by the self-complete, of the developing finite by the ultimate infinite outcome.

Accordingly no dialectic can be materialistic, if that means, as is usually intended, that all forms of reality are reducible to finite, immobile, and dead matter. But if it means no more (nor less) than that matter is pregnant with life and mind, it must be the Hegelian and not the Marxian dialectic that operates in it, and only the universal immanence of the ultimate whole can make that dialectic effective. The ultimate outcome of its process, moreover, can be nothing less than self-conscious spirit, because nothing less can comprehend the relation between the phases of the process and grasp the parts as fitting together as a whole. Nothing less than self-consciousness can envisage and realize, in transparent self-actualization, the completed totality that constitutes the universe, and brings to self-awareness the principle of its own coherent being and activity.

To commend Hegel's dialectical treatment of purpose and teleology in the *Phenomenology* and the Logic, therefore, as Lukács does, following Marx and Lenin, is inevitably to commit oneself to the ultimate reality of absolute Spirit, the final product of the dialectic, and to the very opposite of atheism. It follows that Hegel's account of religion as a moment of absolute Spirit is anything but mystification. Religion, as the felt awareness and conviction of the infinite immanent and potent in all reality, in both nature and history, and transcendent above all finite existence, is one form of that final self-realization of the whole which is the truth, and without which there would be no dynamic to propel the dialectical process. To repudiate spirit and reject all religion is thus to paralyze the dialectic, and in effect to abandon it. But it is, perhaps, too much to expect a convinced Marxist, however respectful an admirer of Hegel, to recognize and confess to this fundamental contradiction in dialectical materialism.

ADORNO'S FAILURE

The accusation that Hegel, in the final resolution of his philosophical position, resorts to a vapid and "metaphysical" doctrine that contradicts and cancels out the admirable advances he had previously made towards sound materialistic social theory, is common to many Marxist commentators. Adorno alleges that, by accepting and developing the legacy of Kant and Fichte, Hegel remains inveterately idealistic, and, for all his immense improvement on the traditional metaphysics, lapses by retaining the priority of spirit. The Hegelian subject-object, Adorno avers, remains primarily subject. Indeed, Hegel insists that it is not merely substance, and that subject "overreaches" (*übergreifft*) object. Why this should be a fault Adorno does not explain, but he objects that it is abstract and floats unsupported in midair: "*Nicht zuletzt daher ruhrt das Schwebende, sich selbst in der Luft enthaltende der Hegelschen Philosophy, ihr permanent Skandalon. . . .*"[8]

Fichte, according to Adorno, excised the subject from its natural life and facticity to enstate in its place the transcendental Ego, which is no more than an abstraction from the natural self. This he did in order to establish a thoroughgoing idealism, which develops in Hegel as Absolute Idealism. Hegel's dialectic is alleged to be simply the development of Fichte's deduction of the objective content of experience from the absolute Ego. Kant had retained a trace of facticity in insisting on the indispensability of the sensuous content of *Anschauung*; but Hegel, Adorno asserts, renounces this extraneous material and retains the transcendental Ego, refusing to acknowledge that it is a mere abstraction from the natural self, elevating it instead to the supreme pinnacle of his system as absolute Spirit. His philosophy is therefore false.

There is a modicum of half-truth in this analysis, but, however apt the criticism may be as directed towards Fichte and the more recent revival of the transcendental Ego by Husserl, it is wholly inapplicable to Hegel, for whom the ego is generated in the course of the dialectic, in the *Phenomenology* from the prereflective level of sense-certainty, and in the *Geistesphilosophie* from the pre-personal phase of *Empfindung*. In the *Phenomenology* consciousness of self emerges from the interrelation of desiring human individuals in all too fleshly internecine conflict. Moreover, as we shall presently see, the whole of Nature is presupposed, tacitly in the *Phenomenology* but explicitly in the *Geistesphilosophie*, as the precursor of these stages in the dialectic, and the prior ground of the generation of the self and of self-consciousness. Initially this is the consciousness of finite spirit—the natural ego—which is transcended later in the social whole by the consciousness of the community (*die Gemeinde*), and in the end by absolute Spirit where the finite finds atonement with the infinite. In Hegel's dialectic the transcendental ego does not figure as such; it is the immanence of the absolute Idea in all finite consciousness. It is not a postulate from which he deduces all experience of the objective world, but the outcome (*Resultat*) of the dialectical development of the world and of finite spirit (what Adorno claims as facticity)—the dialectical process that constitutes the gamut of the self-differentiation of the Absolute.

Adorno, however, maintains that Hegel neglects the palpable nonidentity of subject and object in his claim to reconcile them in the ultimate whole. The very contradiction and *Nichtidentität* that Hegel invokes, Adorno alleges, persists in the end and belies the unity and the resolution that he celebrates:

> *Die Nichidentität des Antagonistischen, auf die sie stößt und die sie mühselig zusammenbiegt, ist die jenes Ganzen, das nicht das Wahre sondern das Unwahre, der absolute Gegensatz zur Gerechtigheit ist.*[9]

In short, the identity of subject and object is a mere postulation which sins (*frevelt*) against the reality which it belies.

No doubt what Adorno has in mind is less the Hegelian Absolute than the exaggerated and intolerable totalitarianism putatively extorted from Hegelianism by those who espoused National Socialism in Germany and elsewhere. Such a whole is unquestionably "*das Unwahre, der absolute Gegensatz zur Gerechtigkeit,*" but to attribute any such concept to Hegel is little less than outrageous, for it is as far and as different from the Hegelian *Begriff* as anything can be; and Hegel, could he have known of it, would have recoiled from it more violently than he did from Robespierre's despotism in revolutionary France. Adorno imputes this distortion of the truth to Hegel only by misinterpreting and misrepresenting the nature of the unity with which

the *Phenomenology* ends, and so, misconceiving Hegel's idealism, he is led astray in his conception of the Hegelian Absolute.

Idealism for Adorno is a scandal, but he does not tell us why. Apparently materialism is to be accepted as axiomatic without argument or defense. It seems never to occur to him that his own adoption of materialistic realism is "*bloße Behauptung*," and that his criticism of Hegel is no more than the fruit of inattention to the text. To say that the ultimate reconciliation of subject and object in Hegel's Absolute is a mere postulate is itself scandalous, for the whole course of the dialectic, both in the *Phenomenology* and in the Logic, is its detailed demonstration. As Hegel writes in the *Encyclopaedia* (*Zusatz* to Para. 160):

> . . . *dies hat sich als das Resultat der ganzen bisherigen logishen Bewegung ergeben und braucht nicht erst hier beweisen zu werden.* (. . . this has established itself as the result of the whole logical movement up to this point and does not need to be proved here.)

It seems clear from his polemic that Adorno has failed to grasp the significance of the concrete universal in Hegel's thought, as well as the operation of *Aufheben* that we have already noticed. Had he not, he could not allege that the absolute subject is an abstraction. The conrete universal, which is the Concept, and is fully actualized in absolute Spirit, is self-specifying; as Hegel says, "*sie hat das Besonderes in ihr selbst.*" In the unity of subject and object, Hegel explicitly, emphatically, and repeatedly declares, the difference is preserved, *aufgehoben*. In the absolute subject the objective other is recognized as its own self, as itself realized in and through its other. Hegel's most renowned claim is the identity in the Concept of identity and nonidentity, and this is demonstrated in both the *Phenomenology* and in the Logic. So the *Nichtidentität*, which persists to the very end, is not belied by Hegel's reconciliation of subject and object, for that reconciliation is nothing other than the acknowledgment of the objectively real as the self-specification of the Absolute, which, in the ultimate realization of its integral unity, is self-conscious subject.

The abysm of travesty is reached in Adorno's mindless ebulition:

> *Die Ruhe der Bewegung aber, das Absolute, meint am Ende auch bei ihm nichts anderes als das versöhnte Leben, das des gestillten Triebes, das kein Mangel mehr kennt und nicht die Arbeit, der allein es doch die Versöhnung dankt.*[10]

This in the face of Hegel's incessant assertions that the absolute Idea is infinite restlessness, constant self-diremption (*Urteil*), which must never be represented as "dead repose, a mere picture, lifeless, without impulse or movement,"[11] but is the eternal and ceaseless activity of an eternally self-actualizing spiritual whole!

FURTHER MISREPRESENTATIONS

In two other respects these oversights in the Marxist critique of Hegel lead to misunderstanding and misrepresentation: (i) Marx alleges, and Lukács follows him obsequiously, that Hegel fails to do justice to the relation of man and his productive activity to Nature. This, they allege, is because Hegel represents nature as the self-externalization of spirit—a mystification, they say, resulting from his idealism. Consequently, for Hegel, Nature is never properly actual but is merely something figured forth and projected by consciousness. Lukács points to Hegel's failure to conceive, in fact his explicit rejection, of any form of natural evolution; so, he maintains, Hegel failed to make the dialectical process continuous, and Nature and history fall apart. Only slight recognition, Lukács points out, is given by Hegel to the relation of Nature to social structure and development—some brief reference to climatic conditioning in the Introduction to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*.

We should notice at once that this is not a fair report of Hegel's writing, for it overlooks the highly relevant and important opening sections of the *Geistesphilosophie*, in which the "internalization" of natural influences and conditions is treated in considerable and illuminating detail.[12] One might excuse Lukács for omitting reference to these passages on the grounds that the period on which he is commenting ends with the *Phenomenology*. But elsewhere he does not scruple to draw upon Hegel's later work when it serves his purpose.

In fact, however, the criticism misapprehends altogether the place and importance of Nature in Hegel's system—an error shared with many idealist critics. Hegel never suggests or intends for a moment that Nature is a mere projection of the human mind. That is a travesty too gross, perhaps, even for Lukács and Marx. But nor did he assert that it was, in Whitehead's words, "an idea in the ultimate mentality." Nature for Hegel is the real external world, and (he writes) "the external world is implicitly (*an sich*) the truth, for the truth is actual and must exist."[13] The full truth, however, to be truth, has to be cognized; and material nature has not and is not cognition. But *an sich* it contains, immanently and potentially, the seeds of that conscious life which develops out of it. No good Marxist ought to deny any of this (for is it not the whole purport of dialectical materialism?), and it is precisely what Hegel says and means. It is true that he rejects biological evolution, but this is because of his intellectual integrity, which will not allow him to adopt philosophically a scientific theory that had not been empirically established. It had already been mooted in his day, not only by Erasmus Darwin (Charles's grandfather), but also by Geoffroi St. Hilaire and Lamarck, but they lacked empirical evidence to support it, and Charles

Darwin's voyage in the *Beagle* began only in the year of Hegel's death. Lukács pays tribute to this very intellectual honesty in Hegel's refusal to invent a historical solution to the conflicts inherent in bourgeois society where none existed in actuality,[14] but he fails to credit it in Hegel's treatment of Nature.

Nevertheless, Hegel does, despite his rejection of biological evolution, present in the *Naturphilosophie* a dialectic of Nature in which physical and chemical nature potentially contains organic nature. The Earth as a whole, Hegel (following Schelling) believed, is a single organism, and it spawns life as what it is in its essence and truth. Life becomes sentient, and sentience is the transition stage to consciousness and reason. This is spirit, and, as Hegel tells us in the *Geistesphilosophie*, Spirit is the truth of Nature. In it Nature is indeed *aufgehoben*, but so far from being volatilized away or annihilated, it comes, through conscious scientific knowledge, into its own, as explicit objective reality, what in itself it is only implicitly.

(ii) The second misconception to which Marxist criticism (along with others) is prone is its accusation of Hegel of bringing history to a close with absolute Spirit, and, by implication, with Hegelian philosophy. One might reply to Marx: tu quoque. Surely, for the Marxist, the Communist revolution and the establishment of the classless society must be the end of the historical dialectic—what could possibly supersede? And with that the ideology of Communism, which is Marxism-Leninism, must bring the history of philosophy to an end. Of Marxism, indeed, it could be said: "Thus there has been history, but there no longer is any." But how true is it for Hegel?

KOJÈVE AND THE END OF HISTORY

In fact, Kojève finds this idea congenial and attributes to Hegel the explicit identification of the Concept with time, so that with the appearance in history of the Hegelian philosophy, which is the exposition of the science of the Concept (absolute knowing), history does in very truth come to an end. Kojève bases his thesis on the statement in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*: "*Was die Zeit betrifft . . . so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst.*" And again, the assertion quoted in the last chapter: "*Die Zeit ist der Begriff selbst, der da ist.*" On the strength of these passages, Kojève argues that *Wissenschaft*, which is the Concept, realizes itself in time, and, as the true form of the Concept is self-consciousness, its realization in time is history—essentially, the history of philosophy—which is finally fulfilled only at the end of history. History, in 1807, had issued in Napoleon's empire, and reflection on its course had resulted in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, culminating in absolute knowing, which is *Wissenschaft*. Kojève maintains that Hegel

believed history to have come to an end factually with Napoleon's victory at Jena and theoretically with his own philosophy—specifically with the *Phenomenology*, which is the description of the self-realization of Spirit through the historical process. All this implies further that the Absolute (God) is incarnated in Man (identified by Kojève with time, or history). Man's self-consciousness is objectified in free action as and through the state, finally coming to fruition in Napoleon and Hegel himself. Together they constitute the God-man, who is the Christ. But this also implies the acceptance of death as final, for time is negativity; and thus the rejection of any transcendent God. Accordingly, Kojève, conveniently omitting all consideration of the Resurrection, sees Hegel's philosophy as essentially atheistic.

In this interpretation, Hegel's conclusion is, in effect, the opposite of Aristotle's. In the *Metaphysics*[15] Aristotle argues that God is both immanent in the world and transcendent beyond it. But, as he declares God to be pure form without matter (i.e., in Hegel's terminology, pure Concept) he virtually returns to Plato's position in which Concept (or Idea) is altogether transcendent, and its immanence in the world (for Plato, in Becoming) is inexplicable. If Hegel had identified Concept wholly with time, or becoming, as Kojève asserts, he would have made the Absolute immanent but not transcendent. This, according to Kojève, enabled him to give an intelligible account of history, as neither Plato nor Aristotle could, as well as of the occurrence in time of human knowledge (that is, of his own philosophy).

Kojève's interpretation is highly plausible, but for that very reason it is all the more seductively misleading. It is a brilliant but dangerous half-truth. Hegel does certainly insist on the immanence of the Concept in the temporal process, and so does resolve the problem left by Plato and Aristotle. I shall return presently to the precise way in which the solution is reached. We can, however, see at once that Kojève's interpretation is not free of difficulty—a difficulty we should have to impute to Hegel if we adopted it. On Kojève's own admission, the Concept is eternal—indeed, he says that, qua science it is Eternity. In that case Hegel is being credited with identifying time and eternity—or more specifically (and this is clearly Kojève's opinion), history and eternity. As the Concept, or science, appears in history, eternity must somehow make its appearance in time. The symbolic, religious version of this is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, which, according to Kojève, is held by Hegel to have been actualized by Napoleon in practical achievement and himself in theoretical elucidation. But eternity and infinity are one and the same—a truth recognized by Hegel in company with Spinoza—and the Concept as science is strictly omniscience. Napoleon and Hegel, however, were men, and, for all their greatness and genius, were still finite. Kojève admits that no sane person could believe himself to

be omniscient and the creator of the world, and he does not impute insanity to Hegel. So he says that the Logic, by Hegel's own claim "the thought which creates the world," is not simply logic but is theology—"the discourse of God."[16]

What this means in the context of Kojève's general interpretation is difficult to understand, for the Logic is Hegel's logic, and it would be just as insane to pretend that Hegel was privy to God's mind as that he was himself the Deity. Is "the discourse of God" what God discourses—"thus saith the Lord"—or is it discourse about God? In either case there is ambiguity and inconsistency in maintaining that the Concept is not at all, or in any sense, transcendent beyond time and the world. If Hegel's Logic is only talk about God it is only talk about the Concept and not the Concept itself. And even talk about the Concept is temporal. Hence, if the Concept is eternity, it cannot be identified with the temporal talk about it. On the other hand, if it is the eternal object of a temporal discourse, it must be transcendent. If the discourse is God's own thinking, it is self-reflection ("the thought which thinks itself") and, because it is infinite and eternal, it cannot be merely Hegel's personal thought—although it may well be the source of his inspiration. In that case, however, it is necessarily transcendent as well as immanent.

If Hegel were the incarnation, with Napoleon, in their own persons, of the absolute Idea, they would be infinite and omniscient, which is palpably absurd, and it is ridiculous to attribute the claim to Hegel. Yet this is what Kojève does, although he qualifies his assertion by adding that "the Wise Man's legitimate claim that Science is *his* knowledge involves the admission likewise that he possesses it only at the cost of his life and at the end of historical time." It is, however, manifest that history did not come to an end with Napoleon, in spite of Kojève's desperate and somewhat strained attempts to explain the sense in which everything that has happened since the French Revolution is simply its continuance and extension throughout the world.[17]

That Hegel identified time with the Concept ("which is there," or "actual") is indeed true, but it must not be forgotten that identity and difference are, for him, inseparable complementary moments of a single whole, and one must not be embraced without the other. To say that the Idea is the same as time or history, and that the divine is the natural, is true, but only in part and one-sidedly. For that reason it is misleading. Hegel is very clear and precise on this point:

> *Wenn diese Versöhnung nach ihrem Begriffe so ausgedrückt wird, daß sie darum bestehe, weil an sich das Böse dasselbe sei was das Gute, oder das göttliche Wesen dasselbe, was die Natur in ihrem ganzen Umfange, so wie die Natur getrennt*

> *vom göttliche Wesen nur das Nichts,—so ist dies als eine ungeistige Weise sich auszudrücken anzusehen, die notwendig Mißverständnisse erwecken muss.*[18]

And he is just as well aware of the difference as he is of the identity. He never confuses the finite with the infinite, or history with eternity, although the equal importance of their identity is also recognized. That he is aware of the difference and makes the distinction clear between the finite status of natural humanity and the infinite status of the Absolute is apparent from his exposition. Spirit has various moments, and the individual finite self, which is one of them, is not to be confused with the absolute, universal Spirit:

> *. . . sondern da er wesentlich das einfache selbst ist, ist dieses an ihr ebenso vorhanden: der daseiende Geist, der das einzelne Selbst ist, welches das Bewußtsein hat und sich als Anderes oder als Welt von sich unterscheidet. Wie dieses einzelne Selbst so unmittelbar erst gesetzt ist es noch nicht Geist für sich . . .*[19]

and further:

> *. . . indem es [dies allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein] die eine Seite der Gegensatzes der Vorstellung ausmacht, nämlich die böse, der das natürliche Dasein und das einzelne Fürsichsein als Wesen gilt, so hat diese, die als selbständig, noch nicht als Moment vorgestellt ist, um ihrer Selbständigkeit willen an und für sie selbst sich zum Geiste zu erheben oder die Bewegung desselben an ihr dazustellen.*[20]

In short, the individual finite self is but a phase in the dialectical movement towards the Absolute—even in the guise of the Christ, the divine man, who *is* universal self-consciousness in the form of natural humanity, in and through whom the dialectical process is *aufgehoben* and inwardized.

The Concept is identical with time: time is the Concept *der da ist*, in empirical existence. But it is also different and distinct from the temporal process. It is the final outcome; and in the final outcome it is absolute Idea, which is both end and process of the dialectic in one. In it the process is *aufgehoben*—canceled, absorbed, and transfigured. It is never simply empirical process, either in part or as a whole, although it is immanent in both. But the empirical process is part of its self-specification, or self-differentiation. It is only part of it, because once the processes of Nature attain to the level of consciousness, they generate a second nature, which is history, and in its course they become (*qua* conscious) self-transcendent. The supersensible supervenes upon the sensible and the merely immanent whole (or Concept), hitherto *nur an sich*, becomes also transcendent *für sich*.

Unlike Kojève and Marx, Hegel does not conflate eternity with time, but maintains the distinction between them. For him, history is the march of the world-spirit in time and (*pace* Lukács) history is the continuation of the dialectic of Nature; for it is the natural generation of conscious humanity that initiates history, human action being the material and the vehicle of the historical process. But in rational self-consciousness, Spirit grasps the

totality which is its own essence, as it is also the essence of Nature, as a whole in which time is *aufgehoben*.

Besides the affirmations which Kojève quotes, Hegel says in the *Naturphilosophie*, "*die Zeit selbst ist in ihrem Begriff ewig*";[21] and with this insight history neither ends nor begins, for (in Spinoza's words) "in eternity there is no *when*, *before* or *after*." To speak of an end to history makes no sense, for Hegel or for any other rational being, and to say that his philosophy brings the history of thought to its conclusion, if it is sensible at all, means only that it is co-temporary: "This then is the standpoint of the present-day, and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded."[22]

IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE

Let us consider more closely this relationship between immanence and transcendence. The Concept is the concrete universal which is self-specifying: *sie hat das Besonderes in sich selbst*. It is therefore at once universal and particularized. Its self-particularization is Nature and finite spirit, and its final realization is absolute Spirit. This, of course, is only a brief and schematic statement, for in the dialectical process of self-specification the mediation through which the universal develops is constantly and repeatedly *aufgehoben*, and each phase is a provisional version of the ultimate outcome—or as Hegel says in the Logic, every category is a provisional definition of the Absolute.

Hence the spatio-temporal processes of Nature are the self-specification of the Idea (in other-being), and through Nature and its processes, humanity, finite spirit, emerges. The forms of consciousness which we enjoy, both theoretical and practical, both individual and social, all of which presuppose Nature, do indeed constitute history; and much of what Kojève has to say about that is correct. It is the dialectical unfolding of these conscious phases that is described in the *Phenomenology*, and its final outcome is *absolutes Wissen*. But this, though it appears (*erscheint*) in history as the Hegelian system of philosophy, is not limited to that, either as *Erscheinung* or as a particular philosophical system. In one aspect it is a self-transcendent self-consciousness (and thus more than any mere *Erscheinung* or *Ereignis*). In another aspect, as philosophy, it is the *Aufhebung* of the whole history of philosophy up to Hegel. Yet *absolutes Wissen* is still more than all this, for Hegel's philosophy, as the comprehending and developed outcome of its philosophical predecessors, is a prevision, an interim report, a provisional exposition of the absolute system itself, which it could be only if and because the Absolute is transcendently infinite and eternal, as well as immanent in all its natural and historical phases.

The transcendent infinite, however, is not, as Hegel never tires of re-

minding us, a mere beyond, in another world. It is no mere *Jenseits*. It transcends, while it generates and determines, the nature of the parts which constitute it, and which it constitutes as its own self-differentiating. The analogues of this transcendence are to be found at every level of the dialectic. A geometrical figure is more than merely the aggregation of its sides and angles. Three straight lines, simply as a sum of units, are not a triangle; yet when they intersect so as to form one, the triangle is not another geometrical element, not a fourth line or angle. It is the total *Gestalt*, which sublates and transcends the sum of its parts. A regular heptagon *is* what seven straight lines in the appropriate arrangement constitute, but it is not merely a collection of seven straight lines, or seven angles. The whole has a character of its own that transcends the sum of the parts. Similarly, a human personality, while it is immanent in every act, every trait, every sentiment and whim of the individual person, is not any of these, nor is it merely their collective sum total, nor the successive occurrence of them in time, nor yet is it a separate entity, a disembodied ghost. It is a transcendent character, which they each express, the self of the individual to whom they all belong and who is their integral unity.

In the same way, the Absolute, for Hegel, is a transcendent whole without being a separate or separable (and so just another finite) reality. It is at once immanent and transcendent. It is at once identical with, yet also different from, its Other, which is the world—the Idea in the form of self-externality, in the temporal process of the evolution of which human beings are engendered as a phase in its dialectical self-specification. The development of their communal consciousness is history, and through history, as the dialectical continuation of Nature, the Absolute is further specified. History is the Idea *die da ist*, but the Idea is just as much transcendent beyond the temporal and the merely historical.

The final result, moreover, is Spirit:

> *Diese Totalitität seiner Bestimmungen macht ihn an sich zum geistigen Wesen, und für das Bewußtsein wird er dies in Wahrheit durch das Auffassen einer jeden einzelnen derselben als des Selbsts oder durch das eben genannte geistige Verhalten zu ihnen.*[23]

It is spirit, first through specifying itself as the gamut of forms of consciousness, and secondly, in its own self-conscious grasp of itself as the universal immanent in and specified as those forms, which are themselves phases of the self-development of the awareness of the world come to consciousness of itself in them—the world which is the externalized self-manifestation of the Spirit of which they are the moments.

This transcendent Spirit is no mere human mind or historical person. It is not restricted to any one historical and human philosophical system. It can

and does appear in the historical series (among other forms) as the history of philosophy, because it is immanent in history and in every aspect of its development. But the ultimate outcome of the dialectic, absolute Spirit, transcends all this. It transcends time. The death of the individual and the end of history of which Kojève speaks are simply the symbols of this transcendence. And through its immanence in human consciousness, human personality and human history become self-transcendent. Spirit remains finite and historical only as long as it does not thus transcend itself and transcend time. When it does fully realize its essential being, it transcends both time and history:

> *Indem seine Vollendung darin besteht, das was er ist, seine Substanz, vollkommen zu wissen, so ist dies Wissen sein Insichgehen, in welchem er sein Dasein verlasst und sein Gestalt der Erinnerung übergibt.*[24]

The transcendent being of the Absolute is, then, more than the merely human and temporal, but it is no mere abstraction, nor yet a beyond; no mere "ought to be," nor any otherworldly far-off divine event. It is absolute Spirit, the absolute self-conscious whole that is the fulfillment of all finite forms, in which it is immanent, and which are *aufgehoben*, absorbed, transfigured, and combined in its transcendent plenitude.

Plain evidence that this conclusion is the reverse of atheistic, is, on the contrary, an express affirmation of theism, is Hegel's identification of the self-knowing of absolute Spirit with the *noēsis noēseōs* of Aristotle's Theos, and his explicit quotation, at the end of the *Geistesphilosophie* of the famous passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*:

> Moreover, life belongs to God, for the actuality of thought is life; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is. (Hugh Tredennick's translation)[25]

Notes

1. Cf. R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato Today*.
2. Cf. Sir Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.
3. Translated by Rodney Livingstone as *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1975).
4. Karl Marx, *The Holy Family (1844), or Critique of Critical Criticism against Bruno Bauer and Company* in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, eds. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 383.
5. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, op. cit., p. 322.
6. Cf. E. E. Harris, *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, (Lanham, MD., New York, London: University Press of America, 1983), p. 31ff.

7. Cf. my "Teleology and Teleological Explanation," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LVI, no. 1, (1959).
8. *Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie* (Berlin and Frankfurt-am-Main, 1957), p. 20: "The Hegelian philosophy does not in the last resort affect, therefore, the floating miasma which supports itself in thin air—its permanent scandal."
9. Ibid., p. 37: "The non-identity of the antagonistic moments, on which it stumbles and which it laboriously bends together, is that very whole, which is not the truth but the untruth, the absolute opposite of rectitude."
10. Ibid. "The cessation of movement, however, the Absolute, means in the end even for him, nothing other than the reconciled life, that of the tranquillized impulse, that knows no more want, nor the labor, to which alone it still owes the reconciliation."
11. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. II, sect. III, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities Press, 1991), p. 759.
12. See Chap. 11 below.
13. *Enzyclopaedie*, 38, *Zusatz*.
14. Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, p. 507.
15. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk XII, x, 1075a12–16.
16. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, (New York, 1969), p. 147.
17. Op. cit., p. 158ff, n. 6.
18. *Phänomenologie*, C (CC), VII C, 780: "If this reconciliation is expressed according to its concept, as if it consisted in the Evil being in itself the same as Good, or the divine Being itself what Nature is in its total range, just as Nature separated from the divine essence is simply nothing—this is to be regarded as a mindless way of expressing the matter, which is bound to produce misunderstandings" (my translation). Trans. Miller, p. 472; trans. Baillie, p. 776.
19. Ibid., 775: " . . . but since it (Spirit) is essentially the singular self, this is just as apparent about it: that it is the existent spirit, the singular self, which has consciousness and distinguishes itself from the world as other. As this singular self is first thus immediately posited, it is not yet explicitly Spirit" (my translation). Trans. Miller, p. 467; trans. Baillie, p. 770.
20. Ibid., 781: " . . . inasmuch as it [this universal self-consciousness] constitutes one side of the opposition in representation, namely, the evil side, for which natural existence and the individual self-awareness rank as essence, so this, represented as self-sufficient and not yet as moment, on account of its self-sufficiency, has to raise itself to Spirit in and for itself, or to establish in itself the movement of Spirit" (my translation). Trans. Miller, p. 473; trans. Baillie, p. 778.
21. *Enzyklopädie*, 258 *Zusatz*.
22. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Part 3 E. An end to history makes no sense if "end" is taken to mean "conclusion." There is another interpretation that does make sense and is discussed below in Chap. 14.
23. *Phänomenologie*, C (DD), VIII, 788: "This totality of its determinations makes it in itself (implicitly) a spiritual being, and for consciousness it becomes this in truth by grasping each one of them as [a determination] of the self, or through the spiritual relation to it just mentioned" (my translation). Trans. Miller, p. 479f.; trans. Baillie, p. 790.
24. Ibid., 808. "In that its fulfilment consists precisely in its perfect knowledge of what it is, its substance, so this knowledge is its reversion into itself, in which it abandons its existence and gives up its form of recollection" (i.e., its historical

form; my translation). Trans. Miller, p. 492; trans. Baillie, p. 807. Miller, in company with Baillie, translates this last clause: "and gives its external existential shape over to recollection." But *der Erinnerung* can as well be genitive as dative, and the form of history is *der Gestalt der Erinnerung*. *Übergeben* also means "surrender," or "give up"; so it would be perfectly correct to translate: "and surrenders its historical form." This, surely, is what Hegel intends, for here he is explaining the transition from the historical deployment of the forms of consciousness to the atemporal comprehension of logic.

25. *Enzyklopädie*, 577; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk XII, vii, 1072b27–31.

5
Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic

COMMON PARLANCE

The words "abstract" and "concrete" are commonly used very loosely, "abstract" generally carrying the sense of something diaphanous or "airy-fairy," and "concrete" giving the impression of hard, massive solidity. Sometimes "abstract" is used to convey that which is intangible and merely cogitative, and "concrete" what is tangible and palpably sensible. Schoolchildren are sometimes taught that an abstract noun is the name of something one can neither see nor touch, while a concrete noun is the name of what is visible and can be handled. This relates to another common use of the terms to distinguish the supersensible from the sensible. An analogous distinction is that which correlates the abstract with conceptual thought and the concrete with actual existent things.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFINEMENTS

Although philosophers are reputed to be more careful in their use of terms and to define them precisely, many tend, more or less unconsciously, to fall in with the common way of speaking. At the same time, efforts have been made to adopt a more accurate usage and, perhaps in the attempt to refine common usage, or more often to serve purposes of their own, dictated by their particular epistemological theories, some philosophers have striven to give the terms more exact meaning. John Locke, for example, writes:

> The mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances—separate from all other existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all the same kind.[1]

This definition is carefully framed to suit Locke's doctrine that the whole

and only material of knowledge consists of "ideas" presenting to the mind the replicae of external things which are their causes; but quite apart from that, it reinforces a more pervasive philosophical tendency to equate the general, or universal, with the abstract and the particular with the concrete. The majority of philosophers have regarded the universal (and most still do) as a property common to a number of concrete particulars which is abstracted from them to characterize a class. It is thus an abstract class concept; and this forms the basis of the calculus of classes in symbolic logic, which has been developed and refined by mathematicians and mathematical logicians into set theory.

In mathematics abstraction has been described as the idealization of an approximate practical situation into an exact theoretical one, or the construction of a mathematical model, an abstract logical structure.[2] The undefined terms in mathematical definitions represent abstract entities, one of which is the set, a collection of objects, or elements. Such elements may or may not have a common property, or may have in common nothing except their membership of the set into which they have been collected. Members of a set are usually regarded as particulars, though they need not be (for they may be other sets—subsets), and they may be thought of either as abstract or concrete. Sets, however, are generally regarded as abstract. Richard Martin, for instance, considers sets and classes (treating the two as synonymous) as the paradigm cases of abstract entities, as opposed to individuals, taken as concrete.[3]

At first sight, Hegel seems summarily to reverse both the everyday distinction between abstract and concrete and the philosophical one by declaring that sensible objects and in fact all finite particulars are abstract and that the universal is essentially concrete. Of the Concept he writes: "The concept is what is concrete out and out . . . it is the concrete, and indeed the thoroughly concrete, the subject, as such. The absolute-concrete is Spirit. . . ."[4] Many find this kind of assertion merely bewildering, but, as we shall presently discover, the matter is even less straightforward than the above quotation suggests; on the contrary, it is far more complicated. However, before attending to the detail of Hegel's doctrine, we may pause to observe that contemporary writers have recently found what they consider to be insuperable difficulties in the very distinction of abstract from concrete, however it is defined or explained.

DIFFICULTIES

Martin finds the ontology of Platonic realism, for which (he thinks) abstract sets or classes are fundamental realities, while concrete individuals are considered mere appearances, to be very unsatisfactory and confusing

and, if sets are "reified" and held to be ontologically primary, the real meaning of abstraction puzzles him. (Of course, Plato's "ideas" are anything but sets, as Martin understands them; but to discuss Platonism is not our present aim.) David Lewis, discussing the status of possible worlds, has difficulty in deciding whether they are abstract or concrete, and so what either of these two terms may strictly be taken to mean. Susan Hale claims to have discovered at least twelve different ways of understanding the distinction between abstract and concrete, many of them mutually incompatible, and concludes that the distinction itself is little better than muddled thinking. The general conclusions reached are that the distinction no longer has any discernible or precise philosophical significance and that there is no clear way in which actual existences can be divided into the supposed classes, abstract and concrete.[5] How should a good Hegelian respond to difficulties of this ilk?

HEGEL'S USE OF THE TERMS

Hegel himself does not, at first sight, seem to use these terms uniformly or consistently. By abstraction, in the first place, he quite explicitly intends separation of some factor out of its context or combination with others, and he considers philosophical doctrines abstract that are fixed, or stuck, in a position that is shortsighted and confined to one side of an antithesis. Such doctrines he attributes to the understanding, which he repeatedly refers to as abstract, and as abstracting. As he says in the *Encyclopaedia* (Sect. 80):

> Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own. (Wallace's translation)

One-sidedness he also castigates as the result of abstraction, and one-sided ideas he criticizes as abstract. At other times abstract seems to be equated with positive, as opposed to and exclusive of negative. Further, identity, intolerant of difference, is said to be abstract. Nor are these the only variants of Hegel's usage: the purely immediate and the abstract are used as equivalent terms. And yet, in what seems to be an altogether opposite sense, he often identifies the abstract with what lacks content and is purely formal. In the *Science of Logic* we read:

> When logic is taken as the science of thinking in general it is understood that this thinking constitutes the *mere form* of a cognition, that logic abstracts from all *content*. . . . (Miller's translation, p. 43)

Hegel is renowned for introducing, in defiance of the traditional view, the notion of the concrete universal—the universal that has its particulars in itself. Yet he also speaks of the universal as "taken in the abstract":

> Universal, particular and individual, taken in the abstract, are the same as identity, difference and ground. (*Enz.*, 164)

Again, although the Concept is said to be out and out concrete, we are also told, almost in the same breath, that

> No complaint is oftener made against the concept than that it is *abstract*. This is partly correct, inasmuch as thought as such is its element and not the empirical concrete sensible, partly so far as it is not yet the *Idea*. (*Enz.*, 164)

As elsewhere it is the empirical and sensible that is represented as abstract, such a statement is all the more puzzling.

Further, the concept, despite Hegel's insistence on its concreteness, appears again (by implication) to be abstract, so far as it is a logical category; for logic, we are told, is the science of pure thought, which is merely formal and lacks content. This, however, is not so much Hegel's own view of logic as the view of others whom he criticizes for mistakenly holding that pure thought is contentless. Nevertheless, logic, the science of the Concept, as pure thought, is contrasted with Nature. "This Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought," he writes in the Greater Logic (Miller's translation, p. 843), as if he were contrasting abstract thought with concrete Nature, which the Idea is about to spawn—although elsewhere the merely spatio-temporal and empirical are decried as abstract, and even here the Idea is said to have contracted itself into the immediacy of being, earlier treated as the acme of abstraction. Are we likely to find any more stable meanings among all these divergent usages than the contemporary critics do among more recent applications of the terms under scrutiny?

Before enumerating the various, often apparently incompatible, ways that Hegel uses the terms in question, Philip Grier draws attention to what he describes as "seemingly paradoxical considerations" which cannot be neglected by any investigation into Hegel's employment of them. First pure Being is said to be abstract, while the absolute Idea is concrete and all intermediate categories are ranged in progression from the more abstract to the more concrete. Second all finite categories are held to be abstract. Third, while Being and Nothing are the most abstract categories, they are, nevertheless, viewed in the Logic from the standpoint of absolute knowing, which emerged at the end of the *Phenomenology* as the final identity of subject and object (hence, presumably, the most concrete form of consciousness). Despite this, in the fourth place, Hegel tells us on the one hand that logic is the realm of pure thought and presents the mind of God before the creation of the world and finite spirit, and on the other that it is the realm of shadows, of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness. The fifth paradox we have already noted, the fact that the concrete

universal harbors within it an abstract universal, essential to its own self-evolution. And finally, as we have said, the Concept, although concrete, is declared to be enclosed within pure thought and is contrasted with the externality of Nature.

Decision as to the intended meanings of abstract and concrete and their legitimacy is crucial for Hegel's conception of logic and his method of exposition, yet very few commentators have given the matter much thought, as Philip Grier remarks in the paper to which reference has been made. Most Hegel scholars take these familiar yet essential terms for granted failing to notice the problems posed by their interpretation. This, no doubt, is for the reason Hegel gives in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where he writes:

> Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account. (Miller's translation, p. 18)

Two exceptions, however, have to be noted, separated by more than half a century, J. B. Baillie (1901) and George Kline (1964). Taking the last first, in a paper devoted to critical review of eight authors, who had written in four different languages, four Marxist writers and four non-Marxists, Kline examines in meticulous detail the way in which each of them translates and interprets key terms in the Hegelian system.[6] He discusses at some length their use of "abstract" and "concrete," having himself first distinguished three ways in which these terms may be used: (i) the sense common among the British Empiricists, in which the concrete is the sense-particular and the abstract is the general and universal; (ii) the "ordinary" sense in which concrete means specific as opposed to vague, or else down-to-earth as opposed to flighty and dreamy; and (iii) Hegel's usage, sharply at variance with both of these, for which "concrete" means "many-sided, adequately related, completely mediated" while "abstract" means "one-sided, inadequately related, relatively unmediated."

Kline recognizes that the terms are central to Hegel's thought and he accuses the writers he is discussing (of whom J. N. Findlay is one) of confusing the above distinctions, even when, as some of them do, they correctly understand and explain Hegel's use of the terms. Kline's own distinctions are, in general, the same as what I suggested earlier, and are in the main correct; but he does not discuss the apparent variations in Hegel's use of the terms, nor does he address the difficulties they seem to portend in the attempt to understand him aright, in particular Kline does not consider the central problem to which we shall presently turn, as it is raised by Grier.

Baillie distinguishes two kinds, or degrees, of abstraction, one that is

ultimately false and another which in the last resort is true, in the sense that what is abstracted is treated as a part of, and as determined by, the whole to which it actually belongs. Grier quotes:

> Where we have one element of experience cut loose from the concrete life of experience (e.g. where subject is taken *per se* apart from object), there, says Hegel, we have false abstraction; we restrict the content considered to one aspect, and cut it out of its usual connection with the whole, which alone is true, for the "truth is the whole." But where the content dealt with is considered as determining and determined by the whole, as *explicitly* involving the system of experience to which it belongs, that content though abstract is a true abstract, for it is concrete as experience itself. Thus the concepts [notions], because not taken as subjective nor as objective, but as constitutive of experience as a whole, are ultimate truths of experience, and not *mere* abstractions.[7]

This comment is hardly sufficient to elucidate all the diverse and bewildering applications of the terms in Hegel's writing; but it is suggestive and may prove helpful. I shall return to it at a later stage. Meanwhile, before we consider how, if at all, we may be able to find a path through the Hegelian labyrinth, there is a more weighty question to be answered.

THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM

Not only are we faced with the task of sorting out all the apparently divergent usages Hegel employs, there is a more central problem and one involving a principle primary to Hegel's philosophy. In the Preface to the Second Edition of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* he lays it down that "the Science of Logic must surpass even mathematics," for

> Such an exposition would demand that at no stage of the development should any thought-determination or reflection occur which does not immediately emerge at this stage and that has not entered this stage from the one preceding it. . . . (Miller's translation)

Now, abstract and concrete are terms that occur ubiquitously throughout the Logic, but they do not emerge at any stage as categories, nor at any stage have they entered as a consequence of the one preceding. What then is their status? They are, surely, concepts, yet they are not "deduced" as specifications of the Concept. And if they are not categories, what are they? Might they be simply expositional terms, helping to explain the status and use of other concepts? If so, there must be a distinction between exposition and subject matter that seems to run counter to Hegel's demand, both here and in the *Phenomenology*, that the subject should develop itself. The use of the terms under consideration seems, besides, to violate the requirement of a presuppositionless beginning.

This lapse Hegel himself admits, but he pleads that it is inevitable (using one of the suspect terms in the very next sentence to the one quoted above):

> However, such an abstract perfection of exposition must, I admit, in general be dispensed with; the very fact that the science must begin with what is absolutely simple, that is, with what is most general and of least import, would restrict the exposition solely to these quite simple expressions of the simple without any further addition . . .

It would then seem that a presuppositionless beginning is impossible, although in the very first chapter of the Doctrine of Being he persists in requiring it.

Despite appearances, however, there is here no inconsistency on Hegel's part, for the dialectical process, as will shortly become more evident, must involve *Aufhebung*, the supersession along with the preservation of every finite phase. Accordingly, any and every category, short of the Absolute itself, in some sense, both excludes and implies its other. Hence it must anticipate to some extent what is yet to come (for that is implicit in it) and presuppose what has gone before. To begin with the most simple is, therefore, to have before one what is implicitly more complex; yet it is only by unfolding these implications in a strict and proper sequence that the subject matter can be scientifically developed. The beginning of the Logic (pure Being), although it is logically presuppositionless, does at the same time necessarily imply at least the dialectical process of the *Phenomenology*, which has raised consciousness to the level of absolute knowing, below which no genuine *wissenschaftliche* beginning can be made at all. The apparent exercise of hindsight in the Preface, therefore, is dialectically vindicated.

Even so, the issue concerning the status of abstract and concrete as categories is of no little importance for Hegel's project in the Logic, because that is to set out in due order the inherent self-development of the Concept, its self-specification, in the course of which all the categories of common experience and of science are supposed to be encompassed, and among these, surely, abstract and concrete should figure. If they do not, and if they are nevertheless indispensable for the exposition of the dialectic, there must be some theoretical principle, or principles, which the dialectic is incapable of producing in the necessary course of its self-unfolding. That would undermine Hegel's fundamental thesis and destabilize the whole of his presentation of the dialectical process. Grier states the predicament thus:

> Given the over-all aim of the *Logic* to articulate the entire circle of fundamental categories or concepts necessary for a rational comprehension of what is actual, the apparently necessary retention of extraneous terms in the exposition might be taken as a tacit confession that the project had failed to achieve its announced goal. Or that the project

appears to succeed only with the help of some machinery hidden in the expository standpoint.[8]

PROSPECTIVE SUBMISSIONS

In attempting to resolve this problem and to throw light on the deviations, apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes of Hegel's usage of the two opposed terms, I shall argue for two theses. The first is that the different quasi-definitions of the terms that he gives are not really inconsistent and all follow from the primary meaning that he adopts. The second is that the reconciliation of expository device with self-development of the subject matter is to be found in the final category of the Logic, the absolute Idea, where form and content prove to be identical.

PRELIMINARY CLEARANCE

Before tackling the main question head-on, a word may be said about some of the difficulties into which modern critics have fallen with the abstract-concrete distinction. The modern writers who fail to find consistent meaning for the opposing ideas, and so seek to reject the distinction as unsatisfactory, have done no more than rediscover what Hegel perpetually instilled into his readers, that opposites are in the end identical, something true not only of this but of all similar distinctions. If one of the distincta is stressed to the exclusion of the other, it will of course tend to turn into its opposite and to contradict itself, so neither taken in isolation will appear self-consistent.

This applies to all the examples that have been offered. The Platonic realism that Richard Martin complains about is reputed to elevate what we normally take to be abstract to the pinnacle of reality, which we normally take to be concrete. Here (without necessarily implicating Plato himself) we find the so-called realist embracing the abstract idea apart from its concrete embodiment and giving it priority. The critic then rigidly maintaining the separation of the two opposites, finds the doctrine involved in self-contradiction because an abstract idea cannot be concretely real. Others, holding fast to the dichotomy and considering the merely possible (i.e., noncontradictory), abstract, and existent worlds concrete, find themselves entangled in self-contradiction when they seek to envisage possible worlds. Other interpretations, under similar conditions of bi-partition, fall into similar discord and can find no clear or satisfactory meaning for the contrasting adjectives. Consequently, the conclusion is reached that our ontology will not support a partition of things into abstract and concrete as mutually excluding classes.

This conclusion is entirely correct and no good Hegelian would ever

entertain the supposition that any such bisection of reality is legitimate or tolerable, and modern writers who find it unacceptable have, once again, simply revealed that thinking on the level of the understanding always ultimately proves self-frustrating and unsatisfactory.

HEGEL'S USES

R. G. Collingwood once wrote:

> To abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable. . . . One cannot abstract without falsifying. . . . To think apart of things that are together is to think of them as they are not, and to plead that this initial severance makes no essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle.[9]

This might very suitably be taken as a text on which to base any discussion of Hegel's use of the terms "abstract" and "concrete." Turning then to Hegel's employment of the terms, all those we have listed lead back to the first: abstraction is primarily defined as the "drawing out" from the concrete whole of some element, which is then considered, or assumed, to be self-sufficient, and held in isolation from the rest. The other suggested definitions are mainly exemplifications, or applications, corollaries or consequences, of the first.

We have learnt from the *Phenomenology* that the truth is the whole, but that it is not what it is in truth until the end and outcome is reached of its own self-development (*Sichselbstwerden*). It is thus only at the end that we shall be in a position to sort out the kind of issue, and to solve the kind of problem that lies before us. The doctrine of the Concept (often infelicitously translated "Notion"), and especially the concept of the Idea, is where we should look for enlightenment.

The whole is genuinely whole only in its full systematic self-differentiation, and it differentiates itself into parts which, to form a whole, are (and must be) mutually adapted and internally related as its ordering principle dictates. This ordering principle is the concrete universal, having (as Hegel puts it) its particulars within itself. Accordingly, while the parts are in the whole and constitute its determinate unity, the whole is also immanent in every one of the parts and (in F. H. Bradley's words) "informs each part with the nature of the whole." Consequently, every part is itself a provisional whole, although as partial and provisional it has a nisus to develop what is merely implicit in it (*an sich*), and to become a more adequate exemplification of the universal ordering principle (the Concept). So, in the Logic, Hegel defines a category as a provisional definition of the Absolute. Each category is a concept and a provisional version of *the* Concept, which, he declares, is in truth what the others are only in some degree.

Now, the whole is obviously concrete in the fullest sense; it is wholeness, or integrity, that defines concreteness. In contrast, what is "drawn away," or separated out, from the whole, and held apart from it and from its concomitant other (its complement) is abstract. But as any such abstracted element, to be what it is intrinsically, or in fact to be anything at all intelligible, must somehow reflect the organizing principle of the whole (for it is in accordance with that principle that it has its place in the whole, is adjusted to, and shaped to intermesh with, the other interrelated parts), and as it is what its other makes it, every element implies the larger whole to which it belongs. Thus it is in some degree a whole in itself, containing implicitly what it has in it to become. It is a provisional expression, an exemplification at a certain stage of development, of the ultimate concrete universal.

Everything, therefore, is both concrete and abstract in some degree, as long as it falls short in any respect of the Absolute. So every "official" category in the Logic exemplifies this unity of opposites, and we most certainly cannot affirm an ontological (any more than a logical) dichotomy between what is abstract and what is concrete. It is precisely for this reason that the understanding creates confusion when it attempts to identify the abstract with, and to confine it to, the universal, and the concrete to the particular, only to discover that the particular turns into its opposite and is equally (if not even more) abstract, and the universal (as species) also particular.

The dialectical relation between categories is, therefore, complex. As each is only a provisional definition of the Absolute, it is in some degree inadequate to its own concept, and so it must be superseded. As far as this is the case, it is finite, limited by what lies beyond its immediate bounds. It is accordingly opposed to its other and to what supersedes it. Yet this other defines it and determines what it is in itself, so they are mutually complementary and together constitute a more adequate whole, exemplifying the Concept more fully. They are at once opposites and also complementary distincts, and each displays a different degree of adequacy to the Concept. They are each and all both abstract and concrete, each in its specific degree. For the same reason, each sums up the development prior to the stage of which it is typical, and sublates the previous categories, preserving them as moments within itself. No satisfactory account of any can be given that fails to do justice either to the moments which contribute to its degree of actualization, or to the implication it holds of further concretion.

We should now be in a position to see the force and significance of all the various ways in which Hegel uses the terms "abstract" and "concrete" and how they should be construed. (i) The abstract is what is separated from, as opposed to what is held in explicit relation to its context in, the whole. (ii) It

is for this reason partial and one-sided, as opposed to what unites and does justice to opposed aspects, holding the moments of their unity together and reconciling their opposition. (iii) Equally, because it seeks to exclude its other, it pretends to unqualified positivity involving no negativity, oblivious of this very exclusion. Consequently, (iv) it presents itself immediately, unmediated by the relation to what it negates, as opposed to the immediacy in which mediation has been sublated. (v) Such an abstraction is immobilized at an incomplete and limited stage of self-development, obstructing the progress of the dialectic by refusal to acknowledge its intrinsic and indispensable relation to its other; so it remains fixed in its separation from its complement. (vi) The supposedly formal and empty of content is a case in point: it depends for its formal character on the content that it informs, without which it is nothing, yet it assumes an independent validity of its own. The first of these is the appropriate definition; the rest are consequences and corollaries.

The Central Issue

We may now turn to what is the central problem of this discussion, the relation of exposition to subject matter, whether abstract and concrete belong solely to the former or have a specific place in the latter. Are they categories, or only descriptive terms peculiar to the exposition of the Logic?

In the quoted passage from the Preface to the Greater Logic the demand made is that, at no step in the development of the subject should a category (or thought-determination) come to the fore which has not immediately emerged at that stage and been derived from the one preceding. From what has been said it should now be apparent that the contrast between abstract and concrete emerges at every stage, from the very beginning, where Being and Nothing contrast as abstract with the first concrete category (as Hegel calls it), Becoming; and that it necessarily emerges from whatever has preceded.

The question arises, however, whether abstract and concrete (each individually, or both together in correlation) rank as categories in the proper sense. Could either, or the dual complementarity, be regarded as a provisional definition of the Absolute? Are they not rather descriptive terms applicable to any and every category (in varying degrees) that is a moment of the absolute Idea? Clearly the terms do not belong among the dual complementaries that are categories of Essence, for they are not the inner and outer aspects of an identical actuality, but are rather terms indicating the degree of completeness and integrity of the category under consideration (whichever it may be). It is because they do this that they figure repeatedly in the exposition of the dialectical progression, and not as "official"

categories in the logical series. They belong, as it were, to the metalanguage of logic. If they could be subsumed under any category, perhaps the most appropriate would be Degree; but that, as a category of pure Quantity, seems insufficiently versatile. Further, abstraction is the characteristic activity of the understanding, which, though relevant to the type of logical thinking in operation, is not itself a logical category, but is a phase in the phenomenology of mind. Whether a conception is abstract or concrete depends in large measure on the attitude of mind with which it is entertained; and here Baillie's distinction between true and false abstraction becomes relevant.

The understanding seeks to take the elements of the concrete whole apart, and to hold them in mutual isolation (or at best in external relation); and, as has been said, to think apart of things that go together is to falsify. So this type of abstraction is false. But speculative reason, while recognizing and insisting upon the finite and partial status of the moments within the whole, sees them in their full and proper context, maintaining at once the necessity for both differentiation and unity as conditions of concrete reality. Thus what Baillie rightly recognizes as "true" abstraction is the realization of the provisional nature and incompleteness of the finite, without negating its connection and contribution to the whole within which its shortcomings are *aufgehoben*—canceled out, although its definite distinctness is preserved as well as transcended. Hegel constantly criticizes the "false" abstract view of finite categories held by the understanding, while he stresses their legitimacy and importance as necessary stages in the dialectical development (their truth as moments). This double treatment of them (especially in the Doctrine of Essence)[10] is a characteristic of his exposition, the not infrequent oversight of which often results in misinterpretation. Commentators are apt to attribute to Hegel, as the position he is advocating, the "false" abstractions that he is in fact criticizing.

But if the terms under scrutiny belong more properly to the exposition than to the dialectical process, we have still to face the question of the relation between these two aspects of the philosophical science. Exposition, it is clear, is the same as method; so our question is concerned with the relation between method (or form) and elements (or content)—*Methodenlehre und Elementarlehre.* This becomes explicit at the end of the science, where Hegel deals with the Idea, especially under the idea of cognition, and again under the absolute Idea. The whole which is the truth is Idea, and Idea is this whole at the level of absolute knowing—the whole fully conscious of itself and of its own self-differentiation (*Sichselbstwerden*). At this level of self-awareness its self-differentiation takes the form of judgment (*Urteil*), and the process of judgment is that of the self-exposition of the Idea, which is the logical dialectic. Here in the Logic, the matter

under investigation is the method itself, and this method is no more nor less than the sublated process of development, through intuition and understanding (to go no further back) up to the level of reason, and the mode of operation of consciousness at each of these levels. When absolute knowing is reached this dialectical process becomes the object of its own scrutiny in the forms of Being, Essence, and Concept. In idea the subject is at home with itself (*bei sich selbst*) in its other (i.e., its object, which is its own self-development) and their identity is fully explicit and obvious. The method (which is the dialectic) and the elements are one and the same. Accordingly, in Idea, exposition and subject matter, form and content, coalesce, and the mind (or Spirit), in its awareness of its own procedure, is aware at every stage of the degree of abstractness and concreteness of every category.

It transpires, then, that these terms are indicative of the immanence of the Idea in every phase of the dialectic. The self-reflective character of the exposition of the logical dialectic discloses, at every stage, the degree of abstraction and/or concretion involved. But, just as subject and object are held apart, and form and content are separated, at the level of understanding, so, in the earlier stages of the Logic, exposition is apparently distinguished from the dialectical process, only to be reunited with it and absorbed into it at the end.

So the provisional definitions of abstract and concrete that we entertained at the beginning of this discussion are transcended, and the apparent paradoxes they seemed to present are resolved. If we held them to be equivalent to universal and particular, we now find (in the Doctrine of the Concept) that these are united in the concrete self-specifying universal, which has its particulars within itself; that the Concept, as a whole, is at once universal, particular, and individual, and that each of these is the whole Concept as well as one of its moments. If we held abstract and concrete to be equivalent to form and content, or if we thought of them as correlative to method and elements, in the Idea we find that they are one and the same. If "abstract" and "concrete" are expositional terms rather than categories, we now find that exposition is, after all, nothing but the judgmental process by which the dialectic expounds its own course and method of development, and that they belong together. The distinction, however, is never entirely obliterated, because difference is as necessary to concrete wholeness as is identity, and the expositional terms appear in the account of the later categories as they do in the account of the earlier.

In his discussion of the problem I have made central, Grier concludes that

> the intelligibility of many of Hegel's remarks involving the abstract and the concrete, especially towards the end of the Logic, presupposes an

> identity between the content of thought and the content of the actual (expressed in the Concept), and that identity can be explicated only by reference to the "infinitude" and the "timelessness" of the Concept. . . . in the end Hegel's use of the terms "abstract" and "concrete" is so interwoven with his doctrine of the Concept that any attempt to make sense of all the occurrences of those two terms in the text while ignoring the doctrine of the Concept is bound to collapse in a heap of apparent paradoxes.[11]

Of this there can be no doubt. The question that we have been considering cannot be answered unless we take account of the outcome of the logical dialectic which reveals the truth in its true form, the Idea in its infinitude and timelessness. The abstract is the finite, which comes to be and passes away, which is limited by what it excludes and abstracts from. It is, therefore, as we were told in the *Phenomenology*, inevitably subject to time. The concrete self-conscious whole transcends the limits and embraces, in mutual reconciliation, the opposing moments. So it transcends, and, in Hegel's words, "extinguishes" time (*die Zeit tilgt*). He asserts, further, that "Time itself in its concept is eternal."[12] Here the relation of process to substance becomes transparent, and the degrees of abstraction and concreteness are sublated. They are revealed as no more than incidents upon the degree of finiteness of the passing phase. Accordingly, "abstract" and "concrete" can be used only as descriptive terms appropriate at every stage of the dialectic, and they do not constitute separate categories, if only because both (each in some degree) are characteristic of every category throughout the dialectical scale.

Notes

1. Cf. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, xi, 9.
2. C. B. Allendoerfer and C. O. Oakley, *Principles of Mathematics* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), p. 12.
3. Cf. Richard Martin, "On the Metaphysical Status of Mathematical Entities," *Review of Metaphysics* 39 (September 1985).
4. *Enzyklopädie*, 164.
5. Cf. David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 81–86; Susan C. Hale, "Spacetime and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction," *Philosophical Studies* 53 (1988). I am indebted for these references and for the discussion of these critics to Professor Philip Grier's paper, "Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic," read to the American Hegel Society in 1988 and published in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, ed. George di Giovanni (Albany, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1990).
6. Cf. G. Kline, "Some Recent Reinterpretations of Hegel's Philosophy," *The Monist* XLVIII (1964), pp. 34–75.
7. Cf. Grier, op. cit., and J. B. Baillie, *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic* (1901; reprinted New York: Garland, 1984), p. 234.

8. Cf. Grier, op. cit., p. 62.
9. R. G. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 160.
10. Cf. my *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, 154f.
11. *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, p. 73f.
12. *Phenomenology*, 429, 487; and *Enzyklopädie* 258 *Zusatz*. Mathematics is a special case and seems to present a difficulty. Mathematical truths are eternal, yet they are also abstract, formal, and to that extent finite. They are abstracted from physical reality, yet the number series, on which they are based, seems to have an independent reality of its own, and is timeless. While I cannot here discuss this problem at length, the suggestion may be offered that mathematics is one way of presenting "time in its concept." Aristotle, for example, regards time as the dimension, or numerable character of change (*Physics*, IV, xi, 220a4).

6
Hegel on Identity (A Reply to Siemens)

Hegel and the Law of Identity

Few topics have occasioned more irritated criticism of Hegel than his views on the Laws of Thought in formal logic, not least what he says about the Law of Identity, which is the root of the matter. Analytically minded philosophers especially, if they take notice of Hegel at all, are upset, not to say outraged, by his assertions on this theme. But their criticism, when voiced, is almost always based on failure of understanding—or rather, it would be more correct to say, failure to go beyond understanding, in Hegel's sense of that word.

A paper by Reynold Siemens, which appeared in 1988, in the September number of the *Review of Metaphysics*,[1] is a good example of such criticism and is especially interesting because it closely follows the teachings of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, and is thus representative of more influential writers. In the course of his attack on Hegel, Siemens takes exception to my explanation in *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel* of the philosopher's doctrine, accusing me of muddle and confusion. In defending myself against him, therefore, I hope to be able to clarify Hegel's position along with my own and at the same time to expose what I believe to be serious misunderstandings by those who believe that Hegel rejected the Law of Identity.

That the criticism is based on confusion of thought is apparent from the very beginning of Siemens's article, in his allegations that Hegel is ambivalent about the Law of Identity and that he equivocates over the meaning of "true," for neither, as I hope to show, is the case. But it is a confusion not confined to Siemens, nor to analytic philosophers, for it is made by much more sympathetic commentators (e.g., in some contexts, by McTaggart).

Truth and Correctness

Hegel makes it quite clear that what he regards as the truth is the whole, and that this whole cannot be grasped, as it is in truth, except through its

self-development, and as the outcome of the developmental process.[2] The form and structure of the process is dialectical, and the relevant phase, for our present purpose, is the Logic, which is concerned with the logical form of the truth, namely, the Concept. The whole (that is, the entire object of experience) is brought to consciousness of itself in this science (*Wissenschaft*) of Logic, in and as the Concept, as it develops into absolute Idea.

In the course of its dialectical development the Concept traverses numerous stages, each one of which is a concept (a thought-determination or category) at its own specific level, and is, Hegel tells us, a provisional definition of the Absolute (or ultimate whole). It is a provisional definition because it is the Absolute at a specific level of its own *Sichselbstwerden*. But, as no more than a specific phase of that self-development, it is the Absolute only potentially, only provisionally; and because it is no more than provisional, it is not in the strict sense true, for the truth about it (or what is true of it) is the Concept itself. Nevertheless, it may be described as "correct." It has a degree or modicum of truth appropriate to its own stage of the dialectic. In his treatment of formal logic and its laws, Hegel makes this distinction between "correctness" and "truth" quite clear, without any equivocation.[3]

As experience develops, the mind (*Geist*) advances from mere perceptual thinking and understanding to speculative reason. The Hegelian distinction between the last two is well known. The understanding represents the reflective stage of knowing, and Hegel stresses its typical insistence on rigid distinctions, its persistence in holding the distincts apart, and its endeavor to maintain their identity in separation one from another. This, he says, is an important characteristic of precise thinking, indispensable for accuracy and "correctness," but it is, at best, only a halfway stage in the progression towards truth. All the same, it *is* a stage, and a necessary one, in the dialectical process; so it is an ever-present aspect of all sound thinking. It fails, however, when and insofar as the understanding is incapable of grasping the interdependence of the distincta within the system of the whole which gives them legitimate definition and meaning, and the stability they lack when held separate and in isolation.

In the Logic, Hegel is expounding this dialectical progression, and, especially in the Doctrine of Essence, where he discusses the Law of Identity, he is dealing with the categories of reflection—in particular, those of the understanding—whose own theory of reflective thinking is formal logic. In his exposition, Hegel is doing two things at once, which he does not always distinguish explicitly enough for his critics to recognize. He is expounding the course of the dialectic and setting out the categories appropriate to its current level of development, and he is also criticizing them (as categories of reflection) from the point of view of speculative reason—of the Concept.

Consequently, his critics (like Siemens) tend to attribute to him, as assertions of his own beliefs, what he is in fact criticizing as inadequately understood categories and ideas of the understanding, which, in consequence of their inadequacy to the whole that is developing through them, fall into contradiction and logomachy on their own level.

So Siemens fails to observe, in his first quotation from the *Science of Logic*,[4] that Hegel is reporting the views of *gesunder Menschenverstand* (sound common sense) which finds such propositions as "a tree is a tree" immediately clear in themselves and in need of no further confirmation. Hegel is not here stating his own opinion, but the common view, and he goes on (as Mr. Siemens's second quotation shows[5]) to point out that such statements are also usually dismissed as silly, because even sound common sense never really thinks in accordance with what is reputed to be a law of thought (the traditional Law of Identity, "A is A"). It must be noted that Hegel is not castigating the law as such, but *what it is reputed to be* by philosophers of the understanding. This becomes apparent from the next passage that Siemens quotes.[6]

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

In Hegel's Logic, the main locus of the critique of the Laws of Thought comes in the Doctrine of Essence under the categories of Identity and Difference. The main point that Hegel seeks to establish is that these two concepts are mutually implicative. He insists that there can be no bare, or pure, identity, because the identity of any object or concept is constituted by its relations to what it differs from, so that to identify is always by the same token to distinguish. For anything to be itself, it must, ipso facto, be distinguished from everything else. In short, identity is always identity in difference. Further, nothing is a bare particular without internal diversity, and so nothing can be identified except in terms of its characteristics. It is an identity of differences. Moreover, we always identify over differences, either of time, or of appearance, or of designation, or of some other distinction. Statements of identity must, therefore, always imply some sort of diversity, and if all difference is excluded from them, either they become vacuous, losing all significance, or else they contradict themselves by denying what alone can determine the identity claimed. Accordingly, Hegel is scathing in his criticism of the formal logicians of the understanding, who contend that the so-called Law of Thought, stated as "A is A," expresses pure identity without any difference at all.

THE ANALYTIC CRITIQUE OF HEGEL

Siemens gives a number of examples of propositions that Hegel offers as instantiating the form "A = A," or "A is A," and points out that they do not all conform to the modern logician's formula, $x = x$. It is not alleged that Hegel thought that they did, an assumption that would hardly be warranted; nor is it clear what is supposed to follow from the fact. It is admitted that Hegel is simply following the practice of his immediate predecessors, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant; but this is surely of no great consequence for Siemens's purpose, which is, presumably to demonstrate a confusion, or misconstrual by Hegel of the nature of identity. He is said, however, to ignore statements like

"The morning star is the evening star"
"Scott is the author of *Waverley*"
"Mount Everest is Chomolungma"

These, it is admitted, are not instantiations of the Law of Identity; and as that is what Hegel is discussing it should not be surprising if he ignores them in that context. On the other hand, in a footnote, Siemens accuses me of the mistaken assumption that they are such instantiations, giving a reference to my book where no evidence is forthcoming that I make any such claim. I do indeed impute the argument *to a possible objector* that in the proposition represented by "A is A" the subject might differ from the predicate in sense but not in reference, and I maintain that if he did, he would simply be supporting Hegel's (and my) case, something that Siemens has apparently missed, although all the above examples are obviously assertions of identity in difference.

Nevertheless, Siemens approaches Hegel's criticism, conceding that he is doing so "obliquely," by way of such statements (while, at the same time, he implies that they are irrelevant), drawing upon the discussion of definite descriptions by Russell and Moore. Both of these writers seem to admit, by implication, that Hegel is quite right, because each of the statements selected does assert an identity in difference, although Russell becomes worried lest somebody may be misled by them into thinking that Scott and the author of *Waverley* were two different people; and Moore fears that they might induce us to believe that a thing could be different from itself. These misgivings are obviously groundless, but Siemens contends that Hegel and I imagine identity statements do, or must, imply that two things are one and the same thing, and that this is palpably absurd. It is supposed to be for this reason that Hegel is misled into holding that the Law of Identity is a contradiction.

IN DEFENSE OF HEGEL

Siemens does not make clear what he means by "thing," so it is difficult to be sure of understanding him aright (or for that matter Russell and Moore either). In any case, neither Hegel nor I entertain the sort of assumption imputed to us. What I take Hegel to be maintaining is that statements of identity, if they are to have any sense, must always involve some difference between the subject and the predicate terms, and that it is because the philosopher of the understanding denies this that *he* converts his Law of Identity into a contradiction. This is why Hegel maintains that, as understood in formal logic, the formula "A is A" contradicts the propositional form in which it is enunciated, for that always promises a distinction between subject and predicate.

As for the absurdity of asserting that two things are one thing, of course, if the "things" referred to are people (like Scott and Dickens, or Shakespeare and Bacon), to say that they are the same person would be absurd (although many have ventured that hypothesis about the last two). But there are other "things" of which this is by no means true. A Beethoven violin sonata is one "thing" (whether qua performance or qua score), yet it is also two "things": a violin part and a piano part. A song is one "thing," yet it is both a tune and a poem. In these cases, there is no absurdity at all in identifying two "things."

Although Hegel was acutely aware of this sort of relationship between the constituents of genuine wholes, and it was constantly present to his thought and argument, his criticism of the Law of Identity does not rest on such examples, but upon the general truth that there can be no genuine identity, nor any sensible identification of anything, that does not involve difference of some sort. When this is admitted, the Law of Identity is perfectly legitimate, but when it is denied only absurdity results.

The sort of difference implied by statements, when they make sensible assertions, varies in different contexts. For emphasis I may say: "A spade is a spade [and not merely a genteel domestic instrument]," or "Crime is crime [and not just aberrant behavior]," or "God is God [not a man-made idol or an abstract idea]." Or I may seek to draw attention to an identity with the pronouncement that "the plant is the plant [cultivated with such care by my wife]" (although here I should probably make the distinction clearer by using the demonstrative: "*that* plant is . . . "). Or, again, statements that identify differents may refer to differences of timing, as in "the morning star is the evening star"; or of nomenclature, as in "Everest is Chomolungma," and so on. Such statements, however, are not (it is admitted) cases of substitution for "A is A." But if under pressure from some logical dogma the philosopher of the understanding insists that "A is

A" implies no difference at all, any sentence substituting singular (or other) terms for the variables becomes meaningless iteration. When all difference vanishes, as Hegel says, no statement is made and meaning evaporates. Mathematicians seldom, if ever, find it useful to write "$x = x$," although "$x = y$" may be an important formula. So the modern logician's "$x = x$," without further qualification, should be treated with caution.

On the other hand, the Law of Identity is perfectly legitimate when it is recognized that identity and identification always depend on the reciprocal definition of finite things and concepts by their mutual correlations in a systematic whole. Then "A is A and not not-A" makes sense, the systematic whole being the ground both of the identity and of the difference. What must not be forgotten is that *omnis determinatio est negatio*, the negation being as important to the identity as the positive assertion. Hegel has discussed all this and expounded its dialectic in the Doctrine of Being, under the category *Dasein* (determinate being) and its subcategories *Ansichsein* (being-in-itself) and *Sein-für-Anderes* (being for another). In the Doctrine of Essence the same concepts surface again as Identity and Difference, concepts now of reflection, not simply of immediate perception. These are being expounded at a higher level of the dialectic, and what is being criticized is the abstract notion of identity entertained by the understanding.

McTaggart, as quoted by Siemens, is (for once), therefore, entirely correct in his representation of Hegel's argument. And Hume, whom he also quotes,[7] has the same insight, in spite of his insistence elsewhere that whatever objects are different are distinguishable and separable, and that separable objects (impressions and ideas) are separate existences.

SIEMENS'S MISCONCEPTIONS

Siemens, further, accuses me of believing that "an A is A statement like
(1) The plant is the plant,
because it is a relational statement, entails a statement like
(4) The plant is *different from* the plant.
And . . . that a statement like (4), in turn entails a statement like
(5) Not-(The plant is the plant)."
and I am said to believe this because I allege that a relation must have at least two terms (an argument I am supposed to have "resurrected" or borrowed from Stace); and Hume, Peter Geach, and the younger Wittgenstein, in whose good (if unlikely) company I am held to be, are all said to be mistaken, because we all rely on the objectionable premise that "a relation can obtain only between different things" (what sort of "things," again, is not explained).

Siemens apparently thinks, in company with McTaggart (who, notwithstanding, admits that no relation can be expressed without a plurality of terms), that there are monadic relations, and that a "thing" can have a relation (e.g., of identity) to itself, where "itself" involves no difference. I must confess that I am unable to conceive any such relation. Kant, it is true, thought that "I = I" could be analytic. Yet even for him, "I = I" is an identity over different times at which the judgment "I think" is entailed, and different "representations" entertained; and the analytic identity is asserted as a counter to the presumption that the "I think" prefaced to one representation at one time refers to a different subject from the "I think" prefaced to some other representation at another time. Thus it should indeed be recognized as an identity in difference. Moreover, Kant promptly goes on to explain that the unity of apperception (which issues from I = I) involves spontaneous a priori synthesis of the diverse representations into a world of objects, so that it is in fact through the synthetic unity of our experience as a whole that we become aware of the identity of the ego.[8]

It is, however, conceded by Siemens that a relational statement must contain more than one token singular term, although it need not therefore be an assertion of a many-termed relation. Nor, presumably, does it assert a relation between the tokens. But, if the relation is monadic, between what does it hold? Between something and itself? But then its self must be projected from itself, as Hegel avers, by reflection, and is related to itself much as your mirror image is related to you. Without some distinction, how can a relation of any kind be envisaged? If, in some hour of remorse, somebody were to exclaim, "I hate myself," the self that is hated is disowned by the I that hates, distinguished and repelled from it. To persuade his readers, Siemens should have produced some more convincing examples of monadic relations, whereas the only one he seems to contemplate is the one in dispute: identity.

Now certainly, if I believed, what I do not, that the assertion, "A is A," involved no difference of any sort, and is nevertheless the expression of a diadic relation, I should have to infer that A is somehow both the same as and not the same as A, and therefore = not-A, and that would be absurd. So if Siemens believes that no difference is implied in "A is A" statements, unless he can explain how a relation can have only one term, and how, as a monadic relation, "A = A" can make sense, he ought to endorse the beliefs he attributes to me. But I do not hold them and have explicitly attributed them only to philosophers of the understanding and to formal logicians who are of similar persuasion. It is they who contradict themselves, not I, nor Hegel; and if they try to get round the absurdity by saying that identity statements assert monadic relations, they simply strengthen Hegel's reason for castigating such statements as silly and meaningless.

I am further accused of defending the claim (which actually I never make) that identity statements identify different things, by giving a peculiar account of what identity statements are about. It is alleged that I hold them to be about words. Only someone who had read rather carelessly the passage from my book that Siemens quotes could believe any such thing. There I attribute the view of what identity statements are about, that he considers peculiar, to a putative *objector* to Hegel, one who offers a very similar criticism to Siemens's own, to the effect that identity statements refer to one object by means of two tokens. I then say that the objection is disingenuous so far as the objector identifies the tokens as proper names and avers that at each occurrence the token is the same, implying that what are being identified *are* the tokens. If Siemens disapproves of this implication, he is on my side, and he should not impute to me views that I (rightly or wrongly) attribute to my opponents. I do not seek to find fault with anything that he quotes from Russell, or Quine, to illustrate what modern logicians do, who are not Hegelians. But is it really true that formal logicians never maintain that the variables they use to stand for singular terms are proper names?

Identity statements are certainly not about the symbols in which they are formulated, although they can sometimes be about words. What, for instance, is the statement, "*Bestimmung* = determination," about? And they can sometimes be about proper names: "Jupiter is Jove," "Jahwe is Jehovah." These statements might be about the gods named, but there are very good contexts in which they are simply about their names. The debate is not, however, concerned with what such statements are about, it is over whether the identity they assert can be devoid of all difference, and none of the above examples is evidence that it can.

Finally, Hegel is credited with the belief that *things* are numerically different from their properties, and old arguments are resurrected about the ambiguity of the copula. The analyses given by Russell and Siemens are gross travesties of anything Hegel may have said or written.[9] Siemens is straining to discover why it is that Hegel contends, what after all is nothing very outrageous, that the propositional form promises a significant qualification of the subject by the predicate, and that purely tautological statements fail to fulfill this promise. It is then quite falsely imputed to him that he holds things to be numerically different from their properties, and concludes that to identify the properties with them (to predicate the properties of them) involves contradiction.

In the first place, I should wish to maintain that numerical identity is properly repudiated by anybody who respects Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and that numerical identity is a spurious kind of identity.[10] But this is somewhat beside the main point. What Hegel actually

maintains is that to elevate the distinction between the thing and its properties into a separation, or so-called numerical difference, is typical of the way in which the understanding thinks, of which the Russell-Siemens argument is an eminent example; and, because it is unwarranted, it does lead to contradiction. It is only

> if it is assumed that *no two things* are *the same*, that is, everything is different from everything else, then A is not equal to A.[11]

To get out of the difficulty, the understanding comes up with a new distinction, which again it exaggerates into a difference, between the "is" of identity and the "is" of attribution, failing to observe that the copula serves both functions in one. And it can do so because identity implies difference, and vice versa.

THE THING AND ITS PROPERTIES

The thing and its properties are one of the double categories coming late in the middle subdivision of Hegel's Logic, the Doctrine of Essence. It is a subcategory of Existence, arising from Ground, in which Identity and Difference have been synthesized and united (Ground is the systematic whole that is both identically one and internally differentiated). In discussing this category, Hegel characteristically distinguishes two levels on which it can be viewed: as an abstract category of the understanding, a butt of his critique, and as a legitimate category of reflection leading on to further development towards Actuality and to the transition from reflection to speculative reason in the Concept. Abstractly treated, properties are held apart from the thing to which they are attributed and considered "numerically" different from it; then the kind of troubles arise that disturb Siemens. Concretely viewed, the thing (in itself) is seen as the aspect of identity, and its properties (its relations to and reactions with other things) as the aspect of difference. Keeping the two sides apart leads to other difficulties than those that trouble Siemens, and although they have a place in Hegel's critique, we need not consider them here. When thing and its properties are recognized as inseparable aspects of a unitary concept, and the identity of the thing is defined in terms of its relations to others, the dialectic proceeds through subsequent categories without hindrance, in the way I have briefly indicated.

MISREPRESENTATIONS CORRECTED

At the end of his paper Siemens says that Hegel has misinterpreted the Law of Identity, first by contending that, if it were a law of thought, it

> would be confirmed by every consciousness, treating it as fundamental to all its utterances, or as *implicit* in all of them . . . ;

secondly, because he then falsely concludes from this that

> everything is in its own self-equality unequal to itself and contradictory; and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is identical with itself.[12]

What Hegel is thought to believe is that, if the Law of Identity is true, then every statement is an identity statement. But here it is Hegel who is being misrepresented. The first of the above quotations is taken out of context. Hegel is merely protesting that sound common sense, as was earlier observed, regards tautologies as senseless, whereas, if it took the law in its abstract formulation to hold universally, it would regard it as implicit in every utterance. This it does not, so it does not believe that every statement is one of abstract identity.

The second quotation states something of ultimate importance to Hegel, which does follow from all his reasoning. That is, that every concept, in principle, is identical with itself only in its identity with its other, and if isolated from this relation to other inevitably contradicts itself. This is because the truth is the whole, which is a system, in which every partial element is what it is by virtue of its coherency with and adaptation to every other, so that, divorced from its proper context, it at once invokes that other (to maintain its own identity), while, through assumed isolation, it denies it. Consequently, "everything is in its own self-identity unequal to itself and contradictory; and in its difference, in its contradiction [or contrast with its other] it is identical with itself."

This is what the understanding always fails to comprehend. This is why G. E. Moore (as quoted by Siemens) asserts that tautologies, even if silly, are true, whereas their silliness is the result of their emptiness of anything approaching truth. If taken literally they are, as Hegel spares no pains to show, at best devoid of meaning (subject, apart from predicate is an empty sound or mark),[13] and at worst self-contradictory. All Siemens's efforts to avoid this denouement succeed only either in strengthening Hegel's case, or in providing further warrant for Hegel's criticism.

Notes

1. *Review of Metaphysics* Vol. XLII, no. 1, (September 1988), pp. 103–7.
2. Cf. *Phenomenology*, Preface, trans. Miller, p. 11; trans. Baillie, p. 81.
3. *Encyclopaedia*, 172 and *Zusatz*.
4. *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, p. 414; *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1, 28–29. Siemens, p. 103f. Cf. also, *Sc. of Log.*, p. 38, and *Enc.*, 115.
5. Siemens, ibid.

6. *Sc. of Log.*, p. 38, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, pp. 28–29.
7. J. M. E. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921, 1968), p. 79f. David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 200–1.
8. Cf. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Deduction. B130–140.
9. Cf. Katharina Dulckeit's discussion of the Russellian criticism of Hegel in *Hegel and His Critics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988).
10. Cf. *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, p. 162.
11. *Science of Logic*, p. 411.
12. Ibid., pp. 412, 414.
13. *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 84; trans. Miller, p. 12f. Quoted by Siemens, p. 122.

7
The Philosophy of Nature in Hegel's System

DOUBTS AND OBJECTIONS

The Philosophy of Nature has been discredited by many contemporary philosophers as spurious. The only genuine knowledge of nature, they aver, is to be had from the natural sciences and any speculation on the part of the philosopher about Nature, or the world in general, would fall outside the proper province of philosophy. Such a view itself presupposes a conception of the nature of reality that requires defense. It is a conception for which no evidence can be obtained from the natural sciences, although it is often, for the most part, presupposed also by the scientist; but if the philosophers who maintain it were to attempt to defend it they would be forced to embark upon just such a transgression of the alleged limits of their subject as they are themselves at pains to condemn. Yet unless the view of reality which they presuppose can be substantiated, their argument against the Philosophy of Nature merits no consideration, and in the following discussion of Hegel's philosophy I intend to ignore it and to allow those arguments to stand by which Hegel himself considered that he had dealt with and disposed of that view of the real on basis of which his philosophy is nowadays frequently ruled out of court. My object in this chapter is to consider Hegel's theory from his own point of view and to suggest an interpretation of it which I believe to be at least near to what he himself intended and one which will obviate an internal contradiction that has been imputed to his philosophy even by those who have been most in agreement with his teaching.

The *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* contains what is rightly called the system of Hegel's philosophy, his other treatises being, in the main, more detailed developments of certain sections of the *Encyclopaedia*. For him the body of philosophical knowledge consists of three major divisions, Logic, Nature-philosophy, and the Philosophy of Spirit, forming the supreme

triad of the dialectic and continuous with one another in the dialectical movement of thought.

The Philosophy of Nature, however, has been held suspect even by followers of Hegel who adhere to the doctrine of Absolute Idealism; in fact, by some of his most ardent disciples. For the development of the view by both contemporary and later thinkers has led to a position according to which Hegel's excursion into Nature-philosophy appears inconsistent with his own idealism. Whether the alleged inconsistency is supposed to affect the Philosophy of Spirit also is not clear, nor does this seem to be considered by the critics, for they usually respect and applaud that part of the system (perhaps because of their estimation of the *Phenomenology*); but it does, at least, throw doubt upon the claim of the second science of the *Encyclopaedia* to be a genuine branch of philosophy. The view which leads to this condemnation of the *Naturphilosophie* was first voiced by Schelling, but it follows also from what I shall call the "Bradleian" version of Absolutism, although this should not be taken to imply that Bradley was responsible for the statement of it which follows here, or that he himself expressed the sort of disapproval that others have shown and is considered below.[1]

THE "BRADLEIAN" POSITION

The arguments relevant to the matter in hand may be briefly summarized as follows. The opposition of subject to object in knowledge is characteristic of a conception of reality that breaks down under criticism. Hegel has shown that this conception is provisional, belonging only to a certain level of thought (understanding). At a higher level it is transcended and the opposition is overcome. This higher conception is the notion of self-conscious mind (in Hegel's Logic, the Idea), which is neither merely subjective nor merely objective. It is an experience which is its own object, an experience which is infinite and all-inclusive. Such an infinite and all-embracing experience is the true nature of reality, but within it there are stages of development of mind at which the real appears under categories more or less inadequate to its proper character.

Bradley represents this development as falling into three phases of which the lowest is "immediate" unreflective experience, or feeling. Next there is "mediate" experience, the sphere of relational thinking in which distinctions (set in mutual relation) within the feeling whole are made and abstractions from it. To this level belong the distinction of subject from object and the representation of Nature as the object of scientific inquiry set over against the mind that observes it. Finally, beyond, and above, relational thinking there is a third level of experience which the human mind knows only in general terms; in its fullness it is unattainable by mankind, who

have, at best, only occasional premonitions of it. On this view, Nature, regarded as an object in opposition to a knowing subject, is held to be an abstraction, an appearance and not reality, an ideal construction. It is a notion having a modicum of truth but one which is not ultimately self-consistent, and which is sublated in a higher conception, namely, that of reality as an experience at once both subjective and objective (in the last resort, the Absolute).

Now the Logic of Hegel is a detailed critical account of all the phases of experience from the most rudimentary to the most explicit. In the course of the dialectic, those categories which science uses in its treatment of Nature as an object external to mind are passed and transcended. The final and the truest concept of reality is the absolute Idea, in which object and subject are identified, and in which the dialectic of the Logic culminates. As, for the Bradleian, experience *is* reality, there should be no more to be said upon the subject. A philosophical science, therefore, which professes to go beyond Logic and to expound the system of Nature as "the Idea in the form of other-being" seems not only unnecessary but spurious. The true philosophical account of Nature has already been given. It is an ideal construction, a partial view of the real which cannot be maintained without displaying internal contradiction. It belongs to an assigned level of thought and has already been treated and disposed of in the Logic.

Whatever may be the faults of the Bradleian position, this criticism of Hegel to which it gives rise is at least plausible in the light of some of Hegel's own statements. For instance, in the *Encyclopaedia* (6), he says that

> *actuality* is that core of truth which, originally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the mental life, has become the *world*, the inward and outward world of consciousness.[2]

One might think that an actuality produced and producing itself in this manner was something very like Bradley's ideal construction. Nature, it would seem, is part—the outward part—of this world. Further, Hegel points out in the same section that in his Logic he "has treated, among other things, of actuality," which is indeed the case. Why then go on beyond the Logic for a separate account of Nature? Clearly the *Naturphilosophie* is not intended to be a recapitulation in extenso of a section of the Logic. This is apparent from what we read in Sections 15 to 18 of the *Encyclopaedia*, and the conclusion of the Logic itself should leave us in no doubt that the Philosophy of Nature is projected as a further stage of the dialectical movement rather than a simple development of part of what has gone before.[3] Moreover, the categories of the *Naturphilosophie* are not the same as any discussed in the Logic, whether in the Doctrine of Essence (where Actuality is treated) or in the Doctrine of the Concept (e.g., the Objective

Concept), as the categories of the *Philosophie des Rechts* are the same as those of the second part of the *Philosophie des Geistes*. Quite clearly the *Naturphilosophie* covers the whole of reality in one aspect (so to speak), that of "externality." Surely, then, its very existence in Hegel's system is an inconsistency, for the statements quoted above, that "actuality" produces itself "within the precincts of the mental life" and that it has been treated in the Logic seem to render any further philosophical account of Nature superfluous.

Nevertheless, it is my belief that a Bradleian interpretation of Hegel, leading as it does to this apparent inconsistency, is wrong, and has missed the main significance of Hegel's advance beyond Fichte, if not also beyond Schelling (who, himself, in his later criticism of Hegel, seems to have failed to grasp Hegel's meaning). The passages that have been quoted are seen in a different light if taken along with what Hegel says elsewhere and are consistent with a different interpretation of the system as a whole, which does not give rise to the Bradleian difficulty affecting the Philosophy of Nature. A conception of Nature is required different from that which Bradley (who has been followed by other British Idealists) expounds in *Appearance and Reality*,[4] a conception consistent with a thoroughgoing objective idealism and more truly Hegelian, one that justifies Hegel's treatment of Nature as the "other" of the Idea.

REINTERPRETATION

We may help ourselves to begin with by taking a view of the world similar to that set out by Samuel Alexander (in *Space, Time and Deity*). We have first the physico-chemical world in space-time (according to Alexander the former is "emergent" from the latter); then life emerges from special configurations of physical matter; from life we get the emergent quality of consciousness; and so on. Although I have used Alexander's language, I do not wish to commit myself to agreement with the detail of his theory, which I have discussed and criticized elsewhere.[5] I am simply offering a view of the world as a process of evolution or "emergence" in which the different forms of existing things are different stages.

Now it ought to be clear that if something emerges from something else, the emergent must be present in some way or other in that from which it emerges. Otherwise it cannot *emerge*, but must come into being independently of what appears to be the prior stage. The butterfly is said to emerge from the chrysalis only because it has all along been present in the chrysalis, even if it has not always been there in the same form. However difficult it may be to understand the notion of becoming or development, so much seems plain, that if the process is to be truly continuous what emerges at the

end of the process must have been present in some form, or in some degree, at the beginning. It is, incidentally, also plain that becoming is a concept indispensable and fundamental to Hegel's dialectic. It is the element of continuity which is important, and one to which Alexander does insufficient justice (though this is beside my present point). It does not mean that development is a kind of growth, or augmentation, that what appears at the end was originally included in some diminutive but completed shape within that out of which it has grown. What is being suggested is not a theory of preformation, but is at least tolerant of the notion of epigenesis. What I want to insist on is that there must be some special kind of identity running through the process of development so that the first phase in some sense *is* what it has in it to become. The difficulty of understanding the conception is just the difficulty of explaining what kind of identity runs through the process. As it is a difficulty, however, that has defeated the efforts of better thinkers than I, perhaps I may be excused if I pass it over here, as it is not necessary for my present purpose to discuss it. All that need be conceded is that there can be no process of becoming (properly so called) unless there is continuity and an identity running through it sufficient for us to say that at every phase what is coming to be is throughout one and the same, and is, therefore, in some sense, degree, or form, what will eventually emerge. There will of course be a correlative sense in which each immature form is *not* what it is about to become, otherwise development will be equally impossible.

If this contention is allowed, it follows that, as the process of natural evolution results in the final emergence of mind, mind must be present throughout its course. Some thinkers (T. H. Green, for instance) deny that consciousness can be a product of natural evolution, but they do so on the grounds that what is in no sense mind cannot generate mind. If, however, we assume that the entire process is one of mind's own development, we are not subject to this stricture. Green protests against the view that consciousness is somehow produced out of a material that is totally alien to mind and which then becomes an object of consciousness.[6] In this he is right, for if consciousness is not in some way implicit in the material, it cannot develop out of it. On the other hand, if we can regard the material as itself a form or manifestation (calling it that for lack of a better word) of mind, the difficulty does not arise. There would then be no foreign material, and in every phase of natural evolution we should actually have a form of mind. Every form of things existing in space-time would be regarded as ways in which mind manifests itself, in the Hegelian phrase, "in the form of externality."

Whatever difficulties this position may be thought to present, I am convinced that the true Hegelian conception of Nature is of a world in every detail of which the Idea is immanent, and through the dialectical development of which mind comes to consciousness in and by means of a process of

self-evolution, so that what it brings to consciousness is at one and the same time itself and its world. On the one hand, mind is not viewed as something merely "subjective" or merely psychical, and on the other hand, matter is not viewed simply as a matrix in which life and mind come into existence at certain points, but as itself a form of the Idea, an implicit (*an sich*) manifestation, that is, of mind. Accordingly, the dialectical principle active in the sphere of thought, is also the principle of natural development. Hegel, it is true, confines development, in the proper sense of the word, entirely to the realm of the Concept;[7] but he also says of dialectic that "it is the principle of all movement, all life and all activity in the actual world."[8] This suggests that, while he regarded dialectic as the universal principle of movement and evolutionary process, it is only in the activity of self-conscious thought that he acknowledges it as coming fully into its own as development proper.

The evolutionary process goes through numerous phases which constitute the range of existing things in the material world, eventually bringing mind, which has been immanent all along, to consciousness of itself—or, to say the same thing in different words (as material things are manifestations of the Idea), bringing the world to explicit consciousness of itself in the self-awareness of the mind.

This must, however, not be taken to mean that all things are conscious minds, in the sense, at any rate, that our minds are conscious. That would be a doctrine both unwarranted and unhelpful.[9] We can say no more than that there must be in things some germ of mind if mind is to develop from them. What form this germ may take, what kind of inchoate or rudimentary consciousness is in inanimate nature, we have little if any means of knowing. It is the continuity of the process of development that makes it necessary to assert that some form of mind is present in lower nature, and if the process were, in fact, not continuous, that conclusion would not follow—at least, not by the same reasoning. Again, if mind is not present throughout, the process cannot be continuous. In the present discussion, however, we may assume that the process is continuous, for we have good reason to believe that, in a very definite manner, Hegel thought it so.

LEVELS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Viewing the process of evolution as a whole, in accordance with the above account of Nature, we see the emergence of life and consciousness as stages in the development of mind. The process of mental development to which that phrase ("development of mind") is commonly applied is now to be regarded as including only the higher phases of a larger process reaching down into spheres of existence where explicit consciousness, as we know it,

is not present. In this process, the higher phases do not merely replace the lower, but they carry them up to a higher plane of existence. Matter is not lost in life, nor life in consciousness, but just as the end is immanent in all earlier phases of the process, so the process is involved and sublated in the end. All the lower stages are held in the succeeding stage, as Hegel would say, *aufgehoben*—that is, at once annulled and transcended and yet maintained as an element or moment in the higher reality. They are annulled and transcended so far as they have been superseded; maintained and preserved, so far as they are involved in and necessary to the emergence of the higher phase and in it their inherent potentialities are fulfilled.

The coming to consciousness of mind, therefore, is the bringing to consciousness of the process of development. In becoming conscious the mind becomes aware of the process of becoming—i.e., of the world. But this consciousness is not in the first instance explicitly of a world known to be the process of mind's own evolution. At first it is vague and confused, probably a mere awareness of "something or other" with no very definite character. Later, when consciousness has become more developed, the world as an ordered system is taken to be an object external or "closed" to mind, which now regards itself as somehow attached to one entity in a world of others, the others being the objects of its consciousness. It is not until the higher stage of self-consciousness is reached and only after critical reflection upon the nature of knowledge, that the mind comes to know itself as the union of subject and object. This critical reflection is the Hegelian logic.

We must pause here to stress three important points:

(i) that the development of conscious experience is a process of growing self-consciousness;

(ii) that conscious experience on which we reflect in logic, is not generated (as it were) in vacuo, but is itself the fruit of a long evolutionary process in Nature. As Bernard Bosanquet put it:

> It is plain that whatever our ultimate view may be as to the position of mind in the universe, it does not come before us in the animal world, except as something which arises, so to speak, on top of a vast evolution and presupposes a long development of connections and formation of dispositions by help of which alone the principle which far down operates as if it were thought, can create for itself a field of consciousness and a self which is formed and full of determinations before it is aware of them or of its own distinct existence.[10]

(iii) The third point to notice is that the process of evolution in Nature is not recognized as the process of self-development of mind at any level of intellectual life of which the logic is the interpretation except that critical reflection which is itself philosophy. In Hegel's Logic the theory of this level

of reflective thought is not even the whole of the Doctrine of the Concept; it comes only in its final consummation, the absolute Idea,[11] and even there it amounts to little more than the explicit recognition of the unity of subject and object.

The first of these three points raises the question, Does the process of growing self-consciousness come to an end at the point where the mind is able to reflect on and to expound a theory of its own knowledge—is the Logic the last phase of the process? The second draws our attention to the fact that the critical study of explicit, conscious knowledge is not directly the study of the whole of reality, for even if all reality were mind, it would be more than mind in the form of explicit knowledge (or even mind at the level of clear consciousness). Nature has its own place in the structure of the real, not merely as a more or less erroneous conception of the world (an ideal construction), but as an actual and substantial form of mind's self-manifestation. The third point shows that the account here given of Nature is not characteristic of any stage of knowledge prior in the scale of intellectual development to the Logic itself. It is not part of the Logic, still less is it characteristic of the understanding, or of empirical science (which views the world as external object). It should, therefore, fall within a sphere of speculative study other than and subsequent to the Logic. For logic is reflection upon experience, and in the lower phases of experience Nature is not recognized as the manifestation of mind, or "the Idea in the form of otherness" in which externality constitutes its specific character.[12] Nature at these levels of experience is regarded as an object set over against a knowing subject, and although their identity is implicit all along, it emerges in explicit form only as the final result of critical reflection. The conclusion of the Logic is, therefore, presupposed by any philosophical account of Nature, and it is necessary to go on from the recognition of the unity of subject and object in knowledge to show just how the world is actually and in fact implicitly mind, the Idea being immanent in it as the indispensable condition of mind's emergence from it in life and sentience.

The belief held by some that this demonstration has already been accomplished in the Logic is, perhaps, due to the influence of Kant. They have considered it sufficient to show that the condition of any coherent experience of objects (and so of Nature) is the a priori synthesis of sensuous experience under logical categories. Hence Nature comes to be regarded as an ideal construction, a phenomenon or system of phenomena dependent for its character on the way we think. But Hegel insisted that the concepts (the categories) of logic were not only the principles which made the world intelligible, but were "at the same time the real essence of things."[13] Such an assertion may, admittedly, be taken in either of two ways. It may mean that the world's *esse est intelligi*, or it may mean that the actual forms of existence

in Nature are manifestations of thought-determinations. One who speaks of "the reason in being—Actuality" (*die seiende Vernunft*),[14] is hardly likely to have held the former view, and, if the latter is the right interpretation of the phrase I have quoted, the Kantian argument is insufficient to explain fully the real identity of mind and its object. A philosophical science to demonstrate in detail the immanence of mind in natural forms is not only legitimate but necessary.

There is a further stage in the development of self-consciousness than that reached in the Logic. The Logic is, from one point of view (i.e., considered as the product of reflective self-consciousness), the result of a long course of development (though, from another point of view, that of its content, it is not). It is the point at which the mind comes to know itself as identical with its world, as the world come to consciousness.[15] But that realization brings self-consciousness a stage further, at which it turns back again upon itself and recognizes its own principle of order as that which has been immanent in and developing throughout the process of evolution in Nature, and which has brought itself to consciousness in knowledge.

The mind first sees itself as the world come to consciousness and then sees the world as the process in which, and by means of which, that coming to consciousness is brought about. Having found its own identity with the world in knowledge, it goes back to the world as Nature to view it as the process in and through which knowledge comes to be, and at the same time itself comes to be the object (or content) of knowledge. As the process is throughout one of advancing self-consciousness, it is a process at once of the emergence of the knowing mind from unconscious natural forms and of the world's (the process itself) becoming known. Mind, in short, having discovered the object of its knowledge to be identical with its own activity of knowing, then discovers its own immanence in the processes of Nature which generate consciousness, and constitute that object—its own presence in Nature.

Transition from Logic to Philosophy of Nature

Understanding the position in this way, we can now interpret the very obscure passages at the end of Hegel's Logic, those which Schelling so strongly attacked, where we read of the Idea "resting in itself" and "secure in itself," "resolving to let the 'moment' of its particularity . . . go forth freely as Nature." The Idea, Hegel insists, is nothing merely subjective. It is not just an idea in my mind or yours, a representation in the sense of *Vorstellung*. It is the whole that is the truth, the real become aware of itself as a developed system and of the principle of its organization as dialectical and speculative reason. This principle is (as Plato said of the Idea of the Good)

what makes the mind intelligent and the world intelligible (the source of knowledge and of the logic which reflects upon it), but it is also the source of the being and essence of all things, which are the parts and moments constituting the whole. It is only at the end of the Logic that this is fully cognized; the immanence of the Idea in Nature, and the dialectic in Nature by which it comes to consciousness of itself as Spirit, has yet to be set out. For the whole is no blank unity, nor is it an abstract principle (this we were told in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*), so it must differentiate itself and become fully concrete. Hence, resting in itself and secure in itself, it particularizes itself—it lets the moment of its particularity go forth freely—as Nature. Nature is that Being from which the Logic began, but as the first logical category it is a bare abstraction, the product of reflection. At the end of the Logic it transpires that what was implicit at the beginning was the whole of the actual world, Nature as a concrete system, and the *Naturphilosophie* has now to examine this presupposition on the philosophical level. So Hegel says in the final *Zusatz* of the Lesser Logic:

> We have now returned to the concept of the Idea with which we began. At the same time, this return to the beginning is also an advance. What we began with was Being, the abstract Being, and now we have the *Idea* as *Being*, but this existent Idea is *Nature*.

The position may be summarized as follows. Reflecting on the nature of knowledge, we are brought in the Logic to the conclusion that the knowing subject is identical with its object. This discovery is a turning point in the growth of self-consciousness. Here thought, which has not hitherto been recognized as the immanent principle in things, but has been regarded as something merely subjective, is found to be "at the same time the real essence of things," which had been regarded as external to mind. In other words, mind has now become conscious of itself as the spirit immanent in Nature, and so has reached a new plane of self-consciousness. The Philosophy of Nature develops this position in detail, displaying Nature in every phase as a manifestation of the Idea (in the form of externality), up to that point at which consciousness emerges in its proper form. Here, as the Idea went over into Nature in the course of the development of self-consciousness, so now Nature passes over into Spirit. Consciousness turns back upon itself to know itself absolutely. This it does in the conclusion of the *Philosophie des Geistes*, as absolute Spirit.

The much disputed transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature is, therefore, simply the passage from one stage to the next in the development of self-consciousness. Mind comes to know itself even more fully and completely and in the higher stages of the development it is constantly turning back upon itself, making itself in the prior stage its own object.[16] As

knowledge (common sense and empirical science) it becomes its own object in the Logic; as mind immanent in the "external" world (subject identical with object as it appears at the end of the Logic) it is its own object in Nature-philosophy; and it makes itself its own object yet again as emergent from Nature in the Philosophy of Spirit.

Apparent Difficulties and Their Resolution

There are passages in Hegel which are admittedly difficult to reconcile with the view here suggested, especially that in which he expressly repudiates the idea of evolution in Nature as a process of continuous change from one phase to another. "Nature," he says, "is to be regarded as a system of grades of which one arises necessarily out of the other and is the proximate truth of that from which it results, but not in such a way that one is engendered *naturally* out of the other, but in the inner Idea constituting the reason (*Grund*) of Nature."[17] He considers it a sign of the essential opposition of Nature to the Idea that "it leaves the differences starkly side by side." The proverb, "in Nature there are no leaps," is true, he says, only of the Idea.[18]

But, on the other hand, he does conceive Nature in accordance with some notion of development. The dialectic, which is continuous throughout the system, does run through all the forms of natural existence, and there are passages which indicate the view that the stark externality of particulars in Nature is to be explained as consequent upon the low level of mind's development at that stage. "Nature," we are told, "is only implicitly the Idea, therefore Schelling called it 'petrified' and others 'frozen intelligence'. But God does not remain stony and dead; the stones cry out and raise themselves to Spirit."[19] Not only is mind immanent in the petrified image, but it cannot rest in such petrifaction, it cannot "remain stony and dead," but is urged by its inherent nisus to develop—to come alive and conscious.

The repudiation of the idea of evolution in Nature is due to the fact that in Hegel's day the hypothesis had not yet been scientifically established. Empirical evidence for it had still to be produced. It had not become, as it has today, almost a commonplace. To Hegel it must have seemed a very dubious theory and his rejection of it is, therefore, really a sign of intellectual integrity, for it would have been a very convenient notion for him to advocate and might have enabled him to avoid a number of difficulties, which he tries to overcome by attributing "weakness" to Nature (*die Ohnmacht der Natur*).

Another apparent inconsistency of my interpretation with what appears in Hegel's writings is the view of the Logic which I have suggested. It may be said that Hegel could by no means have admitted that the Logic was a

phase in a larger development. He claims that the Logic is "the Word" of the opening verses of St. John's Gospel. Hegel describes it as "the presentation of God in His eternal essence before the creation of Nature and finite Spirit."[20] The inconsistency, however, is only apparent. The Logic may be regarded in two different ways, both of which are legitimate, each from one point of view. It may (in fact must) be, on the one hand, seen as the product of human thought, or what the human mind is capable of thinking at a certain level of development. It may, on the other hand, be considered from the point of view of its content, as the system of universal concepts which constitute the intelligible, the eternal, essence of the world. That Hegel did not disregard the first of these two aspects has already been shown,[21] and it is only in the second that we might describe the Logic ideally as "the presentation of God in His eternal essence."[22] Nor are the two views mutually incompatible, for although the Logic is indeed the ideal system which is the intelligible essence of the world, and is not subject to the limitations of space and time, it may still be true that this essential nature of reality comes to consciousness only at a certain level in the development of mind, implicit though it is in all the prior stages. This is really what the *Phenomenology* is meant to demonstrate.

No doubt, when Hegel wrote and for long afterwards, it seemed exceedingly difficult to say just how mind could be immanent in physical nature, and by no means easy to explain the nature of the process of development. No doubt it does seem extraordinary that mind, having essentially a self-conscious nature, should manifest itself in forms which are utterly inadequate to its true character and so be compelled to develop out of these forms and to go through a long and arduous process of evolution in order to bring itself to consciousness. But our immediate purpose is to show that an interpretation of Hegel's philosophy is possible that will justify the place in his system that he gives to the *Naturphilosophie*, and for that it is not necessary to discuss these difficulties. Nevertheless, I am convinced that they are not finally insurmountable, more especially in the light of recent developments in physics.[23] Nor in any case are they greater than the difficulties that beset rival theories, such as those of Bergson, Alexander, Whitehead (who comes nearest to Hegel himself), Husserl, or Heidegger. But to enter into discussion of any of these would here be only an unjustifiable digression.

The theory I have been trying to outline follows naturally from Hegel's main idealistic position, for he declares that the rational is the real and the real the rational, that thought is objective and that "the truth is actual and must exist."[24] "It is the highest and final aim of philosophical science," he writes, "to bring about . . . the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with the reason which is in being, with Actuality."[25] If Hegel means these

statements seriously he must be prepared to demonstrate the "reason which is in being." He must show how "the truth is actual" and how it does exist. The fulfilment of these requirements is the *Naturphilosophie*, which, so far from being inconsistent with his idealism, is required by it, and reveals his doctrine further as the reconciliation of idealism with realism. If this be accepted as the Hegelian view of Nature, it shows the Logic in a fresh light and overcomes the difficulty about Nature and the Philosophy of Nature that beset F. H. Bradley and those who followed him.

Notes

This chapter originally was presented as a paper to the Jowett Society in Oxford in 1935. It did not appear in print until 1949, in the *Review of Metaphysics*. I have revised it and tried in some ways to bring it more up to date. The problem with which it deals is not as pressing today as it was when it was first written, largely due to the work of John Findlay, who stressed the importance of the *Naturphilosophie* in his book, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, New York: Macmillan, 1958). See next chapter.

1. I have stated the arguments in support of this objection in my own way but have based my presentation of it on personal discussions which I have had in the past with prominent thinkers of the Bradleian school (namely, the late Professors H. H. Joachim and J. A. Smith). Similar objections are also raised by Benedetto Croce in *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, although his criticism is made for different reasons. A separate discussion would be necessary to deal with Croce's position, and what is said here can have, at most, an indirect bearing on his view.
2. Wallace's translation.
3. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 18: "The differences of the separate philosophical sciences are simply the determinations of the Idea itself, and it is this alone that presents itself in these different aspects (*Elementen*). In Nature it is not anything other than the Idea which is to be discussed, but here the Idea is in the form of externality: so also in Spirit it is the same Idea, as existing for itself and become absolute (*an und für sich*)."
4. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, Chap. 12. Cf. my paper, "Bradley's Theory of Nature," *Idealistic Studies* Vol. XV, no. 3 (1985).
5. Cf. *Nature, Mind and Modern Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin and New York: Humanities Press, 1954, 1968), Chap. 18.
6. Cf. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk I.
7. *Encyclopaedia*, 161.
8. Id., 81, *Zusatz* 1.
9. Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value* (London: Macmillan, 1927), Chaps. III and IV.
10. *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind* (London: Macmillan, 1923), p. 86.
11. The theory of the Object in the third part of the Logic is not an account of "the Idea in the form of other-being." It treats of certain categories made use of in science which are higher in the order of concreteness than the correlations (e.g., "cause and effect," "whole and part," etc.) which are treated in the Doctrine of Essence.

12. *Encyclopaedia*, 247.
13. Id., 41, *Zusatz* (2).
14. Ibid., 6.
15. That this is Hegel's view: that the "thinking study" which is logic comes only after a long period of intellectual development, is clear from the *Phenomenology* (where it is called absolute knowing) and from what he says in the *Encyclopaedia* as well as elsewhere in his writings. Cf. *Enc.*, 2: " . . . In religious, legal and moral matters, thinking, under the guise of feeling, belief or mental image, has not been inactive. Its activity and productions are present and contained therein." Also *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Preface to the 2d Edition, where he says that the necessity of concerning oneself with pure thought presupposes a long development which the human spirit must have undergone. Here also he speaks of the categories being "put to use" in the activities of everyday life. Finally there is the famous passage in the *Rechtsphilosophie* about the owl of Minerva setting forth on its flight only after some form of life has grown old.
16. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, 413, 443, and *passim*.
17. Ibid., 249.
18. Ibid., 249 *Zusatz*.
19. Ibid., 247 *Zusatz*.
20. *Wissenschaft der Logik, Einleitung*.
21. See above n. 16.
22. Hegel's discussion of the question concerning the eternity of the world (*Enc.*, 247 *Zusatz*) should make it clear that this description of the Logic is not intended to be more than a metaphor. At least, he would never have maintained that the essential nature of God was literally prior in time. Its priority is purely logical. After all, the Idea is only one aspect of the real; Nature is another, and the two are united in Spirit (cf. *Enc.*, 18).
23. Cf. my *Cosmos and Anthropos* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1991).
24. *Encyclopaedia*, 38 *Zusatz*.
25. Ibid., 6.

8
Hegel's Realism and The Philosophy of Nature

IDEALISM, SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE

The major controversy in the history of Western philosophy from the sixteenth century until the late eighteenth was that between Rationalism and Empiricism, and, although it displayed several different facets (materialism versus idealism being one), the central issue was the problem of knowledge. Copernicus had removed the Earth from the center of the universe and elevated it into the celestial sphere as a planet; Galileo had persisted in the belief that it moved in a circular orbit around the sun; Kepler had revised the shape of the orbit and had enunciated his laws of planetary motion, and Newton finally set out the celestial mechanics that explained them. The world was henceforth conceived as a machine composed ultimately of particles that moved either inertially or accelerated under the influence of impressed forces. In it there was no assigned place for the knowing mind, and philosophers, in consequence, wrestled with the question how the consciousness of this machine-world was acquired. Some, following Hobbes and Locke, answered: "Through sense-perception." Others, like Descartes, mistrusted the senses for their fluctuating disclosures and sought solace by trusting in the veracity of God. The presupposition of the first school, the Empiricists, was realism, the belief in the independent existence of a world of material objects external to the mind. The tendency of the second was to cast doubt on this assumption and to seek assurance either from some rational proof, or by dispensing with the assumption altogether. Oddly enough, each side, pursuing the logic of its own premised starting point, reached similar conclusions. Malebranche and Leibniz among the Rationalists and George Berkeley among the Empiricists subjectivized experience and reduced the natural world to ideas, or perceptions, in the mind. This was subjective idealism.

Because Berkeley's idealism led directly to Hume's scepticism, Kant announced his Copernican revolution in epistemology, declaring that we

might find more illumination by reversing the assumption that concepts should conform to objects. In this way he proposed to restore objectivity to empirical science. The objectivity established, however, remained only phenomenal, so his theory was still idealism, akin to Berkeley's, but it professed (at least) to be objective. Things in themselves, while their existence was still stoutly maintained, were beyond the reach of human knowledge (although, Kant confessed, we inevitably frame ideas about them).

Fichte dispensed with things-in-themselves and deduced all knowledge together with its objects from the transcendental Ego, whose self-awareness impelled it to limit itself, as object to itself, and, by opposing thesis to antithesis and then recognizing their essential identity, generated dialectically the whole gamut of its own forms and levels of consciousness and thence, in its practical effort to reestablish its original unity, to posit an "external" world as the object of its activity.

Taking a cue from Kant's account of teleology in his third Critique, Schelling concluded that the unity of the Ego could only be an organized whole, which must be at once subjective and objective, that this distinction was provisional and subsequent to the self-diremption of a self-identical Absolute, from which objective Nature and subjective experience both coordinately derived. This philosophy of Identity still claimed to be idealistic, but at the same time to succeed in establishing the objective reality of the natural world. It called itself Objective Idealism.

Schelling's metaphysic was for the most part fantastic and obscure. He made repeated attempts to formulate it systematically, but he never really succeeded, casting his ideas in different molds each time he tried, and using different terminology, the precise meaning of which, in consequence, remained in doubt. It was Hegel who gave the theory a consistent structure, by developing a dialectic directly proceeding from the intrinsic nature of wholeness and systematicity. By this means he was enabled to reconcile idealism and realism, but neither his contemporaries nor his followers were able to appreciate his achievement, and for long after his death he was hailed by some and castigated by others (e.g., Marx) as the father of Idealism (albeit absolute and objective).

HEGEL'S REALISM

Not only was Hegel as much a realist as he was idealist, he was the only modern philosopher to expound a realism that was self-consistent and which did not get involved either in solipsism or logomachy. To find his equal in this respect one must go back to Aristotle, of whom Hegel was a great admirer and to whom he owes much of his success. In the systems of

both philosophers, moreover, it is the conception of Nature which is the key to their solution of problems by which others have been defeated. With Aristotle I cannot here concern myself. Hegel must be my central figure.[1]

In the modern age realism in its many forms has invariably become entangled in insoluble problems in its efforts to give a feasible account of knowledge. If the material world exists independently of our consciousness, if (as has been often asserted) "knowing makes no difference to the known," and if our minds are lodged in a material body, how do we become aware of these facts? How do we acquire consciousness of what lies outside of ourselves? and how are our minds related to the bodies they are alleged to inhabit? There is no need for me to recapitulate here the tortuous history of attempts to answer these questions. Every freshman is familiar with the paradoxes to which those attempts have led. Either we are seduced by the epistemologist's fallacy to give an account of knowledge, from which we exempt ourselves, as epistemologists: we explain our awareness of the external world as ideas, mysteriously produced from the transmission into the brain by physical processes of effects caused by external things upon our sense organs; an account which, if it were true, could on its own terms never be known; and, if it is known, must certainly be false. Or else we are induced by brilliant and persuasive writers, like Berkeley, to renounce the external world altogether and to lose ourselves in a radical subjectivism, which leads either to scepticism or to a still more paradoxical solipsism. With the exception of Spinoza, all the great thinkers of the modern age had ended in one form or another of these impasses when Kant, proclaiming his Copernican revolution, professed to restore objectivity to the scientific knowledge of Nature, only to confine it to phenomena—the way in which things appear to us—and make it inapplicable to things in themselves. Kant, accordingly, reached only the halfway house in the journey towards a solution of the problem.

This was transcendental idealism, which, more than any influence of Hegel, dominated the thought of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and the school of British Idealism. It has been pursued to even greater lengths by Edmund Husserl and his followers. But transcendental idealism has not escaped the impasse, whether in the hands of Kant, of the British Idealists, or of Husserl.[2] For no way has been found of relating the transcendental subject to the natural psyche so as to reduce the former to human proportions or to illuminate the latter as a self-conscious subject of natural knowledge. Hegel dealt with the problem more successfully than any other philosopher, in a way that even his own devotees for the most part have failed to recognize or understand.

THE DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP

The first essential is accurately to grasp the nature of the dialectic and the relation between its successive phases. To this, Hegel's pronouncement is fundamental that the truth is the whole.[3] The whole, moreover, is no blank unity or any undifferentiated uniformity (not, as Hegel protested against Schelling, "a night in which all cows are black"). The whole is system.[4] Not a set, fixed, or static system, but one that is infinitely and eternally self-diversifying. It is dynamic, self-activated, "infinite restlessness," at once a self-realizing process and an eternally self-realized activity, like Aristotle's *energeia*. It is not a whole of separable parts, except as conceived at a specific level of the dialectic, where whole and parts is a limited and provisional category. According to the level on which it is conceived it may be viewed as an aggregate of constituent segments, a process of successive phases, a series or scale of developing forms, a totality of distinguishable but inseparable moments, or a gamut of logical categories dialectically interrelated. But at every level, and in all manifestations, the whole, which is essentially self-actualized and self-complete, is immanent. Yet because it is dynamic and constantly, actively, self-specifying, it manifests itself perpetually in forms or aspects of itself which are only partial and provisional (its moments). At the same time, nothing less than the self-complete whole can render the partial phase or provisional moment intelligible, for the truth is the whole; and it is this truth, immanent in the partial phase, which reveals its limited and finite character. It is this, likewise, that generates the internal contradiction in the finite, drives it into its opposite (what it lacks and excludes, what negates it) and forces it to unite with its other to produce a more complete representation of the whole in which the less adequate manifestations are sublated.

Because the whole is immanent in every manifestation, each phase of the process is a whole of sorts, and the relation between phases is a relation between wholes. But they are wholes in varying degrees, and each is a specific form of that ultimate whole of which it is a partial expression. The negative relation between them due to their mutual exclusion as differents emphasizes itself as opposition; but, for all that, they are interdependent for their own intrinsic characters as moments of the whole, and they merge into one another in a continuous scale of increasingly concrete forms of self-differentiated unity, in which each reveals a higher degree of truth than its predecessor, a degree to which the prior aspires.

NATURE AND MIND

The relation between Nature and mind being dialectical is of this kind; and it is this dialectical relation between Nature and mind that holds the key

to solving the perennial problems that beset the nature of consciousness and of knowledge. Nature *is* the whole, which is the truth—but only implicitly (*an sich*). It is the truth (or the Idea) in the form of self-externality or "other-being." It does not know itself as the truth and is not self-aware; but it is indefeasibly real, for "the truth is actual and must exist."[5] Because it is not self-aware, however, its status is known and becomes genuinely "truth" only with the emergence of consciousness in finite minds, for whom it is objectively real. In itself, it does not know itself for what it is, not even its own actuality. Although it is actual *in itself*, it is so only *for us*. Hence Nature, while in itself it is real, is *Nature* only for us and not for itself.

Finite minds, however, come to consciousness in and through natural organisms. It is in and through Nature that they are brought into being. But this is the case, and can be so, only because Nature is implicitly Idea, because the immanent Idea is bringing itself to consciousness through the processes of Nature. The Idea is the concept of the whole, the principle of development of which is dialectic, and that is likewise operative in Nature as the principle of movement and life. Mind and spirit are, therefore, potentially contained in the lower natural forms.

According to Hegel, genuine development occurs only on the level of the Concept (i.e., self-conscious thought), but it is implicit in lower phases for, he tells us, "dialectic is the principle of all movement, all life, and all activity in the actual world,"[6] and so is operative in Nature, because it is the principle of structure in the whole (the absolute Idea) which is immanent in the natural order. Thus the dialectic of Nature is continuous with the dialectic of mind. It is in this way that Hegel conceived Nature as an evolutionary process before the science of biology had progressed to the point of discovering the empirical evidence. Hegel's insight, like Aristotle's, was philosophical, and it enabled him to anticipate to a remarkable extent scientific ideas far in advance of his time, while in his Philosophy of Nature he strove desperately to assert only what the science of his own day seemed to warrant. The result is a tension in his theory between his denial of an actual evolution of natural species and a persistent assertion of dialectical relations between natural forms.

The recognition of Nature as the dialectical process through which mind is generated—the process in which the Idea manifests itself "in the form of other-being" (or externality),[7] and through which it brings itself to consciousness—is a philosophical insight, not an empirical discovery. It is not a *Vorstellung*, nor a concept of the understanding, but is the fruit of speculative reflection upon these less self-conscious phases of experience.

Mind, as it first emerges, is mere subjective feeling, in which subject and object are not distinguished, and no world is cognized as "external." The distinction of external object from cognizant subject is the result of media-

tion characteristic of consciousness proper, which supervenes upon mere sentience and is reflective in a higher degree, making sensation its object. Thus what is sensorily presented appears as immediately "given" object, which simply *is* for the subject, and which, only on reflection, is seen to be mediated by the subject-object antithesis. The discrimination of objects as "external" to the mind and to one another in space and time involves (as must be obvious to reflection) a systematizing activity of judging. Hence thought is already at work at the perceptual level where the world of common sense (*gesunder Meschenverstand*) is constructed. Further reflection upon that again brings us to the rational level of observational science, the stage at which consciousness explicitly seeks the universal (idea), which is its own essence, in its object as observed in Nature, and finds it in the system of natural laws.

Up to this point everything that Kant tells us of the conditions of perception and the experience of objects applies. The objective world of science is what conforms to the categories of the understanding, the principles of synthesis and universality reflecting the unity of the apperceptive subject. These categories determine and schematize our sensory data to constitute the phenomena of nature, and they relate them systematically within one coherent experience. But it is only when reason goes beyond science and reflects upon the categories of the understanding and their status in experience that it grasps the true identity of subject and object in its full significance, recognizing the categories of thought (*Denkbestimmungen* in Hegel's terminology) as the actual principles of the real, and comprehending Nature as the self-manifestation of the Idea, in and through which the subjectivity of the mind is generated. This philosophical reflection upon the nature of knowledge—the experience of the external world and its systematization in empirical science—is, for Hegel, Logic, a philosophical science (*Wissenschaft*) at once of thought as the dialectical process, and of the nature of the real as perceived, as scientifically understood, and as philosophically comprehended. The conclusion of the Logic leads at once to a new examination of Nature as the externalized manifestation of the Idea and the dialectical self-generation of spirit, or subjective mind, through physical, chemical, and organic structures.

The relations of Idea to Nature and of Nature to finite spirit are thus dialectical. The absolute Idea, the ideal whole, which is in principle the truth, realizes itself only through self-manifestation in, and development through, the spatio-temporal processes of Nature; and the nisus powered by its immanence in those processes impels them through the dialectical phases of physical, chemical, and organic nature to their interiorized sublation as sentience in the living organism. Sentience is the sublation of the total sum

of all the influences of nature upon the organic body and their registration in its responses. It becomes differentiated by its own inherent dialectic into the consciousness of a world in which its cognizant subject is a member, and is aware of its own membership in being aware of its surrounding environment. This awareness, however, is always (even if for the most part unwittingly) self-awareness. Hence subject and object are always implicitly identical. At each stage the object is the prior dialectical phase: in perception the immediate object is the content of sensation, while the content of perception (or observation) becomes the object of empirical science (understanding). As, in the dialectic of Spirit, the natural object of mind is in this way its own immediate prior phase, so the object of Spirit as such is the prior phase of its own generation—Nature.

On the one hand, the idealism of the Logic establishes the realism of the *Naturphilosophie*; on the other hand, the reality of Nature, asserted in the second major philosophical science, redeems the Hegelian idealism from subjectivism by lodging the conscious subject firmly within a natural organism, the generating conditions of which, astronomical, climatic, seasonal, and environmental, are sublated through its physiological responses in the sentience which is the matrix of consciousness and thinking. At the same time, the problem of knowledge is solved without incurring the difficulties of a representative or a causal theory of perception. Perception is now explained, not as the image, or copy, of an external archetype, but as the sublation and objectification of its own prior dialectical phase, which again has sublated its own generation through the forms and developmental stages of the natural process. It can know all this without self-contradiction, by reflection upon its own content, and discovery of the dialectical relations that obtain between the levels of its own self-awareness. Thus, in being aware of its other, it is aware of itself, and vice versa; and in recognizing its object as the process of its own self-generation, it is conscious of its identity and reconciliation with its other. The transcendental *ego* is now seen to be nothing more nor less than the Concept, the absolute Idea immanent in the natural subject.

Thus the two key transitions in the dialectical system of Hegel's philosophy, that from the *Wissenschaft der Logik* to the *Philosophie der Natur* and that from the *Naturphilosophie* to the *Philosophie des Geistes*, constitute his reconciliation of idealism with realism, enabling him to derive, by a legitimate dialectical procedure, the Kantian transcendental subject from the natural psyche, and so to avoid the dilemma, by which other forms of idealism have been faced, either of succumbing to solipsism or of claiming transcendental omniscience.

SUBSEQUENT OVERSIGHTS

Only if due weight is given to the place and function of the Philosophy of Nature in the system that Hegel designated *Wissenschaft* can this remarkable achievement be appreciated; yet very few Hegel scholars and commentators have seen it in its proper light. Even Hegel himself, in his Introduction to the second part of the *Encyclopaedia*, says that the philosophy of nature had already fallen into disrepute. Those of an empiricist turn of mind suspected it as a spurious rival to natural science, and convinced idealists rejected it as some kind of apostasy. Frederick Engels, who, in company with Marx, rejected Hegel's idealism, but (inconsistently) retained the dialectic, expounded a philosophy of nature along parallel lines, with the added fortification of Darwinism; but Engels was trying to use the dialectical method to support a materialism that was anathema to Hegel.

In the early decades of this century nobody seemed able to discern the importance of the *Naturphilosophie*, opponents of Hegel for fairly obvious reasons, and Hegelians because they thought the *Phenomenology* and the Logic were sufficient in themselves. With the rise and hegemony of Analytic philosophy in the English-speaking world (and elsewhere), any reference to Hegel, except to ridicule him, was regarded as eccentricity; and among contemporary writers John Findlay (who for a time was captivated by Wittgenstein's ideas) is a rare exception. In his book, *Hegel: A Re-examination*,[8] he displayed and advocated respect and admiration, not only for Hegel as a great thinker, but also for his *Naturphilosophie* as well. Yet even today, when Hegel scholarship is enjoying an almost unprecedented revival, special attention is seldom directed to the *Naturphilosophie* and its significance for understanding Hegel's philosophical position.

For this there has been less excuse since first A. V. Miller and then Michael Petry have (somewhat belatedly) given English-speaking scholars admirable translations of the work.[9] Findlay has introduced Miller's translation with a scholarly Foreword, and Petry has written his own introduction. He provides a copious and impressively erudite historical background in voluminous footnotes, but, probably because he views the *Encyclopaedia* as no more than an arrangement of philosophical sciences in order of increasing complexity, and regards this as the primary significance of the dialectical hierarchy, he could not clearly recognize the crucial significance of the *Naturphilosophie* for understanding Hegel's realism and its relation to his idealism.

Findlay was exceptional, however, in declaring Hegel to be a realist; but his appreciation of these characteristics was limited, for he saw the Philosophy of Nature as no more than Hegel's attempt to specify in detail the universal principles set out in the Logic. It is, of course, at least that, but it is

also much more. There is a sense in which everything can be regarded as an exemplification of logical principles (*Denkbestimmungen*), and certainly Nature specifies the Idea, posits it in schematic form, in spatio-temporal self-externality. But that is not all. Nature is the dialectical predecessor of conscious mind: the natural processes are the generation of finite spirit. Accordingly, logic itself, in one aspect an activity of finite spirit (although, in another, it is the eternal structure of the Absolute), logic as the product of human reflection upon its own knowledge and experience, is a later phase of that same dialectical series in which Nature and the mentality it generates in the evolution of organic life, issuing further in the forms of experience traced out in the *Phenomenology*, are forerunners.

The *Naturphilosophie* is, therefore, no mere rehash of the natural sciences, nor simply a systematic display of the way in which logical principles find exemplification in empirical fact. It is the philosophical reflection in detail upon the immanence in Nature of the Idea, as that is implied in the revelation through the Logic of the identity of subject and object. It is the full philosophical development of the insight that what was previously (in empirical science) looked upon as an object external to thought is actually the embodiment and the process of generation of thought itself—its *Anlage*, or rudiment. Only thus can Nature be the subject of philosophical speculation. Short of this, it is no more than the object of *gesunder Menschenverstand* and scientific observation—what common sense regards, and science studies, as a world altogether alien to and exclusive of mind.

Perhaps it is because Findlay views the *Naturphilosophie* as no more than Hegel's effort to specify the principles of the Logic that he tends to treat Hegel's insights too cavalierly, and to make light of them as flights of fancy and speculative eccentricities, whereas, in fact, many of them are prophetic in quite an astonishing degree. In subsequent chapters I shall draw attention to Hegel's anticipation of some features of contemporary physical theory—the unification of space and time as motion, for instance, and the identification of the physical reality of space-time with the spreading light wave. He also foreshadows many of the findings of present-day biology, especially the most recent hypothesis that the Earth is a single organism.

Findlay seems to miss all this. He hints that Hegel ranked the Earth as the first phase of organism merely to make a triad with plant and animal life, but the account Hegel gives of the "inanimate organism" requires a much more appreciative assessment. The modern scientist draws his conclusion from empirical evidence; but while he did not ignore such evidence as was available to him in the scientific theories of his time, for Hegel the conception of the organic Earth was a philosophical insight born of reflection upon the dialectical structure of Nature. The character of the dialectical triad, moreover, is exactly exemplified by this division of organism. The first

moment is that of unity or identity, the second that of difference and diversification, the third is that of unity in and through difference. So the Earth represents the immediate unity of organic conditions (what L. J. Henderson, a century later, called "the fitness of the environment"). Plant life displays the proliferation of associated living units, relatively loosely coordinated and largely equipotential. Animal life, finally, realizes itself in the form of an integrated diversity of immense complexity, but one that requires such intimate interdependence of organs and processes that none can exist or function except within the living totality.

Undoubtedly, Hegel made mistakes, or more correctly, he made assertions that future advances in science proved to be false, but the falsity of which neither he, nor anybody else at the time when he wrote, could have known. Which of us today is not in a similar position? And what scientist is ever free of like deficiency? Hegel supported the view that life was spontaneously generated, in minute and myriad animalicules throughout sea and earth, as light spontaneously proliferates in myriad stars. Spontaneous generation was a soberly sponsored scientific theory in Hegel's day and had not yet been experimentally discredited by Pasteur. Today, however, while no biologist has ever been able to demonstrate the spontaneous generation of life from inorganic matter, every biologist firmly believes in the continuous evolution of living forms from the nonliving. Was Hegel really mistaken, any more than Newton who supposed that light was corpuscular? Hegel explained fossils as manifestations of the organic-plastic potentiality of the earth, producing, as it were, sculptural prefigurations of living forms. He also accepted Cuvier's belief in successive prehistoric cataclysms, which had destroyed earlier flora and fauna. Hegel did not, however, explain fossils in terms of this theory as Cuvier did. Later evidence proved both of them wrong. But it was Hegel who declared that "the very stones cry out and raise themselves to spirit,"[10] which may be only poetic enthusiasm, but is nevertheless a notion full of scientific premonition.

It is easy in our time to see much of Hegel's nature-philosophy as scientifically wild and fantastic. It is easy, also, to ridicule many of his pronouncements as gross scientific errors. But if we do this we must not forget that we have the advantage of hindsight. Hegel's "errors" are nearly always those of the sciences of his time, to which he was studiously faithful, and even when he backs the wrong horse (e.g., Goethe's theory of light in preference to Newton's), he does so for weighty philosophical reasons, which with more recent scientific knowledge have often later been corroborated, and even today can bear wholesome fruit.

Findlay is much more appreciative of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature than most commentators, and he does notice the insights implicit even in what look superficially like scientific howlers. At least he treats them with toler-

ant good humor, where others tend merely to ridicule and despise. But ridicule and contempt are altogether unjustified, for not only does Hegel's extraordinary scientific scholarship deserve the greatest admiration, but also his intellectual integrity and his honesty in refusing to endorse theories that had not been established empirically. If later they became respectable, that is something he could not be expected to have foreseen. On the contrary, the interpretation of scientific theories that he does propose amply repays closer and more careful consideration than most of his commentators have been prepared to devote to them. In this Findlay is an exception, and credit is due to him for having called attention to much that had too long been neglected.

Notes

1. Cf., however, G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle* (London: Ernest Benn, 1932) and *An Introduction to Hegel*; E. E. Harris, *Nature, Mind and Modern Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1954), Chap. V.
2. See my paper, "The Problem of Self-Constitution in Idealism and Phenomenology," *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. VII, no. 1 (1977).
3. Cf. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Preface, trans. Baillie, p. 81; trans. Miller, p. 11.
4. Ibid., Baillie, p. 85; Miller, p. 13.
5. *Encyclopaedia*, 38 *Zusatz*.
6. Id., 81 *Zusatz*.
7. Id., 247.
8. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1958.
9. *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); trans. Michael J. Petry (London: G. Allen and Unwin and Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1976), 3 vols.
10. *Encyclopaedia*, 247 *Zusatz*.

9
Hegel and the Natural Sciences

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Hegel is often represented as scornful and contemptuous of the natural sciences. He seems often to ridicule their method and their achievements and to subordinate them, as forms of knowledge, to the speculative "sciences," which for him constitute the body of philosophy. This is at the very best a half-truth, and is scarcely true even by half; for what Hegel certainly does very frequently ridicule is what he regarded as pseudoscience and charlatanry rather than the genuine article, and his taunts are, more often than not, aimed at philosophers with whom he disagrees and philosophical doctrines about Nature which he considers superficial and trivial rather than at practising scientists and their recognized disciplines. Certainly, he did believe and teach that the empirical sciences belonged to a lower phase of self-conscious reason than philosophy, but such a view is inescapable for any thinker who sees philosophy as the reflective study of human experience, including empirical science; and any philosopher who seeks to deny that his subject includes this reflective task is apt to renounce his birthright as a philosopher. To affirm the reflective (second-degree, or "meta-") character of philosophy, on the other hand, is not to belittle or to disparage the natural sciences; for it is only by paying them due respect that any philosophy of science, be it of its method and the concepts it uses (Logic) or of its subject matter (Philosophy of Nature), is able to attain its goal.

For Hegel philosophy was a single system, not divisible into semi-independent branches labeled Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and the rest. And this was because he saw knowledge, and not simply knowledge, but the whole of reality, as a single system. Its unity was not, however, incompatible with diversity, but required and necessarily implied difference, as any accurate account of any feature of his theory must bring out. It follows that a discussion of Hegel's view of natural science will be fruitful only if that is seen in the light and context of the entire system, and only if the structure of the system is rightly understood.

Hegel saw the real as a single continuous dialectical activity, at once absolute, eternally realized as a whole, and perpetually and continuously realizing itself as a process. That these are not two incompatible aspects he made clear and established by showing that they were necessary and mutually complementary sides of the dialectic. In any genuine developmental process, the outcome is immanent in the incomplete and immature phases, and these, because they are incomplete and are made what they are by the system's principle of order implicit in them, demand supplementation by what they lack, and so become involved in the dialectical process. Hence the whole into which they are developing is presupposed in their very deficiency, and so is in principle eternally realized, yet, as immanent in the parts, and as the source of their *conatus* to self-development, is constantly specifying and actualizing itself. My concern in this chapter, however, is not to discuss this issue, and it will be sufficient to consider only the second aspect—that of the continuous dialectical process extending from the concept of pure Being to absolute self-conscious Spirit.

That this was Hegel's conception of reality is attested by numerous passages in his works. In the second Preface and in the Introduction to the Greater Logic, he maintains, first, that logic is concerned with no merely empty thought forms, devoid of content, but with the determinations intrinsic to, immanent and inherent in, all forms of experience,[1] and indeed all forms of reality. For he asserts here (as he does also in the *Encyclopaedia*) that the principle of movement in consciousness and thought is equally the principle of all movement and activity in actuality.[2] It follows that there is no break between natural motion and the activity of thought. The principle of both is dialectic, and dialectic is a nisus generating a process that goes continuously from one phase to the next, from Being to the Concept.

We must not forget, however, that Being and Concept, while they are *Denkbestimmungen* are not just formal ideas, but are principles immanent both in the external world and in conscious experience. Being is the actual existing world as well as a logical category. But its "truth," what it really is in essence, is the Concept—so Hegel persistently asserts. "The actual world is in itself the truth, for the truth is actual and must exist."[3] The truth, however, qua truth, is known—is for itself (*für sich*) and as such is consciousness or spirit. The knowledge of an object is its concept and the Logic is the science of the Concept;[4] it is the "thinking study" of that dialectical process by which Being generates out of itself (making explicit what it implies) the whole gamut of categories up to the Concept; and this answers to and is parallel with the dialectical process by which the actual external world—the world of Nature—generates the self-conscious subject of knowledge, knowledge both of the world and of itself as the human mind. Consciousness, as it develops, runs through the same series of dialectical

stages, from sentience through perception and understanding to reflective experience and philosophical speculation.

Natural science is a definite phase in this process and must be seen as such. It must be assigned to its proper place in the dialectical series if we are to understand how Hegel viewed it and the attitude, qua philosopher, that he adopted towards it. The emergence of sentient awareness in the organic world is the point at which Nature gives rise to Spirit (*Geist*). The subsequent development of consciousness proceeds through perception and understanding to reason, and, in its course, the mind engages in empirical science. Philosophy is a later phase of the same development, for it presupposes the activity of spirit in practical life as well as in theoretical investigation, and logic sets out the thought-determinations (or categories) implicit in all forms of less reflective experience.

The categories of science will, of course, find a place in this logical system; but natural science itself is temporally and dialectically prior to logic. It is an activity of thought at a less reflective level that takes for its object the natural world as it is observed, or perceived. It is a reflection upon, a refinement and a systematic analytic elaboration of, commonsense experience. Logic is a further turning back of thought upon itself, and is reflection upon this reflection. Further, it is only as the self-reflection of philosophical speculation proceeds that the developmental relations between nature and spirit are brought to self-awareness, and the mind recognizes its erstwhile object (in empirical science) as its own self in embryo. Nature, as it appears to common sense and as it is investigated by science, is mere physical external object. Its movements and processes are not recognized as dialectical, nor as stages in the self-generation of Spirit. It is only when thought has reached the level of self-reflection attained in philosophy, and then only after it has reflected upon its own activity in common sense and in the exact and empirical sciences (which it does in logic) that it becomes aware of the immanence of mind in Nature. It thereupon reverts to Nature and rethinks it as mind in becoming, giving a fresh account of it, not as empirical science has already done, but as *Naturphilosophie*. In this discipline, the pronouncements of the natural sciences are not superseded or contradicted, but they are seen in a new light, as a preliminary, less self-conscious, awareness of an object that has now come to be recognized as identical with the knowing subject in the Idea—the truth, which is actual and existent in life and cognition. We must, therefore, examine Hegel's treatment of the natural sciences in the *Phenomenology* and the *Geistesphilosophie*, and in the Logic as well as in the *Naturphilosophie*.

WISSENSCHAFT

First, however, let us consider what Hegel says of *Wissenschaft* and what he understands by that word. *Wissenschaft* is properly translated by "science," but Hegel did not restrict the term to empirical or natural science, nor even to this taken along with mathematics (exact science). Primarily, for Hegel, *Wissenschaft* is "absolute knowing," the Concept, an awareness of self as its own object and as identical with its object—substance, aware of itself as subject (or *Geist*) and vice versa. Obviously this is the proper province of philosophy. But to be scientific and to be Concept, what is presented can be no mere abstract universal principle formulated as fundamental, nor yet a transcendent pure thought leaving behind it all concrete content. As Hegel expresses it in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*:

> Among the many consequences that flow from what has been said, these may be given prominence, that knowledge is only actual and can only be expounded as science or as system; and further that a so-called fundamental proposition or principle of philosophy, even if it is true, is nevertheless also false, just because and insofar as it is merely a fundamental or first principle.

and again:

> The true form in which the truth exists can only be the scientific system thereof.[5]

A postulated fundamental principle is, by itself, merely abstract and empty, until the system to which it is fundamental has been developed. Only then, as an integral moment within the system, does its true significance appear. Similarly, the final conclusion, unless it is seen as the conclusion of the demonstration and in its systematic relations to the evidence from which it is drawn, is utterly unintelligible.[6] A conclusion, however, which does adequately reflect the reasoning that led to it, sublates the entire systematic derivation, and, as subsuming the process which has issued in that result, holds the whole system encompassed within itself.

Knowledge proper is science, which is fully and systematically developed, elaborated, and set out. And the development is the dialectical self-evolution of the subject matter (*die Sache selbst*). It must be the very nature of the object under scrutiny, through its own negation, through its own deficiency as inadequately grasped or partially envisaged, that impels it to develop. Its implications then unfold to reach that ultimate self-knowledge that is the Concept (its concept)—"*die wahre Gestalt, in welcher die Wahrheit existiert.*" But this is the entire dialectical process, the whole system *aufgehoben*, or sublated, in its outcome.

> The truth is the whole, but the whole is only that essential reality which has fulfilled itself through its development. One may say of the Absolute that it is essentially a result: that it is only at the end that it is for the first time what it truly is; and its nature consists in just that—to be actual subject, or self-development.[7]

Accordingly, nothing is truly scientific that is not systematically developed in rigorous dialectical expansion; and Hegel is very scornful of any exposition claiming to be scientific which is simply a collection of facts, or an alleged demonstration of a theory based on evidence fortuitously dragged in from some unrelated source (or one the relation of which to the conclusion is not clearly made out). In the natural sciences of his day treatises were often written lacking the kind of disciplined rigor that Hegel demanded. They presented their material either as demonstrations, the foundations of which were arbitrarily postulated assumptions, or as mere congeries of facts with little or no systematic interrelation. Against this sort of ineptitude Hegel railed unmercifully, although, as was said above, his target is more often half-baked philosophy than natural science.

Scientific procedure as Hegel conceived it is characteristic of the natural sciences, and the systematic nature and relations of the categories proper to them are set out and dialectically deduced in his Logic. They do, indeed, form only a part—a limited phase—within the total system, which he insisted must be complete and rigorous throughout and must be elaborated in full. But, as a definite and necessary phase of the system, the various sciences are not only legitimate and important, but necessary for the adequate understanding and appreciation of reflective philosophy.

> "It is only after profounder acquaintance with the other sciences," Hegel declares, "that logic ceases to be for the subjective spirit a merely abstract universal and reveals itself as the universal which embraces within itself the wealth of the particular. . . . Thus the value of logic is only fully appreciated when it has come to be as the result of an experience of the sciences. . . ."[8]

Science as a Stage in the Development of Consciousness

Whatever else empirical science is taken to be, it is obviously and incontestably a level of development of consciousness. Science is a way of thinking and a form of truth, and so is characteristic of a particular stage of intellectual (or, in Hegelian terms, spiritual) maturation. We do not look for scientific thinking among primitive people, nor expect it of young children. It is not typical of the untutored mind, of the naive or unsophisticated. The mind must have developed to some degree before it becomes capable of

empirical science; and the course of this development is traced in the *Phenomenology*. "This coming to be of science in general," Hegel writes (using *Wissenschaft* in the sense explained), "or knowledge (*Wissen*), is what this Phenomenology of Spirit sets forth."[9]

Consciousness is shown here to begin with immediate sense-certainty the direct awareness of a this-here-now; but to be this it must at once become something more, for no this, or here, or now can maintain itself except in relation to a that, a there, and a then. And though the purport of "this" is particular, the term applies indifferently to every this, and so is universal—as are "here" and "now." The conflict resolves itself in a here which is many heres, a present which embraces a lapse of several nows, and a this which is a complex of sensuous thises—an individual object. So sense-certainty develops into perception (*Wahrnehmung*), the cognition of individual objects and their mutual spatio-temporal relations. Here again individuality and universality vie with each other. The thing is one, but its qualities are many, and though it is individual its qualities are each shared with innumerable other things. The merely apparent (qualities) comes to be contrasted with what is veridical, the subjective with the objective, and perception appears now as the one and now as the other. The urge towards assurance locates certainty in each in turn and finds it in neither, until it seeks truth in a new form of the universal, unconditioned by sense. This is the form of essential reality, unsensed, yet imagined as lying behind, or beneath, the play of sensuous appearances.

The phase of consciousness that thus emerges is what Hegel calls Understanding (*Verstand*). It moves from the postulation of force as the underlying explanation of sensible change, to the idea of a law governing the play of forces. It presents the object as double and self-reflected, as reality and its appearances, as substance and accident, as cause and effect. It analyzes and distinguishes, and keeps the distincta apart, as if in their mutual dependence they were separable and self-contained.[10]

Findlay calls this "scientific understanding,"[11] although in this context Hegel makes no reference to empirical science. In the Introduction to the Lesser Logic, however, he does tell us that Understanding is an essential moment in all science, empirical as well as philosophical.[12] At one time I held the view that for Hegel empirical science and understanding were more or less identical, and that empirical science was restricted to the level of understanding[13] (which is what Findlay's phrase also seems to imply), but I now think this interpretation is mistaken; first, for the very reason that, in this passage in the Encyclopaedia Logic, he insists that understanding is but one moment in all knowledge, be it empirical or philosophical; and secondly because, in the *Phenomenology* what is patently his account of empirical science is the section entitled *Beobachtung der Natur*, which is an activity of

Reason (*Vernunft*), what corresponds in the *Encyclopaedia* to the Concept.

To say that *Verstand* is scientific understanding is not wrong, because the form of thinking that is characteristic of understanding is predominant in empirical science; but the latter is a *self*-conscious activity, which is not always the case with *Verstand* (though it is indeed conscious). In the *Phenomenology* Hegel tells us that the culmination of the movement of perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is the unconditioned universal, "and it is here that consciousness first truly enters the realm of understanding."[14] But he proceeds at once to describe how sensible singleness dissolves in the dialectic of immediate certainty (the "logic of perception") and becomes universality, and how the interplay of empty abstractions, singleness as opposed to universality, the essential against the unessential (which is nevertheless "necessary"), typifies *gesunder Menschenverstand*, which Baillie translates (correctly) as "sound common sense."

The world of sound common sense is, by and large, the perceptual world, and *Menschenverstand* is also *Verstand* (or understanding). At the common sense level the world is not barely perceived, it is also understood, but in abstract and often contradictory terms, through which, Hegel says, the understanding reveals not their truth but its own untruth.[15] Understanding is as much a feature of common sense as of science (as the passage in the *Encyclopaedia* implies) and common sense is largely perceptual thinking. Similarly, empirical science is based on observation and includes an important perceptual element. *Verstand* signifies a type of thinking present in both, but wholly identical with neither. It is a moment also in philosophical speculation, which, without it becomes vague and mystifying. In the *Phenomenology* the dialectic of the understanding constitutes a kind of transition between "sound common sense," immersed in perceptual immediacy, and empirical science, the observation of nature, which is an activity of reason.[16]

Sound common sense, however, does more than merely perceive the world of things in space and time; it also offers explanations to itself of what it experiences—usually implicit and merely "understood," but also at times explicit. Changes of appearances it sees as the effects of causes, movements as the product of forces, which are regular in the way they act. For commonsense things move only when pushed or pulled, and every change is instigated by some agency that initiates it. Hence it comes to postulate hidden and unperceived influences which express themselves in perceived events. The explanations given, however, are often incoherent (for instance, the early Greek belief that the sun was extinguished at sunset and reignited at sunrise, a renewal which lacked any plausible explanation). Accordingly, the consequent difficulties stimulate closer and more systematic observation and consideration of the phenomena, giving rise to science.

The ideas elaborated in natural science are then reabsorbed into common sense (e.g., that the earth is a sphere round which the sun revolves, disappearing at night when one side of the sphere is enveloped in shadow). But everything that Hegel includes in *Verstand* in the *Phenomenology* is found in the lower phase as well as in the higher. In common sense, what is merely implicit and "for us" (the philosophers, who recognize factors to which consciousness at the commonsense level pays no heed, or simply takes for granted), becomes explicit in science, aware of itself (*für sich*).

Observation of Nature

Empirical science—the observation of Nature—belongs to that stage of reason at which consciousness establishes objectivity as that which conforms to the categories of the understanding. It is the stage of knowledge described and analyzed philosophically by Kant and Fichte, who realized that whatever is known is for consciousness and that the phenomenal object is the mind's own content, molded in its own image. The rational level of empirical science is, in principle, idealistic; it sees universality (the essential nature of the knowing subject) as intrinsic to its object (in the form of natural law).

In claiming the whole world as its own in this way, Hegel reminds us, idealism is merely intuitive and remains oblivious of the process through which it has developed to this stage. This reminder is important, for it underlines Hegel's own realism. The certitude of reason that it is the objective truth has developed not only from sense-certainty, perception, and common sense, for which the object is external and to which it appears as immediately presented, not only through the opposition of self to other in the dialectic of master and slave, but also, as we gather from the *Geistesphilosophie*, it has its roots in still more remote sources in Nature. But in the first flush of self-assurance, the subject of reason forgets these obscure and distant origins,

> " . . . scorning the base degrees
> By which it did ascend . . ."

and it is only after subsequent self-reflection, when the mind has made its activity in science its object, and has traced out the dialectic that has produced it and moves within it, that philosophy becomes aware of Nature as implicit Spirit—the potential self-generation of absolute self-awareness. To the philosophical reflection upon Nature we shall return below. Here we are concerned with our main subject, empirical science as rational observation of Nature.

The confidence of consciousness in its own grasp of, and identity with, objective truth is, however, at this early stage of self-conscious reason, only

"for us," who are examining it philosophically, it is not "for itself." Its own presence in its object is at first only felt, suspected, or presupposed in a general way.[17] To know itself as concretely universal it must first have reflected upon its own nature (*in seine eigne Tiefe steigen*),[18] and only thereafter can it return to external reality and find in that its own sensible embodiment.[19]

But in its observation of Nature reason behaves, as it were, instinctively, unconscious in itself of its own true nature. This unself-consciousness of self-conscious reason is no stark paradox. It is conscious of itself as seeking universality (its own nature) in its object, but it is not yet aware of itself as expressed and embodied in that object, because it has still to reflect upon its own universal nature in philosophy (especially in logic).

Accordingly, reason seems to return to intention (*Meinen*) and perception (*Wahrnehmung*). Again, this is no paradox or genuine regression, for in the dialectic of consciousness the proximate object of each phase is always the prior phase, and we constantly find Hegel apparently going back on his tracks to cover what seems to be old ground in a new way. So here, the objects of reason are common sense and understanding—the perceptual world as understood by sound human intelligence (*gesunder Menschenverstand*). It is precisely the world as understood by common sense that the natural sciences investigate, and their method of investigation is by observation (sense-perception). Nevertheless, the return to sense-perception is not a return to mere naïveté. Observation is not just a matter of "tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing and seeing"; for the sensuously apprehended object has already been determined, in the perception, by thought (distinguishing, correlating, and identifying mutually opposed elements); and for scientific observation the object must have universal significance. For natural science, therefore, although the medium of investigation is sense-observation, it is not simply fortuitous perception, but is directed by the questions raised and the explanations sought. "Reason sets out to know the truth, to find as a concept what for opinion (*Meinen*) and perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is a thing."[20]

Into the detail of Hegel's treatment of the sciences in the *Phenomenology* we need not enter. Throughout he views the scientific enterprise as a phase in the continuous effort of the mind to become aware of itself as self-conscious Concept; and he describes the objects and concepts of natural science as partial and halting prefigurations of this self-knowledge, which in various ways, characteristic of the stage reached, fail to achieve the goal pursued. Reason in its observation of Nature discovers, not what consciousness itself is (although that revelation is the ultimate outcome of its persistent effort), but what things are.

The observing mind regards all its objects externally, as things unaffected

by its observation, and adopts the observational attitude towards both Nature and mind, as well as towards their mutual relation (the expression or manifestation of the latter in the former). Hence we have the gamut of the sciences developing itself from physical science (observation of the inorganic) to biology (observation of the organic) and thence to psychology (observation of self-consciousness itself in relation to external actuality) and so to the sciences which deal with the objective anatomical expressions of the mind (physiognomy and phrenology). Every stage of advance is stimulated by contradictions that appear and become intractable in the current stage.

Empirical science moves from the early stage of promiscuous observation, indiscriminate collection, and minute description,[21] to classification by means of distinguishing marks (or common characteristics). But this proves unreliable, for the mark is subjectively selected and what is required is an objective criterion. Hence a law is sought linking characteristics more systematically. This, in turn, proves to be only a hypothesis, its truth only probable, whereas it was taken to be necessary. Reason then seeks to establish its necessity more firmly by devising experiments to determine what is essential and what is not. At this stage there emerge imponderables and theoretical entities which, though supposed to be observed objects, are actually unobservable, and the universal is emancipated from its immersion in sense.[22]

Organism, the object of biological science, Hegel sees as a new and further development of the Concept as it appears to observing self-consciousness. Biology, in Hegel's day, was just beginning to develop as a systematic discipline, and he outlines and criticizes the concepts it was striving to develop. He notes the looseness and banality of its classifications,[23] the vagueness of the "laws" governing the influence of environment on the organism, and the externality of the "teleological" relation postulated to explain it. He himself has a much sounder conception of teleology as self-maintenance, identified as purpose, of which the aim is the organism itself. His whole conception and exposition of the notion of organism is far in advance of his time. He is well aware of the distinction between merely chemical process which "gets lost in the environment" and the organism which maintains itself by adaptation to, and self-assertion against, its surroundings.

This inner nisus to self-maintenance Hegel sees expressing itself in the three main living functions that contemporary biology distinguished as sensibility, excitability (*Irritabilität*) and reproduction, each of which is manifested in anatomical structure (nervous system, musculature, intestinal structure, etc.). But none of these is a separable entity, nor is any exclusively devoted to a single function, for the whole organism functions in each of them. They are moments of an organic process the distinction

between inner and outer aspects of which is purely formal. The anatomical organs are what they are strictly and only qua functioning. As merely material structures they belong to the cadaver, which is not the living organism as it is properly known and conceived. Structure and function are but moments of the living reality, which alone gives them intelligible meaning.[24]

There are many more examples of Hegel's penetrating insight into the nature of life in his treatment of the organic, and he attributes the relative failure of contemporary biological science to grasp the true concept of the organic to the persistent tendency of observation to reify and set in mutually external relation what are essentially inseparable moments of a dynamic concrete universal.

There is, however, no contempt or disrespect for empirical science as such in Hegel's criticism. He sees it as a necessary phase in the development of consciousness, but one inadequate to full self-knowledge. It occupies a relatively low level of self-consciousness, at which external Nature is explored in the pursuit of that universality which belongs essentially to self-conscious mind. Empirical science, therefore, is, as it were, the first step towards the discovery of mind in Nature. Its limitations are the natural consequences of its attitude to its object—that of observation—and the inescapable peculiarities of that level of awareness.

But observant reason does not restrict itself to the investigation of inorganic and organic Nature, it adopts the same attitude to mind itself and seeks to observe consciousness as well, both in its own process and in its material manifestations. Hence it produces two new pairs of sciences for which Hegel had little or no respect. The first pair concern themselves with subjective aspects of mind, the second with its external anatomical signs. On the subjective side is the traditional formal logic, which Hegel regarded as a sort of "natural history of thought"—a treatment of the laws and forms of judgment, as derived from an external observation of its operation, so that they appear, not as a self-generating dialectical progression, but as "a collection of disconnected necessities," fixed and unchanging, merely "a found, given, i.e. merely existent content."[25] Here Hegel contents himself simply with emphasizing the inadequacy and invalidity of "these so-called laws of thought," reserving more detailed criticism and exposition for the Logic, and he passes on to psychology, the second empirical science of the mind. This is the observation of the process of consciousness, its habits, customs, ways of feeling, and imaging in practice. As before, observant reason finds only a collection of faculties, traits, passions, and the like, the unity of which in a single individuality it fails to grasp. These it catalogs as a naturalist might collect and list species of insects or mosses, and with less right, for they are not (as are the latter) fortuitous and independent particulars.

If biology was in its infancy in Hegel's day, empirical psychology was embryonic, and we can understand his dismissal of what he felt was (in his own terms) far from scientific. His contempt for formal logic sprang from another source: his belief that genuine thinking and its true logic was dialectical, where the distinction between form and content was relative and at best provisional, such that, if sharpened and exaggerated to become a separation, it falsified the nature of thought altogether.

For the last two sciences, which he treats at some length in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel had least respect of all. These are the "sciences" of physiognomy and phrenology. In his time they were taken so seriously that Hegel could not afford to neglect them, but he is never taken in by their pretentions, and he ridicules their pronouncements with ribald contempt. He tries, however, to rationalize their actual occurrence as sciences, and to show why observing consciousness turns to the physiognomic and cranial characteristics of the individual in search of "a law of relationship between self-consciousness and actuality, or the world set over against it." For all their ineptitudes, there is some point to these pseudosciences. It is the life process, the nisus towards self-awareness itself, that has evolved the bodily form. And, in each individual case, the body is the medium through which whatever the person does is effected and expressed. It therefore constitutes "a sign" of the personality and its characteristics. Hegel always insists that every psychical act and capacity has its physical embodiment, so the expressive organs of face and hand cannot, for him, be wholly irrelevant, in their form and articulation, to the characteristics of the person to whom they belong, and who uses them to express his or her individuality.

The alleged "sciences" themselves Hegel castigates as bogus. Their so-called laws are guesswork and empty "fancying" (*Meinung*) really saying nothing at all: mere chatter, on the level of the housewife's assertion that it always rains on washing day.[26] This last stage of observing reason is, says Hegel, its worst, and it underlines the necessity for a complete reversal of outlook.

SCIENCE AND LOGIC

Hegel described the *Phenomenology* as his voyage of discovery. It was his first major philosophical reflection upon the entire range of human experience. It may serve us, therefore, as a guide to the more detailed elaboration of his system in later works. In the section to which we have been paying attention he is outlining the process by which consciousness at the level of reason constructs new ("scientific") objects out of the materials already formed at the lower level of perception and common sense. In the third part of the *Encyclopaedia*, the Philosophy of Spirit, we are told that consciousness

derives its objects from the more primitive stage, in soul, of sensation (*Gefühl*). It does so by determining the sensory content as sensible, existing, material things.[27] The multiplicity of presentations, at this stage, is ordered and reduced to unity at the next, by the imposition upon it of laws and universal principles by the intellect.[28] So the stage that is characterized by empirical science, is one at which, by such organization, reason constructs its data out of the material of the preceding stage. Contemporary philosophers of science have, today, rediscovered this truth about the method and procedure of science, and have come to admit, in opposition to the Empiricism which has so long held the field, that there is no theoretically neutral body of observable evidence available to the scientist, but that he reads his observed data in terms of the scientific theories already established and accepted (or the current "paradigm").[29]

The *Phenomenology*, at its conclusion brings us to absolute knowing, "the reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness"—i.e., the stage at which spirit is conscious of its own actual self-consciousness. This is essentially the philosophical stage and so, in a way, the stage of the *Phenomenology* itself. "All that remains to be done now," Hegel says, "is to cancel and transcend this bare form [of objectivity]; or rather, because the form appertains to consciousness as such, its true meaning must have already come out in the shape or modes consciousness has assumed"[30] (which, in this work, he has already reviewed). But, while this, the culmination of the "voyage of discovery" is a return upon itself, Hegel contemplates, and in the *Encyclopaedia* carries out, an explicit, scientific elaboration of this final phase. Its content, he says here, "is the spirit which traverses [the whole range of] its own being, and does this for itself, qua spirit, by the fact that it possesses the shape of the Concept in its objectivity."[31] And this he regards as going beyond what he has done in the *Phenomenology*. Spirit, having attained to absolute knowing (the Concept), he tells us, unfolds its existence in its own medium ("the aether of its life") as philosophical science, setting forth the moments of its dialectical process "as determinate concepts" and not, as does the *Phenomenology*, "as determinate modes or shapes of consciousness."[32]

The first part of this philosophical science is logic, which sets out the moments, or categories as pure concepts, each an exemplification at its appropriate level of the Concept proper. The succession of categories in the Logic corresponds to the series of forms of consciousness, and "exhibits them . . . in accordance with their immanent opposition." Logic deals, for the most part, with categories of the purely cognitive forms of consciousness (e.g., perception, understanding, natural science, etc.), and constitutes a further phase of reflection upon the activities which operate at a prior and less self-conscious level. As perception and common sense serve as objects to empirical science, so empirical science serves as object to logic; and, of

course, in so doing brings with it the lower forms of awareness as implicit objects. This must not, however, be understood to exclude other branches of knowledge (e.g., mathematics, or theology), for, as we are about to observe, the applicability of logical categories is universal and is not restricted to any special department of experience.

The correlation of the three parts of the Logic, the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Concept, with the three main phases of experience, the immediacy of perception, mediated, reflective scientific knowledge, and speculative philosophy, has some very general justification, but it is somewhat too facile and may be misleading. The dialectic in its movement grows like a fugue, and in so advanced a stage as philosophical logic, the whole range of less reflective experience is *aufgehoben*, or involved. Hegel declares that each category of the logic is a (provisional) definition of the Absolute.[33] In other words, each category presents the whole of reality in one special aspect (or moment), and Hegel finds illustrative material for almost every category from a wide range of diverse experience and from several different branches of knowledge. One cannot, therefore, identify any special group of categories as those belonging exclusively, or even mainly, to the empirical sciences.

For instance, while it is true that perception and common sense, accepting their objects as immediately given, conform to the categories of Being, who would wish to deny that becoming (change, transition, evolution), quality, quantity, repulsion and attraction, magnitude, number and measure, were concepts essential to the empirical sciences, let alone mathematics? On the other hand, identity, difference, the thing and its properties, inner and outer, possible and actual, all categories treated by Hegel under Essence, are categories of common sense just as much as they are categories of empirical science. Nor can science, at least in its methodology, dispense with the categories of the subjective Concept; and those of the objective Concept, though they might be taken as typical of certain forms of metaphysics (materialism, holism, finalism, for example) are clearly concepts derived from and operative in the special sciences. One may say that Hegel's logic as a whole is a logic of the empirical sciences, but also, at the same time, much more; for it is also a logic of levels of thought both below and beyond that on which the sciences operate. In it natural science is *aufgehoben*, is preserved (and transformed) while it is also surpassed, abolished, and annulled. It is preserved inasmuch as the logical categories are its categories; it is annulled and surpassed insofar as the logician knows the categories as at once *Denkbestimmungen* and principles of the real (definitions of the Absolute). For logic, subject, and object are one, whereas for empirical science the object is external and is merely observed, treated from the outside (so to speak), classified, analyzed, and the like, by an observer and theorist who does not

recognize it (or at most very dimly) as the embodiment of the logical principles in terms of which he is thinking.

Desirable as it may be, it is hardly possible in a single chapter to discuss in detail the special relevance of various logical categories to the empirical sciences. It will have to suffice to point out that on numerous occasions Hegel uses instances from natural science to illustrate his exposition. He is particularly fond of calling attention to electrical and magnetic polarity as an analogy to, yet an inadequate exemplification of, dialectical opposition, as well as, in particular, a special case embodying the category of difference in the form of positive and negative contrariety.[34] In the Greater Logic he uses the notion of gravity and its relation to a house standing upon its foundation, to a falling body and to the trajectory of a projectile, as illustrative of the category of Ground.[35] But, of course, he is far from confining himself to scientific examples, for, as has been said, the logic reflects upon the whole range of human experience, and art, religion, and philosophy all provide instantiations of its categories as well as the sciences.

Sometimes Hegel adjudicates between the attitudes of these different fields of knowledge, as when he is discussing the correlation of force and its expression he vindicates the scientific attitude against that of more bigoted forms of religion—the demand to specify and explain natural phenomena in terms of laws, as against the dogmatic assertion that it is all the work of an omnipotent God.[36] This is not to say, however, that he is preferring one discipline (science), to which the logical category is especially appropriate, to another (theology).

SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

As the *Phenomenology* culminated in absolute knowledge, which was philosophy, and is forthwith elaborated in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, so philosophy in its logical phase culminates in the absolute Idea, effecting another *enroulement sur soi-même* (to borrow a phrase from Teilhard de Chardin). This logical phase of philosophy is the mind's reflection upon its own cognitive experience in common sense, science, art, morals, and religion. In each and all of these it is confronted by an object, which is really itself in its prior phases summed up in the one immediately preceding. But the object is not recognized as such but is seen as an Other set over against the knowing (or acting) subject. Yet in each of these cognitive forms in different ways the mind discovers its own principle in and as its object. This discovery, however, at the stage in question, is only *für uns*—for us, who are reflecting upon it philosophically—not *für sich*, for itself. At the philosophical level, however, we who are reflecting are identical with it (the knowing mind) and the identity of object with subject is grasped *an und für*

sich. The identity of subject and object aware of itself as such is the absolute Idea—the ultimate realization of logical reflection in and as the Concept (*Begriff*).

But logic realizes the identity only in the form of concept, only as idea, the true significance of which is that the Idea is no mere idea, but is the truth of the world of Nature—the truth that is actual and must exist. Philosophy, therefore, returns to Nature as revealed in empirical science and gives a new reflective account of it as the implicit Idea—the Idea in the form of externality or other-being—the manifestation of spirit as the world in space and time.

The philosophy of Nature, the second major division of philosophy, is therefore a further phase of self-consciousness, the object of which (as before) is itself in prior phase (absolute Idea, but now in the form of externality). As the second main division of philosophy (absolute knowledge), it stands in opposition to Logic, an opposition which is resolved in the philosophy of Spirit. But qua philosophy, the *Naturphilosophie* has this reconciliation already implicit in it, because it *is* philosophy—it is mind reflecting upon its own experience, and so it is in itself a reconciliation of opposites, namely the logical Idea, on the one hand, and the observed world of empirical science, on the other. The mind is here aware of Nature (the Idea in the form of other-being) as the dialectical process of its own generation, as itself becoming actual.

Whereas the scientist sees the world as a congeries of external phenomena, linked together by causal laws, the philosopher of Nature is now aware of the Idea immanent in it; he sees Nature as implicit or potential mind. His task is to understand what Nature is as a whole, and he asks himself the question: What is Nature?—a question that the natural scientist either does not raise; or, if he does, he seeks the answer in the details, which are endless, and fails to see the wood for the trees.[37] The difference between *Naturphilosophie* and empirical science, therefore, is one of viewpoint: the former is synoptic and self-reflective, whereas the latter is (as we have already seen) observational. In the Philosophy of Nature the activity of reason is full blown, while in natural science it is only "instinctive" and largely intuitive.

Naturphilosophie, in consequence, is not a highfalutin attempt to supplant natural science or to do its work over again more adequately. It must accept the pronouncements and discoveries of the natural sciences as the source of its material. It cannot supplant them because it cannot dispense with them. "Not only must philosophy be in accordance with the experience of nature, but the emergence and formation of the philosophical science has empirical science as its presupposition and condition."[38] Hegel's intellectual integrity with respect to science is, in fact, marked. Contrary to what has often been

alleged about him, he makes no attempt to dictate to the sciences, or to pontificate on what their results should be. The old libel that he declared, on a priori grounds, that there could not be more than seven planets has long been exposed as false, and whoever invented it had certainly not read the *Naturphilosophie*, from which it is apparent that he knew of the existence of Uranus and several of the planetoids.[39] Nor is the more plausible accusation that the Philosophy of Nature is an attempt to deduce the details of the physical universe from a priori principles, which is more appropriate against Schelling, at all justified against Hegel, for he repudiates and disapproves of any such claim. The accusation was made against him in his own lifetime but he treated it with the contempt it deserved in his reply to Professor Krug, who demanded that Hegel should deduce, from his principles, the existence of Krug's pen.[40]

What Hegel does in his Philosophy of Nature is to accept the scientific knowledge of his own day as material from which to construct an "idea of Nature"—a world-picture or *Weltanschauung* (in a somewhat narrower sense than that usually understood in German)—that shows the world of Nature to be an exposition, in spatio-temporal, material, form, of the Idea proper. As such, it will both be a self-complete, internally coherent whole, and it will have a dialectical structure. There will be immanent in it that movement of thought which, in the development of conscious experience, leads up to absolute knowing, and in the Logic, to the absolute Idea.

Consequently, we find in Hegel's conception of Nature two features not especially characteristic of the science of his time, which create a certain tension and oscillation, in his treatment of it, between faithfulness to established scientific theory and speculative venture, which does credit both to his intellectual honesty and to his philosophical penetration.

(i) The holistic cast of his thought leads Hegel to realize that the truly fruitful aspiration of the scientist is towards the construction of a coherently systematic theory, which expresses itself as the belief in the harmonious and ultimately rational character of the physical world. Thus he applauds Kepler's faith in the *harmonia mundi* (more recently voiced in no less insistent tones by Einstein), and defends Kepler's view of planetary motion against Newton's as conceptually sounder. There is undoubtedly an element of nationalistic partiality in his obvious preference for "the German," Kepler, over "the Englishman," Newton; but he eulogizes Kepler especially for his "absolute faith that reason must be [embodied] in" the facts of planetary motion. And there is sound epistemological principle implicit in Hegel's appraisal, a principle frequently overlooked by philosophers of science. The urge to find a unified system *is* what leads scientists to their discoveries and is the motive power of scientific advance. Copernicus states it explicitly as his reason for advancing the heliocentric hypothesis.[41] In their dismissal of

Kepler's earlier astronomical theory, correlating the orbits of the planets with the regular solids, for instance, commentators usually fail to observe that it was this venture in geometrical organization that led him to make the important scientific move of measuring planetary distances from the center of the Sun (the "true Sun") instead of (as had previously been done) from the center of the Earth's orbit (the so-called "mean Sun"). What Hegel finds distasteful about Newton is, perhaps, more his professed radical empiricism than his nationality. He does, however, fail to give Newton credit for those scientific speculations, especially in the last book of the *Opticks*, which are by no means consistent with his admonitions elsewhere against framing hypotheses.

In defending Kepler's conception of the movement of the planets, Hegel stresses the fact that their motion is a single curved movement, and he inveighs against Newton's analysis of it into two rectilinear movements, one tangential to the curve of the orbit and the other radial. The protest is against the rigid divisions and separations of the understanding. Hegel's point is that the two elements in the planet's motion are not two separate and accidentally combined forces, producing separate rectilinear courses, neither of which is actually pursued, and which could not actually be combined to constitute an elliptical curve. "The motion of the heavenly bodies," he says, "is no such hither and thither drag (*Hin- und Hergezogensein*), but free movement; they go on their way, as the ancients said, like the blessed gods."[42]

So poetic, and apparently fantastic, a description of the astronomical facts is apt to be laughed to scorn by the hard-headed scientist. Yet Eddington made this quotation a text on which to elaborate his own version of the movement of the planets in the new light of relativity theory in the twentieth century.[43] The Einsteinian conclusions, that the "forces" are simply curvature in space-time, and that the planets move freely along geodesics, precisely vindicate Hegel's contention.

On the other hand, Hegel's prejudices in favor of the German astronomer led him altogether to suppress the fact that Kepler too believed that the planet was pushed and pulled. He thought the circular tendency of its motion was the result of a thrusting power of solar light as the Sun turned on its own axis, and that the elliptical shape of the orbit, along with the deceleration of the planet at aphelion, was to be explained by a certain inertia or "laziness" on the part of the planet itself.

Yet surely Hegel is not wrong to insist that what must here be conceived is not a collection or a bundle of forces, but a single movement along a geodesic determined by the total configuration of the system.[44] And that is exactly how present-day physicists would wish to represent the fact.

(ii) The second characteristic of Hegel's view of Nature tending to

produce the kind of tensions mentioned above is the intrinsic dialectical movement, on which he insists. The processes of a dialectically structured world should be essentially teleological and evolutionary. But during Hegel's lifetime the conception of evolution had not yet been accepted by biologists nor was it scientifically established. It was only in the year of Hegel's death that Darwin sailed in the *Beagle*, and more than twenty years later that *The Origin of Species* was published.

Yet, what is remarkable about Hegel's treatment of the scientific detail is that he never allows his philosophical insight to dictate what the scientist ought to find, or what Nature ought to reveal, but he adheres closely to the scientifically accepted theories of the day, even when that philosophical insight prompts him to statements and interpretations which foreshadow later developments in science. His faithful adherence to what in his time was held to be scientifically respectable led him to reject the notion of biological evolution, convenient though it would have been for him to accept it. The idea had already been foreshadowed by Erasmus Darwin (Charles's grandfather), had been proposed by Geoffroi St. Hilaire, and an elaborate theory of evolution, which, however, was not supported by observational evidence, had been worked out by Lamarck. When Hegel wrote, the notion was at best a very speculative hypothesis.

It is by no means certain that Hegel would have endorsed every aspect of Darwinism that has since come to be accepted, could he have known about it. He would no doubt have rejected, or at least criticized, the more mechanistic aspects. That the sole agencies at work in evolution are chance variation and natural selection is not held even today by all biologists. Nor is the belief necessary to a dialectical conception of Nature that biological evolution can be explained wholly in such terms. To conceive process as a dialectical progression is more illuminating and more fruitful, and is dependent only upon a thoroughly holistic approach, as I have argued in *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (especially in Chapter XII and XIII) and in *Cosmos and Anthropos*.[45]

The geological evidence of fossils which had already been discovered Hegel explains away—not like Professor Scheuchzer of Zurich, as "the damaged skeleton of a poor sinner drowned in the deluge"—but (we noticed in the last chapter) as the result of an "organic-plastic" impulse immanent in the physical elements, which produces in the organic Earth likenesses of living forms which are not themselves living. We have already mentioned his acceptance of Cuvier's hypothesis of periodic cataclysms in the distant past, and his support of the idea of spontaneous generation. Both of these theories were current in his day and then they seemed scientifically acceptable. This conscientious adherence to what was scientifically accepted and refusal to postulate as empirical fact what had not been observed, leads

to a discrepancy between Hegel's logical and metaphysical insights, on the one hand, and his rejection of what he takes to be scientifically dubious, on the other. He then attributes the failure of Nature wholly to conform to his philosophical ideas to "the weakness of Nature" (*die Ohnmacht der Natur*), its inability, as the merely self-external and repetitive manifestation of the Idea, neatly and precisely to exemplify the categories and moments of the Concept.

But Hegel is unshakably convinced that Spirit is immanent in every natural form and process and that the dialectic is "the principle of all movement, all life and all activity." The belief that Nature is in some sense at least potentially alive and evolutionary is deeply embedded in Hegel's thought, and, for all his scepticism of biological evolution and his rejection of the view that the forms of nature, the species of plants and animals, actually develop one from another, he cannot refrain from expressing his position, if only poetically, in evolutionary terms. Not only do "the stones cry out and raise themselves to Spirit" but, he tells us, the history of the Earth goes back beyond any existence of life and consciousness, to ages when its dormant spirit was merely, as it were, in gestation (*in sich selbst gährend*), when its life was "the movement and dreams of one that sleeps, until it awakens and achieves its consciousness in Mankind."[46]

This confidence of the immanent dialectic in Nature enables Hegel to see, at times, in the natural forms and phenomena what the science of his day had not yet discovered, but has since become sound scientific doctrine. What the thinking of the understanding regards as separate and mutually independent, reason sees as moments in a single unity. So Hegel, in nature-philosophy, can transcend the abstract "absolutes" of Newtonian mechanics to assert the inseparable interdependence of space and time, and their essential union in motion. He maintains that position in space, apart from motion and succession in time, is meaningless,[47] anticipating ideas on which, a century later, the theory of relativity was to be founded. Similarly, he anticipates twentieth-century conceptions of matter when he asserts that the structure observable in the solar system is equally inherent in all matter down to the least detail.[48] Again, his account of light as realization of space anticipates relativity theory. Light, he says, is the pure actual (*daseiende*) power to fill space. Space itself is

> mere abstract subsistence or implicit being, while light is the actual being itself, or that which is in itself and, therefore, pure presentness—the power of universal actuality to be outside itself, as the possibility that coalesces with everything, that which is in community with everything that abides in it.[49]

Compare this with E. A. Milne's statement that space is not per se an object of perception, but only a locus for perceived objects; and that observation of

objects in space implies a causal chain linking the object with the percipient, namely, light. Space without light, he says, has no physical geometry and so no physical properties, thus it is the spreading light wave that creates physical space.[50]

Had the scientific knowledge that is available to us in our time been at Hegel's disposal, how much more powerful a case he could have made for the system he advocated! He might then have had second thoughts about *die Ohnmacht der Natur*, and have found more reliable evidence of dialectical process in the whole range of natural phenomena than was open to him at the turn of the nineteenth century. The science of today accepts without demur the conception of Nature as a continuous process from radiant energy (or even prior to that, from space-time) to elementary particles and from these to atoms, molecules, and crystals. The dividing line between the inorganic and the organic has been blurred and the original evolution of life from the nonliving is accepted (if not yet explained). Within the living kingdom the evolution of species is a theory generally, if not universally, held, and the continuity of physiology with consciousness is widely taken for granted.

In this continuum of developing forms there are evident dialectical relationships, quite apart from those (like the polarity of the magnet) which Hegel noticed, and more integral to the developmental process. Radiant energy stands, at least prima facie, in opposion to matter, as active to inert, yet in the elementary particle the two are united. Each can pass away into the other, and the particle exemplifies both at once according to Bohr's principle of complementarity. The inorganic is opposed to the organic, as self-dissipating (subject to increasing entropy) to self-maintaining (in steady-state systems); yet chemistry and organicism are united and reconciled in metabolism. In the ontogenesis of vertebrate species three stages have been distinguished forming a typical Hegelian triad. The first is that in which the fertilized ovum divides and segments without differentiation; the second is that in which cells differentiate and separate groups develop functionally in different and vitually independent ways, though always mutually complementary; and the third is that in which the whole system is united and coordinated by the development of nervous and vascular systems.

These are but isolated examples, typical of contemporary scientific discovery and indicative of a new view of Nature as a continuous dialectical process that is now developing and is essentially Hegelian in character. For Hegel saw the universe as a single dialectical whole, in which the dualisms and pluralisms of past philosophies (many of which are still credited) were resolved, while the multiplicity of forms which they recognized was preserved and rendered intelligible as moments in, and successive dialectical phases of, a single burgeoning process.

In the following chapter I shall try to show in more detail how contemporary science vindicates Hegel's ideas and to demonstrate that contemporary developments warrant a return to a dialectical procedure and to Hegelian methods of thinking.

Notes

1. Cf. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, in *Werke*, (*Theorie Ausgabe*, Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), Vol. 5, pp. 15ff and 36ff. A. V. Miller's translation, pp. 36ff. and 48ff.
2. Ibid, p. 52: ". . . *das Prinzip aller natürlichen und geistigen Lebendigkeit überhaupt*" (Miller, p. 56; and *Encyclopaedia*, 81 *Zusatz* 1: "*Es ist dasselbe überhaupt das Prinzip aller Bewegung, alles Lebens und aller Betätigung in der Wirklichkeit.*" Werke, Vol. 8, p. 173. (Wallace's translation, *Hegel's Logic*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 116).
3. *Enc.*, 38 *Zusatz*.
4. Cf. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, Preface to the Second Ed., *Werke*, 5, p. 28; Miller, p. 37f.
5. *Phenomenology*, Preface.
6. Cf. Einstein's mathematical equation representing the form of the physical universe.
7. *Phenomenology*, ibid.
8. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, Vol. 5, p. 54f.; Miller, p. 58. Cf. *Enc.* 12; Wallace, p. 16.
9. *Phenomenology*, Preface.
10. This condensed and elliptical account of the understanding is, of course, very incomplete, and is not an adequate summary of Hegel's exposition of its character and dialectic, but it may serve as sufficient for my present purpose, which is to explain the place of natural science in the development of consciousness.
11. Cf. *Hegel, A Re-examination*, p. 92.
12. *Enc.*, 79–80.
13. Cf. my *Nature, Mind and Modern Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 255.
14. *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 175; Miller, p. 77.
15. Ibid, Baillie, p. 178; Miller, p. 79.
16. Hegel interposes discussions of practical personal relations and moral attitudes, which constitute equally essential aspects of the dialectic of emerging self-consciousness; for he is clearly aware that the mind (*Geist*) is no merely cognitive faculty, and that cognition is but one moment of its activity and actualization.
17. *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 281; Miller, p. 146.
18. "Plumbed its own depths"—as in the Logic. Ibid, Baillie, p. 282; Miller, p. 146.
19. In the *Naturphilosophie*.
20. *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 281; Miller, p. 145.
21. Cf. ibid, Baillie, p. 285f.; Miller, p. 148f.
22. Ibid, Baillie, p. 292f.; Miller, p. 154.
23. ". . . animals belonging to the air are of the nature of birds, those belonging to water have the constitution of fish, animals in northerly latitudes have thick coats of hair, and so on . . ." (ibid, Baillie, p. 294; Miller, p. 155).
24. Cf. ibid, Baillie, p. 309f.; Miller, p. 166: "Since the being of an organism consists essentially in universality, or reflection into self, the being of its totality,

like its moments, cannot consist in an anatomical system. The actual expression of the whole, and the externalization of its moments, are really found only as a process and a movement, running throughout the various parts of the embodied organism; and in this process what is extracted as an individual system and fixated so, appears essentially as a fluid moment. So that the reality which anatomy finds cannot be taken for its real being, but only that reality as a process, a process in which alone even the anatomical parts have a significance." Cf. J. S. Haldane, *Organism and Environment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1917), pp. 102–4.

25. Ibid, Baillie, p. 330; Miller, p. 181.
26. Ibid, Baillie, pp. 348–49 and 361; Miller, pp. 193 and 202f.
27. *Enc.*, 418 and 448.
28. Id., 442.
29. Cf. R. N. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); W. V. O. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox* (New York, 1966); Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (New York, 1967); et al.
30. *Phenomenology*, Chap. VIII, trans. Baillie, p. 789; Miller, p. 479.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, Baillie, p. 805; Miller, p. 491.
33. *Enc.*, 85.
34. *Id.*, 119.
35. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, *Werke*, Vol. 6, p. 105f.; Miller, p. 463f.
36. *Enc.*, 136, *Zusatz* 2.
37. Cf. id., *Naturphilosophie*, Introduction, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 11–13, A. V. Miller's translation (*Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970]), p. 3f.
38. Id., 246.
39. Id., 270, *Zusatz*, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 106; Miller, p. 82.
40. Id., 250, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 35n; Miller, p. 23n: "It was in this . . . quite naive sense that Herr Krug once challenged the Philosophy of Nature to perform the feat of deducing *only* his pen. One could perhaps give him hope that *his* pen would have the glory of being deduced, if ever philosophy should advance so far and have such a clear insight into every great theme in heaven and on earth, past and present, that there was nothing more important to comprehend."
41. *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*, I, Chap. 6; Cf. my *Hypothesis and Perception* (London: G. Allen and Unwin and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 88.
42. *Enc.*, 269 *Zusatz*, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 85; Miller, p. 65.
43. Cf. *The Nature of the Physical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp. 147–55.
44. Cf. *Enc.*, 269.
45. Cf. *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1965); *Cosmos and Anthropos* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1991).
46. *Enc.*, 339, *Zusatz* 2; *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 347, Miller, p. 282.
47. *Enc.*, 257, *Zusatz*, 258, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 48f., Miller, p. 34f. See also Findlay's comment, *Hegel, A Re-examination*, p. 275.
48. Cf. *Enc.*, 271 and *Zusatz*, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 106f. Miller, p. 83f.
49. *Enc.*, 275 *Zusatz*, *Werke*, Vol. 9, p. 112, Miller, p. 87f.
50. Cf. E. A. Milne, "Fundamental Concepts of Natural Philosophy," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, Sec. A, Vol. 62 (1943–44), Part I.

10
The *Naturphilosophie* Updated

The philosophy of nature derives its material from the empirical and the exact sciences. It makes, and seeks to make, no discoveries of new phenomena, but only to correlate and interpret what the sciences reveal in an overall conception of the natural world viewed as a single system. The question enunciated by Hegel as its primary consideration, What is Nature? is not raised by any of the natural sciences, nor do any of them attempt to answer it. Nevertheless, no answer could be sought, nor could any be found, apart from or in disregard of the natural sciences, whose pronouncements provide the sole substance on which the philosopher of nature can go to work. In consequence, as the sciences progress, so will the content of a philosophy of nature change, and the extent to which this change will affect its conclusions will depend upon the depth and comprehensiveness of the philosopher's grasp of fundamental principles.

My purpose in this chapter is to consider how far Hegel might have recast his Philosophy of Nature (or how we might do it for him) in the light of the science of our times. To do so in detail would obviously require an entire volume, and cannot be attempted in a single chapter, so I shall confine myself to salient points and to the main lines of structure that determine fundamental relations. What in particular I shall pass over are the corrections that we should have to make today of particular judgments and statements of fact occurring in Hegel's discussion of the issues in dispute at the time when he wrote. He naturally drew upon the theories and beliefs of scientists contemporary with him, many of which have since been abandoned and superseded. When he sides with one of two (or more) rival theories, it is often the one later to be discredited, and he sometimes opposes those that have subsequently become generally accepted. Our hindsight enables us to see that he was wrong in ways that nobody in his day could have guessed, and he could not be expected to have anticipated advances in science that occurred after his death. But the main principles on which the idea of Nature that he expounds depends are not necessarily affected by these peripheral errors, are still important and, I shall argue, are upheld and required by contemporary science.

Hegel, we have observed, asserts that Nature is the Idea in the form of other-being, or externality; and this statement has a twofold significance. It means first that Nature is self-external, that is, spread out in space and time:

> *So ist die Natur nicht äußerlich nur relativ gegen diese Idea . . . sondern die Äußerlichkeit macht die Bestimmung aus, in wecher sie als Natur ist.* (*Enzyclopädie*, 247)[1]

And, secondly, Nature is the manifestation of the Idea in this externalized form, so that it displays the structure characteristic of, and appropriate to, the Idea; that is, a dialectical structure generated by the self-specification of the concrete universal, the principle of wholeness, which unfolds as a scale of moments related as opposites and at the same time as complementaries in successive levels of adequacy to the universal. The opposites at each stage unite to generate a new and more concrete form, constituting the next dialectical phase, so that the whole scale is one of degrees, or gradations, progressively manifesting the universal (the Idea) more fully, until it culminates in the Absolute itself, the end summing up and coincident with the entire process of self-generation.

Hegel presents Nature as conforming to and figuring forth this structure, but, with the material at his disposal that the sciences of his day provided, he could not make the correspondence exact, and he attributes the aberrations to "*die Ohnmach der Natur*," which results from its being at the opposite pole of the dialectic from absolute Spirit, where the principle of differentiation of the universal is least adequately evinced.

> *Die Natur is aber nur an sich die Idee.* (*Enc.*, 247 *Zusatz*).[2]

My thesis is that if the findings of twentieth-century science had been at his disposal, Hegel would have set out his idea of Nature more successfully, and need not have appealed to "the weakness of Nature" (which was really the weakness of eighteenth-century science) to explain apparent divergences from the dialectical norm—in fact, those divergences would not have occurred.

The essential feature of Hegelian dialectic is not the triadic arrangement of opposites so much as the holism from which this triadic structure results. The dominant logical principle is stated by Hegel at the very beginning, in his Preface to the *Phenomenology*: "the truth is the whole." The whole, moreover, is a self-differentiating system. It is a whole that determines, by the principle of organization that is universal to all its parts and moments, the nature and interrelations of its elements, making them mutually interdependent and constitutive. Accordingly, if their distinction one from another is elevated into a separation, and if they are severally isolated from each other and from the system, as is wont to happen under the influence and operation of the understanding, they contradict themselves and one

another, a contradiction symptomatic of defect that is occasioned by their mutual exclusion and the oversight of their mutual complementarity. This is how the antithesis is engendered, the reconciliation and synthesis of whose opposites precipitates the triad. If Nature is to manifest the form of the Idea, therefore, it must constitute a whole of this kind, and if it does, its self-specification will of necessity generate a dialectical series of forms.

At the present time, and despite prevalent disregard of the fact, science presents us with a natural world that eminently has this characteristic of holism, and is consequently specified in a dialectical scale discernible both in microcosm and in macrocosm. This holism was introduced by the theory of relativity, has been reinforced by quantum theory and by advances in elementary particle physics, but it is also apparent in contemporary developments in biology and other sciences. In all these spheres, moreover, processes and entities are ranged in series increasing in complexity, and they bear towards one another what are recognizably dialectical relations. Before attempting to display these relationships in more detail, let us consider how the classical physics, thinking largely in the manner that Hegel identifies with the understanding, ran into contradictions that demanded reconciliation, and that were overcome only by the introduction of a new conceptual scheme.

In classical physics absolute motion was conceived as relative to absolute rest within an absolute frame of reference. Unless this frame of reference can be identified no absolute velocity can be determined and it is impossible to know whether the body under scrutiny is in absolute motion, or whether it is stationary while other bodies are moving relative to it. It is, in short, impossible to distinguish between absolute and relative motion.

The idea of absolute space requires us to presume that events at a distance one from another are simultaneous, but to decide whether they are it is necessary to time them with synchronized clocks located at the separate places where they occur. To synchronize clocks it is necessary to send signals from one to the other. These are necessarily light signals, even if each clock is visible from the position of the other. But light takes time to traverse the intervening space, so exact synchronization is impossible unless we know the precise velocity of light relative to an absolute frame of reference.

Over large distances and especially where high velocities are involved, measurements can be made only with the help of light signals (or others consisting in the transmission of electromagnetic waves); and, if distances and velocities are measured in this way, as light signals travel at a finite speed, the frame relative to which they move has to be determined. In classical physics their velocity was assumed to be relative to the luminiferous ether, which was taken to be absolutely at rest. So only if their velocity

could be measured relative to the ether could one determine exactly other velocities measured by their means. The Michelson-Morley experiment proved that it was impossible to do this, and that no absolute frame of reference could be defined. All velocities, therefore, proved to be relative.

The ether, moreover, was assumed to be absolutely penetrable by moving solids without resistance, and at the same time it had to be rigid so as to be able to transmit vibrations (electromagnetic waves). This and other contradictions made the idea impossible to entertain with any degree of consistency.

The discovery of the invariance of the velocity of light relative to every frame of reference introduced a new absolute, but one that now rendered the notion of simultaneity at a distance (and consequently absolute space) meaningless. Henceforth measurements of distance become inseparable from measurements of time, motion, and velocity. Accordingly, time and space are inseparably interrelated, and space-time becomes one indivisible manifold.

In mid-nineteenth-century physics, the discovery of the field by Faraday, and its mathematization by Clerk Maxwell, introduced a new, and potentially revolutionary conception. A field is a whole of interdependent parts; differences within it (e.g., lines of force) can be distinguished, but they cannot be separated. Classical physics was essentially atomic and had considered mass-points as separable, mutually in external relation, with forces acting between them, which, although in fact they were not separable from them, were regarded as if they were. The introduction of the idea of the field made these assumptions more difficult, if not altogether impossible, to maintain. In twentieth-century physics this conception of the field became dominant. The theory of relativity welded the physical world irrevocably into a single indivisible unity, by making the field prior to the particle in physical measurements and calculations. Space-time now became the metrical field and the physical universe was, accordingly, comprehended in one undissectable whole. Within this universal field all forces were geometrized, as curvature, and all motion was along geodesics determined by the structure of the field.

In relativity physics, therefore, space and time are united in a single, four-dimensional whole, in which all measurements (whether of length, duration, or velocity) are interdependent and mutually determining. All relations are internal to their terms, and the space-time whole is a system governed by a universal principle of order to which all relations are subject. In special relativity this figures as the Lorenz transformations, and in general relativity as the tensor calculus.

Space, time, and the metrical field (space-time) thus constitute a primary major triad. The metrical field, moreover, as which the antithesis of space and time is resolved in contemporary physics, is the field of electromagnetic radiation, and in general relativity all fields of force are represented as curvature

in space-time, which defines the geodesics of motion within the field. The synthesis of space and time may properly be regarded, then, as motion; and Hegel's first triad in the *Naturphilosophie* is appropriately vindicated.

Regions in space-time of very sharp curvature form singularities, which Eddington picturesquely referred to as "chimneys" or as "folds" in space-time. They are material particles, which are not, however, solid, massy grains (although, of course, some of them have mass) but cloudlike entities that behave sometimes like waves and sometimes like particulate bodies. They have been called "wave-packets," the assumed effects of superposition of waves of varying frequency. Energy ostensibly specifies itself into particles of different kinds, and always, it seems, in opposites, with opposite charges, as matter and antimatter: electron and positron, proton and antiproton, positive and negative muons and pions, and the like. These oppositions, however, seem more like the intro-reflections typical of the categories of Essence in Hegel's Logic than the oppositions characteristic of Being. The true dialectical opposition, perhaps, is that between electron and proton which unite in a higher form as an atom. Meanwhile, space-time and energy have proved to be the moments of a new whole, adumbrated in the last subordinate triad under Hegel's exposition of Space and Time: place, movement, and matter (*Enc.*, 260–61).

As a result of the presence of matter—or curvature—in space-time the physical universe curves in upon itself and becomes a four-dimensional hypersphere, described by modern cosmologists as finite but unbounded. It could just as truly be described as infinite but closed, and it answers aptly to what Hegel called the true infinite, as opposed to the spurious infinity, or endless progression of repeated finites. The hypersphere is an all-inclusive whole, whereas the absolute space of Newtonian physics was endless extension, never self-complete.

The radius of curvature of the hypersphere was taken by Eddington as the natural unit of length. This, he claimed to be able to demonstrate, determines the fundamental physical constants and such primary quantities as the masses of the electron and the proton.[3] Thus the modern conception of the physical universe is of a unified whole whose principle of structure determines the nature and relations of its constituents in detail as well as its total configuration. This unity of the universe has been impressively demonstrated in numerous diverse ways, whether it be by the dependence of centrifugal and Coriolis forces upon the action of the fixed stars, or of the constant of gravitation on the age of the universe, or the original unity of the four fundamental forces (strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational) at the extreme high temperatures obtaining immediately after the big bang, or by the consequences of Bell's Theorem.[4]

At the stage reached by science in the early nineteenth-century no such

conception of the physical world was possible, and Hegel, therefore, did not entertain it. So he shifts the realization of the true infinite ultimately to the final phase of the dialectic in absolute Spirit. The category appropriate to it, however, is *Fürsichsein*, which Hegel identifies as ideality. In this he is right, for strictly the true infinite is only properly actualized in self-consciousness. But my present submission is that contemporary physics provides better evidence than the science of Hegel's day of the manifestation in and as Nature of the Idea, and this is precisely the effect of the present-day conception of the physical world as an unbounded four-dimensional hypersphere—a conception not available to Hegel. Nevertheless, Hegel did maintain that "the totality of the being-for-self [of matter] is posited . . . in the solar system as a whole . . ."[5]—a wholeness that foreshadows the *Fürsichsein* and true ideality of the Absolute.

Moreover, contemporary physics has produced even stronger evidence of the unity and indivisibility of the physical universe, and of its self-specification as a scale of dialectically related forms. Recent research on elementary particles has uncovered a dialectical series from quarks to hyperons. They are set in mutual opposition, hadrons to leptons, fermions to bosons, some are charged some are uncharged, some are negative others positive. At the same time, apart from the complementarity of particle and wave, the particles themselves are mutually complementary in the composition of protons and neutrons made up of different kinds of quarks.

The question whether the various short-lived particles are really material forms or are simply transition stages in the transference of energy is immaterial for my purpose, and is scarcely any longer an issue for the physicist, for in any case particles have been found to behave equally as waves, and energy to be equivalent to mass. Physicists nowadays routinely treat forces exerted between particles as exchange particles. There is, however, a marked difference in stability between various kinds of elementary particle, and some types of "wave-packet" tend to combine into yet more stable forms as atomic nuclei. In these, then, the prior varieties are *aufgehoben*, that is, they are at once canceled and superseded yet preserved and transformed, the oppositions and contradictions which they presented in their more primitive forms being overcome.

If Eddington is to be believed, all these elementary particles are dependent, for their quantitative characteristics and their consequent behavior under mutual influence, upon the main structural principles of the ultimate spatio-temporal hypersphere (i.e., the constants of nature), even to the determination of their sum total in the universe—which he designated as the cosmic number, *N*. Nor, in spite of some more recent aspersions cast on Eddington's views, do contemporary physicists question the main contention. Accordingly, the universal principle of structure is immanent in every

partial element and specifies itself as their ordered plurality. This precisely is the character of the Hegelian concrete universal, the Concept, and it gives further support to my thesis.

The combination of the more stable kinds of particle into atoms gives rise to new wholes, each of which is a unity in its own right, and one the properties of which depend entirely on the structural pattern of its component elementary particles. Each is not so much a combination as a coalescence of fields, discriminable into a nuclear field (itself complex) and a peripheral field of orbiting electrons. Neither of these is a really separable component, for each behaves like a standing wave (in some unidentifiable medium), analogous to the vibrations that run round the rim of a sounding bell. The number and arrangement of orbiting electrons depends on that of the nucleons and is regulated by Pauli's Principle of Exclusion, which forbids the juxtaposition of two like particles with the same quantum numbers (or state of motion). The atom, as a whole, is thus an energy system sublating the diverse elementary particles and forms of energy of which it is constituted.

Eddington used the same Principle of Exclusion, in conjunction with Einstein's formulae for gravitation and the global form of the entire universe, to calculate the cosmic number N, obtaining a result in close agreement with the calculations based on empirical data.[6] Even though this feat of deduction is not today given much attention, it does imply that the universe as a whole is constructed on the same principles as the atom, which is thus a microcosm mirroring the structure of the macrocosm. Here again we find that Hegel, even in spite of the strictures under which he worked because of the limitations of the science that he knew, recognized in principle this recapitulation in miniature of the integrated pattern of the whole. He writes: "The form determinations which constitute the Solar System are the determinations of matter itself."

> *Die totalität des Fürsichseins ist nur im Ganzen des Sonnensystems gesetzt; was das Sonnensystem im Ganzen ist, soll die Materie nun in Einselnen sein.*[7]

The physics of our own day presents us with a worldview dialectically relating space-time to energy and matter in a unified system just as Hegel strives to present it in the first main division of his Philosophy of Nature, *die Mechanik*; but, because of the limitations of the science at his disposal, less successfully. His next main division is called "Physics," but today we should perhaps identify it rather with chemistry, although Hegel treats here of such topics as light, sound, and electricity, along with much else that traditionally (and still today) belongs to physics. But here again Hegel is hampered by the backward condition of contemporary science, which treated heat and electricity as fluids along with other forms of energy. Our

knowledge that these subjects must be differently classified, however, does not invalidate the dialectical structure that still governs the relations between the major branches of science. In the Logic, the corresponding triad is, in fact, Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology, which, in the *Naturphilosophie*, appears as Mechanics, Physics, and Organics, and the difference between Mechanism and Chemism as set out in the Logic is still upheld by our own science, in spite of the necessary continuity between the two fields. The first is the structure of relations between relatively independent entities and the second the sublation, in the combination of different substances, of the properties they display in separation. The transition from one to the other is, in effect, from less to more complex and integrally united wholes from atoms to molecules, and from molecules to crystals.

The bonds which hold atoms together in molecular structure, whether homopolar or heteropolar (covalent or electrovalent), depend on the saturation or otherwise of the outer electron shell of the atoms concerned. This dictates the chemical affinities of the atoms and the pattern of structure in the molecule that determines its chemical properties. These result from the nature of the new whole and are quite different in chemical compounds from those of their constituent elements in separation. In the new whole atomic structures are preserved but are superseded and, in some sense, canceled out. In Hegel's terminology, they are *aufgehoben*.

Chemism in recognizable measure unites and reconciles the opposition inherent in the physical forms. The elementary particle taken in isolation is a standing contradiction. Its precise localization cancels out its momentum, and the exact assessment of its momentum abolishes its position. It appears both as wave and as particle, yet these two descriptions are mutually incompatible. A wave expands spherically, traversing the whole of space-time, as a continuous feature in a continuous medium. A particle is discrete and self-contained, internally invariant, and it follows a trajectory. Even if it is conceived as a wave-packet the contradiction is not removed, because a wave-packet tends to spread and to dissipate, as a particle should not. Only at the level of the energy system constituting an atom does the particle derive from its internal structure some measure of permanence and individuality. But the wave character of elementary particles within the atom is not totally abolished. It is *aufgehoben* in the form of standing waves, and the whole system acquires stability and chemical properties arising from their special arrangement.

The geometry of crystals is likewise determined by the molecular pattern in which the atoms are set, according to their bonds and positioning in the molecule. The effect is as if the crystal were one enormous molecule, repeating in three dimensions the single molecular structure. But now new

properties appear which depend on what chrystalographers call the leptocosm of the crystal, and which are not possible for separate molecules. These are such as have been called "cooperative properties" like optical anisotropy, ferromagnetism, and electric conductivity. They are cooperative because they result from the combination and intermesh of the molecules within the crystal. Once more the characteristics of the prior phase have been sublated, suppressed, and superseded, in a supervening whole, which transforms them in new potencies; and the nature of the parts is subordinated to, and their behavior modified by, the structure and unity of the whole.

The structures characteristic of inorganic substances are complexified, combined, and intricately enfolded into the macromolecules of substances like proteins and nucleic acids, which display new propensities portending a transition to a higher level of versatility. Some of these highly complex molecules combine into liquid crystals—smectic and nematic—which display characteristics premonitory of living matter.[8] Viruses are held to be crystals of a very complex kind, and Schrödinger speculated that the chromosome is an aperiodic crystal related to the periodic (or repetitive) variety that is typical of inorganic substances as a tapestry is to the design of a conventional wallpaper.[9]

So we have a triad of forms of chemical combination: the molecule, the periodic crystal, and the aperiodic. Each is a microcosm in its own right, and each includes and subsumes its predecessors, transforming them in a larger and more complex unity. The continuous gradation among these forms is obvious, as well as the contrasting characters of free molecule, periodic fixity, and labile aperiodic polymericity. The more detailed relations of antithesis and synthesis require closer study, but the claim seems not unjustified that here, as well as at purely physical levels, we have a dialectical scale.

The principles of modern physics and chemistry are continuous, through quantum chemistry, one with another. So likewise are modern chemistry and biology, biochemistry, and microbiology forging the links. In the same way Hegel's Mechanics, Physics, and Organics form a continuous scale, although the sciences of his time provided far less evidence of this continuity. The contrast and opposition between these three major categories is much the same today as those attributed to them by Hegel, in spite of important differences made evident by the subsequent advances in the sciences. Today physics is no longer mechanistic and the main contrast between physical processes and chemical is the more purely probabilistic and stochastic character of the former as opposed to the more determinate and regularly proportionate nature of the latter. Synthesis of the two offers

the modern conception of teleonomy, which is the regulation of relevantly variable generative processes by a systematic totality which constitutes itself through them and differentiates itself as they proceed.

This is the salient character of living processes, but it is not absent altogether at the lower levels of physical and chemical activity. We have already noticed how chemical properties are determined by structural pattern in the molecule, and at the physical level Max Planck, Erwin Schrödinger, and Werner Heisenberg have, in different contexts, all maintained that the only satisfactory explanation of quantum phenomena can be given by taking cognizance of the physical system as a whole within which they occur.[10] The same conviction has been forced upon mathematicians and scientists in other fields by the more recent discoveries in Chaos science, the investigation of complex dynamic systems.[11] Henry Margenau has suggested that the Exclusion Principle operates as a principle of organization among elementary particles, and through them, at the higher levels.[12] So everywhere structural form and ordered wholeness determines the nature and behavior of the constitutive elements. But this governance by the whole is much more assertive and wide-ranging at the organic level, where it becomes, as it were, overt, whereas at the inorganic it was only latent.

Hegel was emphatic in his denial that teleology was to be understood in an anthropomorphic sense and in his protest against the attribution of deliberate purpose to unconscious processes. He maintained that it consisted in the realization of an end which was the totality implicit and immanent in the more primitive phases of the dialectical process. For him teleology was the self-development of the whole immanent and present *an sich* throughout the dialectic and actualizing itself through its progression.

Contemporary biology eschews teleology, but only in the false sense of the term that Hegel also rejects. Even so reductionistic a thinker as Jaques Monod acknowledges that the living organism can be understood only if it is recognized as a total system constantly maintaining itself. He calls this tendency teleonomy (a useful term to denote the dominance of the whole over the parts).[13] And this is, in principle, virtually the same as the teleology on which Hegel insists and which is characteristic of all his thinking, namely, the priority and directing determination throughout the dialectic of *das Ganze*.

Teleonomy is the persistent tendency of the organism to constitute itself into, to maintain, and to reproduce, the complete organized system, both structurally and functionally (neither of which can be divorced from the other), in which whole and part are mutually ends and means. In every way, it is the determination of the form and activity of the constituent parts and organs by the principle of unity and structure that constitutes the total system. That this is the fundamental and invariable character of organism is

generally recognized and acknowledged in modern biology, which, indeed, has extended it to the ecosystem and to the biosphere as a whole.

With amazing prescience, Hegel treats the earth as an organic whole, anticipating the Gaia hypothesis only very recently put forward by James Lovelock. The mistakes in Hegel's account are those of the scientists of his day and are not philosophical errors. That the planet in its atmospheric envelope is a single biocoenosis is one of the most up-to-date doctrines of modern biology, and is the persistent theme of present-day ecology. The idea has been attractively illustrated by Lewis Thomas in his beautiful little book *The Lives of a Cell*, where he says that he can think of no better analogy than to a living cell, with its organelles, mitocondria, ribosomes, and Golgi bodies, as a means of describing the organic unity of the Earth, with its complexity of component parts and ramifying interconnections, especially in the way it regulates, uses, and controls absorption of energy from the Sun to maintain an organic milieu for generation and symbiosis of terrestrial living forms. "In this immense organism," he writes,

> chemical signals might serve the function of global hormones, keeping the balance and symmetry in operation of various interrelated working parts, informing tissues in the vegetation of the Alps about the state of eels in the Saragossa Sea, by long, interminable relays of interconnected messages between all kinds of other creatures.[14]

If this image were rejected as too fanciful and exaggerated, it is nonetheless incontestable that modern biologists regard the Earth as a single ecosystem within which organisms are interdependent for their health and habitat, and environmental conditions are as much determined by their behavior as is their survival by external influences.

The biotic totality, as Hegel sensed, differentiates itself in myriads of burgeoning organisms multifariously diversified. They range in a continuous scale (of which Hegel was very inadequately aware) from bacteria and protistan organisms to the most versatile and highly developed mammals. The evolutionary scale branches into plants and animals, invertebrate and vertebrate, cold-blooded and warm-blooded, patently opposited forms, for the synthesis of which it is not altogether clear where we should look. But this point need not be pressed. What is clear is that the essential characteristics of each lower form is preserved and transformed in the higher, and that the latter incorporates, uses, and gives new significance to the functions of the former.

In every case the antithesis seems to combine the capacities of both forms: animals feed on and assimilate plants, the animals being dependent upon the plant's capacity for photosynthesis to supply what they cannot themselves synthesize; animals also combine the vegetative functions of growth and

reproduction with others more diverse. Vertebrates perform, in general, the same kind of activities of which invertebrates are capable along with others more coherently perceptive of their surroundings. Warm-blooded animals adapt themselves to external change with greater versatility than cold-blooded without sacrificing any of the advantages or accomplishments of the latter. In all this there is a strong suggestion of dialectical relationship. But it is even more clearly discernible in more detailed comparisons.

The structure of living development as recognized today answers to that of the Concept in Hegel's logic, to which Organics in the *Naturphilosophie* corresponds. The moments of the Concept are universality, particularity, and individuality. In the realm of life, universality is represented by the omnicompetent functioning of the protozoon and the concerted cooperation of colonial forms (like the slime mold). Particularization is effected in multicellular creatures with differentiated organs (like hydra and plants); and individuality in organisms anatomically and physiologically differentiated and unified by nervous and vascular systems. The same triadic pattern is exemplified in orthogenesis, beginning with a single fertilized cell, which segments into a colonial form (or blastula) of equipotential cells. At this stage the unity of the embryo is relatively simple and undifferentiated. But in the next stage of its development, the cells segregate into special groups, each of which becomes the rudiment of a particular organ or limb. The development of these rudiments cannot be diverted by transplantation, as could that of the mother cells from which they have descended. Each develops in apparent independence of the rest, until finally all are once again integrated into a diversified whole linked together by arteries and blood vessels, as well as a nervous network that regulates the functions of all the organs and members of the body by means of ganglionic aggregations, which, in the course of evolution, develop into brains.

The same triadic structure is to be found in the biological process of living functioning: metabolism, including nutrition and respiration, which maintains the general auturgic adaptation of the organism to external conditions, is universal. Sentience and locomotion (linked together long ago by Aristotle) are particular in their reflex responses to special stimuli, responses coordinated by the organism to subserve the ends of self-maintenance. The individuation of objects and situations to which adjustment has to be made is effected by perception informing relevantly varying and coherently directed behavior, instinctive and intelligent.

Finally, as already mentioned, the whole biotic sphere is organized into symbioses and biological communities, the smaller included within and superseded by the greater, until the entire planet is encompassed as a single biocoenosis. Even here we cannot draw the line, for cosmological physicists assure us that everything on our planet is integrally affected by everything

else in the universe. Life on earth is obviously vitally dependent on the outpouring of energy from the sun. It is subject to effects from cosmic rays and the dynamic forces (gravitational, centrifugal, and Coriolis) that impinge upon organic bodies, and are dependent on their relation to the fixed stars. The whole range of celestial bodies, from the moon and the planets to the stars in outer space have subtle effects upon living processes which are only now beginning to be scientifically discovered. The unity of the universe—of Nature—is the ultimate determinant of all its detailed forms and phenomena. Their explanation and the truth about them is ultimately to be found in the universal principle ordering the whole. This, as we have seen, reflects and at every level of existence and development recapitulates the moments of the Concept in their triadic relationship. And the whole process of natural evolution, bringing itself to consciousness in the human intellect, finally realizes in self-conscious awareness the theoretical exposition of the logic of the Concept itself. Only when it is cognized and comprehended as a systematic whole—when it becomes *für sich*—is the ultimate unity fully realized. This is why the Philosophy of Nature has to pass over into the Philosophy of Spirit, bringing to full self-consciousness and actualization the absolute Idea in a religious and philosophical experience that transcends the very human limits within which its immanence makes its conception possible.

This would be the Hegelian interpretation of the modern scientific worldview; and contemporary science provides far more and far better material for a philosophy of nature on Hegelian lines than could have been dreamt of in the early decades of the nineteenth century. If, therefore, we could call Hegel's spirit from the vasty deep and set him to rewrite his *Naturphilosophie* in the light of modern knowledge, there is little doubt that he would be able to retain its general principle, its overall schema, and its major divisions. But he would replace their detailed content in substantial measure with the more appropriate material now available. Abandoning any appeal to the weakness of Nature to explain its failure to fit in with the dialectical structure of the Concept, he would be able to pour new wine, without risk, into the older bottles that he had originally provided.

Notes

1. "Thus Nature is external not only relatively as opposed to this Idea . . but *externality* constitutes the characteristic by which it is Nature."
2. "Nature is only implicitly the Idea."
3. Cf. Sir Edmund Whittaker, *From Euclid to Eddington* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 200.
4. Cf. D. W. Sciama, *The Unity of the Universe* (New York: Doubleday Anchor

Books, 1961); E. A. Milne, "Fundamental Concepts of Natural Philosophy"; also Fritjof Capra, *The Tao of Physics* (London: Wildwood House, 1975; Fontana Paperbacks, 1976); David Bohm, *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* (London, Boston, and Melbourne: Ark Paperbacks, 1983); Henry Stapp, "Quantum Mechanics and the Physicist's Conception of Nature: Philosophical Implications of Bell's Theorem," in *The World View of Contemporary Physics: Does It Need a New Metaphysics?* ed. R. Kitchener. (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988); E. E. Harris, *Cosmos and Anthropos* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1991), Chap. 3.

5. *Enc.*, 271 *Zusatz*.
6. Cf. Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 176f, and Whittaker, *From Euclid to Eddington*, p. 194.
7. *Enc.*, 271 *Zusatz*: "The totality of being-for-self is only posited in the whole of the Solar System; now what the Solar system is as a whole, individualized matter should be."
8. Cf. Joseph Needham, *Order and Life*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1936), 158ff.
9. Cf. E. Schrödinger, *What is Life?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947).
10. Cf. Max Planck, *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1931), pp. 17–26; E. Schrödinger, "Are there Quantum Jumps?," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* Vol. III (1952); W. Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy* (London: Faber, 1959 and New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 96.
11. Cf. James Gleick, *Chaos* (London and New York: Viking Penguin, 1987).
12. Cf. H. Margenau, "The Exclusion Principle and its Philosophical Importance," *Philosophy of Science* 11, 187, 1944; *The Nature of Physical Reality* (New York and London: McGraw Hill, 1950), Chap. 20.
13. Cf. Jaques Monod, *l'Hazard et la Necessité* (Paris, 1970).
14. L. Thomas, *The Lives of a Cell*, (New York: Viking Press, 1974), p. 41.

11
From Nature to Spirit

Major Transitions

If the Philosophy of Nature merits more attention than it has received, even despite the recent revival of Hegel studies, the early sections of the Philosophy of Spirit deserve just as much, and have been equally neglected. The major transitions in the Hegelian system, from Logic to Nature and from Nature to Spirit, have been targets for much criticism, and the suspicion that has attended the first has also infected the second. But, in fact, both are of profound importance and both express penetrating insight into the solution of long-standing philosophical problems. If these problems still cry out for clearer understanding and treatment, it is largely due to students' and commentators' neglect of Hegel's exposition.

The purpose of the present chapter is to examine that part of the *Geistesphilosophie* which bears most directly on the problem of body-mind relationship, a question on which the wider connection between Nature and Spirit obviously bears. The body is a natural organism and its mind, qua consciousness, does not seem to be subject to the same causal laws or relationships as are physical and organic bodies, if only because the mind is conscious of those laws and relationships. Consciousness is self-transcendent in a manner that is impossible for material things. It not only stands in relation to its objects but is aware of that relationship, it grasps within itself both of the terms. No physical body can do this. The relations of physical bodies to one another are at best *an sich*, whereas the relation between consciousness and its object is *für sich*. The relation of the body as a natural product, to the mind that knows it as such, is thus at the same time the relation of Nature to Spirit; and that is what we are about to investigate.

Hegel's solution of this problem rests upon the dialectic. All previous attempts to view the relation as causal, or as dualistically parallel, or as epiphenomenal, or to avoid the problem by denying the existence of either of the terms, have ended in epistemological disaster. Hegel's answer is that the relation is dialectical, and this, if the nature of his dialectic is properly understood, enables him to overcome the difficulties that had beset his

predecessors (as well as most of his successors). Let us then return to the dialectic and consider it again in some detail.

MORE ABOUT DIALECTIC

Hegel's dialectic is sometimes ridiculed out of hand as a monstrous texture of sophistry, but only by those who have failed to understand it or have refused to examine it seriously. It is commonly misunderstood as a quasimechanical juggling with opposites providing nothing better than a triadic procrustean bed into which Hegel forces every topic he chooses to handle. The alleged theses and antitheses, say the critics, are contrived and unnatural and the pretended necessary transitions are arbitrary and forced. Yet the same critics who make this accusation frequently proclaim in the same breath that Hegel fails to apply his triadic structure strictly.

The truth of the matter is that Hegel regarded dialectic as the normal and proper movement of *thought*, which he held to be the immanent principle of all movement, of all activity, and especially of all development. The real, for him, was a continuous developing process in which, as it proceeded, the principle of movement also developed in a definite and characteristic manner. It is not, therefore, always wholly reducible to the same clear-cut paradigmatic formula, and what at one stage can be presented as a stark antithesis of abstract moments subsequently resolved in a synthesis not much less abstract, at other stages becomes complicated and involved, displaying overlaps and anticipations which defy presentation as a simple triad.

Hegel saw the activity of thought as one of construction, and what it constructs is a concrete universal, or system—a world, which is a single totality comprised of a multitude of internal differences. This kind of union of differences is organization, and that involves distinction and relation between elements which is impossible without negation. Distinction and discrimination require the identification of "this not-that" and the combination of both by correlation within one complex. The negative, therefore, plays an indispensable part in the process of thought, or dialectic. But what is negatively distinguished from what is other than itself ranks, in that negation, as its opposite, and the distincts and their subsequent correlation therefore present themselves as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The structure is triadic because the negative relation is essentially bipolar whether the negated other is simple or complex.

Hegel was far from mistaking distincts for opposites or confusing the two, as Benedetto Croce contended.[1] In the Logic he deals with distincts in their proper place. But more significant is his realization that the idea of a group of coordinate species of a genus, which rank as distincts, is an abstraction that classificatory science, thinking on the level of the under-

standing, imposes on a structure which never quite answers to the imposed form. The species are never really coordinate. They are invariably in some measure serial (or dialectically related), so that in some way one is prior to another. They constitute a progression of some sort. The Aristotelian or the Kantian tables of categories are cases in point, or Plato's distinctions between the forms of knowledge on the Divided Line, or the classification of states by both Plato and Aristotle, or the list that they give of the virtues. Every specification of a genus ranges as a scale of forms ascending in importance or degree of adequacy to the generic concept.[2] Numbers, however classified, always constitute series, and geometrical figures, because of their close relation to numbers, have a similar tendency (compare the regular solids, conic sections, and the like). Biological species turn out to be evolutionary and are related in similar scales.[3]

Wherever this occurs the extremes of the series are opposite poles, and however the series is limited or truncated its members become related (qua members of a series) as opposites. Distincts and opposites, therefore, are not strictly distinct. If they are treated as such they immediately become opposing characterizations of difference and their identity is obvious.

The opposition inherent in negation accounts for the triadic form of Hegelian "deduction," but this deduction must not be mistaken for, or confused with, the deduction practiced by the formal logician. Dialectical deduction is never the derivation of equivalent propositions (or formulae) one from another by stipulated transformation rules. It is always a development of implications which displays each result as a phase in a developing series. It follows that the kind of opposition obtaining at one end of the scale is not necessarily the same as that which obtains at the other; the kind of opposition between adjacent members is not necessarily the same as that between members more widely separated; and while we may expect some degree of similarity in the relationships, we must not be surprised to find the dialectical process displaying differences at different points and in different phases.

Further, Hegelian deduction is no merely formal linear illation from one simple idea to another (as was contemplated by Descartes[4]). Nor does it begin from some arbitrarily posited hypothesis or fortuitous premise. Nor is it a sort of intellectual creation ex nihilo. It is a constant and progressive effort to characterize the universal that is its goal. Every such effort, therefore, is a more or less vague and provisional definition of the concrete universal—the Absolute. Thus the whole, which is the ultimate conclusion, is implicit from the start. The process is analogous to that of focusing a picture projected by a lens on to a screen. At first it is a mere blur, although in the blur all the elements of the picture are already adumbrated; and as the focus sharpens these elements become progressively more distinct. But the

universal that is the goal of reflective and speculative thinking is unlike a picture in that it is not just a static pattern which might be built up piecemeal out of simple units. It is an activity of systematization, or self-differentiation, that reveals a complex world, not merely as a dead lump, but as a developing process. And that process turns out to be continuous with, and to include, the very process of thinking that seeks to know it. The object of thought thus reveals itself ultimately both as the world and as the thinking self-awareness, a statement that ought not to surprise us, for the final goal of thought is generally admitted to be both the comprehension of its object as a self-differentiating and self-differentiated system, as well as of its own procedure.

The object of knowledge is the world, which, while it is the content of experience, is also a world of which the subject who thinks is aware that he or she is a member. Reflective thought, therefore, always presupposes (more or less tacitly) the whole of experience as its prepredicative background; and that experience (as we shall presently see more fully) presupposes in its turn the world, not only as its object but also as the source of its own development. Accordingly, in increasing its knowledge of the world, the mind ipso facto increases its knowledge of itself.

It follows that the dialectical process is one of increasing self-knowledge, and at those levels on which its self-consciousness becomes explicit the object of each succeeding phase is the one immediately prior (and through it the preceding process). At these levels also we can, in consequence, expect a noticeable overlap between stages. Some overlap is implicit at every stage, but in the higher and more developed stages it becomes more evident.

LOGIC AND NATURE

If we understand the dialectical process in this way we should be able to grasp the connections guiding Hegel's transitions, and may be able to interpret successfully some of the more obscure passages in his exposition. The most important transitions, and those often considered the most obscure, are the moves from one of the major divisions of the system to the next, from the absolute Idea to Nature, and from Nature to Spirit. These are, in fact, key turning points in the dialectic. Yet what, one may wonder, could be more obscure than Hegel's conclusion to the Encyclopaedia Logic?

> The Idea, which is for itself, treated in accordance with this its unity with itself, is intuition; and the intuitive Idea is Nature. But as intuition, the idea is set in the one-sided determination of immediacy or negation through external reflection. The absolute freedom of the Idea, however, is not merely that it goes over into life, nor lets life appear in itself in the form of finite knowledge, but in the absolute truth of itself it decides to

> release freely from itself the moment of its particularity or of the first characterization and other-being, the *immediate Idea* as its reflected image—itself as Nature.

It must be remembered, however, that the Idea is the mind's awareness of itself and of its own attainment to absolute knowing in the knowledge of the world, its object. In logic, however, this self-knowledge and the awareness of the identity in it of subject and object is purely conceptual. It is the concept of the Idea, the concept of life and cognition and the realization of the fact that they are the explication of the principle of order implicit in all prior forms of experience as well as in their object (the external world). As Concept, although it is the concrete universal, it is qua universal, still relatively abstract. Hegel insisted from the start, in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, that a pure principle, even though it might be the primary and fundamental principle of philosophy and knowledge, could not in itself be the truth. To be fully concrete it must particularize itself—it must "release from itself the moment of its particularity." The Idea, we have been told, once grasped, is mediated immediacy, for we had also been told that everything is at once both immediate and mediate.[5] But the characteristic of immediacy is particularity, self-externality, the very form that constitutes the spatio-temporal world of Nature. The self-particularization of the absolute Idea, then, which is essential to its truth as absolute, is the free existence of Nature, "its reflected image" in other-being.

Hegel maintained in the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* that it presented "God in His eternal essence." What, in effect, he is saying at the end of the Logic is that, of necessity, God creates the world ex nihilo.

As argued earlier, once this has been recognized the next stage of self-conscious knowing is the detailed philosophical account of Nature as the self-development of life and consciousness. But consciousness is not self-external and not simply in itself and for another. It is for itself, and it has to be treated afresh in a further philosophical study, to trace out and examine the stages through which it comes to comprehend the identity of finitude and infinitude which it implicitly is, and which transcends it (*es übergreift*).

The philosophical attainment of the logical Idea is an achievement of human thought; but that is the activity of an embodied individual person—a member of the world it knows. The logical Idea is both more and less than this. As the absolute truth it is more, but so far as it is abstract it is less. As known by us, it exists in the human mind—in an embodied personality—which is a natural product included within and continuous with the rest of Nature. It is necessary, therefore, to show how it emerges from, and (in Hegel's term) inwardizes the processes of Nature and brings them to fruition in consciousness.

NATURE AND MIND

Hegel is commonly accused of volatilizing Nature away into an idea or logical construction in some mind, either God's or man's; but there could be no greater travesty of what he has actually written. He is aggressively realistic in his affirmation of Nature as the precondition of the existence of the human mind, and in his assertion that the truth is actual and must exist. The Absolute, of course, is prior, both ontologically and logically, to everything finite, but its actualization as absolute Spirit is not found in Nature, nor in the dialectical series prior to it, for, as stated above, the logical Concept is relatively abstract, and in it absolute Spirit is not yet fully realized. "God, in His eternal essence," as we shall later discover, is only the universal aspect of Deity, and is relatively abstract; for God is not simply a concept. "The divine Idea is precisely this: to disclose itself, to exhibit this Other produced from itself and to take it back into itself again in order to become subjectivity and spirit."[6] The realization of subjective mind requires the actual existence of an organism, and so presupposes the creation of the world, or the externalization as Nature of the rational principle immanent in all reality. For Hegel, then, Nature is the actual process of becoming through which mind is realized. His conception of reality is both realistic and essentially teleological, the nisus of the process throughout being the dialectical push towards self-completion.

The entire natural process is one through which the self-externality of the spatio-temporal world is progressively overcome, as each successive grade of natural being explicates and reflects, more adequately than its predecessor, the organizing principle of the entire system. This is evident first in the merely mechanical interdependence of physical entities; next it is evinced in the interrelation of environment and organism (both vegetable and animal), and in the increasing efficiency of the latter in dominating the former and subjecting it to its own needs; finally, in sentience, the whole of this natural interconnectedness is focused and "inwardized" in the animal organism in subjectivity.

Mind comes to be both as the product of Nature and as its sublimation in feeling and awareness; it is the form in which Nature becomes aware of itself in a natural organism. Nature provides the vehicle and instrument of consciousness in and through which it becomes known. Thus the relation of Nature to Idea is epitomized in the relation of the organism (the natural body) to its mind. Idea is the conceptualization of the activity operative throughout Nature, and this actually takes place in the living body as (through the mediation of its physiological processes) it becomes aware of itself and its world. The mind-body relationship is therefore the focus of,

and the key to the understanding of, the relation between Idea and Nature. The crucial point of the transition from Nature to Spirit is the emergence of sentience, constituting what Hegel calls the soul, the origin and basis of everything that appears in consciousness.

Body and Soul

The Cartesian doctrine of two substances inexplicably related in the human mind-body nexus Hegel rejected as emphatically as any of the modern opponents of "the ghost in the machine," while at the same time he allowed for those features of the contrast between mind and body that make dualistic theories seem plausible. His protest against "the so-called Rational Psychology, or Pneumatology" is unequivocal. This, he says, concerns itself with abstract general characteristics, with a putative (*erscheinungslose*) essence lacking any sort of evidence or manifestation. It raises futile questions whether the soul is a single immaterial substance, and regards it as something fixed and unchanging; whereas spirit, Hegel declares, is absolute unrest, pure activity. The soul is not an already complete being hiding itself behind the multiplicity of its appearances, but one that is truly actualized only through the determinate forms of its own necessary self-revelation. It is not a "ghost-thing" (*Seelending*) in external relation to the body, but integrally involved with the body, through the unity of the Concept.[7]

The body is the medium of the soul's "necessary self-revelation" and the "absolute restlessness" and "pure activity" with which Hegel identifies it is an activity that takes place in and through the body. There the psychological functions, reflecting wide-ranging natural influences, are focused and integrated into a single unity, which is felt, and is sublated (*aufgehoben*) in feeling, subjectivized and idealized as sensation. Primitive sentience belongs to the soul, the "dark" or preconscious stage of mental process; but the restless activity of organizing, distinguishing, correlating, and ultimately of objectifying its own sentient content persists and develops into intelligent awareness and reason, which are the activities of mind proper.

It is only when the soul is pictured as a thing set over against matter as something *true* (*ein Wahres*)—an intelligible and completed reality—that the question of its immateriality can have any interest. But, on the one hand, even the physicists have found matter becoming "imponderable," and the biologists fail to identify "vitality" with anything solid, while, on the other hand, mind is intelligible as the unity constituting "the truth of" the self-alienation of matter.[8] Today the "imponderables" of the physics of Hegel's time have been replaced by the immaterialism of the relativity and the quantum theories, and the vitalism of the early naturalists has been

replaced by systems theory and organismic biology; but Hegel's philosophical insight remains valid and his treatment of the body-mind relationship is in principle still appropriate.

This relationship, he says, is an utterly incomprehensible mystery as long as we (falsely) insist on treating soul and body as absolutely antithetical and independent of each other.[9] His own treatment of the topic is very different and is closely bound up with his conception of the relation between the particular and the universal, and that again with the antithesis between immediacy and mediation. These terms, like so many others in Hegelian dialectic, have relative application. The purely immediate, the totally abstract, what is utterly devoid of mediation and determination, is pure Being, empty and contentless. Anything with any degree of definition or determinateness is at once mediated by an antithesis to what it is not—what defines and determines it. It is mediated by the structural principle and design of some system within which it has definitive position. But as this system develops and is further elaborated, what at an early stage appears as relatively mediate, at a later stage appears relatively immediate. We may say in general that the immediate is what is simply presented (*Dasein*), even though its presented character may involve implicit and unexpressed mediation, and that it is mediated as these tacit implications are explicated and set out to view. The unified structure, the explication of which is the process of mediation, is, for Hegel, the (concrete) universal, and the presented element or moment in this structure, presented without explicit elaboration of its defining relations, is the particular. The body, as a mere material entity, simply given or presented to perception, is immediate, only a particular. The explication in idea of its relation to the natural world and to the total scheme of things is mind or spirit, the mediate universal.

But within the process of this explication there are many phases, which, compared with what supervenes upon them, are only immediate, although compared with that upon which they have supervened are themselves universal. So we find Hegel speaking of "immediate mind" (*der unmittelbare Geist*), and of sentience as immediate, although also in a sense universal:

> In virtue of sentience, the soul has thus come to the point at which the universal constituting her nature becomes for her an immediate determination.[10]

Consciousness, which emerges from sentience as a further development, is the explicit grasp of this universality or unity-in-and-through-differences. The mind, of which the sentient soul is the inchoate form, is the universal "for itself"; and the body, a mere particular within the system of Nature, is this universal "in itself." Hence "mind comes into being as the *truth* of Nature."[11] We shall presently see how the body sublates within itself (in

sentience) the entire system of Nature and so is the universal *an sich*, and how the mind is the explicit unfolding of this universal, becoming the universal *für sich*. But this principle of holism come aware of itself is no new immaterial entity; it is, as Hegel says, the general immateriality (universality or idealization) of Nature.[12] For the same reason (as will shortly become apparent) it is equally proper to say that the mind is the idealization of the body.

THE AWAKENING OF MIND IN NATURE

The first division of Subjective Mind in the *Geistesphilosophie* Hegel calls Anthropology, which, as is his custom, he divides into three sections: (i) The Physical Soul, (ii) The Feeling Soul, and (iii) Actual Soul. The Physical Soul is again subdivided into Physical Qualities, Physical Alterations, and Sensibility, or Sentience (*Empfindung*). The subdivisions of the Feeling Soul are: Feeling Soul in its immediacy, Self-feeling, and Habit. Actual Soul is not subdivided, but is treated as the combination and reconciliation of the other two, each expressed and actualized in its other. It also provides the transition from sentience and feeling to consciousness.

This division of the dialectic is especially instructive and enlightening with respect to the relation of Nature to Mind and their interdependence. In particular, the section on the Physical Soul explains in some detail how mind emerges from the organic natural processes and reflects, or "inwardizes" the physico-chemical externalities of the outer world.

Nature is a whole of interrelated parts and processes such that at any level at which we consider it, physical, chemical, or organic, each part in some degree reflects the whole. Physical interdependence of material entities had been recognized by Leibniz; and the dependence of the chemical on the physical and of the biological on the chemical was already widely recognized in Hegel's day. The self-external character of material nature is to this extent counteracted even before the biological and psychological levels are reached. But, Hegel would say, this expression by the part of the whole is, at levels below consciousness, only "for us" (who reflect upon it) and not for the natural entity itself, whose dependence on its relation to its environment constitutes this expression and reflects the organizing principle of the system. In it, the unity of interrelationships is only implicit (*nur an sich*). As this unity becomes progressively more integral and complete it is more fully internalized in the entity concerned, so that in living forms (even in plants) their behavior is more explicitly responsive to other things and events external to them. The process of "inwardizing" has already begun. In such reaction to environmental influences plants are less organic than are animals. The parts of the plant are not so fully dominated by the character of

the whole vegetable organism as are the bodily parts of animals by the animal organism, in which the vital interchange with environment is more intimately focused and concentrated. Organic reaction is commonly thought of as sensitivity, and with it we are verging upon sensibility. When that emerges it is the more intense unification or reflection-into-self in the animal organism of the scattered self-external profusion of Nature.

> We have learnt from the Philosophy of Nature how Nature sublates her externality step by step, how already at the material level weight nullifies (*widerlegt*) the independence of multiple singularities, and how this nullification begun through weight and still more through the indivisible simplicity of light, is completed by animal life and the sentient [organism]. For this reveals to us the pervading presence of the single soul at all points of its corporeity and thereby the sublated reality of mutual externality of material parts.[13]

The subjectivization of Nature's self-externality is thus, at the same time, the felt unity of the bodily organism in the primitive phase of mind that Hegel designates soul.

It is, however, no world-soul like that described by Plato in the *Timaeus*. Hegel explicitly repudiates hylozoism (cf. *Enc.*, 391). Life emerges in a multiplicity of individual organisms, "like light in an endless multitude of individual stars."[14] In its sentient phase it is soul. Those of its characteristics that express natural qualities most directly, representing its most rudimentary phase, are from the beginning characteristics of individual living beings. They are not, as Findlay thinks,

> a sort of psychic life diffused throughout wide segments of Nature and not yet parcelled off into separate individual Souls.[15]

There is no evidence of this in the text. But the effects of climate, the changes of the seasons, and differences of times of day do express themselves in the sensitive character of plants, beasts, and humans. The types of life and the differences of human temperaments appropriate to tropical, temperate, and polar regions of the earth, are actualities, the moods reflective of the different seasons are well known and universally expressed—the gaiety and exhilaration of the spring, the relaxation of the summer, the invigoration of the autumn, and the tendency in the severe cold of winter to exhaustion and congealed inactivity (corresponding to the hibernation of animals). These are not only physiological responses to external conditions (which they undoubtedly are), nor are they just outward behavioral manifestations, but are also psychical qualities *felt* by individual animals. Similarly, everybody is familiar with the different feeling tones accompanying the various periods of the day, and these again vary with climatic conditions and the seasons of the year. There occurs here, as we shall observe further

anon, an overlap of different kinds of feeling tone corresponding to different natural conditions, those of morning, noon, and evening with those of climatic and seasonal differences. In this way, indeed, wide segments of Nature are subjectivized, but not in some pervasive soul-substance, for which no evidence is forthcoming, only in the felt experience of actual individuals; for it is as actual individual minds that the universal Concept *exists*.

These more general expressions of natural conditions are specified in racial and national characteristics, again in part determined climatically and in part by local circumstances. Hegel draws attention, for instance, to the differences in national character between mountain- and plain-dwelling peoples. Once more, all these naturally conditioned characteristics are individualized in persons and express themselves mentally in their temperaments, moods, dispositions, and aptitudes, as well as physically in their bodily appearances and types.

What Hegel is concerned with here is really one set of mental traits, not three; but they are expressive of Nature in three different ways, reflecting (a) geographical, (b) biological or racial, and (c) personal characteristics. These are degrees of specification and also contrasting aspects. For the merely geographical conditions are largely physical and mechanical, the biological are more teleological, and the two are synthesized in the personal traits of the individual which give them actual expression. So the dialectical form is still in evidence, but not as a synthesis of starkly opposed abstractions, rather as a concrete realization of two interdependent, though nevertheless contrasted, aspects of a single phase of psychical life.

The Mind's Embodiment

The essential point to be emphasized is the inseparability of mind from body. All natural qualities are as much bodily as mental and find expression equally in either form. Accordingly, the physical changes and varieties of biological functioning occurring in the animal organism also represent forms of soul or psychical determinations: the periods of life from infancy to youth, from youth to maturity, and from maturity to age; the difference between the sexes; and the alternation between sleeping and waking. Here there certainly is no dialectical rigidity, and the list of moments seems at first sight quite haphazard and fortuitous. What "logical" connection, one might ask, has the difference between male and female with the ages of man, on the one hand, or with sleep and waking, on the other? Yet they are all differences, in one way or another, of psychical and physiological condition, and they are by no means unconnected. The stages of animal life might well be represented simply as stages of sexual maturation, and corresponding to them the sentient life of the individual is variously divided between

sleep and waking. The infant sleeps the greater part of the time, having as it were barely awakened from the continuous sleep of gestation. As the individual matures, waking takes precedence over sleeping, and as age increases to senility the proportion of sleeping to waking tends to be reversed.

Sleep is the psychical state in which the unconscious processes of the body are present without explicit awareness, yet it is no mere physiological condition, for dreams give evidence of a sentience of some obscure kind, which as it emerges into a higher cognitive form, takes on fantastic and symbolic significance. The waking state, as Hegel says, is that in which the soul finds, as a "given," the contents of its subconscious sleeping condition and becomes explicitly aware of them.[16] Every stage of psychical life takes on these two alternating states at all ages, thus they are an aspect of all the other psycho-physical conditions listed. Further, all the psycho-physical differences characteristic of the life-periods of the individual are duplicated in the two sexual forms. Accordingly, all these natural alterations are interrelated, all aspects of the same organic life, and all forms of psychical as well as of physiological functioning.

Sexual differences involve separate individuals, while differences of age occur in one and the same individual. Sex is also a persistent bodily and mental form, while with age both mind and body constantly change. Both sets of alterations are obviously combined in the alternate forms of sleep and waking. Nevertheless, the negation by each moment of the other, as is seen in other triads of the dialectic, is not sharp or obvious here, although the sex differences themselves form an opposition, as do sleep and waking, even if the form of their reconciliation is not clearly defined. Further, all these physical alterations are specific and affect the individual directly, as opposed to the generality of the natural qualities of the prior group. And both sets are united in the sentient life of the individual organism. If the dialectic is here somewhat loose and lacks the "necessity" that Hegel so frequently claims for it, it is still true that what is being described is a continuous process of emerging mentality, the phases of which are mutually disposed in a relationship dialectical in type.

The main significance of this section is the recognition by Hegel of a subconscious psychical life that emerges into consciousness when physiological functioning reaches a critical degree of intensity of integration. This is the great contribution of his theory of feeling, in a measure anticipating Freud. We must, however, now pass on to consider the main discussion of sentience, passing by many interesting and perceptive remarks that Hegel makes about physical alterations, which could be properly treated only in a detailed and voluminous commentary.[17] These omissions may, perhaps, be the more readily excused because Hegel's discussion here admittedly presumes much that properly belongs to a later stage of the dialectic. As he

frequently points out, one can treat of the sentient characteristics of the mind for the most part only as they are known and recognized in the more developed forms of consciousness, which must therefore be, in a sense illegitimately, anticipated by the reflective study.

This is especially noticeable in the succeeding sections of the exposition, for the distinction between sleep and waking brings us to a level of awareness that is not yet fully explicit consciousness (*Bewußtsein*), but also is not mere oblivion and total unconsciousness. It is sentience (*Empfindung*) a phase that spans the frontier between the unconscious and the conscious. For sentience of a sort exists in sleep and at subconscious levels of mind, yet at the same time no awareness, however clear, is completely devoid of it. For Hegel, consciousness requires explicit recognition of an object set over against a subject, an opposition not characteristic of sentience. Yet the objective as well as the subjective elements in explicit consciousness are both derived from sentience and are, so to speak, forms imposed on what is felt as if it were a sort of primary (psychical) "matter."

SENTIENCE

Sentience is the immediate unification at once of the processes of the body and of the whole of Nature. It becomes mediated in consciousness as the awareness of self and of the world. How it unifies and sublates the variety of Nature we have already been told in the account given of natural qualities, and its integration of bodily states is indicated in the account of physical alterations. Hegel treats it initially as the manifold of sensations (outer and inner), summing up all that has been outlined above, and then he passes to the essential unity of self-feeling (*die fühlende Seele*), first as purely immediate, then as self-distinguishing, and finally as realized in active (habitual) unity of body and soul, each precisely and without conflict expressing the state and condition of the other. It is in fact this intimate unity of the two aspects which Hegel repeatedly stresses throughout his exposition.

On the one hand, the immediacy of natural forms and conditions becomes "ideal" in being felt (while as merely felt it remains sensibly unmediated). On the other hand, what is "inwardized" and belongs essentially to the incipient *ego* is incorporated and has bodily form and expression. Everything that enters into consciousness belongs to the waking life of the individual with which the personality is identified; and at its lowest psychical level it is the feeling or sensation of all those physiological states and processes that reach a sufficiently high degree of organized unity. These are all present in sleep at the preconscious level (*an sich*), so sleep and waking in a peculiarly appropriate way represent the relation of body and soul.

The dialectical advance involved in the transition from sleep and waking

to sentience consists (Hegel tells us) in the fact that the undifferentiated "being-in-self" of the organism represented by the sleeping state is displayed in waking sentience as a manifold demanding concrete (i.e., discriminated) unification. This cannot be effected simply by the alternation of sleep and waking, but is realized in the sentient soul as an immediate "given." The manifold determinations are absorbed (*versenkt*) into the universality of the soul and so are idealized (*Enc.*, 399 *Zusatz*). The point seems to be that the diversity of merely physiological unconscious processes is unified in sentience in such a way that, under the later effect of conscious attention, its contents can be distinguished and correlated (the activity of the single subject) so that it can be explicitly and manifestly organized as a concretely organized system.

But the bodily states and processes are themselves organic integrations of and adjustments to natural influences reflecting wide areas, if not the entire world. Consequently, all Nature comes to be summed up and consummated in the sentient awareness of the individual organism. The "object" of waking consciousness is the bodily unity and, through it, Nature; and the contents of sentience subsequently become the objects of consciousness, as they are distinguished by attention, identified, related one to another, and defined as external and independent.

"Sentience in general," Hegel writes, "is the healthy community (*Mitleben*) of the individual mind with its corporeity" (*Enc.*, 401). The variety of corporeal influences are specified in the external senses, the internal reactions, no less expressed in and through corporeal processes, are specified as inner emotional states. To be felt, they must at one and the same time be received as the effects of alien causes and identified with the subject as his or her own inner states. Therefore, these affections must be embodied and have a physiological aspect.

Hegel's detailed treatment of the external senses (in the *Zusatz* to Paragraph 401) must here be passed over, for our main concern is his account of the body-mind relation which he brings out more directly in discussing inner affective states. In his treatment of the five senses an apparent application of the procrustean bed occurs. The five senses are classified as three groups corresponding to the moments of the Idea: (i) sight and hearing corresponding to physical ideality, (ii) scent and taste to real difference, and (iii) touch to terrestrial (solid) totality. However artificial this classification may appear at first sight, it does not lack perspicacity. Sight reveals only evident surfaces, hearing only inner conditions (resonance, hollowness, harshness, and the like), smell and taste make us aware of forms of chemical process; but all go together to make up the solid body which is grasped and felt by contact. The two dualities are combined severally and together in the final synthesis of touch.

To return, then, to the inner emotional states, we read in the same *Zusatz*:

> If we speak of the inner determinations of the feeling subject, without reference to its corporeity (*Verleiblichung*), we deal with this subject as it is merely *for us*, but not as it is for itself, as it feels its own determinations in itself. . . . This somatization of the manifold of inner feelings presupposes a circle of corporality within which they proceed in sequence. This circle, this limited sphere, is my body, which defines itself as the sphere of sentience, as much for the inner as for the outer determinations of the soul. The vitality of this, my body, consists in the fact that its materiality is not able to be for itself. It can offer me no resistance, but is subordinate to me, permeated throughout by my soul, for which it is something ideal. It is through this [psychical] nature of my body that it becomes possible and necessary for my feelings to be corporally manifested and the movements of my soul become immediately movements of my body.[18]

This passage has a remarkably modern ring. In the first place it anticipates the modern neurophysiological and psychological doctrines of the body image, which play so large a part in contemporary theories of the localization of sensations and of perception. But Hegel avoids the error of conceiving this "image" as a replica in the brain of the schema of the body to which sensations are referred.[19] For him the body image is the felt unity and order of the physiological processes. His doctrine is in effect that which R. G. Collingwood reasserts in *The New Leviathan* (Chapters 2 and 3) that there is at least one sense of the word "body" in which it means simply bodily feeling. Hegel makes the point that so far as the body is alive (*lebendig*) it is in this sense (of "feeling") that the word is properly used.

The unity (*Mitleben*) of body and soul, referred to above, is here further illuminated in such a way as to exclude any suggestion of dualism. The physical body, inasmuch as it is "quickened" and alive, is permeated by soul (or feeling), for sentience is the sublation of the physiological process. The theory is not unlike what Susanne Langer maintained in her later works,[20] that feeling is the integrated whole of physiological functioning at a threshold of crucial intensity. It is a doctrine that renders the traditional theories of body-mind relationship futile and obsolete—as Collingwood calls them, old wives' tales—what they have been ever since Hegel wrote.

The subsequent account given by Hegel of the bodily counterparts of felt emotional states is, on the one hand, marred by the primitive state of the scientific psychology and psychiatry on which he was able to draw, so that it includes the old wives' tales then current about psychosomatic effects. On the other hand, he recognizes and himself asserts that the true facts of the matter had been obscured by centuries of error and misunderstanding,[21] and his own descriptions, in spite of their occasional fantasies, are all full of

anticipatory insights adumbrating the James-Lange theory of emotion and the modern understanding of psychosomatic phenomena.

THE FEELING SOUL AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

We said earlier that each category of the dialectic was a provisional definition of the Absolute. So we find in the *Geistesphilosophie* that each phase gives one specific view or aspect of mind, as such and as a whole, and, at the level in which we are immediately interested, this is soul. What we have reviewed so far has been the character of the content of Spirit at the sentient level, and sentience, because of its immediacy and mere givenness, is particular and transient (*Enc.*, 402). But this does not apply to the soul as the subject of sentience. All sensed content belongs to and is felt by the single individual subject and is of necessity gathered into one experience which the individual feels as self, not as clearly and intellectually distinguished from and in contradistinction to not-self, but as a single totality of feeling in which the distinction of self and not-self is still only potential. This is the soul in another aspect, which Hegel calls the Feeling Soul.

Hitherto we have used the words "feeling" and "sentience" as equivalent with no attempt to distinguish between the German words *Empfindung* and *Fühlen*. Hegel here uses the latter to refer to the feeling soul as a totality. Sentience (*Empfindung*), he says, implies passivity, but feeling (*Fühlen*), although he does not go so far as to call it active, implies to a greater extent an awareness of self (*Selbstichkeit*). The distinction, he admits, is not one usually made, although we do speak of "a feeling of rectitude," and "self-feeling" where we should not say "a sensation of rectitude," or "a sensation of self." The term does indeed connote some degree of active spontaneity, and Hegel uses it to refer to forebodings and experiences of second-sight—the sort of thing of which one says, "I feel it in my bones"—not as a mere sensation but as an implicit judgment.

The feeling soul is intermediate between the immediacy of sentience and the explicit consciousness of a surrounding world of objects, in which (as Hegel puts it) what is immediately sensed is just a point in the comprehensive interrelatedness of things in the objective world.[22] This intermediate stage is hard to describe. Hegel uses the phrase "*die ahnende Seele*," the soul experiencing some kind of intuitive, foreboding, vague, inexplicable, non-discursive awareness; and in his detailed account of this phase of mental life, he is undoubtedly dealing with what nowadays we call the Unconscious. He includes under it dreams, the mental life (such as it may be) of the embryo in the womb, the subconscious self or genius of the individual, various forms of extrasensory perception (*das fühlende Wissen*), hypnotism ("animal magnetism"), somnambulism, and the like. What was known of

these psychological phenomena in his time was vague and unsystematic, and as far as it might be called scientific at all, it was groping and speculative. So also were the current accounts of insanity, which Hegel also treats in a later section in this subdivision. Many of the errors and vagaries current at the time are reflected in his writing, for Hegel, as we have said, was always careful to adhere to what the contemporary science had accepted as established. In dealing with matters of empirical fact, he scrupulously held to the available evidence and refused (even when it would suit his philosophical inclinations) to accept theories that were then mere speculative guesses. Consequently, he adopted many explanations of psychological phenomena that to us seem ludicrous and are now obsolete, while he made valiant efforts to render them reasonable. But the errors can hardly be held against him, for we cannot expect him to have known better, or to have divorced himself entirely from his own age. What is remarkable about his thought is the extent to which he was able to detect the shortcomings of the accepted views and the penetration with which he was able to advance beyond what was then known.

Claims to clairvoyance, extrasensory perception, and similar experiences Hegel treats seriously, but he attributes them to a level of mind below that of consciousness and cognition proper. They are forms of intuitive awareness which can give no rational account of themselves and are simply "felt." Their source is precognitive and is thus subconscious. Hegel commends Plato for associating divination with the liver and for ascribing it to the irrational part of the soul. Clairvoyance, he considers, is far from "clear," but rather is confused with accidental fancies and extraneous suggestions, so that it is difficult to distinguish between genuine prevision and self-deception. Least of all is it justifiable to treat this kind of experience as an elevation of spirit, capable of giving access to higher truths (*Enc.*, 406); at best it is a psychical manifestation typical of a pathological condition.

Some may dispute the interpretation that attributes to Hegel a theory of the Unconscious, but there are passages that can hardly be otherwise understood, for example, the following:

> Every individual is an inexhaustible treasury of sensations, ideas, pieces of information, thoughts, etc., but the *ego* is nevertheless entirely *simple*, a featureless pit in which all this is stored, without existing. Only if *I* recall an idea (*Vorstellung*) do I bring it out of that interior into existence before consciousness. It happens in illness that ideas and information, said to have been forgotten years ago because they had not been brought to consciousness for such a long time, come again to light. We were previously not in possession of them and come no more to possess them by such reproduction of them as occurs in illness, yet they were in us and continue to remain in us. So a person can never know how many items of

> knowledge he actually *has in him*, once he has forgotten them; they do not belong to his actuality, nor to his subjectivity as such, but to his implicit being (*an sich seinden Sein*). (*Enc.*, 403)

Again, he says of the feeling self that it is mind "in the stage of its darkness," and it is to this dark featureless pit that he traces back not only things recovered in delirium, but also the phenomena of dreams and somnambulism, psychic *rapport*, and noninferential prescience mentioned above. One can hardly consider the level of *Fühlen und Ahnen* as anything but preconscious, for although there is some awareness of their products, it is an awareness that strictly belongs to a more developed and explicit stage of mind (the treatment here, as elsewhere, being proleptic), and Hegel quite unmistakably places it below the level of consciousness, for which he reserves the term *Bewußtsein*.

The feeling self is presented under three heads, as the feeling self in its immediacy, self-feeling, and habit. Once again there is much that we must pass by for lack of space, and a brief comment on Hegel's treatment of insanity is all we shall permit ourselves. Self-feeling is that stage in which the soul identifies itself as subject of its feelings, but as one with them. This appears to be the stage at which the Ego distinguishes itself from the Id (in Freudian terms). Modern psychologists, whether of the analytic school or other, have given definite recognition to this emergent self.[23] It becomes the center of the subsequent phase, at which, with the explicit distinction of itself from the objects of its experience, it attains to consciousness proper, the awareness of an ordered world of interrelated objects. But if at this stage the self becomes so obsessed with some special element in its feeling life that it loses the sense of the proper relation of that element to the rest, so that it becomes disproportionately engrossing, the element thus selected assumes the role of a dream encapsulated, as it were, in waking life, and is thus a mental derangement. Again the root source is the feeling (subconscious) life of the soul, but now disproportionately and illegitimately invading the higher sphere of consciousness.

In his attitude to insanity, Hegel is again in advance of his time. He declares that the mentally ill must be regarded not as devoid of sanity but simply as suffering derangement. The conscious, rational individual is one who has subjected the content of the soul at the level of feeling to order and rule. The relaxation of this control by the organizing activity of thought and the reversion of the mind to the lower level, allowing the felt content of the soul to play a disproportionate role in its consciousness, is insanity. But neither is the feeling soul insane, nor do the insane altogether lack rationality. The lunatic is a rational person in whose consciousness some element of feeling has usurped the dominant place. Treatment of the ailment, there-

fore, must depend upon and assume the basic rationality of the patient, as the physician bases his cure for physical ills on the normal functioning of the body. The treatment must be humane and considerate of the individual as essentially a responsible person.

HABIT AND THE ACTUALIZATION OF SOUL IN THE BODY

It is not, however, only the abnormal that is to be attributed to subconscious sources. Hegel has given plentiful evidence of his awareness of the influence upon our ordinary waking life of causes that have deeper roots than we are conscious of. Moreover, our conscious practices may also affect, or find lodgement in the subconscious underpinning of the mind, and may reduce deliberate action or thought to automatic unconscious habit.

This reduction of overt action and experience to unconscious automatism is a necessity for higher mental development, in that it releases the mind from the need to attend to particular details and enables it to direct itself to the more general and universal aspects of things. The vehicle of this unconscious automatism is again the body, in which repetition and practice engender a "second nature." So the body becomes completely molded and dominated by the soul and is in fact and actuality the soul's existence. Thus the feeling soul is actual as the body; they are identical, the soul being but the psychical aspect of the same natural entity of which the body is the physiological aspect. But the identity is not such as to restrict the mind to mere feeling; rather it is one that equips it for activities higher in degree of organization and more explicitly complex unification, which it accomplishes in properly conscious activities of knowing and doing.

The modern neural-identity theory obscures these differences in degree of complexity, organization, and holism; and restricts the correlation of psychical and physical to brain processes, similarly neglecting the holism of physiological activity. Hegel avoids the dualism against which the modern theories inveigh, while he consistently preserves the distinctions between body and mind (Nature and Spirit), physiology and psychology, feeling and explicit consciousness, the awareness of which persuades the dualist of the inadequacy of narrowly materialistic doctrines. The soul, and subsequently the mind, are presented as successive phases of integrating, idealizing activity, the effect of which is the attainment of progressively higher degrees of organization and diversified unity. What is unified and idealized is primarily the organic process of the body, for body and mind are not two substances in external relation, but one in which different dialectical phases of concrete organization are manifested. The more explicit and integral sublate (cancel, while they preserve in more developed form) the more immediate and implicit. The process of advance is one in which unconscious

organic functioning becomes preconscious sentient apprehension, and thence emerges into clear awareness as the activity of discrimination, opposition, and interrelation of elements proceeds.

Today Phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty are returning to a position similar to this. They seek to get back to an original experience prior to the presupposition of a formed world of external objects and a "knowledge" of that world recorded in the mind. They rebel against the picture of a soul as a thing set over against matter (or the world) as *ein Wahres*. They find the knowledge of the world inseparably bound up with the direct awareness (feeling) of the body and its organic functioning; and they regard attention as the primary activity of thought, singling out, or rather creating, its own objects in a quasi-dialectical process which moves in consequence of the stimulating drive that results from vagueness and contradiction, the problematic character of the object presently discovered. "It is precisely by overthrowing data [what Hegel calls *Aufhebung*] that the act of attention is related to previous acts, and the unity of consciousness is built up step by step through a 'synthesis of transition'." It is the object which "gives rise to the 'knowledge-bringing event' which is to transform it, only by means of the still ambiguous meaning which it requires to clarify."[24]

So writes Merleau-Ponty, and he quotes Valéry as saying that "the work of the mind exists only in act." Hegel has told us that it is absolute unrest and pure activity. But the Phenomenologist, while he brackets the assumption of the existing world (as *ein Wahres*) nevertheless asserts that that assumption is prior to our theorizing. He leaves it either undefended or, by implication, deducible from our consciousness. The relation remains obscure, which Hegel through his dialectical procedure succeeds more satisfactorily in explaining. So far as the Phenomenologist fails to make good his claim to transcend the antithesis of idealism and realism, Hegel has already advanced beyond him; so far as Phenomenology succeeds it has been anticipated by Hegel.

CONSCIOUSNESS

Once the distinction between subject and object, self and other, becomes definite, the mind rises from the level of mere feeling to consciousness proper, and we enter the phase of Phenomenology (in Hegel's sense of the word). This is subjective Spirit, released, as it were, from Nature and operating in its own proper sphere. When it reaches the levels of intellect and reason it is active, as Hegel would say, in the aether of its own ideality. As our aim in this chapter has been to examine the transition from Nature to Spirit and the way in which mind arises within its natural body through the unification and integration of its organic functioning, we

may leave the matter here and shall not comment further on the detail of the succeeding sections.

In spite of the obstacles that discourage students from paying attention to the opening subsections of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit—the obscurity at times of his writing, his often involved and elliptical exposition, as well as the inclusion in his discussion of ideas about physiological and psychological phenomena long since discredited—it nevertheless repays close study, if only because of its many suggestive insights and illuminating analogies. Note, for instance, the penetrating remark, "Habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence."[25] Hegel anticipates so many later developments and presents them often in ways so superior to their modern versions, that the result of neglecting his teaching gives testimony to the truth of Collingwood's judgment:

> The philosophy which ignores its own history is a philosophy that spends its labour only to discover errors long dead.

Notes

1. Cf. B. Croce, *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, trans. D. Ainslie, London, 1915.
2. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, 1950), Chap. 3.
3. Cf. C. D. Michener, "Some Future Developments in Taxonomy," *Systematic Zoology*, 12 (1960): pp. 151–72.
4. Cf. R. Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Rules II and III.
5. Cf. *Enc.*, 65; and E. E. Harris, *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, p. 291.
6. *Enc.*, 247 *Zusatz*.
7. *Enc.*, 378 *Zusatz*.
8. *Enc.*, 389.
9. Ibid.
10. *Enc.*, 399 *Zusatz*: "*Durch das Empfindung ist somit die Seele dahin gekommen, daß ihre Natur ausmachende Allgemeine in einer unmittelbaren Bestimmtheit für sie wird.*"
11. *Enc.*, 388.
12. *Enc.*, 389.
13. *Enc.*, 389 *Zusatz*; cf. also 390 *Zusatz*.
14. Ibid., 390 *Zusatz*.
15. Cf. *Hegel, A Re-examination*, p. 291.
16. Cf. *Enc.*, 399.
17. In particular, Hegel's perspicacious comparison of the mental characteristics of youth and age, and his unerring solution of Descartes's problem of the distinction between dream and waking. See *Enc.*, 396 *Zusatz*, and 398.
18. *Enc.*, 401 *Zusatz*. I have tried by this circumlocution to convey Hegel's sense of the word *Verleiblichung*.
19. Cf. W. Russell Brain, *Mind, Perception and Science* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), p. 17.
20. Cf. *Philosophical Sketches* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 9; and

Mind, An Essay on Human Feeling (Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), Vol. I, Ch. I.

21. *Enc.*, 401 *Zusatz*.
22. *Enc.*, 402 *Zusatz*: "*Zugleich ist dies Empfundene aber für mich ein Punkt in dem allgemeinen Zusammenhange der Dinge.*"
23. Cf. K. Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 319ff.
24. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) pp. 30–31.
25. *Enc.*, 410.

12
Objective Concept and Objective Spirit: The Theory of Action

> Men do not understand how what is at variance with itself agrees with itself—a harmony of opposed tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.
>
> Heraclitus (Frag. 51).

The harmony of opposed tensions which is the pervading theme of Hegel's philosophy is the concurrent and alternating objectification of the subjective and the subjectification of the objective. The reality and the truth is the whole, the Absolute. But the Absolute is subject (Idea and Spirit), the diversified wholeness of which can only be fulfilled in explicit self-awareness; yet that again is only complete as self-differentiated, self-specified, and objectified. This is the comprehensive explanation of what occurs at every stage of its dialectical development. For example, Idea is always externalized, actualized in prolific self-specification; soul is always embodied; and the subjective is always objectified. At the same time, this self-external embodied objectivity, being implicitly the whole (the Idea), always tends unrestrainedly to become aware of itself, to explicate the immanent Idea subjectively in self-knowledge. Only if we understand this harmony of opposite tensions in which what is opposed to itself agrees with itself, can we understand Hegel's theory of action in general, and the concept of political action in particular.

The Logic as Key

The key to the whole of Hegel's system is the Logic, and it sets the pattern for every other philosophical science; so we must seek in the Logic for the principle of explanation permeating the *Geistesphilosophie*, which

includes the *Rechtsphilosophie*. In the Logic the identity of opposites is expounded in detail as the principle of the dialectic. The dialectic is proclaimed as "the principle of all movement, all life, and all activity in actuality." And in that statement we have, in a nutshell, Hegel's theory of action.

The dialectic, however, is the eternal activity of self-realization of absolute Spirit—the whole that is the truth—and that activity is one of self-specification, or of objectification, in which the externalized elements are distinguished one from another and, in their endeavor to maintain themselves, first become opposed to each other, and then become reconciled in mutually dependent interrelation, in which their opposition is *aufgehoben*, as they are ranked as necessary moments within the self-conscious whole. Thus is the Heraclitean principle ubiquitously exemplified.

OBJECTIFICATION OF THE IDEA

The externality of Being-in-itself is internalized to Being-for-itself, and that, as a whole, is explicated in the opposed yet mutually indispensable correlations of Essence, which is progressively objectified as it develops to Actuality, and so led back to the subjectivity of the Concept. Concept, however, proves to be not only subjective, but equally objective, in the categories of Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology, where it attains to the objectified subjectivity of Idea, in Life and Cognition. Life is objective as organism, subjective as cognitive, but again, as such, it becomes objective in Volition. Absolute Idea is then realized as the identity of subject and object in explicit philosophical comprehension. To repeat, the subjective Concept, in its fulfillment is objective knowledge of an actuality that comes to further fruition in the active realization of conceived ends, and this takes place through the medium of life, which is both cognitive in knowledge and active in volition. Hence volition (action) is the objectification of subjective Concept as cognized by a living being who is an object in the actual world of Nature.

THE SUBJECTIFICATION OF NATURE

Accordingly, the truth of the absolute Idea is Nature, for Nature is its self-objectification (its self-specification) in the form of externality, or other-being. Nature is the utterance (*Äußerung*) of the Idea, which is immanent throughout, and, through the natural process from the physical and chemical to organic life, it returns to subjectivity, inwardizing itself as the feeling soul, the matrix of self-conscious spirit.

Reobjectification of Spirit

Subjectivized Nature, Spirit, becomes conscious of itself only to express itself through appetite, generating its self-recognition in and through its other: first in the mutual conflict that appetite occasions between individuals, next in the domination of one by the other, and finally in mutual recognition and the reconciliation of demands (what come later to be seen as rights). Thus is self-awareness initially objectified in practical self-expression. Subjective awareness develops in theoretical knowledge and expresses this in practice, as the conscious self realizes its desires in reflective, deliberative, rational conduct. So subjective spirit progressively becomes objective; and, as it can be subjectively self-conscious only through the recognition of itself in the self-consciousness and self-actualization of others, theoretical mind is from the very beginning social, it is throughout other-directed, and the practical life in which it objectifies itself, born in conflict but freely realized only in mutual recognition, is social action. Its objectification, therefore, is a social order, and action, properly so-called, being rational and deliberate, is always socially ordered. As this is actually constituted in institutional organization, it becomes political action, or to express the matter in Hegelian terms, knowledge and desire, theory and practice, are all sublated (*aufgehoben*) in political activity.

The Interdependence of Subject and Object

The Hegelian dialectic is inevitably set out serially as successive phases in the concretion of the Idea. This consecutive progression is, moreover, one of its necessary aspects (or moments). But the Idea is essentially one and eternally whole; and while it is eternally active and perpetually in process of self-differentiation—which is precisely its self-objectification—it is also essentially and eternally self-realized. This Hegel states explicitly towards the end of the Lesser Logic (*Enc.*, 212 and 237).

Accordingly, the theoretical and practical, the subjective and objective moments, are not simply sequential but are also concurrent, always mutually interdependent; and objectification not merely presupposes the subjective, but also actualizes it, as speech actualizes thought,[1] while without the subjective aspect the objective lacks its essential nature. Action, therefore, the utterance or objectification of consciousness, is as necessary to its being as is the subjective content to the action (for without consciousness activity is simply physical motion; even living movement implies some sort of sentient response).

Hegel never loses sight of this interdependence, although he does not always make it obvious when discussing the subjective aspect. In his account of soul, in the Anthropology, he constantly insists upon the ne-

cessity of its embodiment and outward manifestation. Elsewhere he similarly emphasizes the indispensability of *Gestaltung* (the giving of external shape) to the forms and phases of consciousness. Not only is the emergence of consciousness dependent on the development of the living organism, but self-consciousness is dependent upon (is in fact identical with) the conflict between persons pursuing their needs and impulses (appetites). Appetite is the externalization at once of the awareness of want, and of an other that is wanting. It is thus an awareness of a contradiction in the self, and its satisfaction is the internalization (the consumption and enjoyment), of the object, effecting a reconciliation between subject and object that removes the contradiction. All this is at the same time overt behavior, the activity of overcoming and appropriating the object. Likewise, the structure of society is the objective self-manifestation of morality, which is rooted in practical feeling and volition, both subjective and objectively expressed, besides being illuminated (implicitly or explicitly) by reflection and reason. There is more to be said about all this, to which attention will presently be given. First let us take note of its logical basis.

LOGICAL STRUCTURE

The dialectical framework consists of the two contrasting moments of the Concept, its universality or unity and its particularity or diversity, and the identity of these moments in (and through) their opposition, its concrete individuality as a differentiated whole. The first aspect is the whole in its simple immediacy, the second is its self-diremption or specificity, and the third is the explicit identification of the two, in which each is at home with itself in its other.

Generally speaking the second or middle stage is that of objectification. In the Logic, the Doctrine of Essence holds this position, although Hegel there prefers the term *Gesetztsein* (positedness) to objectivity. The categories of immediacy, which, in Being, passed over one into another, here are posited in their interrelation and reflected into each other. He says:

> In Being everything is immediate, in Essence, on the other hand, everything is relative. (*Enc.*, 111 *Zusatz*)

Of course, Being is also in a sense objective, but in its sheer immediacy both objectivity and subjectivity are only implicit (*an sich*). They are foreshadowed in Determinate Being (*Dasein*) and in Being-in-itself (*Ansichsein*), on the one hand, and in Being-for-self (*Fürsichsein*), on the other. The first becomes fully explicit only in Nature, and the second only in Mind (*Geist*). The first stage of this explication is its *Gezetztsein* in Essence, where the quasi-Kantian categories of objective knowledge are set out.

The dialectic, however, moves through wheels within wheels, not only

in its consecutive triads, but also in its major cycles; and the wider relationships are recapitulated in the lesser ones, and the earlier in the later. Thus when we come to the Doctrine of the Concept (which is essentially what Logic is)—the union of Being and Essence in explicit self-awareness—the subjective Concept (judgment efflorescing into syllogism, or inference) is objectified in the categories of the physical and organic world which culminate in Teleology.

Teleology, etymologically, is the realization of an end, but genuine teleology is recognized by Hegel as holism, the principle of totality (or order) by which the whole determines the parts both in their essential nature and in their mutual relations. It is the principle by which the ideal (whole) becomes real (thus the principle of Idealism). It is the objectification of the subjective aim (*der Zweck*); so it is the category of purpose and the spring of action. Its realization is that identity of subject and object which is the Idea (or ideal) manifesting itself as life and functioning as cognition and volition—once again, action—objectifying the subjective self-awareness of the prior moments (*aufgehoben* within it) as Idea.

Life is treated here as a logical category, a thought-determination, or *Denkbestimmung*. It is, however, also a natural form, and Nature is the Idea in the form (or phase) of externality, the objectified Idea. Life is actualized as organism through which the whole of Nature is, as it were, focused in the organic relationship of the living being with its environment, and is sublimated in sentience. This (as we have seen) is the first immediate phase of Spirit or mind.

Recapitulation in Spirit

In the Philosophy of Spirit these logical relationships are recapitulated on a more concrete level. The second stage of the major triad is that of Objective Spirit, at which the subjective moment is actualized in external self-manifestation. It is uttered, or acted out. But the same relationships are traceable also on the subjective side. Here feeling, as primitive sentience is immediate and, properly speaking, neither subjective nor objective, although it is always and necessarily embodied, and so has external form. As felt it is subjective, but it is not yet intentional object, and so the necessary opposition to subject is still wanting, thus the distinction between subject and object cannot yet be made. It is first made on the level of consciousness, which is the phase of self-differentiation, in which the contents of sentience are discriminated into objects of perception. As Hegel says, it is the stage of appearance, of correlation and reflection.[2] At this level the world *appears* to the subject as an external object, marking, in the sphere of subjective Spirit, the moment of objectification. The object presents itself

as external other, although its content is wholly derived from the earlier phase of sentience; for in the realm of Spirit the prior phase is always object to the posterior. In this way the identity of subject and object is preserved, and the distinction is made *within* experience. It is a self-diremption. In Fichtean terms, the self, by its own activity, posits a not-self as its other, and encounters its object as an *Anstoß*, a check or opposition to itself.

This opposition develops, on the one hand, as sense-perception (in which the external object appears) and understanding (which distinguishes and relates the appearances), and, on the other hand, as appetite, the feeling of deficiency and the inner contradiction consequent upon it, which arise from the extrusion of the other from the self. The self, in effect, claims the extruded other as its own, while it feels it to be opposed to itself. At the same time it finds itself in its other, or object; and this in more ways than one. First, the object is the prior phase of itself; secondly, it is objectified by the very projection into it of the principles of organization and unity (the Kantian categories, which are the principles of objective knowledge) that reflect the self-identity and spontaneity of the subject (qua synthetic unity of apperception); thirdly, the object (primarily sentience, which is internalized, *erinnert*, Nature) is organic as well as inorganic, and so presents itself sometimes as inanimate object and sometimes in the guise of other living beings. Thus the other, whether nonliving or living, not only opposes the self, as external to it and limiting it, but also contradicts itself, for it is at the same time dependent on and constituted by the self. Such contradictions within both self and other, as well as between them, are insufferable and they engender the impulse to remove them—they must be *aufgehoben*, and as always the dialectical principle reveals itself as the spring of action: "*das Prinzip aller Bewegung, alles Lebens, aller Betätigung in der Wirklichkeit.*"

Hence there arises the struggle for recognition: first for the destruction of the other, its assimilation, extinction, and annulment. But, as this proves self-frustrating, for the other is in fact identical with the self, the opposition issues first in dominance over, and finally in equal recognition of, the other. This is the famous master-slave sequence of the *Phenomenology*, and its satisfactory outcome can only be the mutual recognition of, and respect for, persons as equals; for the other is actually the self in its other-being. They are indeed identical, and each can be fulfilled only so far as the other is also fulfilled. It is the slave who develops all the satisfying and self-fulfilling activities claimed by the master, and it is only when both exert themselves equally in their common interest that real fulfillment is achieved.

Action here, both as conflict and as cooperation, is the expression of a subjective want or inner contradiction prompted by the self-organization of the sentient field that is effected by attention and perceptive understanding. It is a further advance in objectification issuing in the recognition of, and

interaction with, persons. But the subjective moment is not temporally prior to the objective, or the merely passive earlier than the active. They are concurrent and mutually instrumental.

With this recognition of self in other, the subjectification of the object and the consequent objectification of the self, self-consciousness is actualized and the level of reason is attained. At the same time, the foundation of morality has been laid, for morality is rooted in the recognition of persons and is the fruit of rational reflection upon their mutual relations and interaction.

Reason is the proper and genuine form of self-conscious Spirit and it issues, on the theoretical side, as cognition, or knowledge of the truth, through the media of the subjective faculties of mind, intuition, representation (*Vorstellung*), and thinking. On the practical side, it expresses itself as practical feeling (or moral sense), desire (the rational quest for self-satisfaction), and choice (deliberate decision)—in sum, the pursuit of happiness.

Practical feeling is not just instinctive impulse, which belongs to the merely conscious (not yet self-conscious) level. It is the correlate of intuition, which is an immediate apprehension of things in their mutual relations prior to analysis. It is the intuition of fitness and unfitness to which modern writers on ethics refer when they speak of what we intuitively feel to be right. And although its primary immediate forms are pleasure and displeasure, it always has moral overtones and could more suitably be called approval and disapproval (of which it is at least the basis). Hegel distinguishes the feelings as such: joy, contentment, gaiety, fear, terror, etc., as contentless, from the moral feelings, such as complacency, shame, and remorse, as those distinguished by their content. But clearly no feeling has definite significance apart from its object, which must be cognized in order to be distinguishable. Thus theory and practice are interdependent and concurrent.

Such interdependence is even more apparent in the case of desire and choice, which obviously depend on the cognition and theoretical assessment of the object, on comparison, and on judgments both of fact and of preference. And happiness, as the general feeling of contentment, satisfying the self as a whole, implies not only a theoretical judgment of what will satisfy the self, a judgment concerning the criterion of practical goodness, but also, in practice, the perception of the harmonious nature of what one calls one's lot, in which satisfaction is taken. Theory and practice are therefore inextricably interwoven; the inner and outer aspects of experience are thus mutually indispensable.

For this reason it is not sufficient merely to feel nor simply to intend. Feelings and actions to be significant must be expressed in action. In the Logic, when he is commenting on the category of Inner and Outer (under Essence), Hegel inveighs against claims to virtue on the ground of good

intentions alone, and the pretense that only the inner conception matters, the claim that the person with high ideals, the poet or the painter with lofty notions, who never carry them out in comparable actions, may nevertheless pride themselves on their high-mindedness.[3] The inner must be externalized, objectified (*äussert*), if it is to count as real.

The activity of the subject is the urge to satisfy its desires, the translation of subjective purposes into objective reality.[4] As before, action is objectification of the subjective content. But practical feeling and its developed forms, while incident to action, remain subjective. They pertain to the individual self and are in principle selfish, contingent, and arbitrary. For this reason Hegel protests against the elevation, in ethical theory, of feeling above duty and law; or, what amounts to the same thing, contempt for intelligence and reason as superfluous and ineffectual in morality and religion.

Volition, we have seen, is the objectification of cognition and it is now revealed as identical with intelligence. Action that is truly responsible must be rational and deliberate. But purely personal and selfish volition is abortive and self-defeating, because, as we have also seen, the recognition and self-awareness of the person is concomitant with and dependent upon the recognition of other persons. Accordingly, inclinations and desires, which, in the nature of the case come into conflict even in the private life of the individual, so that he or she must, to attain happiness, choose between them and reduce them to order subject to some universal and overriding end, come into conflict further with the desires and interests of other persons, in conjunction with whom private aims have to be pursued, and without whose cooperation seldom if ever can be achieved. The consequent organization of life, both private and public, is the work of reason, whose function precisely is to introduce order where disorder had previously prevailed.

Society as Objective Spirit

It follows that the objectification of subjective purpose is only possible in concert with others and must take the form of social action. Only thus can the aim and content of the will be truly universal; for, because of the interdependence of persons, self-centered desire is bound to be frustrated by conflicts that arise in the absence of social regulation. The particular will can only be satisfactorily effective, therefore, as a factor in the common, universal, or general will. Thus Objective Spirit is a structured society, and Plato's insight was unerring when, in the *Republic*, he referred us to the larger letters of the polis for the discovery of justice.

Self-consciousness, the self-determining subject, or the self-differentiating universal (all different ways of expressing the same thing) is the

formal definition of free agency. But this self-differentiation is in principle self-objectification. It cannot, therefore, be merely subjective and contingent; it is not merely natural or biological; hence, even the Greeks, so far as they held it to depend only on birth, or on education, or on subjective attitude (compare Stoicism), failed to grasp it in its genuine form. It is attainable only in and through social and political organization, so that freedom—even moral freedom—is in the last resort political action. This is the full and proper objectification of subjective Spirit; but, as we shall find, it is not, and should never be, merely one-sidedly objective. It is in its truth (or its concept) both objective and subjective at once.

The objectification of the subjective Concept issues in teleological or purposive activity, and cognition in the realized Idea objectifies itself as volition. So subjective Spirit, expressing its theoretical awareness of the world in practical activity, is objectified in society and its institutions—the order of the State. As Nature is the Idea externalized, and as natural forms and conditions sublated in organism are *aufgehoben* yet again in sentience and subjective mind, so all of this is once more *aufgehoben* in objective Spirit. So Hegel writes:

> Objective Spirit is the absolute Idea, but existing only implicitly. (*Enc.*, 483)

It is with this presupposition that he says of the state, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of History,[5] that it is the divine Idea as it exists on Earth, and that he calls social morality "a second Nature"[6]—it is the second externalization of the divine Idea. But as it *exists*, the state is only implicitly the Idea, because it "rests on a basis of finitude" and is externally manifest; for the absolute Idea is fully realized only as the subjectivized object, as absolute Spirit, in art, and religion and the pure thought of philosophical comprehension and insight. But none of these can exist or be elaborated in "external appearance" except in an organized social setting.[7]

In the major triad of Objective Spirit, the general rule mentioned earlier, which so far has always been observed, seems to have been reversed. Whether inadvertently or deliberately, Hegel has put the subjective aspect of social regulation into the second main division and has begun with the objective. It is clear that abstract legal right, taken in its positive guise (what the jurists call positive law), and the morality of conscience (*Moralität*) are opposite but mutually complementary and necessary aspects of social order; but even if one were to consider the former as the immediate form of regulation and the latter as the mediate or reflective (as indeed they are), it would be difficult to argue that conscience is the objective embodiment of the moral law, as opposed to a more subjective legal structure of right. The reverse is obviously the case.

When we come to the union of these two aspects in *Sittlichkeit*, however, objectivity is much more evident in the second subdivision, bourgeois (civic) society, which is definitely the phase of external action and division of function, in contrast to the communal and relative internality of the first, the family. And it is in bourgeois society that the first moment of the overall division—the moment of abstract law, of property rights, contract, tort, and crime—is more evidently sublated. But I do not wish to concern myself here with the details of the dialectical structure so much as with certain general features of Hegel's theory determining the nature of political action.

Freedom is activity wholly self-determined and this has been identified with self-consciousness, as the self-specifying universal. It is the true infinity and its appropriate logical category is *Fürsichsein*. For Hegel, political activity, constituting society and the State (for these *exist* only in actual practice) is the actualization of freedom. The self-specifying (or concrete) universal, however, is organized system, in which the principle of order, or wholeness, determines every detail, both what it is and how it is related to every other; and this principle governs all processes of development and interaction among its parts or moments. It is this internality of relations and the permeation of the whole by the universal principle that is signified by the term *Fürsichsein*, and it is what Hegel identifies with ideality. In so doing he is entirely correct, for only in the self-knowledge of a conscious subject is it properly realized. In the externality (*Nebeneinandersein*) of spatio-temporal appearances it is only *an sich* (implicit). They are governed by it in principle, but express and represent it only *in posse*. But it is only to the extent that they do evince forms of order and wholeness that they actualize freedom.

In terms of human action, freedom is not merely dependent upon, but is synonymous with rational thought. "*Wer das Denken verwirft und von Freiheit spricht, weiß nicht was er redet.*"[8] We have already seen that reason imposes order and regulation upon impulse and desire in the pursuit of happiness, and that this again implies accommodation between the interests of self and others. In short, freedom and social order coincide; social anarchy and uncontrolled caprice are destructive of freedom, they characterize the Hobbesian State of Nature, in which human beings are impotent and life is "nasty, brutish and short." It is the negation of freedom.

The notion that freedom is to be found by the individual in isolation, or in exemption from government interference, is obtuse and fallacious, Thoreau notwithstanding. For the isolated individual is helpless and incapable. In infancy he or she cannot survive without tendance, and in adulthood could effect little if deprived of the goods and services provided by society. The belief that the benefits of these can be enjoyed (or that they can even at all be provided) without regulation is mere self-deception, which the slightest critical reflection will dispel.

Organized civil society is thus the realization of freedom, and that, without government, is impossible. It follows that political action is the objective reality of liberty (the subjective or personal pursuit of happiness). This is true in principle as well as in fact, but short of the absolute ideal it is a matter of degree. Therefore, in practice, liberty is not always, if ever, fully realized. Here, however, we are dealing with the essential principles of social organization. We shall attend presently to its practical failures.

The point to be made is that social organization culminates in the constitution of the State, which unifies a nation and gives expression to the national spirit. The institutions of government comprise the sphere of political action par excellence, but they cannot be treated in isolation from the other aspects and institutions of society over which they preside, which are represented in them, and the realization of whose purposes they ensure.

The institutions of government, while they epitomize the whole (and, in fact, for that very reason), may not be divorced from civil society and the family, which are the complementary institutions, as well as aspects and consecutive developmental stages, of civilized life. The family embodies the natural ties and feelings of kinship and close-knit community, but its wants and the means of its livelihood can be supplied only in wider relationships, in a society of persons performing different and interdependent functions in production, industry, distribution, and exchange. This is the economic aspect of society (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), which is more individualistic and contains looser associations. The higgling of the market and the "cash nexus" in large measure determine its relationships. While the family bonds are love and consanguinity, the ties in civil society are rights, contracts, services, and the interplay of trades and professions. It requires its own peculiar forms of order and regulation, incorporations, administration of law, and policing. But these activities, which are primarily self-seeking, pursuing individual or specialized corporate interests, can be concerted and unified in the common interest (without which they tend to conflict and to frustrate one another) only by a universal governing authority with legislative and executive powers. Such authority is embodied in the constitution of the State, which must provide for the representation of estates (*Stände*) and of the popular interest, so as to express a general, or common, will aimed at a common interest. And this interest is primarily the universal interest in orderly and harmonious government, which makes possible the unhampered pursuit of desired ends.

The popular will cannot effectively govern unless it is organized. Disorganized, the people are a mere mob, whose activity is so far from government that it results in no less than the breakdown of law and order. Its organized expression, on the other hand, is effected in the constitution of a State which is the objectification of the popular will. As organized action

the State is, therefore, the Concept actualized in political form. It is just because the essence of civilized life is social order; and because that culminates in the State which unifies a diverse society into an ordered whole, that the State "is the Idea as it exists on Earth."

The ultimate unity of political authority is personified in the Head of State—in Hegel's eyes, the constitutional monarch. For the state is a corporate person and its acts can be finalized only by the personal authorization of the royal (or, if one prefers, the presidential) seal. This is the ultimate political act; and while it is a royal or presidential act, it is also an Act of Parliament, and by that same token it is an act of the whole people socially and politically organized. Organization is the unification of differences, the welding of many into one, the Head of State personates and embodies the aspect of unity; the legislature represents the elements of diversity, and together they constitute the political whole.

All political action is thus action on behalf, and on the authority, of this public organization, or whole: *die Verfassung*, the constitution of government, expressing and seeking to realize the common ends of a common will and in a common interest. It is the General Will envisaged by Rousseau; not merely the will of the individual as it is exercised in the bourgeois society, but that will as modified and corrected, regulated and constrained, by the conditions necessary to the welfare and harmony of the whole organized society, without which no individual will could attain its proper end, or shape itself, as Hegel would say, according to its concept. It is, therefore, the real will of the individual, what he or she would will (and does will) if thinking rationally. It is that rationally self-determined will which is the essence of freedom. Thus the General Will and the particular wills must ultimately coincide in the realization of freedom, through their common objectification in the institutions of government.

THEORY AND PRACTICE; CRITICISM AND VINDICATION

The "realistic" and cynical reaction to all this is that it is romantic idealistic nonsense descriptive of some cloud-cuckoo land remote from political reality. Everybody must confess, and Hegel would have been the first to admit, that actual states do not in full measure actualize the conditions of freedom. Were we not told at the outset that Objective Spirit is the absolute Idea only *an sich*, so far as it is in the realm of the finite? The mark of finitude is defect, and incident upon defect is evil. Finitude characterizes every incomplete phase of self-differentiation of the Idea, and deficiency and inadequacy signify immaturity or corruption, or both. Anything short of the absolute whole will be to some extent faulty. And that there should be phases short of the whole is inevitable, for without them the whole would

be a mere empty abstraction, without definite content. It would not be differentiated, and the differences are as necessary to it as is its unity, for they are precisely what it unifies. The reality of evil is, therefore, unavoidable. Moreover, we have seen that the aspect of difference is that of objectification, and the state is freedom objectified.

The inner aspect of political action is morality—the personal self-regulation of conduct. And while that is admittedly the pursuit of good and the expression of the rational will, nobody pretends that necessarily and of itself it excludes vice or obviates wickedness. Its categorical imperative is directed precisely against temptation and weakness, and it fails just to the extent that the will it animates is finite and merely passionate or instinctive. So too its objectification in the institutions of social and political order is subject to corruption, and the degree of its finitude is the measure of its failure.

In this objectification, therefore, we are bound to find flaws. Actual historical states will realize human freedom only in some degree, according to the historical circumstances, the stage of civilized development reached, or the exigencies of the historical period. Further the political process, political activity within the society, never, in the very nature of the case, runs smoothly. If it did there would be no need for the enforcement of law. Nor is it always (if ever) wholly successful in generating a truly general will, or in transmitting faithfully, or transforming completely, selfish aims into common interests. Accordingly, the state will always be only an imperfect actualization of freedom.

Even so, all forms and degrees of failure are possible only as defects and incidents of a structure or organized activity that precisely is, and is designed to be, the realization of the free, rational will. We cannot speak of political freedom except in the context of ordered, civilized living; and it is only to the extent that rationally ordered civilized life breaks down, is corrupted or misguided, that oppression occurs and liberty is lost. If the state were not in fact the objective institutional form of free activity, maladministration could never thwart its proper purposes. But misgovernment is still government, and its correction is good government, not anarchy. For without social order there is no possibility of freedom, and Thoreau's ideal is a fallacious, abstract, and self-contradictory fantasy. No human being can survive in complete isolation (even Robinson Crusoe depended on what he could salvage from the wreck, what society had provided); and no group of human beings can successfully attain their desired ends without cooperation, which, as the society grows and activities become more complex, must be organized if it is to be effective. The failure of the state to ensure the freedom of its citizens, when it occurs, is but *corruptio optimi*, and that alone is the source and origin of misgovernment and oppression.

Criticism may further be offered on the lines that Hegel's account of the State, while it might be more or less applicable to Western democracies, cannot account for dictatorships either of the right or of the left. This would be a strange cavil in an age when Hegel has been accused of fathering both Marxist Communism and Nazi authoritarianism. But such strictures are so loosely grounded in the text as almost to be beneath the need for refutation. One could argue, as above, that regimes like the former Soviet or Fascist dictatorships were modifications of political organization conditioned by the contingent circumstances of history, contingencies for which Hegel's theory makes room. Or one might respond with an *argumentum ad hominem*, charging that the Russian Union of Soviet Republics as little conformed to Marxist doctrine (for example, that of the withering away of the State) as it did to Hegelian. But such answers would be superficial. If we penetrate a little below the surface, we find a better defense.

Ever since the First World War there have been those who have accused Hegel of fathering "Prussianism"[9] and, since the Second World War, of being the originator of National Socialism,[10] in spite of strong arguments to the contrary by such writers as Bernard Bosanquet, John Muirhead, and Sir Malcom Knox.[11] He has also been accused of servility, during his Rectorship of the University in Berlin, to the Prussian authorities. As long ago as 1940 Knox, in an admirable article in *Philosophy*, marshaled a convincing body of evidence, both historical and textual, to demonstrate the contrary. Nothing later would be required to provide this than the text of the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, published in 1821, which shows plainly that Hegel argued consistently for the rights of the individual and against what we now call totalitarianism, that he favored Monarchy only in its constitutional and limited form, and that he did not aggrandize war for its own sake (see Chapter 13). More recently new editions of his *Lectures on Natural Law and Political Science*,[12] from the notes taken by his students, give even clearer evidence.

The editors of these editions, in their scholarly Introductions, each address this issue, and all come to the same conclusion about Hegel's liberal, rather than conservative, views. Otto Pöggeler outlines the historical background of Hegel's intellectual development, and, in effect, he corroborates what Knox had demonstrated, that as his theoretical ideas advanced Hegel's political attitudes never materially changed, beginning, as they did, with his youthful enthusiasm for the French Revolution, an enthusiasm which, although it became modified by his revulsion against the Terror, never left him. In later life he continued unremittingly to celebrate the anniversary of the Revolution with his students. Nor did his admiration for the unity and social solidarity of ancient Greek political life, and their sense of freedom and independence, ever materially change. It matured as a deep conviction

that, in the modern world, individual freedom had to be combined with the Greek ideal, and that (as Dieter Henrich cogently demonstrates) was possible only through the institutional organization of social activity.

Many of Hegel's detractors have aimed their criticisms at the so-called *Doppelsatz* stated in the Preface of the *Grundlinien* and usually translated: "What is real is rational and what is rational is real." This is said to legitimate the status quo, which at the time was the Prussian autocracy. He has been attacked, also, for his advocacy of Monarchy and for his apparent eulogy of the benefits of war. His quotation of Schiller's dictum, "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,*" is castigated as equivalent to declaring that might is right. We shall return to some of these criticisms in the next chapter, but here we may note that Knox has disposed convincingly of the last.

Without any new evidence it should be apparent to any scholar conversant with the essential dynamic and progressive nature of the Hegelian dialectic that he could not have intended to justify any status quo by the *Doppelsatz*; and Henrich draws attention to the fact that in the 1819/20 lectures it appears as: "*Was vernünftig ist, wird wirklich, und das Wirkliche wird vernünftig.*" This confirms what I have argued above (in Chapter 1), that Hegel's meaning is that the real is what is becoming rational and that the rational (the truth) is actual and must exist. Henrich maintains (with some justice) that the double formula in the Lectures has a historical-theoretical sense, stressing the aspect of development, while the formulation in the Preface of the *Grundlinien* seeks to emphasize the difference between Hegel's approach to the state and the otherworldliness of Plato. Henrich cites in corroboration Heine's report that Hegel, in reply to an enquiry as to the meaning of the dictum, explained that "*Alles was vernünftig ist, muß sein.*"[13] Hegel's conception, however, is not empirical-historical, much less is it otherworldly. He seeks to demonstrate the actualization in the institutional forms of society of the rational character of human action. Karl-Heinz Ilting, on the other hand, continues to regard the double-formula as an "accommodation to authority," veiled in the phraseology of Hegel's earlier liberalism, after his hopes that Prussia would adopt a liberal constitution had been disappointed. There seems little reason to make any such assumption, however, especially if one credits Heine's report; for the gloss which that gives on the dictum is that the necessary course of history is the self-realization of reason.

To all these critics the essential answer is that what Hegel is doing in the *Rechtsphilosophie* is not recommending any particular political ideology, but rather analyzing and expounding the principles on which all human political life is founded. The fundamental moments, phases, and aspects of social order reappear in all historical political structures. In the Soviet Union, as well as in all military and Fascist dictatorships, the family has persisted as

the natural basis of society. Without it, in fact, and apart from some form of family association, the nation (indeed, the human race as such) would not survive. In these regimes, again, as in any civilized society, there is an economic order based on wants, services, the division of labor, and the specialization of functions. Even if this order is centrally planned (as in socialist systems), it still requires some form of incorporation, whether as cooperatives, communal farms, or (as in fascist regimes) corporations and syndicates; and it requires administrative regulation. Further, all of this is directed by a supreme governmental structure constituted formally—a Chamber of Corporations, a Supreme Soviet, an executive council, however appointed or elected—and is presided over, whether only ceremonially or in executive efficacy, by a titular Head of State.

If these political institutions operate so as, in greater or lesser degree, to restrict and repress legitimate human rights, it is nevertheless true that no dictatorship can be so absolute and oppressive as to nullify human freedom altogether. Political power, however tyrannous, is never that of one person, or even of a few, and is never sheerly physical force. Socrates reminded Thrasymachus that "the strongest" is not the pancratiast, and that even among thieves there must be some trust and honesty.[14] And Hobbes wrote:

> Nature hath made men so equal in faculties of body and mind; (that) . . . when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit. . . . For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself. (*Leviathan*, Chap. 13)

and Rousseau declared that

> the strongest is never strong enough to remain always the master unless he can transform force into right and obedience into duty. (*The Social Contract*, Chap. III)

In the last resort political power is always bestowed upon the agencies of government by the people themselves, who are its subjects, for unless the majority of the populace acquiesces, and unless some considerable number of them approve of the way in which power is exercised, the authority of the governing body will not be recognized, and it will be deprived of its weapons, which are provided and wielded only by its own subjects; thus its power will melt away, "thaw and resolve itself into a dew," like snow under the midsummer sun.

It is always true, then, as Hegel contends, that political action is the objectification of freedom. For it is the organization of concerted social

activity to encompass those ends, without which no freedom at all, not even its rudiments, could be actualized. Hegel was not merely describing the form of political order that he thought most effective in nineteenth-century Europe; nor was he trying to devise a contemporary form of Utopia. He was distilling out the presuppositions and the underlying principles of civilized living, as were Plato and Aristotle, to whose influence Hegel owes much. Aristotle also distinguishes the (*aufgehobene*) heritage of the polis of its earlier developmental stages: the family, the village community, and the state, which "comes into existence for the sake of mere life, [and] remains in existence for the sake of the good life." Hegel translates this truth into modern terms and clothes it in modern dress. But neither he nor Aristotle is writing history or anthropology. Both are striving to develop a philosophical analysis of political action.

Notes

1. Cf. *Enc.*, 459.
2. Cf. *Enc.*, 413.
3. Cf. ibid., 140 *Zusatz*.
4. Cf. id., 475.
5. Cf. H. B. Nisbet's translation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 95.
6. Cf. *Rechtsphilosophie*, 4, and *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Introduction.
7. Cf. ibid.
8. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, 2, Kap. 2,C,c. ". . . he who casts thought aside and speaks of freedom knows not what he is talking of" (trans. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simpson).
9. Cf. F. Carritt, *Morals and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 107, and *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1935–36, p. 230.
10. Cf. Sydney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (London, 1936), p. 19; Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938), pp. 58 and 171; E. A. Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1938), pp. 38–39; Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1945, 1966).
11. Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* (London: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 230ff.; J. H. Muirhead, *German Philosophy and the War* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1915); T. M. Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," *Philosophy*, Vol. XV (1940), pp. 51–63.
12. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft: Heidelberg, 1917/18, mit Nachtragen aus der Vorlesung 1818/19, Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannemann* (Herausgegeben von C. Becker, W. Bonsiepen, A. Gethmann-Siefert, F. Hogemann, W. Jaeschke, Ch. Jamme, H.-Ch. Lucas, K. R. Meist, H. Schneider, mit einer Enleitung von O. Pöggeler, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983); G. W. F. Hegel, *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannemann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19)*, (Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und erlautert von Karl-Heinz Ilting, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1983);

G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts. Die Vorlesungen von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift* (Herausgegeben von Dieter Henrich, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983.

13. Cf. *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen* (Hamburg: G. Nicolin, 1970), Dokument 363, cited by Henrich, op. cit., p. 16.
14. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 338c and 351c.

13
Sovereignty, International Relations, and War

SOVEREIGNTY

"*L'état c'est moi*" declared Louis XIV, and on his canon he had inscribed the legend: "*Ultima ratio regum.*" Hegel appears to agree, at any rate prima facie, and to endorse both doctrines. For he writes:

> Sovereignty . . . *exists* only as subjectivity certain of itself, as the abstract (and to that extent groundless) self-determination of will in which the finality of decision lies. It is this, the individual aspect of the state as such, in which alone it is *one*. Subjectivity, however, exists in its true form only as subject, personality only as person. . . . This absolute decisive moment of the whole is, therefore, not just individuality in general, but an individual, the Monarch.[1]

Further, Hegel maintains that because the relations between states have as their fundamental principle their respective sovereignties, "they are to that extent opposed to one another in the State of Nature,"[2] and "the conflict of states, for that reason, so far as their particular wills find no agreement, can only be settled by war."

But quoting passages in isolation from their contexts is as unscholarly as it is unfruitful, and can result only in misunderstanding and misinterpretation. The bad habit of so doing is outstandingly exemplified by Sir Karl Popper's criticism in *The Open Society and its Enemies*.

In the first place, any careful reader will be aware that Hegel, despite what is quoted above, does not identify sovereignty with the monarch. Certainly, the monarch personifies the State and embodies its individuality; for Hegel protests that the State is no merely legal or fictitious person, but is a genuine individual, which becomes personal in the monarch. To that extent *l'État c'est le Roi*. But the king (or queen) is not the government, as such; he (or she) is but one moment in the total unity, while, as ever in the sphere of

the Concept (to which the State corresponds in the dialectic of *Sittlichkeit*) each moment is at the same time the whole. The government or constitution of the State, however, is a system of functions, legislative, executive, and judicial, sublating all the functions and institutions of *die bürgerliche Gesellschaft* and the family, and constituting a whole, the members of which are each and all as integral to it as are the cells and limbs of a living body to the mature organism.[3] Monarchy is thus constitutional monarchy, and is neither despotic nor feudal.[4] To that extent, Louis XIV's assertion is un-Hegelian. He represents, perhaps, the historical transition from the feudal to the modern form of the state, the centralization of power, prior to its liberalization.

How far is Hegel justified in this assertion of the personal character of the sovereign and of the embodiment of its will in the monarch? Those who allege that he is advocating a personal despotism, or tyranny, are, as I shall presently show, profoundly mistaken. Strictly, as has already been maintained, the *Rechtsphilosophie* is not the advocacy of any political form so much as the analysis of political forms in general, or more properly of political order as such. If Lord Bryce's description of Hobbes's *Leviathan* as a gigantic political pamphlet[5] is hardly justified, a similar imputation to Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* is even less so. When Hegel insists that the individuality of the State is, and must be, embodied in a person, he is doing nothing more than pointing to the undoubted fact that the representative of the sovereign will is always a particular individual, whom we today would identify as the Head of State, be it Queen Elizabeth, President Bush, or Chairman Mao. But, for Hegel, this is not just an empirical fact (and so merely contingent); it is in principle necessary to the actualization of a politically sovereign will. Every sovereign act must, to be sovereign, bear the seal and signature of the Head of State.

The conception of sovereignty is to be understood in relation to the organic unity of the society as a whole, which essentially *is* the State and its sovereignty. The will of the State, what Rousseau would have identified as the General Will, is not the individual will of any particular magistrate, nor that of any citizen, or body of citizens, nor that of any particular institution or function of government, regarded as independent, but is the expression of the community in which any or all of these are but moments and in which they are all sublated.

A self-differentiating unity, specifying itself in mutually interdependent moments is, for Hegel, as we have seen, a being-for-self, or an ideal unity. This unity is immanent in each and all of the moments, but is actual only as a whole. We already know that the whole is nothing other than the united parts, and their unity is rightly referred to by Hegel as their ideality (it is evident only to a cognizing mind). By that Hegel is far from meaning that

the unity is not real. On the contrary, it is the truth and actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of the moments and of the prior dialectical phases which are sublated in it. Consequently, Hegel says that sovereignty is "in the first instance only the general thought of this ideality."[6] It operates in actual fact in (at least) three forms:

1. First through the quasi-independent pursuit of individual (or family) concerns in civil society. These concerns, although prima facie they appear separate and independent, at times even conflicting, are in principle facets of a common interest, so far as they are all interests in, and subject to, the *organization* of activities that constitute the economic and social order. It follows that they all contribute to that order not only, as Hegel puts it, "by way of the unconscious *necessity* of the matter, in accordance with which their self-seeking is transformed into a contribution to reciprocal support of the whole" (*Grundlinien*, 278); but also through their undisputed and presumed interest in the general order that their activity upholds. This could be demonstrated and exemplified in detail, but for our present purpose one or two examples may suffice:

The farmer, the tradesman, the craftsman, and the contractor, each following his own vocation and pursuing his own interest in apparent independence of one another, is nevertheless providing goods and services to all the others and is contributing to the supply of common needs. The litigants in a civil suit, each maintaining his or her own interest against the other, are, by taking their case to court, serving the common interest in the legal defense of rights and the orderly settlement of disputes. The common benefit is not consciously or deliberately sought by any of these parties individually, but it is served in consequence of the prevailing system of social order, and necessarily so inasmuch as individual ends are deliberately sought according to customary practice and within the recognized framework of social relations.

2. The second way in which the ideality of sovereignty manifests itself is closely related to the first and is coupled with it in Hegel's exposition. It is the direct control of private professional and business activities by government regulation in those respects required by the public welfare. The common interest, here again, impinges upon and adjusts individual conduct to conform to the requirements of general unity of purpose.

3. Thirdly, in contrast with the relative individualism of the two preceding manifestations, in times of emergency and crisis, when the safety and independence of the whole community is in peril, personal pursuits are consciously subordinated to national requirements, private interests are sacrificed to common needs, and the diverse pursuits of all citizens are unified in the service of the defense of the realm. Thus, Hegel assures us, the ideality of sovereignty comes to its own proper actuality.

Karl Marx accused Hegel of idealizing sovereignty and then "in a mystical way" infusing it into the person of the monarch. Had he started with real subjects as the basis of the State, Marx avers, he would not have found this mystification necessary.[7] But such criticism is rooted in misunderstanding of Hegel's use of the term "ideality" and the exegesis given above is sufficient to lay bare Marx's profound misconception. For, as we have seen, Hegel is not (as both Marx and Popper[8] imagine) identifying sovereignty with the monarch absolutely, nor is he "idealizing" it in any sense that involves denying its substantial actualization whether in the persons of citizens or magistrates, or in the functions of government and the Head of State.

Still more gross is the distortion of Hegel's meaning which represents his theory as approving despotism and providing theoretical grounds for totalitarianism. The former he explicitly repudiates, and he does so in a passage that reveals beyond doubt his conception of the State as a system of rights and liberties:

> Thus oriental despotism may, on account of its similarity in that the will of one individual stands at the head of the State, be included under the vague name of monarchy, as also feudal monarchy, to which even the favoured name of "constitutional monarchy" cannot be refused. The true difference of these forms from genuine monarchy rests on the content of validated principles of right which the power of the State actualizes and guarantees. These principles are those developed earlier in the spheres of freedom and property and, over and above that, of personal freedom, the civil society, its industry and communities, and the regulated efficiency of official functions dependent on the laws.[9]

What Hegel is propounding is the theory of the rule of law under constitutional monarchy which, as he himself says, despotism equally with the anarchy of mob rule abolishes and destroys:

> Because the sovereignty is the ideality of all particular authority, the misunderstanding easily arises and is very common, of taking it for mere might and sheer arbitrary will, giving sovereignty the same meaning as despotism. But despotism means any state of lawlessness, where the particular will as such, be it of a monarch or of a people (Ochlocracy) counts as law, or rather replaces law, while on the contrary it is precisely in legal, constitutional systems that sovereignty is the ideality of the particular spheres and functions. . . .[10] ("ideality" here clearly means ideal unity).

From these passages it is obvious that criticisms of popular government and of the "talk of 'sovereignty of the people'" that appear in the *Rechtsphilosophie* (279, 301, 308) and in the *Geistesphilosophie* (loc. cit., 544) are not

directed against constitutional democracy. In the context of these very criticisms Hegel makes it clear that his objection is to unorganized popular intrusion into the governmental process and not to the constitutional structures of democratic rule. It is the aggregate of people as *vulgus* and not the political unity of the people as *populus* that he excludes. In the *Encyclopaedia* (544) his criticism of the English system for giving private persons a predominant share in public affairs, whether merited or not, is immediately followed by the acknowledgment of the benefits of participation by private citizens in public transactions. Essentially "it is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an overt general will acting in orderly and express efficacy for the public concern."

The use here of the phrase *allgemeine Wille* is (I suspect deliberately) reminiscent of Rousseau, and it is precisely Rousseau's distinction between a General Will and a Will of All on which Hegel is anxious to insist. In his comment on Rousseau in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* he is quite explicit:

> The universal will is not to be looked on as compounded of definitively individual wills, so that these remain absolute; otherwise the saying would be correct: "Where the minority obey the majority, there is no freedom." The universal will must be the rational will, even if we are not conscious of the fact; the State is therefore not an association that is decreed by the arbitrary will of individuals.[11]

One cannot reasonably doubt, in the light of these statements, that Hegel's critique is not directed against the conception of sovereignty of the people as it is advocated by Rousseau, but only against loose and confused uses of the phrase that identify the people with a casual association, an aggregate or a mob, or that fail to distinguish such an aggregate from a genuine community.

Popper's typically wild and irresponsible allegation that Hegel voiced his criticism of popular sovereignty in order to please the Prussian King, to whom he was beholden for his academic position,[12] is stultified by the fact that the last installment of the posthumous essay on the English Reform Bill, despite its critical character, was suppressed by the Prussian censorship because it expressed approval of the genuinely democratic aspect of the advocated reforms and criticized the Bill for failing to attack the root cause of the former abuses.[13]

The supremacy of the sovereign power of the State, as the highest mundane authority in the nations's internal affairs, in legislating, administering, and adjudicating the law, is a patent fact of modern history. There can be no right of defiance or revolt, for right is what the law recognizes and protects. Unrecognized rights may be claimed, but they become legal rights only when legally enforced; and no right of rebellion can be claimed because

revolt is itself an abrogation of law and order, which, if it succeeds, becomes revolution, the dissolution of the State, and the substitution of a new political authority. That occurs and is justifiable when the General Will ceases to be realized by the existing government. For Hegel, if he ever considers its possibility, rebellion is just a rampant political disease, and is justifiable in a conquered province because directed against a power that is strictly illegitimate.[14] In form, such rebellion belongs more properly to the sphere of external affairs and comes under the concept of war. To that sphere we shall next turn our attention.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In external relations the State is sovereign, or it is not a State; and its sovereign status has to be recognized by other States. What is thus recognized is its independence and consequent freedom from subjection to any higher power or political authority. It acts sui juris and, as sovereign cannot be made subject to any law superior to its own. It follows that its relations with other States are limited in form either to agreement, or treaty, entered into by its own will and determined solely by its own interest, or, where agreement fails, enmity and war. It is here that ordnance becomes *ultima ratio regum*, and Louis XIV is vindicated. To say this is not to glorify or to romanticize war, it is simply to recognize what is inevitably the case as long as States are sovereign. For, as Hegel, in company with Hobbes and Spinoza, quite clearly saw, where no superior authority regulates, the State of Nature prevails.[15]

Treaties are observed, therefore, as they are entered into, only subject to the will and interest of the parties. Observance cannot be enforced, and the only sanction against breach is war. About all this Hegel was perfectly clear, and its truth is copiously illustrated in the facts of history.[16] For the sovereign State its own interests are paramount; hence there can be no community of sovereigns, because community implies a common interest which takes precedence over the particular interests of members. It is this common interest within the State that makes its sovereign authority supreme and is precisely what Hegel means by its ideality. If States were to become members of an international community, therefore, their sovereignty would be dissolved and some higher sovereignty would take its place. A community of sovereign States is thus a contradiction in terms.[17]

International Law is not and cannot be the law of a community because it lays down the proviso that its "subjects" can only be sovereign States (which, by definition, are subject to no superior authority). It is therefore not properly law in the political sense of that word. It is not positive law, for it cannot be imposed; it is not effective law because it cannot be

enforced. It rests simply on treaty and agreement, subject to the particular wills of the participants, so it cannot regulate agreements or ensure the observance of treaties. Its primary principle, *pacta sunt servanda*, as Hegel puts it, "goes no further than the ought to be"—it is an empty aspiration. The principle cannot be an article of law because the law is itself a treaty which can hardly be the source of its own obligatoriness. In consequence, the actual situation, as Hegel tells us, alternates between the maintenance of treaty relations and their abrogation.[18]

In actual historical fact treaties are as often broken as observed, if not more often, and no less frequently are they denounced or ignored, as the interests of one party or another dictate. Each party can interpret their provisions as it thinks fit, and there is no disinterested arbiter. The worthiest and most respected statesmen have pronounced that no obligation to keep a treaty can be extended beyond the national interest. Among them were W. E. Gladstone, Theodore Roosevelt, and even Woodrow Wilson, chief architect of the League of Nations Covenant, itself a treaty, ostensibly to end all violations. But that no treaty could serve such a purpose Hegel had been well aware.

Above States, he reminds us, there is no judge or Praetor, no power that can enforce a law or ensure the bond of contract. Enforcement upon a sovereign State is and can but be war; and when agreement fails the settlement of disputes can only be by force. It follows, therefore, as the night the day, that no league or confederation of States can secure peace, for every such association presupposes agreement, which itself depends on the particular sovereign wills and national interests. If that agreement fails, the alternative is war, to try forcibly to prevent which is to wage it.

The experience of the past century has borne this out, when the reasons for preventing war and the desirability of maintaining peace have been immeasurably greater than could have been conceived in Hegel's time. His analysis still holds good and the mutual conduct of nations conforms to it to this day.

Kant's vision of perpetual peace involved the establishment of a world confederation, which could not be effective unless it involved the transference of sovereignty from the nation-state to an international body. But Kant is obviously confused on this point, for, while he clearly understood that States as sovereign cannot combine into a super-State without contradiction, he contemplated a "federation (*Föderalism*) of free States," and he speaks of the federation as "a compact of the nations with each other," but one of a special kind, apparently more universal, seeking to put an end to all wars forever, not just to one. But if such a compact were more universal, Kant shows us no way in which it could be made more binding or enforceable. It is to be *called* a pacific federation (*Friedensbund*) but it will not aim, he

says, at acquiring any of the political powers of a State. It will only be concerned with the maintenance and guarantee of the freedom of States without subjecting them to promulgated laws or coercion.[19] If that were so, it could at best be a kind of confederation or league of nations, the futility of which for its avowed purpose we, in our day, know only too well.

Because Hegel refers to the "pacific federation" as a *Staatenbund*, Popper accuses him of misrepresenting Kant.[20] But the misrepresentation is Popper's, for Hegel labored under no misapprehension. That was precisely the kind of body that Kant had described; and Hegel saw that no such arbitrating authority could have more effect than would be allowed by the particular wills of the sovereigns, the prior agreement of whom it must presuppose, and that it would, therefore, "remain infected with contingency."

Hegel's insight was corroborated a century later when between the two world wars of the twentieth century the League of Nations not only failed in its final outcome, but never genuinely conducted itself as a law-enforcing authority and in no particular instance succeeded in converting international relations into anything other than power politics. The same has since been true of the United Nations which, as originally conceived, was to have been provided with "teeth" to remedy the impotence of the League. The teeth would not have been its own, but were to be provided voluntarily by its members and to remain under their control. Even that, however, was more than the sovereign nations could stomach, and the organization has remained toothless to this day. Even when all five permanent members of the Security Council unprecedentedly agreed to act against Iraq, the result was hardly describable as the maintenance of peace. These bald statements have been provided with supporting evidence and argument, not only by me,[21] but by more authoritative authors. Georg Schwartzenberger has shown that under the aegis of the League and the United Nations the relations between States have never been other than power politics in disguise. E. H. Carr develops essentially the same thesis, and a similar doctrine has been put forward by Bertrand de Jouvenel.[22]

WAR

That power politics is the inevitable character of the intercourse between States is not only shown by the historical record, it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The paramount concern of a sovereign State is to maintain its power, for without means of defense its independence is in perpetual jeopardy. Because its neighbors are obsessed with a like concern, because each of them acts in accordance only with its own will and interest, and further because no State can be trusted indefinitely to keep a treaty, each must regard potential rivals with constant suspicion and vigilance. As one

augments its power so must the others keep pace. That national interests, in such circumstances, inevitably come into conflict is not surprising, and the very existence of a powerful neighbor may be regarded as a threat. Hegel understood all this unerringly:

> A State through its subjects has widespread and many-sided interests and these may be readily and considerably injured; but it remains inherently indeterminable which of these injuries is to be regarded as a specific breach of a treaty or an injury to the honour and autonomy of the State. The reason for this is that the State may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns . . . and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. (*Grundlinien*, 334, Knox's translation)

Every State, in consequence, seeks to increase its power and to prevent its rivals from gaining an advantage. It becomes, with its rivals and potential enemies, involved in an uncontrollable arms race. All its policies, when carefully investigated will be found to rest upon and to subserve this fundamental interest in power. All its external activities are power maneuvers, in one form or another; and the peace, while it lasts, is always a precarious power balance. Today, our political leaders acknowledge this fact in their constant pronouncements on the need to maintain the world balance of power, or that of a particular region (like the Middle East), and their expressions of fear for the breakdown of peace should that balance be unduly disturbed.

A State lacking power has no effectual voice in negotiations with others. "In the world today," said Neville Chamberlain in 1939, "an unarmed nation has little chance of making its voice heard." And the methods of negotiation involve the persistent use of threats, whether veiled or open, usually described euphemistically as "pressure," and necessarily backed by the potential use of force, without which no pressure can be exerted. The result is a constant series of intermittent crises threatening the maintenance of peace, and the eventual outcome can hardly fail to be open warfare. In short, Clausewitz's dictum in reverse is largely true of international relations, for here politics is war carried on by other means. Today this is no less true than it was when either Hobbes or Hegel wrote, and both of them understood perfectly the inevitable implications of relationships between sovereign States.

To see things as they are, however, is not necessarily to approve of their being so, and to realize the inevitability of war in interstate relations is not the same as to advocate it. There is nothing in Hegel's doctrine that actually glorifies war and what he writes in its favor is consolation for an unavoidable evil. War, he says, is not to be regarded as an unmitigated evil, which is

far from welcoming it as a positive good. It has an ethical aspect, which even today few would wish to deny, especially those who in Britain, during the perilous months of 1940 and 1941, experienced precisely what Hegel, in this connection, perspicaciously describes. Rather than providing a theoretical justification of Hitler and the Nazis, it would be more just to suggest that Hegel expounds the essentials of political character that were exemplified at that time by Churchill and the indomitability of the British.

When the existence and independence of a nation is endangered, the loyalties and devotion of its citizens are most readily called forth, the sacrifice of private interests to the preservation of the realm is most ungrudging, and the solidarity of the people is most fully realized and most intensely felt. All industrial and professional functions are subordinated to the public need, and life itself is held expendable in the national cause. The ethical aspect that Hegel stresses is that of sacrifice and service. He never glorifies (as did Mussolini and Hitler) the destructive and disruptive aspects of aggression. Nor does he hold, with Oswald Spengler, that man is by nature a beast of prey, or attempt to condone the element of hate and ferocity that war encourages. He seeks only to insist upon the altruistic virtues and patriotic loyalty that it requires and excites.

That war also involves harsh and undesirable aspects is not denied. It is the negative aspect of the state's external life, the incidence upon it of the Other which must be overcome and somehow reconciled. But as, for Hegel, the State was the ultimate unity of a nation's organized life, the only sublation of this negativity he could contemplate was that provided by world history. Here alone could the ultimate resolution of conflict be achieved in the hegemony of a nation embodying the dialectical phase of development of *die Weltgeist* appropriate to the age. It is for this reason that he saw *die Weltgeschichte als das Weltgericht.*

In the early nineteenth century war was a very different phenomenon from what it has become in the twentieth. In the eighteenth century it had been little more than a dangerous but gentlemanly blood sport. With Napoleon it became more generally destructive and horrible, but not until our own time has it developed into a universal disaster. Hegel could still point to mitigating advantages, the stiffening of the national moral fiber, the regeneration of the national spirit, and the revitalization of cooperative solidarity. Today even these by-products are liable to be obliterated by the overwhelming holocaust that war is liable to bring.

Hegel knew nothing of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles; and short of these, could he have foreseen high explosives, aerial bombardment, fragmentation bombs, napalm, chemical and bacteriological warfare, he might well have concluded, as we should, that the patriotic virtues could be no countervailing advantages. So far as they encourage

bellicosity, they might even themselves become part of the general menace. Could Hegel have foreseen the character of nuclear war as envisaged today by such prognosticators as Herman Kahn and Tom Stonier, he would have seen that the very enormity of the terror of modern warfare undermines and corrodes away these very virtues—as, for instance, when citizens preparing to protect themselves against nuclear fallout contemplate shooting compatriots who seek to share their forlorn and dubious shelter.[23]

Hegel's general theory of international politics is sound and his insights are penetrating. Contemporary events still exemplify the principles he set out. His doctrine is not, therefore, in this respect obsolete. But the development of nuclear and other modern weapons has rendered obsolete the whole structure of politics, national and international, a structure which, nevertheless, we and our national leaders continue to preserve and implement. What is obsolete is not the theory, for sovereignty is still sought by national groups and still recognized in international affairs, and power politics are still the current practice. What has become a self-contradiction is the idea of nuclear war, even as a threat, a putative deterrent, or a means of self-defense, and its use, likewise for that reason, as an instrument of policy.

Until very recently it was evident that it was so used from the feverish competition among the great powers to develop vaster and vaster nuclear arsenals, with more powerful and more devastating warheads, along with more widespread and efficient systems of delivery. "When we deter the Soviets," wrote Herman Kahn,

> by the threat that if they provoke us in a limited war, subsequent reprisals may blow up into an all-out thermonuclear war, we are deliberately or inadvertently using the threat, and therefore the possibility, of nuclear war. When we tell our allies that our Strategic Air Command protects them from Soviet aggression, we are in a sense *using* nuclear war.[24]

Yet it is generally admitted that the use of these weapons would destroy both attacker and defender, both potential victor and potential vanquished. *Ultima ratio regum* has become *ultima exitium nationum*.

Nevertheless national sovereign States remain in the State of Nature and the practice of power politics with its debilitation of International Law continues. The recent changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have, at any rate for the present, ended the cold war and reduced the nuclear threat, although they have by no means removed it altogether. Nobody knows how long it may be before fresh changes and crises produce new dictatorships. There is still no guarantee against new threats and new wars (as we have just witnessed in the Gulf).

If contemporary mankind could pay closer attention to Hegel's teaching a salutary lesson might still be learned, the lesson that national sovereignty is

the greatest of all obstacles to world peace; and that might send us back to Kant for salvation and for the solution of international problems. A pacific federation is indeed what is required, but one that will not shrink from acquiring sovereign power and authority. The difficulties in the path of such a project may be formidable and the obstacles to its establishment enormous—not the least is the widespread lack of belief in such an institution and of clear recognition of the nature of our present situation. But these difficulties cannot match the enormity of the alternative, whether it lies in the nuclear menace or the equally terminal threats from global warming, the loss of the ozone layer, and the general disruption of the Earth's ecology. If that alternative could be somehow sufficiently impressed upon the minds of the peoples of the world, perhaps they would make a more determined effort to overcome the obstacles to world government. This is not the place to discuss its necessity and its advantages, or to set out the cogent reasons in its favor. I have attempted to do that elsewhere.[25] But if a sufficient number of people could be convinced of its necessity and if it could be brought about, *die Weltgeschichte* might indeed produce *ein Weltgericht* with some hope of genuine adjudication and of the maintenance of human rights. Morality would no longer be irrelevant to world historical figures operating in an anarchical State of Nature, where, Hegel tells us, no *Sittlichkeit* prevails, and the rationality of mankind—or, perhaps, nothing more than the cunning of reason, working through human fear and the instinct of self-preservation—might give new significance to the pronouncement that the real is the rational and the rational real.

Notes

1. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 279.
2. Id., 333.
3. Id., 278.
4. Cf. ibid.: "In former times of feudal monarchy, the State was certainly sovereign in external affairs, but internally neither the monarch nor the State was sovereign." Cf. also *Enc.*, 544.
5. *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), Vol. II, p. 86.
6. *Grundlinien*, 279; words omitted from the opening quotation above.
7. Cf. *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated by Annette John and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 23.
8. Cf. *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1949), Vol. II, p. 54.
9. *Enc.*, 544.
10. *Grundlinien*, 278.
11. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simpson's translation (London 1896. Reprinted 1968), Vol. III, p. 402.
12. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 54.

13. Cf. Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chap. 2.
14. Cf., *Grundlinien*, note to 281.
15. Cf., T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. 13; Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus*, Ch. III, 13; Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie*, 333.
16. Cf. my *Survival of Political Man* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1950), Chaps. III and IV; *Annihilation and Utopia* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1966) Chaps. V and VI.
17. Cf. Id.
18. *Grundlinien*, 333.
19. Cf. Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, Section II, Art. 2.
20. Popper quotes Hegel in Knox's translation which advisedly uses the phrase "League of Nations," and Popper was writing at a time when the League of Nations set up after the First World War had signally failed to prevent World War II.
21. *The Survival of Political Man*, Chap. V; *Annihilation and Utopia*, Chap. X.
22. Cf. G. Schwartzenberger, *Power Politics* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1951) 2d ed.; E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1946); B. de Jouvenel, *On Power* (Geneva, 1945; Boston, 1962).
23. "In Las Vegas, J. Carlton Adair, the head of the local civil defence agency, announced that a militia of 5000 volunteers would be necessary to protect residents in the event of thermonuclear war against an invasion, not by a foreign enemy, but by refugees from Southern California, who, he said, would come into Nevada like a swarm of locusts. In Hartford, Connecticut, at a private meeting of citizens to consider civil defence, one man maintained that firearms were standard equipment for shelters as a means of repulsing the inroads of people maddened by the effects of wounds or radiation. One's own family, so it was argued, must be protected because there would be only sufficient food and water for them. Neighbours caught in the open by warning of attack, who might rush to friends for shelter must, therefore, be shot down." *Annihilation and Utopia*, pp. 121f.
24. *Thinking about the Unthinkable* (London and Princeton, 1962), p. 101.
25. In the works cited above. Cf. especially *Annihilation and Utopia*, Pts. II and III. Also, *One World or None* (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1993).

14
Absolute Spirit in History

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Not until comparatively modern times has the idea of progress, which is often taken for granted as an unquestionable fact, been current. It was not entertained by the ancient Greeks, who looked back to a golden age in the past rather than to continuous advance towards a future millenium. The other-worldliness of the Middle Ages contemplated no progressive achievement on Earth, not really even towards the Kingdom of God, for that was conceived as belonging to a future life. Christian thought, although it continued the Jewish belief that history was a succession of divine acts, was in essence apocalyptic, envisaging a catastrophic end to the world rather than continuous progress.

The scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, however, ushered in a period of undeniable and spectacular progress in scientific knowledge, which, in the nineteenth century, led to technical developments that have continued at an increasing pace up to our own times. These were, until recently, regarded without question as the sure mark of progress, but their effects at the present time on the ecology of the Earth, and some of their products (like nuclear bombs) have, in the late twentieth century, raised doubts about the very conception of progress, especially as identified with scientific and technological advance.

If the subject of progress is taken to be civilization, it should consist in more acute moral awareness, increasing political order and harmony, and the improvement of social conditions. But recent history has been a tale of quite the opposite tenor. With few exceptions moral standards seem to have declined, or at best become more dubious and confused, cruelty and torture have been widespread, political conflict and chaos in many countries has prevailed, social injustice has nowhere been overcome, and international tensions, crises, and the most ominous threats of devastating war have been frequent and recurrent; nor have domestic and racial conflicts decreased the world over. What sort of progress, one may ask, do facts such as these underwrite?

But, if progress is not the burden of the song in world history, how is

history, as such, to be viewed? Is it to be regarded as an aimless impromptu, without form or direction? Or can some sort of order and pattern be discerned in it? The religious, at least the Christian, conception of history is of a teleological process directed towards the fulfillment of God's purpose; but as far as that is held to be inscrutable, it is a process of which, by human minds, the end and direction is strictly unknowable in more specific terms. In that case there can be no historical evidence of the nature and end of history and its course must seem, at least to us, to be wholly unintelligible.

No philosopher of history, however, has taken this view. They all seem to see history as having some kind of order or pattern, either as progressive towards some kind of goal, or cyclical, repeating itself after protracted periods. Such conceptions have led philosophers to speak of "the laws of history" as if it could be treated as the subject matter of a special science, and even those who reject any form of historical determinism, do so in the interest of human freedom and purpose, and so (openly or tacitly) presuppose an ultimate end of historical action.

The optimism of the nineteenth century was fired, not only by the success of the natural sciences, but also by the political revolutions in America and Europe, which proclaimed a gospel of political liberty, earlier preached (as a product of the Reformation) by the Puritans and Parliamentarians in England and the philosophers of the Enlightenment. This led on to the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century, between which and the rationalism of the eighteenth, Hegel sought to mediate. The latter was the rationalism of what he called the understanding, the empirical approach of individualistic liberalism, associated with the scientific outlook. The former appealed more directly to feeling and sentiment, to a pietistic morality and a vision of progress towards a sublime utopian consummation:

> . . . one far-off divine event
> To which the whole creation moves.

It can hardly be doubted that the form given by Hegel to his dialectic, so far as it entered into historical thinking, would have strengthened the tendency to believe in progress, but it was far more the theory of evolution that emerged a quarter of a century after Hegel's death that seemed to give it firmer foundation.

THE END OF HISTORY

The dialectic, for Hegel, is the self-unfolding of the concrete totality of self-conscious Spirit, the self-elaboration of system, which can be brought to fruition only in the experience of a self-conscious subject. As it emerges from organic Nature, Spirit takes the form of human personality, which

develops necessarily and essentially in a social setting. The dialectic of Spirit thus becomes objective in political institutions culminating in the State, and disclosing itself, consequently, in the course of history. History as the record of human action, which, as human, is essentially rational, will pursue a dialectical course, for the dialectic is the form, as well as the self-generating content, of rational thinking.

It is generally accepted by modern Hegelians as at least plausible that Spirit develops and actualizes itself in and through the dialectic of consciousness presented by Hegel in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Again, it is generally understood that the dialectic of the Concept in the Logic brings itself to fruition in the absolute Idea. That, we have been told, goes over into other-being to manifest itself as Nature, which, again, through its own dialectical process generates spirit through organism. The dialectic of Spirit, subjective and objective, culminates in absolute Spirit, and, when Hegel turns to history, he says that it too is a rational and dialectical process:

> . . . the rational and necessary evolution of the world spirit. This is the substance of history; its nature is always one and the same; and it discloses this nature in the existence of the world. (The world spirit is the absolute spirit).[1]

That absolute Spirit should realize itself in history, however, is a doctrine presenting serious difficulties, and many commentators have raised objections to it. Those who believe in progress point out that, if it is true, there should be some period of history in which Spirit in its absolute fulfillment is or will be completely actual. That would bring all progress and development to an end. Some have even affirmed that this has already happened and that Hegel meant to say so: Kojève, we remember, contended that Hegel considered his own philosophical system to be the theoretical attainment of absolute Spirit, and Napoleon's empire its practical realization in history. The issue has lately been revived by Fukuyama, who heralds the demise of Communism and the universal establishment of democratic regimes as the end of history as Hegel conceived it.[2]

Those who reject the idea of progress find no evidence whatever of the existence of any world spirit revealing its activity in world history, or of any emergence of absolute knowledge such as it would entail. Whatever Hegel himself might have achieved, the advance of the sciences since his day as well as of historical knowledge itself, so they say, show his theories to have been at best incomplete and defective.[3]

Indeed that history should have, or ever could come to, a final end seems palpably ridiculous, and there is good evidence that Hegel never intended to suggest any such thing. Moreover, absolute Spirit is *absolute*, and is the true infinite, and that is eternal. How then could it conceivably be actualized in

full panoply at any one moment, or in any one historical period? History is essentially a temporal process. How can it bring into existence at some one time what is in essence an eternal whole comprehending all time? How, further, can an essentially temporal process come to an end, beyond which there can be no further historical events?

What we face here is a problem that was ever present to Hegel's mind and the whole of his philosophy aims at its solution. It is the problem of the relation between, and ultimate reconciliation of, finite and infinite—the relation between time and eternity.

In the Logic we are not dealing with temporal matters—at least, not directly—but with the Concept, and the process of the dialectic is logical (or ideal) in essence. Of course, it is exemplified and manifests itself in temporal things and processes, and the categories, as we have been told, are put to use in ordinary thinking and in practice. Dialectic, we have been assured, is the principle of all activity and movement in the actual world. The Concept, however, is the logical interrelation and connection of ideal moments, which are logically distinguishable but are mutually necessitated and inseparable, so that in the final outcome the dialectic issues in the absolute Idea, in which all differences are united in a single discursive intuition and there is no further process.[4] It is the ideal unity of identity and nonidentity.

Dialectic is operative in Nature, because Nature is the Idea in the form of externality, and that involves time; hence, natural processes are spatio-temporal. At the stage of organism, when this self-externality is again inwardized in sentience to become soul, Spirit emerges as the human mind, and the absolute Idea that has been immanent in every phase of the process expresses itself now as self-conscious subject and in its proper form as reason. The urge, however, of the self-conscious subject to express itself in practical activity is the opposite tension to the above-mentioned inwardization. It is *Äußerung*, self-assertion, or self-othering, through which the personality has achieved self-conscious status in conflict with and eventual recognition of (and by) another, as equal and in the last resort identical with self. The subsequent objectification of Spirit, of the unification of its theoretical and practical moments, is the institutional structure of society in the State, the development and continued life of which is history. From a philosophical point of view all this is at once actual and ideal, but Objective Spirit is, in its operation, a temporal process. It is the historical process, through which civilizations, cultures, and States have lived in the past, and will live in the future. The question we now have to consider is how, or in what sense, absolute Spirit is disclosed in this process.

REASON IN HISTORY

Hegel begins his introduction to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* by asserting that reason governs the world. This he says is a presupposition for the empirical historian, but is proved within philosophy by speculative cognition.[5] The proof is the dialectical exposition briefly summarized above which demonstrates step by step that the absolute Idea is immanent in every phase, or moment, into which it differentiates and specifies itself. It is this self-differentiation that constitutes the world of both Nature and history. This is no mere extravagance of mystical enthusiasm, for, apart from Hegel's exposition in extenso of the system of his philosophy, it has considerable support from the conclusions of modern physics, biology, and psychology, as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere.[6] Here, however, our concern is with history in particular, and clearly if the dialectic is indeed the principle of all activity, it must operate in history even more obviously than in Nature.

It is inevitable that history should be determined by rational principles, because history is the account of human action and of nothing else (except what is relevant and ministers to human action). As Collingwood maintained, its sole subject matter is res gestae, things done, by people and neither by animals or gods. Now human action, as human, is rational action. Animal behavior is merely instinctive, but human behavior, even so far as it is instinctive, is transformed by self-conscious (i.e., rational) thought into intelligent action. Human beings are rational, even when they act irrationally, for irrationality is possible only for rational beings (animal behavior being nonrational). Only as deliberate and rational can action be responsible, and it is only such action that is the subject matter of history, which must therefore reflect and express more eminently than any mere "natural history" the principles of reason. It is this that Hegel means when he says that "spirit and the course of its development are the true substance of history"[7] and when he denies that Nature properly speaking has any history at all (because natural processes, even animal behavior, are not responsible or rational actions).

> The spiritual sphere is all-embracing; it encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the present day. Man is active within it; and whatever he does, the spirit [i.e., self-conscious reason] is also active within him.[8]

In this sense, it cannot be denied that there is reason in history. But no attentive reader need be warned that this does not mean that all human action is in the fullest sense rational, or that no human action is ever irrational, or that it is not motivated by passion and does not involve feeling

and sentiment. It means only that no truly human action is devoid of self-awareness and self-reflective intelligence, and that makes an essential difference to the elements of impulse and emotion that also necessarily enter into it.

We have already observed that rational action is always ab initio social, requiring the distinction, opposition, recognition, and reconciliation of self and others. The dialectic of these relations we have considered in earlier chapters. It generates an ordered and organized way of social and political life, and it does so just because it is rational, and social action is rational just because it is so organized. This rationally ordered way of living is what we call civilization and the empirical detail of the course of its development through time is what history is about. So Hegel maintains that history (and especially world history) is concerned with States, their rise and fall, their mutual relations, mutual conflicts, and successive hegemonies. By the State, however, Hegel means the whole structured order of the life of a community, its entire culture (*Bildung*) and civilization; so the history of States is that of civilizations, each taken as a whole. Collingwood's objection to Hegel's conception of history as restricted to political events[9] is not, therefore, altogether justified.

The task of the philosophy of history, Hegel tells us, is to consider world history in relation to its ultimate end, to decide what that end is, to define it, and to determine the manner of its realization. Drawing on what he has established in earlier writings, he defines the end as the Idea, but qualifies this definition, in relation to history, as "its operation within the medium of the human spirit; in more specific terms, it is the idea of freedom." Thus, it is not the Idea in its purely logical character, nor in its divine signification (God in His eternal essence),[10] but so far as actualized by the human mind in human thought and action.

We must note before going further that the word "end" is ambiguous. It means "termination," but it also means, and particularly in this context, "aim." What Hegel is asserting, therefore, is that the process of world history is the persistent striving of human communities for the attainment of a goal, which is human freedom. This does not entail that, even if and when that goal is achieved, history will come to an end (in the sense of termination). Moreover, there are stages and degrees in which the end may be realized, one of which is its being brought to consciousness in the minds of the mass of the people, so that they become aware of what they want and strive for it deliberately. Hegel believed that this had occurred with the French Revolution, which, under the influence of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, had made the mass of the people aware that what they wanted was freedom. Europeans, at least, became conscious that everybody ought to be free and that social and political institutions should be designed to

defend and ensure the rights of everybody. This is the significance of Hegel's identification of the three stages in the development of world civilizations as that in which only one (the despot) is free, that in which a privileged few are free, and that in which it is acknowledged that all persons should be free. It is in this sense that reason in history works towards and realizes an end. It does not imply that history will come to a stop, or even that, as yet, human freedom has been fully achieved.

We cannot, however, speak of an ultimate end, Hegel tells us, without implying that this end is destined to be accomplished. So even if we conclude that history has so far gone through the stages of recognizing first one, then some, and finally all persons as entitled to freedom, and even though such freedom is yet to be won, this nevertheless presupposes that the end can be, and eventually will be, realized at some time, if the process continues as it has begun. And if the process is the activity of reason, which is, for Hegel, essentially dialectical and teleological, the eventual realization of the end must be assured. There is nothing paradoxical in the suggestion that the end can and will be realized at some time in the course of history, as long as we understand that the aim is the establishment of political and social institutions that will give assurance of freedom.

Even if the end were realized, however, it would be no inert or static condition. Freedom is untrammeled and unobstructed activity, the opposite of immobility or passivity. It does not bring res gestae to a halt, but only gives them a richer and more satisfying quality. Moreover, Hegel knew as well as John Philpot Curry that "the condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance."[11] As moral attainment is no more nor less than continuous endeavor against temptation, against actual and incipient evil, so political order and the protection of rights is a perpetual watch against infringement and a continual adjustment of administrative measures to potentially disruptive conditions. Liberty is no passive state, but is an activity constantly alert to the threat of invasion.

The function of social organization is in itself the regulation of human activities and relations to secure the provision of physical needs and intellectual satisfactions by cooperative action. Its fulfillment is political liberty, which, in its ideal form, is not a fixed framework but a dynamic persistent *conatus*, and one which could only be brought about by virtue of the operation, through the medium of the human mind, of the Idea. Let us then consider more closely the relation of the Idea, as absolute, to the idea of human freedom.

FREEDOM

First we should take note of what Hegel means by freedom. To think of it merely as the absence of restraint is to think of it abstractly. Unfreedom

results from restraints the sources of which are beyond the control of the agent, who is free only when the causes of action are wholly within his or her power. That does not mean that they are wholly indeterminate. In fact, freedom is but the obverse of determinism. It is self-determination intrinsic to the whole which is constituted by, and as, the self-conscious subject (and that, we learn from the Logic, is the Concept). The free act is the act of the person as a coherent individual, the expression of a formed and fully rounded character. No such personality is possible without self-awareness, self-criticism, and self-organization, all of which is precisely the work of reason. It is this self-conscious personality that grasps implicitly, and brings to explicit self-knowledge, the totality of the real, and, in the last resort, is the absolute Idea uniting subject and object. Absolute freedom is such absolute self-determination.

Human freedom is only relative. It is the autonomy of the organism extended and augmented by the self-conscious autonomy of the knowing and active subject, but it is limited by external circumstances, by passion, and by the competitive activity of other persons when that is not ordered by rational regulation. The first two of these limitations can be mitigated by education and moral training, the third by social custom and organization (*Sittlichkeit*). It is here that the State becomes relevant, the raison d'être of its institutions and legal provisions being the objective realization of freedom. Only in an organized social system can human beings satisfactorily overcome the physical obstacles to the good life (that is, a life worth living by rational beings) and the personal and group conflicts that frustrate its aims. Only in an organized social system can they aspire to freedom.

This is what Hegel calls objective spirit, and he says of it: "The objective spirit is the absolute Idea, but only existing implicitly (*nur an sich seiend*)."[12] The qualification must not be overlooked, as it so commonly is by critics who deplore Hegel's declarations that the State is the divine Idea as it exists on Earth and that it is the way of God in the world. The emphasis is and must be placed on the final phrase in each case: it is the Idea as it exists on *Earth*, the way of God *in the world*. In short, it is the realization of freedom in the temporal sphere—and so in history.

History and Absolute Spirit

History is the history of civilizations and of States. It is concerned with the temporal endeavor to actualize freedom. It is about human action, the end of which is freedom. But the highest and most complete freedom is not achieved by political institutions as such. They are a *condicio sine qua non* of its realization, but its ultimate attainment is in absolute Spirit, the reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) of the finite with the infinite, the atonement of man with God. Such reconciliation is achieved in art, as it figures forth the divine

Idea in finite symbols and images, in religion which reveals the unity of God and man in Christ, and in philosophy which discovers the meaning of this unity in the identity of the Idea as the absolute and eternal whole with its own self-generated differences (that constitute the sphere of the finite). It is only in these supreme activities, transcending finite and temporal exigencies, that true freedom is to be found, especially through religious faith and atonement—"the service of God is perfect freedom"—and the knowledge of God, the ultimate explicit awareness of the identity of finite and infinite.

This, as we have said, transcends, as it sublates (dissolves, yet preserves and transforms) the finite and the temporal, and it must not be sought, and cannot be found, in a merely temporal event, or even in a historical period. It is the end of history in the sense that it is the aim of all human activity, but it is not realizable in a final and terminating event in time.

Hegel never misconceived either the Idea or history so as to imagine that the temporal course of development could produce the infinite and eternal as a finite phenomenon. Of course, the life of Jesus is the revelation of the identity of the finite and the infinite; but what it reveals is the eternal truth of human salvation, not a historical actualization of it. The life and teaching of Jesus reveal to mankind the reconciliation and atonement of the human with the divine nature. Jesus is the Christ, as the embodiment of divinity in human form; but his advent is not the final fulfillment and consummation of absolute Spirit, for that must involve mankind as a whole. The Son is the second person of the Holy Trinity, which also includes the Father and the Holy Spirit; and although each person in this triadic unity is at the same time the whole of the Godhead (as each moment of the Concept is at the same time the whole), the appearance of Jesus on Earth does not exhaust the Divinity or complete the salvation of mankind. It was only after the crucifixion that the full realization of the truth dawned upon the Apostles, and only then that the community came into being on which the Holy Spirit was poured out and in which it dwells in truth. The salvation offered by Christ has still to be won through individual conversion and faith. It is a consummation reached in spirit, of which the temporal occurrence is only the contingent aspect. That Jesus' historical ministry is not the full actualization of absolute Spirit in history is proved by the event and nature of his death, which is at once the evidence and the transcendence of his finite human nature and the fate of all finitude.

The crucifixion is, in fact, "the Golgotha of the spirit," "the infinite grief," which marks the transition from finite to infinite, and from religious representation to Absolute Knowing; and the resurrection is the realization of the truth, which is no mere historical event, however it is portrayed in the Gospels. It is a spiritual realization—the rebirth of the spirit to the awareness of eternal verities, the reception into the community of the Holy

Spirit, the Comforter, who brings that peace which the world cannot give. Precisely what this religious language signifies is that the ultimate realization of absolute Spirit is not simply historical, not a mere temporal event, nor even a temporal state of mind, but is the truth that transcends time altogether, and that can be experienced only as such.

On this point Hegel is quite clear both in his *Religionsphilosophie* and in the *Phenomenology*, where, as we saw when we were criticizing Kojève's interpretation, he makes the relation between time and eternity unmistakably plain:

> Time is the Concept itself, which exists (*der da ist*) and presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition [perception]; for this reason Spirit appears necessarily in time, and it appears in time just as long as it does not grasp its pure concept, that is, does not extinguish time.[13]

This passage leaves us in no doubt about the relation of the goal of human action to what occurs in the course of history. Historical events appear in time and present themselves to consciousness perceptually (*als leere Anschauung*). They are human acts, the ultimate end of which is total self-comprehension. History, in short, is the *appearance* in time of Spirit, which appears in this way only as long as it does not grasp its pure concept, its eternal and infinite self-identity in its other. When it does that, it abolishes time and transcends history. "Time itself in its concept is eternal."[14] But Spirit does this in its concept, not in its appearance. History is the appearance of the Concept in time, it is the spatio-temporal activity of the spirit, as human conduct, the Concept that exists; but when it grasps itself in its pure concept, it apprehends time *in seinem Begriff* and attains to the eternal and infinite where time is extinguished.

The end of history, therefore, is the end, or goal, of human rational and spiritual activity. It is the transcendence of the temporal in an eternal awareness of an eternal truth. This may, indeed must, involve historical events, so far as it involves human acts and psychological states of mind; but the historical events and the psychical states are not the cognized truth. That is the absolute Idea, which appears in time, no doubt, in the forms of Nature and finite spirit, but which in its infinite self-activity transcends all time and all history, for it is the eternal essence of God prior to and transcendent beyond both Nature and history.

Seen in this way, history is a teleological process, but not one that proceeds orthogonally towards a definite historical event at some precise (however distant) date. It is teleological because it is an account of the pursuit in human action of human ends through time, and human action is teleological. So far as it is rational it pursues a rational goal, and so far as it is successful it is inspired by an awareness of the absolute Idea. But we need

not assume, nor is there evidence to show, that this is often the case, that the awareness is acute, or that the concept of the end is at all clear to the persons living in any one era. Actual "progress" can either be positive or negative, without vitiating the dialectical conception of history. Dialectic, after all, involves negation, contradiction, and conflict, and although its persistent tendency is to negate the negation, resolve the contradiction, and overcome the conflict, when this has occurred, new problems and contradictions are always liable to arise—in fact, so far as the agents are finite subjects and the purposes of action are limited, this is inevitable. The ultimate attainment is never a temporal event. It is always and only the apprehension of the Concept, which, when truly achieved, transcends and annuls time.

THE HISTORICAL DIALECTIC

Hegel's philosophy of history, therefore, does not require any crude or simple-minded belief in progress and is quite compatible with social regression and moral failure in the course of history. Absolute Spirit is not a historical person, not even a "world-historical" character. The eternal essence of God is not to be found *in propria persona* in the pages of history; and "the way of God upon Earth" is the State, Objective Spirit, which is the absolute Idea existing only implicitly, the Concept which is there. Accordingly, one does not argue justly if one tries to identify our own or any other historical period as the end of history, nor does one interpret Hegel aright if one contends that he thought this about his own achievement or his own time. No more is it right to say that today we cannot accept the Hegelian notion of history as the unfolding of Spirit, because we have witnessed the disintegration of modern society, the excesses of Nazism, and the general breakdown of traditional morality.[15] All these may be interpretable in terms of the dialectic of history as Hegel conceived it, once we comprehend that concretely in its widest context, for history remains the account of *res gestae humanae*, and human beings, however wicked and irrational they may be, are and can be so only because they are by nature rational, self-conscious thinking beings.

That we fail to achieve our ends is not evidence that we have none. The goal of human conduct and the end of history remains the same: *daß der Geist seinen reinen Begriff erfasse*. It is not reached at any one particular time, nor is progress towards it a smooth continuous upward ascent. In its course whole peoples may be misled and deluded; in some periods civilization may regress and the ends of action may become befogged and confused. But seldom is any advance in insight wholly lost, even though it may become distorted or overlaid by other distracting interests. And what emerges from an anarchical, or a despotic, a stagnating, or a revolutionary period in

history may well be something quite other than any of the participating agents envisaged or any contemporary historian could have anticipated. The "cunning of reason" operates often in unexpected ways to produce historical effects.

That history does follow a dialectical course and that the historical dialectic did not stop with Hegel or at the opening of the nineteenth century I have tried to illustrate in some detail in former discussions.[16] My object here is simply to interpret Hegel more correctly than seems hitherto to have been customary. Some current trends, however, may be indicated that suggest a corollary with respect to the future.

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

Today, although we may not be able to see whither history is leading mankind, we have ample evidence that the dialectic of history has not, and cannot have, completely run its course, nor have we any good reason to conclude that there is no dialectical shape to be discovered in its continuance. Men and women still think and reflect, seek to improve their lot and to attain some degree of self-understanding. Rationality in some measure informs and motivates their deeds. New dialectical phases may well, even now, be in the making.

Hegel saw that past social evolution had, by the early nineteenth century, produced the national sovereign State as the sociopolitical norm through which civilized life expressed itself and sought to achieve its ends; and he read its implications for international relations clearly and unerringly. We today should see as clearly (although he could not) that these implications spell destruction for that same civilization. By now we should have recognized (even if our politicians seem incapable of doing so) that the national sovereign State is no longer competent to satisfy the needs of civilized communities the world over, as these needs have developed in the modern era. For they have become global in their scope and exceed the jurisdiction of any national authority. No national State can within its own jurisdiction solve problems of world overpopulation, or the exhaustion of world resources, or the destruction of the environment, or of global warming. Equally it should by now be clear that these global needs cannot be served through diplomacy and agreements between sovereign states upon which no superior law can be enforced.

It ought by now to be apparent to every political theorist and to every political activist that national sovereignty must be superseded by a new form of political order embracing all nationalities if civilization is to survive. If and when the implications of the concept of sovereignty become sufficiently recognized, the historical dialectic will move to another phase in its

progression towards comprehensive unity, and another milestone may be reached on the road towards "the end of history," understanding that phrase in the proper teleological rather than the eschatological sense. If however the dire consequences of the presently persisting international anarchy are allowed to continue, if their implications are not understood and the world situation is not promptly and adequately dealt with, we may well expect the end of history in the eschatological sense. For time is rapidly running out and few can reasonably doubt the inevitability of ecological collapse, even without a nuclear holocaust, unless swift and determined efforts are made to find wide-ranging remedies.

THE CUNNING OF REASON

To return to Hegel, however, we must understand his thesis in effect to be that history is the account of deliberate and responsible human action, and that is immanently rational. At the same time, human nature is finite, even if the human mind is self-conscious and consciousness is always self-transcendent, potentially encompassing the infinite. Consequently, its very failures and depravities are incidents in the continuous endeavor to fulfill its true spiritual aim. That endeavor, despite its setbacks and frustrations, is essentially rational and its constant nisus is to remedy its own deficiencies, to overcome its weaknesses, and to reverse its backslidings. The persistent tendency of reason is the overcoming of evil, so that the aim and object, in principle, of all rational action is in keeping with St. Paul's exhortation to "walk circumspectly, not as fools, but as wise, redeeming the time, because the days are evil."[17]

The dialectic of history is not, and is not represented as, a ceaseless triumphant progression towards a millenium. It is indeed the continuing activity of reason, working as a leaven within passion and sentiment, redeeming the time because the days are evil. The time is redeemed so far as the evils of the day can be counteracted and overcome; and inasmuch as we are able to grasp the pure concept of our human destiny, and retain faith in the ultimate identity of, and reconciliation between, finite and infinite, time will be extinguished. The influence of reason is the pervading influence of the whole, whether it be the totality of the physical and biotic organism, the whole personality, the whole solidarity of the community, or the whole experience of mankind (what Hegel calls the World Spirit). As far as this is grasped by thinking human beings (and because they are finite that is always only partially) its influence directs their actions (if never wholly yet always in some degree), so that *die List der Vernunft*[18] uses the very stupidities and disasters of human behavior to effect historical results beyond and unimagined in the explicit intentions of the historical agents.

THE OWL OF MINERVA

The future, however, cannot be foreseen, and the outcome of the historical dialectic cannot be calculated or scientifically predicted. Neither the historian nor the philosopher is a prophet. Nor can the course of the dialectic be detected by those participating in the contemporary process. It is not the function of the dialectician to foretell what will occur. The widespread misconception of Hegel's dialectic as a sort of formal deduction must once and for all be rejected. The dialectic is the way in which the whole differentiates itself; and this could be anticipated only with a full and adequate grasp of the Absolute, which is never available at any preliminary stage of its development. Especially in the case of history, the meaning and importance for future eventualities of current happenings become evident only after the events have occurred, and then only after much historical research and reflection. History itself cannot be written except with hindsight, and the significance of its trends can be properly understood only when whole periods (even aeons) have elapsed and can be reviewed and interpreted. The purview of the philosopher of history is never merely the present age or century, but ranges over the major tracts of the past. It is not just that "philosophy paints its grey in grey when some form of life has grown old"; history itself can discover its proper subject matter only after the acts that it records have been performed. Nor can it assess their importance until long afterwards, in the light of a multitude of proliferating and reticulated effects. The reflection of the philosopher upon all this is a further work subsequent to that of the historian. We cannot, in consequence, place the history of our own times within the course of the comprehensive dialectic during or immediately after the events we currently experience and in the continuing process of which we participate. Recognition of the direction and scope of the pilgrimage of reason cannot with any great confidence penetrate the obscurity of the future and must await the flight of the owl of Minerva at the fall of the dusk.

Notes

1. Introduction to *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, p. 29.
2. Cf. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989). Fukuyama's argument has so little credibility and is based on such tenuous textual evidence that I have not included any discussion of it. See, however, P. T. Grier, "The End of History, and the Return of History," *The Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring 1990).
3. Cf. Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Chap. XX.
4. Cf. *Enc.*, 237.

5. Cf. *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet's translation, p. 27.
6. Cf. my *Cosmos and Anthropos, Cosmos and Theos*, and *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*.
7. Cf. *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet's translation, p. 44; also p. 25: "All that is truly human, as distinct from animal, contains an element of thought."
8. Ibid.
9. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 121.
10. Cf. *Science of Logic* and *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet's translation, p. 46: "God and the nature of the divine will are one and the same thing, it is what we call in philosophy, the Idea."
11. Speech on the Right of Election of the Lord Mayor of Dublin, 10 July, 1790.
12. *Enc.*, 583.
13. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Chap. VIII.
14. Cf. *Enc.*, 258, and *Zusatz*.
15. Cf. Taylor, *Hegel*, Chap. XX.
16. Cf. my "Dialectic and Scientific Method," *Idealistic Studies*, III, 1973, and the discussion in *The Reality of Time* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), Chap. VII.
17. Ephesians, 5, 16–17.
18. Cf. *Enc.*, 209 *Zusatz*, and *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet's translation, p. 89.

15
Hegel as Christian Philosopher

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

The heading Christian Philosophy immediately brings to mind names like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas, and directs attention primarily to Medieval thought. Among modern philosophers one would not hesitate to include Ettienne Gilson and Bernard Lonergan, but if the name of Hegel were proposed eyebrows might well be raised. Yet there is a sense in which Hegel is the Christian philosopher par excellence. He is the inheritor of all the wisdom of the Middle Ages, as well as of the critical acumen of the Enlightenment, and he strove persistently to reconcile their opposing trends. One could quite appropriately describe those opposing trends as the conflict between faith and reason, and it would not be wrong to say that the whole development of Christian Philosophy has centered in the dispute over their compatibility. This is also the central issue in Hegel's thought, even if it is not always obviously in the forefront, and it exercised his mind from the very beginning of his career, from his school days and the time when he was a student at Tübingen. In his mature philosophy he finds its resolution.

Before attempting to justify this claim, some consideration should be given to what should be meant by "Christian Philosophy." The story is told of a professor who, when asked by his faculty to offer a course in Christian Philosophy, replied that he would be happy to do so when the professor of mathematics offered a course in Christian Mathematics. But this stricture is based on too narrow a conception of philosophy and too intolerant an interpretation of Christian Philosophy. That title does not imply that there are two (or more) kinds of philosophy one of which is Christian and the other (or others) non-Christian. We have no qualms about distinguishing moral philosophy from epistemological, or the philosophy of history from the philosophy of art; and we speak without hesitation of the philosophy of mathematics. Similarly, we need not reproach ourselves for contemplating a philosophy of religion and, in particular one of Christianity.

As Hegel conceived it there is only one philosophy, all past philosophy

being but the continuous development of the search for truth, which is one truth; and this philosophy turns out in the end to be nothing other than the philosophy of Christianity, not inappropriately described as Christian Philosophy, both in the sense that it provides a philosophical interpretation of Christian dogma, and in the sense that it incontrovertibly establishes the ultimate necessity of Christianity as "the absolute religion," the revelation of the absolute truth. For Hegel, philosophy, as he understood it, was the true theology, and all past theology was philosophy, sound or unsound, in varying degrees.

FAITH AND REASON

As I have said, the prevailing theme of Medieval philosophy was the question of the possibility or impossibility of reconciling faith with reason. Among the early fathers Tertullian declared "*credo quia absurdum*" (I believe because it is absurd), indicating a radical incompatibility between faith and reason. I am no authority on Tertullian, but I suspect that his assertion is not quite as paradoxical as it appears on the surface. He is intuitively convinced of the truth of Christianity, but to his finite reason its doctrine seems absurd, hence he declares his belief in it as a transcendent and infinite truth which finite human reason cannot grasp.

But later thinkers were not content with this dispensation. Are we not exhorted in the Bible to know God? and is not such knowledge the essence of religion and especially of Christianity? "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge" says the author of Proverbs (Prov. 1, 7); and St. Paul reminds the Hebrews, that, through Jeremiah, God has promised them a new Covenant by which He would write His law in their hearts and they should know Him. To the Philippians he writes that he "counts all things but loss for the excellence of the knowledge of Jesus Christ . . ."; and St. Peter writes: " . . . giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge." So Anselm, taking seriously the proverb I have quoted, declares, "*Credo ut intellegam*" (I believe in order that I may understand). His faith is the foundation and inspiration of his understanding. Thomas Aquinas concludes that although faith goes beyond reason there is no conflict between them.

But Anselm's and Aquinas's assurances, and the proofs they offered of God's existence, have repeatedly been challenged and criticized, not only by infidels and atheists, but also by devout believing Christians. The competence of reason has been called in question, and has even been denied, in almost every age, as well as the ability of faith to satisfy the intellect. In that case, the knowledge of God is denied to us, yet we are still (by the devout) exhorted to believe.

It is clear, however, that we cannot genuinely believe unless we believe that the content of our faith is the truth; nor can our belief be sound or sincere if it is not founded upon secure grounds; so we cannot rest in any position that repudiates reason altogether, and we cannot maintain the faith if it conflicts with what the intellect demands. Of the absolute necessity of reconciliation between faith with knowledge Hegel was deeply convinced, and his whole adult life was spent in working it out in detail. His final persuasion was that Christianity was itself that reconciliation, for it was the revealed religion—the ultimate self-revelation of God to man in Christ.

GOD AS TRUTH

St. Augustine identified God with the truth, and knowledge as divine illumination. Hegel, without direct reference to Augustine, follows him in this respect. The truth is the object of knowledge, which is not properly knowledge unless it is true. If God is the truth, then the object and content of both knowledge and religion are one and the same. This, in principle, is the reconciliation of the conflict between faith and reason—in principle, but not in detail, for the explicit knowledge of the truth may well be unattainable by finite minds, and faith may be the only substitute available to human beings.

Hegel, however, succeeds in resolving the issue by making a distinction between two stages (or aspects) of rational cognition: a distinction between the finite understanding and speculative reason. This distinction, we have already seen, is fundamental to a proper understanding of what Hegel means by intellect and reason, and is crucial to the question here at issue. Understanding, comprising what he calls "sound common sense" and scientific analysis, is finite because it makes distinctions and recognizes differences, which it then regards as mutually exclusive and repellent. What is so distinguished from other things is inevitably limited, and necessarily falls within definite boundaries. It is therefore finite. As the understanding never gets beyond the insistence on such distinctions and definitions, it is confined to the realm of the finite. Speculative reason, on the other hand, because it recognizes the mutual interdependence of the distincta, sees that they are mutually complementary and go together to constitute a whole.

The understanding, concentrating on the limits that define things precisely, always finds that there is something else falling outside those limits, and pursuing it, runs away interminably in the search for complete understanding which it can never reach. So it generates what Hegel calls the false (or the bad) infinite—the endlessly finite. But if the mutual complimentarity of opposites and distincts is recognized, as it is by reason, the infinite is seen to be the whole, which is complete in itself and all-encompassing. This is

the true infinite, or Absolute, the concept of which (the logical Concept) is the concrete universal, or the principle of organization that, as he says, has its particulars in itself, and so differentiates, or specifies, itself into a system. The recognition of this difference between understanding and reason is indispensable to the proper comprehension of Hegel's treatment of religion and of God.

To put Hegel's position provisionally, in a nutshell, faith and rational understanding ("rationalism") are in persistent conflict and opposition; but reason proper, speculative philosophy, has the same object and content as, is in fact identical and at one with faith. That content is no less than the divine truth (or, as Hegel calls it, the Idea); and the absolute Idea, or the Truth with a capital *T*, is identical with God, as Augustine had rightly divined.

To state the position in Hegelian terminology, the absolute Idea is the idea of the Concept, the systematic, or philosophical, exposition of which is logic; and Hegel says of his Logic that it is "God in His eternal essence, before the creation of Nature and finite spirit." This claim has offended many, especially many professing Christians, to whom it has seemed to be a palpable blasphemy. But the objection overlooks the Augustinian tradition (that goes back even further than Augustine in the history of philosophy), that God is the Truth; and for Hegel the science of truth (or of knowledge) is logic, the doctrine of the Concept and its Idea, nothing less than which can genuinely be the Truth.

For the truth, Hegel has told us, is the whole, and the true form in which the truth exists is system—that is, philosophical science (*Wissenschaft*), the systematic self-development and self-explication of absolute Spirit (or, in other words, of God). This is not the sacrilegious boast that we, or Hegel himself, in expounding the Logic, have attained divine omniscience; it is simply the necessary recognition—necessary for the existence of any knowledge whatsoever—of an ultimate and absolute standard of truth; and that, for Hegel is the Whole. Now, it is obvious that none of our finite minds, nor all of them taken together, comprehend the absolute whole of reality, which, at least in one sense, transcends them infinitely. And that transcendent Infinite is God.

There has, of course, been dispute among Hegelians whether Hegel really held the view that God was so transcendent beyond the finite world, or, in particular, beyond human self-consciousness. He has often been accused of Pantheism (which he strenuously rejected), and so at least of incipient atheism. More lenient critics are prepared to exonerate him with the intriguing title of Panentheist. But, clearly, none of these labels fits, and it is undeniable that Hegel did maintain that absolute Spirit was transcendent above all finite being. As he himself says: ". . . *in der negativen Einheit der*

Idee greift das Unendliche über das Endliche hinüber" (in the negative unity of the Idea the infinite overreaches [surpasses or transcends] the finite).[1]

GOD'S SELF-DIREMPTION

This is, however, only one aspect of God's nature, which is just as much immanent in all finite reality; and unless one acknowledges this side of the Godhead as well as the other, one cannot rightly call oneself (or Hegel) Christian.

The whole which is the Truth would not be a whole, nor could it be absolute or infinite, unless it were infinitely differentiated and articulated as a system. It could not be a whole unless it had parts, each different from all the rest, and mutually related in interdependent ways, so that they fit together systematically to constitute a single whole. No blank or empty unity is a genuine whole, only one that is a unity of differences. A material, spatio-temporal system is a whole in itself, but it is systematic and its parts are related, not *for* itself, but only for a knowing mind that can grasp it as a whole. In the last resort, therefore, the absolute whole must be *begriffen*, that is, grasped or conceived by an actively thinking consciousness, as a unitary structure of many interrelated elements (or moments). This is why Hegel calls it the Concept (*der Begriff*). Consequently, the Absolute can never be regarded as a fixed, dead, or "block" universe, nor can it be just a haphazard collection of particular finite items, as the understanding misconceives a whole. It is, and must be, essentially active, and in the final outcome turns out to be the activity of thought. For this reason Hegel says that it is Idea or Spirit, actively aware of itself.

Only speculative reason is capable of comprehending such a unity in difference. The understanding holds the two aspects (unity and difference) apart as incompatible one with the other, and separates the particular elements, attributing to each a spurious independence which falsifies its nature. Wholeness and truth, therefore, elude it, and it falls into contradiction, both with itself and with religious faith.

The whole, then, is infinite activity, or in Hegel's words, *unendliche Rastlosigkeit* (infinite restlessness). It is a persistent and an eternal activity of self-differentiation, in which the principle of organization of the whole works itself out in detail. As it were, it tears itself apart and projects its differences, as opposite to itself (as unity); and as it must be self-conscious, it projects the differences as objects to itself (as subject). Hegel describes this process as one of self-diremption. It is an activity that takes the form of dialectical development ranging from the simplest ontological being and the most abstract logical category to the most complex, to culminate finally in its own transcendent, infinite, eternal, all-encompassing and self-comprehending totality. As Augustine had said long before, God's infinite

perfection is complete only through His creation of every grade of goodness, from the lowest and most corruptible to the highest incorruptible excellence.

This entire scale of degrees of perfection, aware of itself as such, *is* the absolute Spirit, and its activity of self-specification (or self-development) is the creation and the continuing process of the physical world of Nature, developing out of itself living organisms, in whom consciousness awakens and the capacity to think and to know is generated and nurtured. In mankind consciousness develops through an elaborate range of forms and configurations, increasing progressively in self-awareness, as its knowledge of the world increases and clarifies. In each and every one of these natural and spiritual forms, the whole that is specifying itself through them is immanent:

> Behold, the heaven and the heaven of heavens is the Lord's thy God, and the earth also, with all that therein is. (Deut. 10:14).

GOD AND MANKIND

In human experience, the immanence of the divine Idea manifests itself as the aim of all moral endeavor, as the ideal of beauty, and as the standard and criterion of truth, the goal of philosophical thinking; and all of these merge into the ultimate object of religious worship, God, who is the absolute Spirit.

In all forms of human consciousness God is immanent, but preeminently in its rational capacity. As it is written in the book of Genesis, "God created man in his own image." So human beings, in their thinking, mirror the truth, or, as St. Paul has it, "We see through a glass darkly." The human mind represents a late and a highly elaborate phase of the dialectical development of Spirit, and the principle of infinity or wholeness is intrinsic to its (as to all) consciousness. But mankind is always subject to natural limitations. The human remains always the finite spirit, and the assurance we can have of the validity of our knowledge and of our faith is wholly dependent on the immanence of the absolute Idea in both of them. It is this very principle of wholeness and infinity that is the principle of human as of all self-consciousness.[2] And it is this, likewise, that reveals to us our limitions, our own finiteness and shortcomings, for without such a standard and criterion of judgment, we could never be aware of defect.

ORIGINAL SIN

There is in consequence always a tension or conflict between human finitude, the deficiency of human nature, with its natural limitations and shortcomings, on the one hand, and the immortal longings of human aspiration, on the other. This tension displays itself in many ways and at

many levels: in the conflict between falsehood and truth, in the opposition of vice to virtue, and in the corruption by temptation and sin of righteousness—in a word in the struggle between evil and good. It is summed up in the contrast of finite to infinite. It is the estrangement of mankind from God. In religion this is represented in the doctrines of the Fall and of original sin.

Hegel asserts that man's original sin is his naturality, his limitation to organism and by natural conditioning, by passion and lust—in short, by the temptations of the flesh. It is the fact that in him perfection is at best never more than potential. But human beings are conscious of themselves and so are capable of reflection and self-criticism. They thus become aware of defect in themselves, which would not be possible without implicit intuition of a criterion and standard of perfection and of truth, by reference to which the critical judgment of value is made. This is the knowledge of good and evil, the source of man's sense of guilt as well as the intuitive awareness of perfection, both immanent in and transcendent beyond the capacity of human thought. It is the source, likewise, of the longing and striving for a salvation, which, for the finite intellect and for secular morality, is not attainable.

SALVATION

So far as mankind is created in God's image, however, this salvation is human destiny, for the absolute Idea is immanent in finite spirit. Salvation is attainable only through the reunion of humanity with God, through atonement, the reconciliation (*Versöhnung*), of the finite with the infinite. This occurs in and through the revelation of God to mankind in his own person, as man, and also as the mediator between finite and infinite who effects the atonement.

Christ is the Son of God and at the same time the Son of Man. But man is a natural creature and his existence presupposes the creation of the world. God's eternal nature, Hegel insists, is such as to divide Himself and to posit an Other, which is nevertheless His own self, with which He is identical. He does this in two ways, one is the creation of the world, the other is his reduplication of Himself in his Son. In the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel writes:

> God reveals Himself in two different ways: as Nature and as Spirit. Both manifestations are temples of God which He fills, and in which He is present. God, as an abstraction, is not true God, but only as the living process of positing His Other, the world, which comprehended in its divine form is His Son; and it is only in unity with His Other, in Spirit, that God is Subject. (*Enc.*, 246 *Zusatz*)[3]

It is the very nature of Spirit to do this. Spirit is self-conscious, and it is

characteristic of the self-conscious subject that it posits itself as object (as other), with which it is accordingly identical. This much Hegel had learnt from Fichte, and in his own *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* he writes: "God posits the Other and sublates it in his eternal movement." This means that He posits the Other and then, in his eternal activity of dialectical self-differentiation, cancels it out again, while still retaining it and transforming it into His own Spirit. This is at once the eternal act of creation along with the final act of reconciliation, and also the mission of the Son, his crucifixion, and transfiguration.

As we have expressed all this earlier, God, to be absolute and infinite, must be a self-specifying or self-differentiating activity; and the totality of His self-specification constitutes the difference within the whole of which He is the unity. The two fundamental aspects (or moments) of God are his unity (universality and wholeness) and His inexhaustible mutiplicity and variety (particularity). The second is the Other of the first. For this production and projection of the Other out of Himself by God Hegel uses the word *Entäußerung*, which may be translated either as externalization, or alienation. *Äußerung* is "utterance," and in this sense it is the Word, which St. John tells us was in the beginning with God and was God.

As created finitude this Other is the world. God's self-diremption and self-alienation is creation. Hegel writes:

> One says, God has created the world; so one expresses this as a deed which has happened once and will not happen again, as a determination which could or could not be; God could have revealed Himself or not; it is [represented] as if it were an arbitrary accidental determination, not belonging to the concept of God. But, as Spirit, God is essentially this self-revelation; He does not create the world on a single occasion, but *is* the eternal creator, this eternal self-revelation, this act. This is His concept [i.e., His essential nature], His specific character.[4]

Creation is thus God's self-alienation, or self utterance—His Word, and, as finite, it is the world of Nature; but, as spirit, the indwelling divinity in the created natural human being, it is begotten, not made—the only begotten Son of God. Jesus is the Son of Man, but in his life, his ministry, and his final self-sacrifice, the perfection of spirit in man is revealed and with it the unity of man with God. In his own person he revealed the fulfillment of his own exhortation, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Likewise, he is the revelation of the nature of God as Love; that is, the spiritual union of self and other, the reconciliation of finite and infinite and the gift of salvation in atonement. Jesus is, therefore, the Christ, and through him, through faith in him as Christ, he mediates between man and God, between finite and infinite. Through him human beings are reunited in spirit and in love with God and with one another. So

they form a sacred community, the Church, which is the body of Christ, and is imbued with the Holy Spirit, the spirit at once of God and of Christ ("who proceedeth from the Father and the Son"). This is the reconciliation proper, the final atonement of God and mankind. It is the Kingdom of God, in which His community is pervaded by his Holy Spirit.

We must not fall into the error committed by some interpreters of Hegel of thinking that this atonement or reunion of humankind with God altogether obliterates the moment of finitude and the difference between that and the infinite. Hegel always insists that the identity of opposites, which he so constantly affirms, does not eliminate the aspect of difference altogether. The opposition is reconciled, certainly, and the contradiction resolved, but the distinctions are not obliterated. They are sublated (*aufgehoben*), which means that they are canceled and superseded, but also preserved, though transformed. The reconciliation does not produce a blank and empty unity, but a diversified whole. In religion, the atonement, while it unites finite and infinite, mankind and God, does not blot out or blur the distinction between them. Thus each person remains him or her individual self, and only through consciousness and love of Christ is reunited with the Godhead.

THE HOLY TRINITY

In outline, this is Hegel's exposition of the meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity. That, he holds, is the complete and final revelation of the Truth, or of the nature of God. Because God is the Truth and the Truth is the whole, and because nothing can be a genuine whole, or can be absolute, unless it is differentiated, that is, unless it divides its universality into particular moments and gives embodiment to the spiritual principle that is its essence—because all this is the case, God necessarily assumes the form of a Trinity, which is also a unity; and by His own nature, expresses (or utters) His essence as an Other, which is alienated from Him, and is nevertheless His own self, which again he takes back into Himself in reconciliation. Christianity, accordingly, is the final and absolute religion, the self-revelation of God.

Other religions are but stages and stepping-stones on the way to Christianity. This does not mean that they necessarily develop into it, except perhaps in the case of Judaism. In them the revelation is implicit, but they represent it only in finite terms. They constitute lesser degrees of truth. The nature religions recognize in some measure the immanent divinity in Nature. Polytheism figures forth in symbolic forms the diversity of the divine spirit. The Jewish and Mohammedan religions recognize the unity and universality of God and His pervasive power. There is also recognition in

the Oriental religions of the divinity immanent in all creation and in mankind, and of the spiritual nature of the Deity. But the atonement they envisage tends to obliterate human individuality and to lose all diversity in a featureless oneness, or Nirvana. Christianity brings the revelation to full fruition. It achieves the self-consciousness of God in mankind through Christ, and this self-consciousness of God, which is also the bringing of the world to self-consciousness, and the self-realization of the destiny of humanity, is the true nature of Spirit.

Hegel arranges these diverse types of religion in dialectical order, the detail of which need not detain us here. Some notice will be taken of it in the next chapter. Our present interest is in the relation of faith to knowledge and how Hegel thought that he had resolved the opposition in his own philosophy.

CONTENT AND FORM

The truth which Hegel considers is finally revealed in Christianity is set out by religion as dogma and is presented in sensuous and figurative form. The form of religion, he says, is representation (*Vorstellung*). To represent the truth in this way is the proper function of religion. The human mind cannot fulfill itself or properly grasp the meaning of the truth unless it is presented immediately in perception, as well as in concept and judgment. In fact, concept and judgment are merely abstract if they have not developed out of, and are not the explication of what is implicit in sense-perception. Religion, then, must present the truth in sensuous and imaginative form. It expounds it as dogma to be taught and believed. It is therefore the realm of faith. The truth in its explicit form, however, is the Concept, and while that is the content of faith, it is conceptualized only in philosophy.

To the finite understanding, what religion teaches is a mystery and a paradox. Only speculative reason can grasp its true significance and follow the dialectic of the whole. Speculative reason sees the interdependence and the ultimate unity of the opposite moments of identity and difference, which the understanding holds rigidly apart and finds mutually incompatible. Only reason recognizes the identity of the universal with its particulars, of self with other, of subject with object, and of finite with infinite. Accordingly, the truth, which is believed in religion, is known in philosophy. It is the same truth in both, which has been finally revealed in Christianity. Between religion and philosophy, between faith and reason, there is no difference of content, only a difference of form. What is made manifest in religion to sense and imagination is assimilated by feeling, and is believed. It is realized in practice and devotion; but in philosophy it is conceptualized and systematically expounded in the form of thought.

The finite categories of the understanding, that is, of common sense and natural science, are inadequate to this content. So the understanding finds in it only absurdity, which it either rejects as nonsense (as when its "rationalism" gives rise to atheism), or regards as mysterious, something beyond its ken, about which it can make no judgment (as when it prompts to agnosticism); or else it abrogates all knowledge of God and insists that religion can only be a matter of feeling and faith—as Kierkegaard declares, a leap in the dark. To Hegel all this is anathema. For him, God is the Truth, and truth is the light that shines in the darkness. "The darkness comprehendeth it not" so it cannot remain hidden, for it is the very nature of God to manifest and reveal Himself. Religion may indeed be mysticism, but it is a mysticism that speculative reason finds intelligible and can interpret. It sees the object of religion as identical with its own. Faith and reason are therefore at one and in harmony. The apparent conflict exists only between faith and the finite understanding.

> For the understanding, to be sure, the mysteries of Christianity are an impenetrable secret. But, because they are speculative in nature, reason can grasp them. Nor are they secret; for they are revealed.[5]

Notes

1. *Enc.*, 215.
2. Consciousness of self as a member of a surrounding environment involves the grasp of the presented situation as a whole and of its continuity with the experienced world of systematically related objects. The immanent principle of order is the concrete universal, or Concept.
3. A. V. Miller's translation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 13.
4. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Part III, A, 1; *Werke*, Vol. 17, p. 193.
5. Cf. *Enc.*, 82 *Zusatz*.

16
All Philosophy is *Religionsphilosophie*

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Kierkegaard accused Hegel of making the ridiculous claim that he could comprehend the infinite in his philosophy and of ranking human philosophy above religious faith. The appropriate Christian attitude, he maintained, was humbly to acknowledge the limitations of the human intellect, making the leap of faith into the dark to find the redeeming power of divine Providence and love. As it is written:

> For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord.
> As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Isaiah, 55: 8, 9.)

Such criticism of Hegel, however, reveals a failure to comprehend or to appreciate his position aright. He not only recognized but insisted upon the limitations of the human intellect, as understanding; but he pointed out (specifically in his criticism of Kant) that to recognize such limitations the mind must already have passed beyond them, and have risen to the stage of speculative reason. Kierkegaard's strictures remain within the confines of the understanding, and his objections are typical of its thinking. For the understanding separates and holds apart what are legitimate distinctions as if they were separable absolutes. So it separates the finite from the infinite, setting the latter in an unattainable beyond, leaving God as an abstract and empty name, the true meaning of which we cannot know. But this, Hegel argues, simply converts God to another finite, while it ignores the exhortation of Christianity to know God.

> . . . for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord. (Jer. 31: 34; Heb. 8: 11)

Speculative reason recognizes the spurious nature of the false infinite that is no more than a perpetual removal of the limit beyond the particular point

reached, so that the result remains endlessly finite, and it recognizes the true infinite to be the whole, in principle and of necessity complete in itself and self-sustaining, which is the source of the existence and is immanent in the nature of all finites, including the human mind. This whole is the truth, the proper object of philosophy, but (as the true infinite) it is equally, and by the same token, the object of religion, apart from which philosophy would be impossible, because there would be no awareness of truth, and consequently no philosophy.

Accordingly, so far from exalting philosophy above religion, Hegel makes it conditional upon religion, and sees all philosophy as the philosophy of religion. This thesis is nothing new. Something very like it has been brilliantly maintained by Emile Fackenheim, and abundant evidence for its truth has been mustered in Quentin Lauer's admirable exposition of Hegel's conception of God, in his book of that name.[1] My object in what follows is no more than to try to elaborate, from what Hegel actually writes, an argument that he does not explicitly state, in support of a position that he undoubtedly held.

Textual Evidence

For Hegel philosophy is absolute knowing, that is, Spirit aware of itself as spirit, and that again is religion:

> *Die Religion nämlich ist Wissen des Geistes von sich als Geist* . . . (Religion is, namely, Spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit).[2]

Philosophy, he tells us in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, is not simply the love of wisdom, but is the knowledge of the truth as scientific system—the true form in which the truth exists. And the truth is the whole.[3] The whole, moreover, is the Absolute, culminating as absolute Spirit, which is God, and God, as Augustine had long since declared, is truth. So we find Hegel, throughout his philosophical writings, referring to his subject matter in theological terms. In the *Phenomenology* he constantly speaks of the Absolute as *das Göttliche*, and refers, whether in criticism of other theories, or in advocacy of his own, to *Göttlichkeit* as what the theories are about.[4]

The Logic, he says, is "God in his eternal essence, prior to the creation of Nature and finite spirit";[5] and in the very first paragraph of the *Encyclopaedia* he tells us that the object of philosophy is common with that of religion: "they both have the truth as their object, and indeed, in the highest sense, that God is the truth and He alone. . . ."[6]

Nature is the Idea in the form of other-being (or externality), what Schelling called petrified (and others "frozen") intelligence. "*Der Gott aber bleibt nicht versteinert und verstorben, sondern die Steine schreien und heben sich zum Geiste auf.*[7] The previous portion of the same *Zusatz* is a sustained

exposition of the relationship of Nature to God. The place of Nature within the whole, he says, is determined by the fact that the Idea posits difference and otherness within itself, "so that God remains equal to Himself [at home with himself] in his [self-]determination; each of these moments is itself the whole Idea, and must be posited as the divine totality."[8]

The *Geistesphilosophie* traces the dialectic of subjective and objective mind, and unites them in absolute Spirit, ending with a long quotation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (that he himself calls Theology) describing God as active reason.[9]

Contrary to common opinion, Hegel's system culminates in religion, the final moment of Absolute Spirit, philosophy, being nothing more (nor less) than the philosophy of religion. It simply identifies content with form, subject matter with method. Hegel invariably insists that the content of art, religion, and philosophy is one and the same (namely, God, or Truth), the only difference being their appropriate forms; but in the case of philosophy content and form coincide in the thinking study of thinking, which, in the last resort, is God as active reason. So philosophy, as the self-awareness of Spirit, is the consummate religion, though not in the form of representation, as we find it in the New Testament, but in the form of the Concept, as set out in the third part of the *Religionsphilosophie*. The final sections of the Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit state this formally, but the final part of the Philosophy of Religion sets it out in its concrete substantiality,[10] as do also (more concisely) the final chapters of the *Phenomenology*.

The dialectic, as we all know, repeatedly recapitulates earlier categories in new and developed forms. This occurs, not only throughout the Logic, but similarly (if less obviously) in the *Naturphilosophie*, as well as in the *Geistesphilosophie*. It is therefore not surprising that we find similar recapitulation in the *Religionsphilosophie*, the phases of which correspond primarily to the major logical phases of Being, Essence, and the Concept, and also to those of the *Geistesphilosophie*.

Religion is an activity of the spirit, so the categories of Nature feature within it only implicitly, in suppressed and symbolic appearances. But Nature plays an important and indispensable part, not only in the religion(s) of Nature, but also as represented in the second Person of the Trinity in the Christian revelation.

Religion as it appears in history (its *Erscheinung*), is the self-awareness of spirit immanent in human experience (as *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*). In its emotional and representational aspects it belongs to subjective mind; in its ritual and institutional forms it is a feature of objective mind; and in its ultimate self-awareness, as revealed religion, it is absolute—the Christian Trinity. In each and all of these phases, it recapitulates the dialectic of the

Concept, which is the formal structure at once of subjective experience, of objective reality, and of self-conscious reflection. And this is what is set out *in extenso* both in the system as a whole and in the *Religionsphilosophie*, its culminating phase.

Religion in human experience is the awareness of the relation of human nature to God, to the divine nature, that is, to the whole, or Truth. It is the revelation of the truth to the human mind. Spinoza maintained that revelation occurs in two forms, through the intellect and through the imagination.[11] And Hegel agrees in principle. Revelation through the intellect takes place (as it does for Spinoza) in philosophy in general, and in the Logic in particular (the Idea being God in His eternal essence, prior to Nature and finite spirit). Revelation through the imagination is (for Spinoza) prophecy and likewise for Hegel, representative religion, the universal moments of which are set out in the first part of the Philosophy of Religion. The second part reviews and sets in their dialectical relationships the forms representational religion has taken in the course of its historical development; and their consummation, the revelation of the immanent truth, is expounded and explained in the third and final part. Thus revealed religion in its representational form is religion proper, and the philosophy of religion is its theology. Philosophy, if it ever calls religion in question, does so only in order to establish its content (God) as the ultimate truth.

Recurrence within the Dialectic

Hegel is quite explicit in the Introduction to the first part of the *Religionsphilosophie* that philosophy and religion coincide. Philosophy, he says, only explicates itself so far as it makes religion explicit, and so far as it makes itself explicit, it explicates religion. "So religion and philosophy fall together in one; pnilosophy is in fact itself the worship of God (*Gottesdienst*), is religion. . . . Philosophy is identical with religion." But it differs from what one usually calls religion in the peculiar style and manner in which each is concerned with God.[12]

Philosophy is the consciousness of truth as Idea, the truth in thought, the concrete concept of which is a unification of opposed categories. It busies itself with thought-determinations (*Denkbestimmungen*), not simply with intuitions (*Anschauungen*) or representations (*Vorstellungen*). Religion, however, is the consciousness of the truth as the total object of speculative reason, as absolute and self-determinate, concretely universal. Its object is not merely the whole as thought, but, at the same time as actual and active in the world and individual consciousness—not just "God in His eternal essence," but the living God, the Creator of the universe. In short, the

object of religion is absolute Spirit uniting the Idea and Nature. But this could just as well be a description of the entire content of the *Encyclopaedia*, in short, of speculative philosophy.

The ordinary worshiper, however, asks for "the meaning" of all this, meaning by "meaning" not the concept (e.g., of God), but its representation. Without some representation the ordinary worshiper finds the thought content hard to grasp. It then becomes the task of the Philosophy of Religion to explicate "the meaning" of the representation of God entertained.

In the Introduction, Hegel says all this by way of explaining the place of the *Religionsphilosophie* in the system of Philosophy as a whole; and what he says amounts to a virtual identification of it with the third division of the *Geistesphilosophie*, on absolute Spirit. Yet, as is well known, this division in the *Encyclopaedia* includes Art and Philosophy as well as Religion, so how are we to understand this explanation?

Here, as elsewhere, Hegel treats his subject matter as the divine substance, and views Art as the sensuous expression of *das Göttliche*, of the objects of religion, so aesthetics becomes, in effect, part of the philosophy of religion. Philosophy, he says in the concluding paragraphs (572–577), is the unity of art and religion in which the sensuous form of the first and the representative form of the second are united and raised to self-conscious thought:

> *Dies Wissen ist damit der denkend erkannte Begriff der Kunst und die Religion* . . . (This knowledge is thereby the thinking, cognized *Concept* of art and religion [*Enz.*, 572]).

He declares that the content of religion and philosophy are the same, he inveighs against the spurious philosophy of the understanding, known as "Rationalism," which claims to discover contradictions in the exposition of the Faith, that arise only in consequence of the inadequate representations through which it is expressed; and he upholds "the conceiving reason" and genuine philosophy, "the content of which is speculative and thus religious." Then after a long defense of philosophy against the accusation of Pantheism (with which we have become familiar from earlier passages), he ends with an account of philosophy, much like that outlined above, but now in terms of the three major syllogisms, that were set out previously in the Logic, in which each of the main divisions of the *Encyclopaedia* mediates the transition from one to another. In effect, therefore, philosophy again turns out to be the philosophy of religion.

The whole, or concrete universal, that is in the final outcome absolute Spirit, is a self-representative system, dialectically structured, like a fractal curve in complex dynamic systems theory. In whatever range it is examined, and on whatever scale, it discloses a similar configuration. In the

Logic, the moments of the Concept are Being and Essence, but within the doctrine of Being, quality, quantity, and measure stand in corresponding relations one to another. So, in Essence, do identity, difference, and ground; and these reappear at the level of the Concept, as universal, particular, and individual. On the larger scale of the entire system, Idea, Nature, and Spirit are mutually related as are Being, Essence, and Concept, as identity, difference, and ground, or as universal, particular, and individual. It is thus only to be expected that the same structure should reappear in the culminating phase of the system, the philosophy of religion.

That philosophy begins with "its universal content, the as yet veiled concept of religion itself, that God is the absolute truth, the truth of everything, and that religion alone is true knowledge." Its first task is to develop scientifically (i.e., philosophically) the notion of God that is present in all religious experience, but is still, for the intellect, an abstract name. God is for *Religionsphilosophie* what Being is for Logic, the immediate, initially unmediated, universal. At this level of the dialectic, however, God has to be defined as the absolutely true, the absolutely concrete universal, which comprehends everything, contains its particulars in itself, and gives them subsistence, differentiating and specifying itself by its own inherent activity and power. God is, in short, at once absolute Idea, and absolute Spirit manifesting itself in Nature and human mentality.

The essence of religion is its self-reflective phase, the reflection of spirit into itself in its self-differentiation and self-specification. It now presents itself as the relation of God to His creation, the naturally generated human personality—the relation of human consciousness and of the human person to God. What Hegel calls "the necessity of religion" is proved by its establishment as the inevitable outcome of the dialectic of consciousness itself and of its object. The next phase of the philosophy of religion is thus a phenomenology of religious experience, recapitulating at the appropriate level the earlier categories of Subjective Spirit, and by implication those of the Philosophy of Nature of which spirit has proved to be the truth.

The outcome of this dialectic is the apprehension of an affirmative relation of finite to infinite spirit, the concept of religion as this relation, and more, as the self-relation of absolute Spirit to its other; and yet more, as the idea of spirit relating itself to itself, or the self-consciousness of absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit sets itself as its own object, thus limiting itself and implicating finite consciousness (in which subject and object are also thus distinguished).[13] It posits itself as finite consciousness, mediating itself through it in order to become knowledge of itself. Thus religion is the knowledge of the Divine Spirit of itself through the mediation of finite spirit. The relation of the divine and the human, which is the essence of religion is, in this way, explicated so as at once to define it speculatively and

to prepare the ground for the account of the Incarnation to be given in the final part of the *Religionsphilosophie*.

In this context Hegel explicitly refers to "the activity and movement of the idea of absolute Spirit in itself," whereby it makes itself object and self-subsistent as opposed to the Concept, in the form of the natural world. While this self-diremption is one moment, the other is the return of this object, through its own process to its source. Spirit is self-appearing to itself, and the appearance is Nature, but not merely as phenomenon; it is also the process to its own appearance to itself in human experience. Within the religious consciousness this is represented as the Heavens declaring the glory of God, and God as the Lord of the world.

What we have been given here is then virtually a retracing of the dialectic of the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopaedia*, but in the context of the final phase in each case. Process and end overlap, the latter sublating and encompassing the former. The philosophy of religion displays itself as the whole of philosophy *aufgehoben*.

The third moment of the Concept, as such, is individuality; so the concept of religion likewise has a third phase in which its subjectivity is objectified. In the Introduction Hegel wrote:

> . . . *der Geist, der nicht erscheint, ist nicht*
> (there is no spirit that does not appear).

Objectification of the subjective is a theme we have found recurring consistently and systematically throughout Hegel's philosophy; so here again subjective religion, like subjective mind, expresses itself in objective configurations, as cult, in the forms of creed, ceremonial, and church. This is the unity of God (as universal) and humanity (as particular) in the religious community inspired by the Holy Spirit (individual). The cult is the impregnation of social life and custom with religious conviction and practice, and is, in fact, the latent motif of the whole philosophy of Objective Spirit, as becomes evident in this section of the Philosophy of Religion. Not surprisingly, then, the first part of the *Religionsphilosophie* ends with a lengthy discussion (echoing that in Paragraph 552 of the *Encyclopaedia*) of the relation between Church and State.

Accordingly we have here a recapitulation, not simply of the appropriate logical categories, but also of those of Objective Mind, within the framework of the consummatory phase of Spirit, as such, in which all prior moments have been sublated, that is, preserved while having been superseded and transformed.

We are told in *Enzyclopädie*, 114 that the Doctrine of Essence is the most difficult part of the Logic, because, Hegel says, it (especially) contains all the categories of metaphysics and science (meaning by "metaphysics" the old-

style dogmatic metaphysics). It is indeed the most difficult, not only for the reason given, but also for reasons more profound and intrinsic to the dialectic. Essence, as we are also told in this context, repeats the categories of Being, but now as relative, as reflected into themselves. Its categories become twofold, each consisting of a pair of complementary and interdependent aspects, so that we have to grasp the significance of their mutual relation as well as their relation to prior and posterior categories that are likewise double.

Further, the categories of Essence are those of the understanding (i.e., of science and metaphysics), which is that stage of thinking that characteristically abstracts, analyzing its objects and holding the distinguished elements apart, oblivious of their mutual interdependent relationship. Accordingly, each category can be interpreted both concretely, as a necessary and legitimate moment in the dialectic of the Concept, and abstractly, as applied by the understanding. Logic, therefore, at once expounds them as they are generated by their inherent dialectic and criticizes them as abstractly understood. Criticizing them from the viewpoint of the Concept, it anticipates by implication what is to follow, while it also reflects what has gone before. It is by reason of such complexity that Essence becomes the most difficult part of the Logic.

Much the same is true of the second Part of the *Religionsphilosophie* and for the same reasons. It corresponds to the Doctrine of Essence in the Logic. It deals with the self-specification of religion, its different historical manifestations, its particular determinate forms. It relates to the first Part, therefore, as particular to universal, as it should, so far as religion, qua Absolute Spirit, has sublated the categories of the Concept. But while the concept of religion is immanent in each and every actual, historical religion, none expresses it adequately; and they advance dialectically, progressively approaching in degree the consummate religion that is to be expounded in Part III. It is, so to speak, the essence of which they are the adumbrating appearances (as the Concept is in principle the essence that appears in reflection upon Being). For this reason, however, they are also false appearances (*Schein*), and, while their legitimacy as phases of religious development is to be established, they are concurrently criticized for their inadequacy. They are each, at the same time, the actual existence of religion (*Dasein*), religion *an sich*, but not yet *für sich*—not yet *Geist für den Geist*. Accordingly, Part II is the most difficult, the most complicated, and by far the longest, of the *Religionsphilosophie*.

Further, determinate religion relates to the concept of religion as Nature relates to the Idea: it is its externalization. And the position of Nature is ambivalent. It is at one and the same time a return to the immediacy of Being, yet is self-external and reflected into itself as other, revealing its

therefore, in fact, treated as a determinate religion, but as that determination which is at the same time the actualized universal, at home with itself in its other. Hence it is the Truth, absolute and revealed.

The object of religion is Truth, the absolute Idea, God, in His eternal essence; but the Idea is the identity of subject and object, which is here represented in the identity of Christ, as human and finite, with God as infinite and divine. It is the identity of finite spirit, incarnate in man, with infinite spirit, God, incarnate in Christ. Each is self-conscious, and each is conscious of the other as object, and each is conscious of the other as identical with self. This absolute unity in difference of God and Man Hegel identifies as eternal Love. The identity is now set out as mediated by its essential moments of universality, particularity and individuality, as it was (qua Concept) in the Logic and (qua Absolute) in the *Encyclopaedia* as a whole. And its exposition in the Philosophy of Religion runs parallel with both of those expositions at once.

> That is ever the way of all science: first the concept, then the determination of the concept, the reality, objectivity, and finally this, that the first concept is object to itself, is for itself, becomes objective to itself, relates itself to itself. That is the way of philosophy. First the concept of the conceiving science; this concept *we* have. The last, however, is that the science itself grasps its concept, this concept is for itself. (*Philosophie der Religion*, III, 1)

In short, all philosophy is what the philosophy of religion is, and especially is reenacted in the final part, the theory of the absolute, the fulfilled, the revealed religion. It is here that "the science itself grasps its concept," and the concept, which is, in its fulfillment, the Truth (God in His eternal essence), is for itself.

The content of Part III makes this abundantly clear. God, the Truth, the absolute Idea, alienates Himself from Himself, making himself, as other, His object; that is, He creates the natural world, and within it humanity. So Nature returns through its own inner dialectic, to Spirit, but in the first instance, finite spirit. Thus God reveals himself first in Nature:

> The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork. (Ps. 19)

> The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof; the world and all that dwell therein. (Ps. 24)

But in the fullness of time, when the human spirit has developed to the appropriate point in its history, God reveals Himself in his true form as Spirit, in the person of Christ, uniting in one, both finite and infinite Spirit, which then continues to dwell in the holy community, as objective religion—in the Church, where the concept of religion has become its own object.

All this has been presented in the extended system of philosophy: the Idea in the Logic, its self-diremption and appearance in the form of otherbeing in the Philosophy of Nature, and its becoming aware of itself and objectifying its self-awareness in history in the Philosophy of Mind. Culminating in absolute Spirit, this self-awareness and self-objectification takes the forms of art and religion, the philosophy of which, is finally the Philosophy of Religion, the whole of philosophy.

This "*Gang in aller Wissenschaft*" presents itself in the third Part of the *Religionsphilosophie* in three phases: the Realm of the Father (Idea), the Realm of the Son (Nature), and the Realm of the Spirit, disclosing the philosophy of religion as the whole of philosophy become aware of itself as object, the object being that of religion—Truth, in the sense that God, and He alone is the truth. And this Truth is the identity of identity and non-identity: the atonement of God and natural man in Christ (who is the spiritual Head of which the Church is the body).

The self-diremption of the universal, its self-specification into the diverse particular embodiments of its own self-development as its other, and its final identification of itself with this other, is the persistent and repetitive structure of the dialectic of spirit throughout its course. And this is what is shown to be the essential nature of the triune God of the absolute, the revealed, religion. The Holy Trinity is thus the implicit content of, and therefore what is actually foreshadowed by, every triad in the dialectic. For Hegel, religion (in particular the Christian religion) is the presupposed foundation and intrinsic essence of all philosophy; and the entire *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, culminating in the *Religionsphilosophie* is the demonstration in extenso of this inner inspiration.

So, for Hegel, philosophy does not take precedence over religion, but is dependent upon it, while in the philosophy of religion both are identified. The Philosophy of Religion is, qua Concept, what religion itself is, qua representation; and philosophy as a whole, and in its detail, is a presentation, as knowledge, of the Holy Trinity worshiped in the Christian religion. It is the knowledge of God, of which Isaiah sang:

> . . . the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.[14]

Notes

1. Cf. Emile Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Philosophy*; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967); Quentin Lauer, *Hegel's Concept of God* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982).
2. *Vorlesungen über der Philosophie der Religion*, III, Jaeschke, v. 5, p. 104; *Werke*, Vol. 17, p. 192.

3. *Phänomenologie*, Preface.
4. Ibid.
5. *Science of Logic*, Introduction.
6. *Enzyclopädie*, 1.
7. *Enzyclopädie*, *Zweiter Teil*, 247 *Zusatz*.
8. Ibid.
9. Cf. *Enzyclopädie*, 552, where Hegel identifies the concrete content of faith as spirit, "the absolute determination of which is active reason."
10. In the passage quoted above from the *Religionsphilosophie*, Hegel explains that religion is spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit, but that merely subjective knowing is limited and so insubstantial. Truly infinite self-knowledge is concrete, as realized in absolute Spirit.
11. Cf. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Chap. I.
12. *Religionsphilosophie*, I, Introduction, A, II, 1.
13. Here there is a distinct echo of Fichte.
14. Isaiah, 11, 9.

17
Appendix: Hegel and Whitehead

The most common reason given nowadays for the impossibility of returning to a system like Hegel's is its incompatibility with the outlook and attitude established by contemporary science. The advance of modern science and technology, Professor Charles Taylor has told us, has burst the bounds of the Hegelian system and has shattered the ideals and illusions of nineteenth-century Romanticism.[1] Throughout this book I have been trying to demonstrate the opposite thesis, that Hegel is astonishingly up-to-date, and that both his conception of Nature and the dialectical pattern of his reasoning and of his philosophical schema are precisely suited to contemporary developments in physics. This claim can be reinforced by comparing Hegel's doctrine with the ideas of the modern philosopher, who as well as being a prominent mathematician and scientist, is undoubtedly the greatest of twentieth-century metaphysicians since F. H. Bradley; that is, A. N. Whitehead.

Nobody is likely to suggest that Whitehead's theories are incompatible with the outlook of contemporary science, for, among other things, he was one of the foremost contributers to the theory of relativity, offering an alternative version of the theory to Einstein's; and his whole philosophy was based upon and derives from the conception of the universe impressed upon him by his scientific studies. If a close parallel can be found between the thought of Whitehead and that of Hegel, Professor Taylor's strictures will seem rather less formidable, and that there is such a parallel, I am firmly convinced and long ago tried to demonstrate.[2]

Whitehead's metaphysic is, however, no less than Hegel's, discredited in many quarters today, not only as obscure and fanciful, but also as a thoroughly outdated and old-fashioned attempt at comprehensive system building. In this respect, at least it is generally admitted that Whitehead and Hegel are alike: they are both notorious system builders. And metaphysical systems are these days regarded as disreputable—any such system being considered an arrogant claim to omniscience and a pontifical pretense of finality.

In the light of recent developments in science any such criticism is perverse. The theories of modern physics and biology tend in different and complementary ways towards a holism that provides actual empirical evidence in favor of metaphysical systems like those of Hegel and Whitehead, and further affords a foundation and indeed a demand for just such system-building, embodying principles and forms of explanation set out by R. G. Collingwood in his *Essay on Philosophical Method*. I have tried elsewhere to demonstrate all this at length, not only theoretically, but also in practice.[3] It would not be appropriate to repeat the details of those attempts at this point, and the more stubborn opponents of systematization will have to refer to them directly for stronger persuasion. Meanwhile, let us recall that Hegel castigated any unsystematic philosophizing as the display of mere whimsical opinion, unworthy of the name of *Wissenschaft*.[4]

Thomas Kuhn, whose work has been taken seriously and has been widely discussed in recent years by both philosophers and scientists, contends that all science operates under the aegis of what he calls a paradigm. Whatever difficulties attend the definition of this concept, he insists that it includes assumptions of the general nature of things and of their fundamental characteristics. This clearly implies that all science presupposes a metaphysical system of some sort, the explicit formulation of which, one would imagine, is the appointed task of the philosopher. If any such exposition is to be sought today, it is hardly likely to be forthcoming from Analysts or Existentialists, so if guidance and inspiration is to be found in recent philosophy at all, there is little alternative to going back to Whitehead. A comparison of Whitehead with Hegel, should, for this reason, repay close study; and when it is made it discloses an outstanding example of two minds, roughly a century apart, independently thinking amazingly alike.

Whitehead is known and widely revered as the father of Process Philosophy, as opposed to the more traditional metaphysics of substance. In one of his earlier works, *The Concept of Nature*, he protests emphatically against the idea of substance, maintaining that the primary reality consists of events.[5] He develops this notion into a conception of reality the fundamental principles of which are creativity and process. These concepts are not commonly associated with Hegel, as they should be, for they are as essential and as fundamental to his position as they are to Whitehead's and in much the same way.

Hegel asserts in the Introduction to his *Encyclopaedia*,[6] that dialectic is the principle of all life and all movement. For Hegel dialectic structures the whole of reality. Its basic category and character is Becoming, the ubiquitous and fundamental movement of thought, of Nature, and of Spirit. He frequently describes Spirit and the Idea as eternal restlessness, and in the *Encyclopaedia* he says, "The idea is essentially process insofar as it is absolute negativity and therefore dialectical" (215).

Objection might be raised that process and creativity in Whitehead are not the same kind of movement as dialectic in the Hegelian sense, because they do not involve negativity and contradiction in the same way; but any such objection would involve misconception of either or both theories, and a rather superficial reading of Whitehead. For him, the process is one of concrescence, and so it is also for Hegel, the coming into being of the concrete. In both cases the concrete is a systematic ordered whole; and it is with reference to this alone that the significance and function of negativity can properly be understood. For both thinkers it is in fact the same, although stressed rather differently by each.

To give an adequate account of the role of negativity in the systems of either of these two philosophers would require at least a chapter to itself. Here I shall be brief and selective, in the hope of highlighting what is essential to both. For Hegel, at every stage of the dialectic, the whole, which is the truth, is being developed (or rather, is developing itself) out of partial and abstract elements, the true natures of which are solely determined by their place in the whole. Taken in isolation, therefore, the whole immanent in each of them demands the supplementation of each by what it omits, its other, which, because that is what it excludes, negates it. Negation is the concomitant of difference and distinction, essential equally to the precise discrimination of parts and the integrative concrescence of the whole; for no undifferentiated unity is more than an abstraction, and the true and ultimate whole, "the true form in which the truth exists" is always and only a fully elaborated system.[7] The dialectical function of negativity, in consequence, is nothing other than the nisus towards the whole, the immanence of which in the part demands its other, defines its limits, reveals its inadequacy, and unites it with its opposite (its negative) in a systematically differentiated totality. It is precisely this unity of opposites in their mutual distinction (the unity of being and nothing) that is Becoming.

For Whitehead, concrescence is primarily the grasping into the unity of the actual entity of the multiplicity of Nature (in fact, of the whole of the universe) by each and every actual occasion; and negativity appears in negative prehensions. "A negative prehension," Whitehead tells us, "is the definite exclusion of that item from positive contribution to the subject's [the actual entity's] own real internal constitution."[8] That negative prehensions serve the same function for Whitehead as negativity does for Hegel is illustrated by the following passage from *Process and Reality*:

> The importance of negative prehensions arises from the fact that (i) actual entities form a system, in the sense of entering into each other's constitutions, (ii) that by the ontological principle every entity is felt by some actual entity, (iii) that, as a consequence of (i) and (ii), every entity in the actual world of a concrescent actuality has some gradation of real relevance to that concrescence, (iv) that, in consequence of (iii), the negative

> prehension of an entity is a positive fact with its emotional subjective form, (v) there is a mutual sensitivity of the subjective forms of prehensions, so that they are not indifferent to each other, (vi) the concrescence issues in one concrete feeling, the satisfaction.[9]

From this it is evident that negative prehensions are necessary to the grasping into unity of the entire universe by each actual occasion, and the systematic character of the unity determines their relevance. For this reason, in Whitehead's thought as in Hegel's, negativity always has a positive aspect and is always significant negation. The negative prehension with its emotional subjective form is an element in that "lure for feeling" which appetitively urges on the concrescent process towards satisfaction. Thus the unity of the actual entity is an expression and a reflection of the ultimate unity of the universe. This is as true for Whitehead as it is for Hegel, as will presently appear.

From the passage quoted, it is further apparent that Whitehead recognized the internality of relations that follows from systematic order in a whole. Actual entities enter into each other's internal constitution, so none is independent of the others, whether it prehends them positively or negatively; they are all mutually relevant in varying degree. The emotional contribution of the negative prehension to the subjective form (and aim) of the actual entity, we may presume, is the urge to overcome contradiction and to effect harmonious concrescence in one concrete feeling that satisfies. All this is recognizably Hegelian in tone, and is entirely consonant wih the way in which the Hegelian dialectic works.

Although both philosophers are eminently and unquestionably process philosophers, neither of them abandons the concept of substance altogether. What they do is to reinterpret it, transforming it from that of a solid and static substrate to a fluid and dynamic activity of self-differentiation by the universal whole. That they are alike in this respect is evident from their respective attitudes to Spinoza's doctrine. "In the analogy with Spinoza," Whitehead writes, "his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus the concrete fact is process."[10] The process is that of the self-individualization by the totality which is the universe, and which is constituted in and by the mutual prehension of its modal differences. This is precisely what Hegel's dialectical becoming effects.

Hegel criticizes Spinoza's conception of substance (I think unjustifiably) as lacking any principle of self-differentiation that can explain the diversity of its attributes and modes, so that substance remains the only genuine reality, in which all differences are absorbed and obliterated.[11] Although I think this misrepresents Spinoza and fails to do him justice, it makes clear

Hegel's intention to recast the conception of substance as a concrete universal, one that particularizes itself by its own inherent dialectic, as he puts it, the universal which has its particulars in itself. In the final outcome, Hegel insists that this universal is the absolute Idea, which is infinite restlessness, and its ceaseless activity is that of self-differentiation and self-unification in one—the essential drive of dialectic. And this too is the nature of Whitehead's process of creativity.

That Whitehead's process of concrescence is always and essentially one of integration, uniting into a whole a multiplicity of differences, is beyond question; and that every such whole is the expression of the universal whole is not difficult to demonstrate. Likewise, in every such whole the principle of order and unification is always immanent. About the first of these submissions Whitehead leaves us in no doubt when he writes:

> "Creativity" is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.[12]

The universe disjunctively is the multiplicity of actual entities, each of which prehends into unity all the rest, and so becomes the universe conjunctively. The universe is the macrocosm of which each occasion is the microcosm. Both, therefore, are different versions, or expressions, of the same whole; and the principle of unity in the former is immanent equally in the latter.

The role played by "eternal objects" in the process of concrescence reinforces this immanence of the whole in each and all of the parts. Just what Whitehead means by eternal objects is a matter for debate, but some statements about them can be made without undue hesitation. In *Science and the Modern World* he lists as examples "colours, sounds, scents, geometrical characters" (29), and he also says that they are "transcendent entities," which have in the past been called universals, and "are thus, in their nature, abstract" (197). Except for the fact that they have in the past all been called universals, colors, sounds, scents, and geometrical entities are not exactly a homogeneous grouping; but from what Whitehead writes about eternal objects elsewhere, it is fairly clear that he takes them to be concepts in some general sense. It is only in their nature or "essence" that they are abstract, not in their ingression into actual occasions. He defines them further, in *Process and Reality*, as "potentialities of definiteness" which function as a "lure for feeling." *How* something is felt is the mode of ingression of an eternal object into the actual entity (131). Further, they are the objects of conceptual prehensions, the "only operations of 'pure' mentality," and they are identified with Platonic forms.[13] Accordingly, it does seem fairly clear

that Whitehead intends eternal objects to be understood as concepts, abstract if taken in their essential nature, but, in their ingression into actual entities, principles of structure determining the way in which prehensions are felt and ordered (potentialities of definiteness).[14]

In Whitehead's theory every actual entity prehends every other, and the subjective form of its prehensions is regulated by eternal objects. So formed it achieves satisfaction and becomes a superject which is objective to subsequent occasions. Thus eternal objects, the prehensions of which constitute the mental pole of the actual entity, are implicit in every prehension, physical or mental; in other words, concepts are "at work" in all reality—and this is what Hegel tells us in the Introduction to the *Wissenschaft der Logik*.

The immanence of concepts in all reality is emphasized in Whitehead's account of the primordial nature of God, which, he tells us, is "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects," their togetherness, determining the relevance to each and every actual entity of all eternal objects.[15] This too, he says, is abstract and "deficiently actual" apart from God's physical prehension of the actual entities of the evolving universe.[16] The primordial nature of God is thus the ordering principle of the entire universe determining the relevance of each eternal object to every actual entity. Thus the principle of wholeness and concrescence is immanent in every finite entity and is, in God's primordial nature, the conceptual logical totality.

There can be little doubt that God's primordial nature is Whitehead's counterpart of the Idea in Hegel's Logic. Hegel asserts that the Idea is "God in his eternal essence, prior to the creation of Nature and finite spirit" and Whitehead says of God in his primordial nature, "he is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation" (almost as if he had Hegel in mind).[17] Hegel says of the logical Idea that it is abstract apart from its dialectical unfolding, its embodiment in Nature and its self-knowledge in spirit, just as Whitehead's God is deficiently actual in his primordial nature but fully actual in his consequent nature. For Hegel, every category of the Logic is a provisional definition of the Absolute, and the whole range of categories *aufgehoben* in the absolute Idea is what the Logic is—the doctrine of the Concept, the ordered range of concepts as they relate to the actualities of the world. This is just what, for Whitehead, God is in his primordial nature.

Equally it will be true to say that, as for Hegel, Nature is the Idea in the form of other-being, or externality, so for Whitehead, Nature is the exposition or embodiment of God's primordial nature. As, for Hegel, Nature returns to itself in spirit out of Nature's self-externality and comes to know itself as absolute, so for Whitehead, God's consequent nature is the prehension of the total evolving scheme of things, which he explicitly says is conscious, "the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and

through the transformation of his wisdom." The subjective aim of every actual entity is to achieve concrete unity, and God, in prehending all superjects realizes all subjective aims. His consequent nature is thus the final realization in full self-consciousness of all striving—the ultimate unity of all subjects with all objects. It is, in short, Hegel's absolute Spirit.

But what of creativity and the dialectic? Although we may admit that Hegel is essentially a process philosopher and that negativity is as important for Whitehead as it is for Hegel, is the Whiteheadian process really dialectical, and is God, in his consequent nature, really absolute? These are points, perhaps, which will be most hotly disputed by the stauncher Whiteheadians.

Hegel has told us that dialectic is the principle of all movement and all activity. It is so because it is the process of self-differentiation of the whole, that is immanent in all its moments and thus in all reality. Each partial and provisional element, therefore, fails to maintain itself in isolation, because its true and only nature is as a moment in the whole, so that it demands and goes over into its other to unite with it and to constitute a more complete and adequate exemplification of the ultimate universal principle of wholeness. This is, in the final outcome, absolute Spirit, which, throughout the dialectical movement, is realizing itself as subject. Characteristic of this process throughout is *Aufhebung*: the absorption, preservation, and elevation of what has been superseded.

Whitehead nowhere gives as explicit an account of the method of process as does Hegel, but in what he does say about it we can recognize most of the important features of dialectic. In his anxiety to preserve realism, Whitehead avoids a purely logical or conceptual account of process and traces the stages of concrescence at the level of organism, which, for Hegel, is the level of *Geist* rather than that of Logic; so that we find the closest parallel between Hegel and Whitehead in what Hegel calls "Anthropology," "Phenomenology," and "Psychology."

But for both of them the process is one of self-realization of subjective unity. The category of subjective unity, Whitehead says, "has to do with self-realization" which is "the ultimate fact of facts."[18] The unity of the subject establishes a sort of preestablished harmony making the many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase compatible for synthesis.[19] This, in effect, is Kant's unity of apperception, which Hegel identifies with the Concept. Actualization of this unity, Whitehead tells us, involves "objective definition at the hands of other entities," apart from which truth and falsity are meaningless.[20] Here we have the *determinatio* which is *negatio* as Hegel takes it over from Spinoza. And the result is unity—the unity of subject-superject which "is the purpose of the process originating the feelings."

The subject, as it prehends the multiplicity of other entities in the world,

has the whole immanent in it. Its subjective aim results from its prehension of the primordial nature of God. "Each temporal entity," Whitehead says, "in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world. . . ."[21] And the unity which is the purpose of the process is, as we have seen, ultimately gathered up into the unity of God's consequent nature.

That the process is *aufhebend* the following passage gives testimony:

> Each stage carries in itself the promise of its successor, and each succeeding stage carries in itself the antecedent out of which it arose. For example the complexity of the datum carries in itself the transition from the conformal feelings to supplementary feelings in which contrasts, latent in the datum, achieve real unity between the components.[22]

The main account which Whitehead gives of process is of concrescence within the individual actual entity; but as the transition from one "epoch" or "duration" to the next is simply prehension by the subsequent generation of actual occasions of the preceding objectified superjects, the principles involved are the same throughout. The phases are those of dative ingression, conformal physical feeling, conceptual feeling, and comparative feeling. The first two are virtually one, for conformal feelings are simply the veridical prehensions of the data. So we have a Hegelian triad: first immediacy, then distinction and differentiation, and finally articulated synthesis.

The latter two stages of feeling are constituted by the realization of specific modes of diversity and identity, the realization also involving adjustment of intensities of relevance.[23]

Whitehead concludes the section with the remark:

> In place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought, the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of feelings.[24]

Feelings, for Hegel, are on the level of spirit; so what we are dealing with here is *Empfindung*, and the dialectic which is being traced is that from sentience to feeling (*Gefuhl*) and the unity of the subject. Feeling, Hegel has said, is the inwardizing (*Erinnerung*) as soul of the natural effects on the organism, which is exactly what Whitehead calls dative ingression, and it leads to the unity of the subject; in Hegel's words: *Die Seele ist zum individuellen Subjecte vereinzelt.*"[25] It is the first stage of the process which finally culminates in Spirit and becomes absolute in its ultimate self-knowledge; and this is, of course, a recapitulation at a higher stage of the logical dialectic. So what began in the Logic as a hierarchy of categories of thought develops in the end (as Whitehead requires) into a hierarchy of feelings. Interestingly we find Whitehead asserting in his own version of the development process:

> But *what* becomes is always a *res vera*, and the concrescence of a *res vera* is the development of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea.[26]

The reiteration or retention of a pattern of prehensions along a historic route of actual occasions constitutes an enduring object; and an animal body involves the intersection of numerous such objects in a complex web. The final node of such a body is the presiding occasion of the complex social nexus. This presiding occasion inherits a wealth of superjective material including prehensions of diverse types, which in it are synthesized and united into a harmony of contrasts issuing, Whitehead says, into intensity of experience, so that the human body is conscious of its bodily inheritance. Consciousness, accordingly, is a late phase in the process of concrescence in a highly complex society of actual occasions.

Such an account is entirely consonant with, and runs closely parallel to, Hegel's view of *Empfindung*, or soul, as the *Erinnerung* of the processes in the organic body registering the widespread influences of the natural world. And just as, for Hegel, Spirit is the truth of Nature, and each successive phase of Spirit is subject to which the preceding phase is object, so for Whitehead, "conscious intellectuality," as a

> higher grade of mental activity is the intellectual self-analysis of the entity in an earlier stage of incompletion, effected by intellectual feelings produced at a later stage of concrescence.[27]

The final outcome of this development in Hegel's *Geistesphilosophie* is absolute Spirit, which he identifies in the *Religionsphilosophie* with the Holy Spirit. It is the ultimate self-knowledge of the whole, Aristotle's *noēsis noēseōs*, what God is. So also Whitehead brings the process to culmination in God's consequent nature. God, for Whitehead, is both primordial and consequent. He is the beginning and the end. So is he likewise for Hegel. Whitehead tells us that the completion of God's nature is the objectification in him of the world. By such objectification the mere potentiality of eternal objects acquires physical reality, so that God's consequent nature is the complete totality of the universe. God is thus at once eternal and everlasting—the eternal structural principle of all reality everlastingly actualizing itself in the prehension of its own creation. In the same way, Hegel tells us that the absolute Idea is eternally realized, while it is at the same time infinite restlessness that ceaselessly differentiates itself through self-diremption, to create a world of Nature—itself in the form of other-being—which it draws back into itself and with which it unites in absolute Spirit.

Whitehead was trying to express a view of the universe, both in detail and as a whole, which the physics of relativity and quanta in their early years

had impressed upon him. Since his death, developments in particle physics have led to a view of the world which almost precisely answers to Whiteheadian and Hegelian metaphysics: a unitary world, systematically ordered by an immanent organizing principle, which specifies itself in dialectical fashion, so as to culminate in human intelligence. This has been expressed by recent scientists (notably Stephen Hawking, Paul Davies, John Barrow, and Frank Tipler) as the Anthropic Cosmological Principle. The philosophical implications of which I have tried to develop in *Cosmos and Anthropos*.

When Whitehead wrote, the current philosophical debate was between Idealism and Realism: the first was represented in Britain by the Oxford school of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, and in America by thinkers such as Josiah Royce and Ernest Hocking; the second was represented by writers like Bertrand Russell and the American Critical Realists. Whitehead was anxious to retain an "objectivist" position, while doing justice to the insights of the idealists. As he himself says in the preface to *Process and Reality*, if his cosmology is to be deemed successful, "it becomes natural to ask . . . whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism on to a realistic basis."[28] In some respects, therefore he leaned strongly in the Realist direction, insisting on the indispensability of "physical data" for knowledge and the "conformal phase" of feeling, while at the same time repudiating what he called "vacuous actuality" (that is, actuality devoid of subjectivity or mind), and emphasizing the formative role in concrescence of the "mental pole." Nature, he declared, in an early work, is closed to mind.[29] But then almost immediately he protests against and rejects any tendency to bifurcate Nature into what is purely physical and what is mind-dependent. In his mature thought, as we have seen, Nature is the process of concrescence throughout which principles of definiteness, the objects of conceptual prehensions, which are the germ of mind, are everywhere immanent, so that no actuality is "vacuous"; and this mentality develops until it emerges as consciousness, which attains its ultimate and complete realization in the consequent nature of God. So Whitehead's philosophy reconciles the Realism and the Idealism of his day.

Hegel, at that time, was misunderstood by his own idealistic followers equally with his materialist Marxist critics as wishing to reduce the world to pure subjectivity; whereas in truth, as some contemporary scholars have come to realize, Hegel is emphatically realist in his conception of Nature, out of which, he teaches, spirit is dialectically generated, so that in the self-consciousness of spirit, Nature becomes aware of itself (*an und für sich*); and, because what anything truly *is* is what it dialectically *becomes*, Spirit is the truth of Nature. But this is not to overlook the concomitant facts that the truth is actual and that the external world is the truth implicitly.[30]

Hegel, therefore, also reconciled Idealism with Realism with an insight which was not recovered until Whitehead developed a metaphysical system that was, in effect, Hegelian, although he had never really read Hegel, but knew of his ideas almost entirely from what others had written about him.

Notes

1. Charles Taylor, op. cit., Chap. XX.
2. Cf. *Nature, Mind and Modern Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1954), Chap. XIX.
3. Cf. *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1965); *Hypothesis and Perception* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1970); *Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical Thinking* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987); *The Reality of Time* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988); *Cosmos and Anthropos* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1991).
4. *Enc.*, 14.
5. *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), pp. 15ff.
6. Ibid., 81.
7. Cf. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface.
8. *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 56.
9. Ibid.
10. *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), p. 87.
11. Cf. *Science of Logic*, Pt. I, Bk. I, Sect. III, Introduction; Bk. II, Sect. III, Chap. III, *Rem.*; *Enc.*, 50; *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Vol. III, Section Two, Chap. I,A,2. Cf. also my paper, "The Concept of Substance in Spinoza and Hegel," *Proceedings of the First Italian International Congress on Spinoza: Spinoza nel 350° anniversario della Nascita*, ed. Emilia Giancotti (Napoli: Bibiliopolis, 1985), pp. 51–70.
12. *Process and Reality*, p. 28.
13. Id., pp. 54, 60, 63.
14. Ibid. and p. 487.
15. Id., pp. 44–46.
16. Id., pp. 122 and 489.
17. Id., p. 486.
18. Id., p. 314.
19. Id., p. 315.
20. Ibid., p. 314.
21. Id., p. 317.
22. Id., p. 231.
23. Ibid.
24. Id., p. 232f.
25. *Enc.*, 395.
26. *Process and Reality*, p. 234.
27. Id., p. 77.
28. Id., p. vii.
29. *The Concept of Nature*, p. 4.
30. *Enc.*, 38 *Zusatz*.

Select Bibliography

HEGEL'S WORKS

Collected Works

Gesammelte Werke. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981.

Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe. 20 vols., herausgegeben von Herman Glockner. Stuttgart: 1927–34. Reprinted 1964.

Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Ausgabe. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson und Johannes Hoffmeister (succeeded by other editors). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1911–55.

Werke. In zwanzig Bänden, Theorie Werkausgabe, *Redaktion.* Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971–78.

Werke. In 18 Bänden, 1832–1845, herausgegeben von P. Marheineke, J. Schulze, L. Henning, E. Gans, H. Hotho, L. Michelet, and F. Forster. Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1840–47.

Single Works

Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie. Herausgegeben von G. Lasson. Leipzig, 1928.

Glauben und Wissen. Herausgegeben von G. Lasson. Leipzig, 1928.

Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Herausgegeben von G. Lasson. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1930.

Hegels Phenomenologie des Geistes. Jubiläumsausgabe. Herausgegeben von G. Lasson. Leipzig: Verlag der Durr'schen Buchhandlung, 1907.

Die Philosophie des Rechts, die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg, 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19). Herausgegeben von Karl-Heinz Ilting. Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta, 1983.

Philosophie des Rechts, die Vorlesungenvon 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift. Herausgegeben von Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983.

Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie. Herausgegeben von G. Lasson. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1913.

Vorlesungen: Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft, Heidelberg 1817/18, mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818/19 nachgeschrieben von P. Wannenmann. Herausgegeben von C. Becker, W. Bonsiepen, A. Gethmann-Siefert, E. Hogemann, W. Jaeschke, Ch. Jamme, H-Ch. Lucas, K. R. Meist, H. Schneider, mit einer Einleitung von O. Pöggeler. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983.

English Translations

Early Theological Writings. Translated by T. M. Knox. Introduction by R. Kroner, Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press and Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

Hegel, The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy. Translated by J. P. Surber. Reseda, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1978.

Hegel, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. Translated by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, N.Y.: University of New York Press, 1977.

Hegel, Faith and Knowledge. Translated by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1977.

Hegel, The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics. Translated by John W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni. Introduction and Notes by H. S. Harris. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986.

Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1892 and reprinted, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1955, 1963, 1968.

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Edited by P. C. Hodgson. Translated by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, with assistance from H. S. Harris. 3 vols. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif. and London: University of California Press, 1984–87.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. Translated by Sir James Baillie. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1910. Revised 1931. Reprinted 1955, 1961, 1964, and 1966.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Analysis of text and Foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Revised with translation of the *Zusätze* by A. V. Miller. Foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford, 1971.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Translated by A. V. Miller. Foreword by J. Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Translated by Michael Petry. 3 vols. London: G. Allen and Unwin and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1970.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.

Hegel's Political Writings. Translated by T. M. Knox and Z. A. Pelczinski. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964–69.

Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1969.

Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers. 2 vols. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1929.

Lectures on the Philosophy of History, by G. W. F. Hegel. Translated from the third German Edition by J. Sibree. London: George Bell and Sons, 1881.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction Reason in History. Translated by H. B. Nisbet with an Introduction by Duncan Forbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

The Logic of Hegel. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892. Revised by A. V. Miller with Foreword by J. Findlay. Oxford, 1975.

Natural Law. Translated by T. M. Knox. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975.

OTHER WORKS ON HEGEL

Adorno, Th. *Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie,* Berlin and Frankfurt-am-Main, 1957; in *Gesammelte Schriften,* V., Suhrkamp, 1971.

Avineri, S. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Burbidge, J. *On Hegel's Logic*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981.
Caird, E. *Hegel*. London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1883.
Croce, B. *What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*. Translated by D. Ainslie. London, 1915.
Fackenheim, E. L. *The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought*. Bloomington, Ind. and London: Indiana University Press, 1967.
Findlay, J. *Hegel: A Re-examination*. London: G. Allen and Unwin and New York: Macmillan, 1958.
Greene, M. *Hegel on the Soul: A Speculative Anthropology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.
Gregoire, F. *Étude Hegeliennes, les points capitaux du système*, Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, Louvain, and PUL, 1958.
Günther, G. *Gründzuge einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1933.
Harris, E. E. *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*. Lanham, Md., New York, and London: University Press of America, 1983.
———. *Lire de Logique de Hegel: Commentaire de la Logique de Hegel*. Translated by Ph. Muller. Raison dialectique, Lausanne, l'Age d'Homme, 1987.
Harris, H. S. *Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts, Jena 1801–1806*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
———. *Hegel's Development: Towards the Sunlight*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
Harris, W. T. *Hegel's Logic*. Chicago: Griggs, 1890 and New York, 1969.
Houlgate, S. *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Hyppolite, J. *Genèse et Structure de la Phenoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel*. Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1946.
———. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
———. *Logique et Existence: Essai sur la Logique de Hegel*. Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1953.
Kainz, H. *Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary*. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1976.
———. *Part II: The Evolution of Ethical and Religious Consciousness to the Absolute Standpoint*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983.
Kaufmann, W. *Hegel, A Reinterpretation*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.
Kojève, A. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Translated by J. H. Nichols. New York: Basic Books, 1960.
Lakebrink, B. *Kommentar zu Hegels Logik*. 2 Bände, K. Alber, Freiburg/München: K. Alber, 1979.
Lamb, D. *Hegel: From Foundation to System*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
Lauer, Q. *Essays in Hegelian Dialectic*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1977.
———. *Hegel's Concept of God*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982.
Leonard, A. *Commentaire Litèral de la Logique de Hegel*. Vrin, Paris, Louvain, 1974.
Litt, T. *Hegel: Versuch einer kritische Erneuerung*. Heidelberg, 1953.
Loewenberg, J. *Hegel's Phenomenology*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1965.
Lucas, G. R. *Two Views of Freedom in Process Thought: A Study of Hegel and Whitehead*. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1979.
Lukács, G. *The Young Hegel*. Translated by R. Livingstone. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1966.

Marcuse, H. *Reason and Revolution.* New York and London: Oxford University Press and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1941.
McTaggart, J. M. E. *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910 and New York: Russell and Russell, 1964.
———. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896 and New York: Russell and Russell, 1964.
Müller, G. E. *Dialectic.* New York: Pageant Press, 1953.
———. *Hegel: The Man, His Vision and Work.* New York: Pageant Press, 1968.
Mure, G. R. G. *An Introduction to Hegel.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
———. *A Study of Hegel's Logic.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.
———. *The Philosophy of Hegel.* Oxford: Home University Library, Oxford University Press, 1965.
Noël, G. *La Logique de Hegel.* Paris: Vrin, 1897, 1967.
Pippin, R. *Hegel's Idealism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Plant, R. *Hegel.* Bloomington, Ind. and London: Indiana University Press, 1973.
Reyburn, H. A. *The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921, 1967.
Rockmore, T. *Hegel's Circular Epistemology.* Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986.
Rosen, M. *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Stace, W. T. *The Philosophy of Hegel.* New York: Dover Publications, 1955.
Taylor, C. *Hegel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Wallace, W. *The Logic of Hegel: Prolegomena.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

Anthologies

Algozin, K.; O'Malley, J.; Kainz, H.; and Rice L.; eds. *The Legacy of Hegel.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
Cohen, R., and Wartoffsky, M., eds. *Hegel and the Sciences.* Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984.
di Govanni, G., ed. *Essays on Hegel's Logic.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Horstmann, R., and Petry, M., eds. *Hegels Philosophie der Natur.* Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta, 1986.
Lucas, G. R. *Hegel and Whitehead.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1986.
MacIntyre, A., ed. *Hegel.* New York: Doubleday, 1972.
Steinkraus, W., ed. *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971.
Steinkraus, W., and Schmitz, K., eds. *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press and Surrey, England: Harvester Press, 1980.
Stepelevich, L., and Lamb, D., eds. *Hegel's Philosophy of Action.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983.
Verene, P., ed. *Hegel's Social and Political Thought.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press and Surrey, England: Harvester Press, 1980.
Weiss, F. G., ed. *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
Weiss, F. G., and Paolucci, A., eds. *Hegel in Comparative Literature.* New York: St. John's University Press, 1970.
Westphal, M., ed. *Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press and Surrey, England: Harvester Press, 1982.

Index

Numbers in italics indicate chapters, in boldface indicate subdivisions.

Absolute, 15, 17f., 27ff., 32, 37, 55f., 59, 61 et seq., 75f., 83, 95, 115, 122, 142, 146, 160, 177, 221, 235; frame of reference, 143; knowing (knowledge), 20, 35, 39 et seq., 49, 58, 70, 73, 78f., 106n. 15, 121, 132ff., 159, 210, 216; motion, 143; provisional definition of, 75, 77, 131, 157, 170, 252; rest, 143; restlessness (unrest), 17, 161, 174; space, 145; Spirit, *see* Spirit; *Wissen*, 62
Absolutism, 94; Bradleian, 94ff.
Abstraction, 54, 64, *67–80*, 102, 156
Absurdity, 5, 11
Action, 177, 182; human, 210, 212f.; theory of, *177–93*
Actuality, 95, 104
Adorno, T., 44, **54ff.**
Aesthetic, vii, 238
Aether, 130, 174
Agnosticism, 233
Alexander, S., 96f., 104
Alienation, 50f.
Alpha and Omega, **243ff.**
An sich, 39, 150, 155, 163, 188
Analytic philosophy, 5f., 9, 11, 114, 248
Anarchy, 11f.; international, 220
Anschauung, 54, 217, 237
Anselm, St., 223f.
Ansichsein, 87, 180
Anthropology, 163, 179, 253
Antithesis, 108, 156
Appearance. *See Erscheinung*
Apperception, 88. *See also* Unity: of apperception
Appetite, 180, 182
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 223
Aristotle, 1, 45, 59, 108, 110f., 152, 157, 193, 236, 255
Arms race, 13
Art, 40, 132, 215, 238, 245
Atheism, 50, 54, 64, 224, 233
Atonement, 215f., 229, 231, 243
Attention, 168
Aufheben (*Aufhebung*), 50ff., 56, 58, 62, 73, 131, 148, 161, 178f., 182, 185, 231, 240, 253f.
Augustine, St., 223, 225ff., 235
Äußerung, 178, 211, 230
Authenticity, 12
Authoritarianism, 4, 190
Avineri, S., 206n. 13

Bacchanalian revel, **37ff.**
Bacon, F., viii
Baillie, J. B., 71, 78
Balance of power, 13
Barrow, J., 256
Beagle, 58
Becoming, 59, 97, 160, 248
Begriff, 133, 217, 227
Behaviorism, 16
Being, 70, 77, 79, 102, 119, 162, 236, 239; Doctrine of, 73, 87, 131
Bell's Theorem, 145
Bentham, J., 45
Beobachtung der Natur, 123
Bergson, H., 104
Berkeley, G., 107ff.
Besonderes, 62
Bewußtsein, 167, 172
Bible, 224
Bildung, 29, 213
Biochemistry, 149
Biocoenosis, 151f.
Biology, viii, 16, 111, 115, 127, 149, 151, 248; organismic, 162
Biosphere, 151
Body, 40; and soul, **161ff.**, 169; -mind relation, 17, 155, 160, 168, 173
Bohm, D., 154n. 4
Bohr, N., 138
Bosanquet, B., 45, 99, 105nn. 9, 10, 190
Bradley, F. H., 75, 94, 96, 105, 109, 247
Bryce, Lord James, 196
Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, 187, 196
Butler, S., 47

Capitalism, 51

Capra, F., 154n. 4
Carr, E. H., 202
Carritt, F., 193n. 9
Categorical imperative, 12, 24, 189
Categories, 100; Aristotelian, 157; Kantian, 157, 180, 182; logical, 100, 119, 130, 132, 211; of the natural sciences, 122; of the understanding, 125, 233
Category, 37, 41, 49, 70, 72f., 76 et seq., 83f., 87, 94f. *See also* Thought-determination
Causation, 53; efficient, 52
Cause and effect, 105n. 11, 123
Chamberlain, N., 203
Chaos, 150
Charlatanry, 118
Chemism, 148
Chemistry, 138; quantum, 149
Choice, 5
Christ, 59, 61, 224, 229, 231, 243ff.; body of, 231; both finite and infinite spirit, 244; God and man, 59, 216, 244
Christian philosophy, *223–33*
Christianity, 23, 25, 30, 47, 208, 223ff., 231ff., 234, **243ff.**
Church, 231; Catholic, 25; Christian, 25; Protestant, 25
Churchill, W., 204
Civilization, 208, 211, 219
Class, 68
Clausewitz, C. von, 203
Collingwood, R. G., 7, 75, 169, 175, 213, 248
Common sense, 28, 84, 91, 103, 112, 120, 124ff., 132, 225, 233
Communism, 2, 46, 58, 190, 210
Complementaries, 142
Complementarity, 143; principle of, 138
Conatus, 18, 119
Concept, 10, 24, 26, 32, 37ff., 42, 51, 55, 58 et seq., 68, 70, 72f., 75f., 79f., 83, 90, 111, 113, 119, 121, 124, 126f., 130, 133, 147, 152, 159, 210, 218, 232, 236f., 240f.; dialectic of, 241; dialectical structure of, 153; Doctrine of, 42, 75, 95f., 100, 131, 181; fulfillment of the, 243; generic, 157; logical, 226; moments of the, 153, 180, 239, 244; objective, 95f., *177–94*; subjective, 181, 185; universal, 165
Concrescence, 249, 254
Concrete, *67–80*, 249. *See also* Universal
Conscience, 12, 15, 185
Consciousness, 39f., 61, 63, 95, 102, 108, 111ff., 119f., 128, 130, 153, 155, 162f., **172–75**; configurations of, 49; dialectic of, 239; process of, 128; self-reflective, 37
Constantine, 25
Constants, physical, 145
Constitution, 187f. *See also Verfassung*
Content, 78
Contingency, 14
Contradiction, 11, 17, 38, 86, 146, 218, 249
Contrariety, 132
Copernican revolution, 107; Kant's, 107ff.
Copernicus, N., 107, 134
Copula, 89
Correctness, 82ff. *See also* Truth
Creation, 230
Creativity, 249, 251, 253
Critical Philosophy, 28
Croce, B., 105n. 1, 156, 175n. 1
Crossman R. H. S., 64n. 1
Crystal, 149
Culture, 29, 213. *See also Bildung*
Cunning of reason, 14
Curry, John Philpot, 214
Cuvier, G. L., 116, 136

Darwin, C., 2, 57f., 136
Darwin, E., 57, 136
Darwinism, 114, 136
Dasein, 87, 162
Davies, P., 256
Death, 59
Deconstructionism, viii
Deduction, 157; dialectical as opposed to formal, 157
Degree, 78
Degrees, scale of, 142
Deity, 22, 24, 160
Democracy, 2, 4, 192, 198; constitutional, 199
Denkbestimmungen, 112, 115, 119, 131, 181, 237
Descartes, R., 36, 107, 157
Desire, 183
Despotism, 196, 198
Determinism, 215
Development, 97, 104, 156
Dewey, J., 1
Diads, 242
Dialectic, viif., 9ff., 15, 17, 32, 36, 38, 40ff., 45, 48ff., 52 et seq., 61, 64, 77, 79f., 83, 87, 90, 95, 98, 114, 124f., 150, **155–58**, 178 et seq., 209 et seq., 218f., 236, 241, 248, 253; exposition of, 73; historical, **218f.**, 221; logical, 78, 254; of Nature, 40, 61, 102; recurrence within the, **237–43**; transcendental, 48; turning points in the, 158
Dialectical Materialism, 10, 54. *See also* Materialism

Dialectical movement, 136, 180f.; process, 78, 121, 150; relationship, 110; scale, 146, 149; structure, 142, 153. *See also* Method
Dictatorship, 11, 205
Difference, 28, 45, 61, 69f., 79, 91, 116, 132, 157; numerical, 89f.
Differenzschrift, 27, 35
Distincts, 156f.
Doppelsatz, 17, 104, 191
Dualism, 169, 173; body-mind, 10, 155. *See also* Body: -mind relation
Dulckeit, K., 92n. 9

Ecology, viii, 151, 206, 208
Economic determinism, 3
Economics, 48f.
Ecosystem, 16, 151; the Earth as, 151
Eddington, Sir A., 135, 145ff.
Ego, 32, 37, 39f., 167; transcendental, 54f., 108, 113; unity of the, 108
Einstein, A., 16, 134, 147, 247
Embodiment, 180
Emotion, 168f.; James-Lange theory of, 170
Empfindung, 55, 163, 170, 254f.
Empiricism, 5, 28, 107, 130; British, 37; Newton's, 135
End, 99, 213; of History, *see* History
Energeia, 10, 110
Engels, F., 46, 114
Enlightenment, 21f., 48, 50, 213, 223
Epigenesis, 97
Epistemologist's fallacy, 109
Epistemology, 118; empiricist, viii
Erfahrung, 236
Erinnerung, 254f. *See also* Inwardizing
Erlebnis, 236
Erscheinung, 62, 236, 240
Essence, 24, 79, 236, 239; categories of, 77, 145, 240f.; Doctrine of, 78, 83f., 87, 90, 95, 105n. 11, 131, 180, 240
Eternal objects, 251f.
Eternity, 59, 62, 210f.; of the world, 106n. 22
Ether, luminiferous, 143f.
Ethics, 35, 118, 184
Eudaemonism, 31
Evolution, viii, 57, 97ff., 103f., 136f., 138, 209; natural, 97, 153
Excitability, 127
Exclusion, *see* Principle: of Exclusion
Existence, 90
Existentialism, viii, 2, 5, 7, 11, 248
Experience, 100; reflective, 120. *See also* *Erfahrung*; *Erlebnis*
Exposition, 77f.
External world, 39f.
Externality, 97, 133, 142, 181, 186

Fackenheim, E., 235
Faith, 20, 28, 31f., 42, 227, 232, 234; and reason, 223ff.; relation to knowledge, 232
Family, 186f.
Faraday, M., 144
Fascism, 15
Federation, 201f., 206. *See also* *Föderalism*
Feeling, 42, 94, 111, 161, 167, 181; lure for, 250f.; moral, 183; practical, 183f. *See also* Sensation; Sentience; Soul
Feuerbach, L., 44
Feyerabend, P., 7
Fichte, J. G., viii, 20, 28, 37, 45, 47f., 54f., 96, 108, 125, 182, 230
Field, 144, 147
Finalism, 131
Findlay, J. N., 71, 105, 114ff., 123, 164
Finite, 28f., 53, 61, 110, 211; and infinite, 227, 244; identity (reconciliation) with infinite, 215f., 220, 229f.
Finitude, 159
Föderalism, 201
Form, 59, 78; Platonic, 251
Fossils, 116, 136
Freedom, 12, 15, 17, 21, 23, 185 et seq., 213 et seq., 242f.; human, 209; moral, 185; negative, 45; objectification of, 192f.; political, 21, 189, 209; realization of, 187
French Revolution, 21, 49, 190, 213
Freud, S., 2, 166
Freudianism, 16
Friedensbund, 201
Fühlen, 170; *und Ahnen*, 172
Fukuyama, F., 210
Function, 128
Für sich, 39, 119, 132, 153, 155, 163
Fürsichsein, 146f., 180, 186

Gaia hypothesis, 151
Galileo, 107
Ganze, 23
Geach, P., 87
Gefühl, 130, 254
Geist, 83, 120, 139n. 16, 235, 241
Geistesphilosophie, 17, 58, 64, 120, 125, 155, 163, 170, 177, 198, 236, 255
General Will, 188f., 196, 199
Generation, spontaneous, 116, 136
Genus, 156
Geodesic, 135, 144f.
Gestalt, 63
Gestaltung, 10, 37, 180

Gesunder Menschenverstand, 84, 112, 115, 124, 126
Ghost in the machine, 161
Gilson, E., 223
Gladstone, W. E., 201
Glasnost, 4
Gleick, J., 154n. 11
God, 17, 23 et seq., 31f., 37, 52, 59f., 64, 70, 103f., 107, 159f., 213, 224, 228 et seq., 239f., 255; as truth, **225ff.**, 244; before the creation, 70, 226; consequent nature of, 252 et seq.; does not remain stony and dead, 103, 235; eternal essence of, 213, 218, 226, 237; existence of, 224; image of, 228f.; Kingdom of, 231; march (way of) on Earth, 15, 215, 218; primordial nature of, 252, 254; relation of humanity to, 243; service of, 243; Son of, 229f.; triune, 245; worship of, 237
Godhead, 216, 227, 231
Goethe, J. W., 116
Good, Idea of the, 101
Gorbachev, M., 4
Gospel, 216; St. John's, 104
Gottesdienst, 237
Göttlichkeit, 235
Government, 187
Gravity, 132
Greece, 47, 185, 242; ancient, 22, 29, 47, 124, 190f., 208
Greek city state, 25
Greeks, *see* Greece
Green, T. H., 12, 45, 97, 109
Grier, P., 70 et seq., 79, 221n. 2
Ground, 38, 90
Grund, 103, 132
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 190f., 197

Habit, 163, **172ff.**
Hale, S., 69
Hanson, R. N., 140n. 29
Happiness, 186
Harmonia mundi, 134
Hawking, S., 256
Hegelianism: left-wing, 45; right-wing, 45
Heidegger, M., 2, 5, 7, 104
Heisenberg, W., 16, 150
Henderson, L. J., 116
Henrich, D., 191
Heraclitus, 177
Herder, J. G., 48
Hilaire, Geoffroi St., 57, 136
Hinrich, H. F. W., 23
Historic route, 255
Historical determinism, 209
Historicism, 46f., 49
History, 35, 50, 54, 61f., 63; absolute spirit in, *208–22*, **215–18**; end of, **58–62**, **209ff.**, **220f.**; natural, 212; of philosophy, 49, 58, 64, 199; world, 204. *See also* Philosophy: of History
Hobbes, T., 15, 52, 107, 186, 192, 196, 200, 203
Hocking, E., 256
Holism, 131, 142f., 163, 173, 248
Hook, S., 193n. 10
Hume, D., 6, 37, 87, 107
Husserl, E., 7, 42n. 2, 55, 104, 109
Huxley, A., 193n. 10
Hylozoism, 164
Hypersphere, 145
Hypotheses, 135
Hyppolite, J., 36, 42n. 1

Idea, 13f., 21, 23, 30f., 33, 40, 49, 59, 63, 70, 75, 78f., 94, 101, 103, 111f., 115, 120, 134, 142, 158, 216, 226, 239; absolute, 32, 55, 60f., 70, 77f., 83, 95, 100, 112, 115, 133f., 153, 158, 188, 210ff., 215ff., 228f., 238f., 241f., 251; concept of, 159; divine, as it exists on Earth, 185; immanence in Nature, 102, 242; in the form of externality (other-being), 95, 105n. 11, 133, 142, 178, 211; manifestation as Nature, 146; objectification of, 178; of the Good, 101; of progress, **208f.**; operation of, 214; self-exposition of, 78
Ideal construction, 95, 100
Idealism, 1, 3, 10, 48f., 54, 56f., 105, 107, 113, 181, 256f.; absolute, 54, 94, 256; British, 45, 109; objective, 96, 107f.; reconciliation with Realism, 105; subjective, 37, 107f.; transcendental, 37, 44, 48, 109
Ideality, 146, 196f.
Idealization, 163
Identity, 28, 61, 69f., 79, *82–92*, 97, 116, 157; and difference, **84–87**, 232; and nonidentity, 56; Law of, 82f., 85ff.; numerical, 89; of identity and nonidentity, 56; philosophy of, viii, 108; statements, 89
Ideology, 3ff., 7, 11, 58
Ilting, K.-H., 191
Immanence, 59, 62ff., 102, 115, 153, 156, 228, 251f.; of mind in Nature, 120
Immediacy, 70; mediated, 159
Immediate, 69
Immortality, 22

Imponderables, 127, 161
Incarnation, 59, 240
Indifference point, 37
Individual, 70
Individualism, 25, 49
Individuality, 152
Infinite, 27ff., 61, 210f.; bad (false, spurious), 53, 145, 225, 234f.; grief, 29, 243; overreaches the finite, 227; relation to finite, 23; restlessness, 110, 227; transcendent, 62; true, *see* Infinity
Infinity, 59, 159; false, 21, 33, 145; pure night of, 29; true, 21, 33, 53, 145, 226, 235
Insanity, 171
Intellect, 27, 130; finite, 229; human, 153
Interest, 186; common, 187f.; corporate, 187; national, 203
International relations, **200ff.**
Intuition, 79, 217
Inwardizing, 159f., 163
Irrationalism, **3–8**
Irritabilität, 127
Isaiah, 234, 245

Jacobi, F. H., 22, 26, 28
Jena, Battle of, 35, 59
Jenseits, 63
Jeremiah, 234
Jesus, 23ff., 29, 59, 216, 224, 230. *See also* Christ
Joachim H. H., 105n. 1
Jonas, H., 19n. 3
Jouvenel, B. de, 202
Judaism, 24, 30, 231
Judgment, 78

Kahn, H., 205
Kant, I., viii, 1, 18, 21ff., 24, 28, 33, 37, 48, 52, 54, 85, 88, 100, 108f., 112, 125, 201f., 206, 234, 253
Kant's Copernican revolution, 107ff.
Kepler, J., 107, 134f.
Kierkegaard, S., 17, 233, 234
Kline, G., 71
Knowing, Absolute. *See* Absolute: knowing
Knowledge, 103, 109, 232; human, 59; of God, 224, 234; of good and evil, 229; problem of, 107
Knox, Sir M., 33nn. 2, 3, 5, 8, 190f.
Koffka, K., 176n. 23
Kojève, A., 44, 49, **58–62**, 210
Kosok, M., 44
Kroner, R., 33n. 2
Krug, W. T., 134, 140n. 40
Kuhn, T., 7, 140n. 29, 248

Lamarck, J.-B., 57, 136
Langer, S., 169
Laplace P. S., 16
Language, 5
Lauer, Q., 235
Law, 21, 123, 185f., 219; and order, 11f., 15; causal, 133; enforcement, 189; International, **200ff.**, 205; natural, 112, 125; positive, 200; rule of, 198
League of Nations, 201f.
Leibniz, G. W., 36, 85, 89, 107, 163
Lenin, V. I., 52, 54
Lewis, D., 69
Liberalism, 191, 209
Liberty. *See* Freedom
Life, 27, 30, 41, 100, 115, 152, 181; as logical category, 181
Light, 137f., 233; signals, 143; spreading wave, 115, 138; velocity of, 143
Locke, J., 37, 67, 107
Logic, vii, 23, 27, 38f., 41f., 52, 54, 56, 60, 62, *67–81*, 93, 100f., 104, 112, 114f., 118f., 120, 122, 128, 130, 133f., **177f.**, 210f., 238f.; abstract and concrete in Hegel's, *67–81*; and Nature, **158f.**; exposition of, 153; formal, 82f., 86, 128f., 157; Greater, 32, 36, 42, 70, 77, 132; Hegel's, 84, 90, 94f., 99, 101, 131, 152; Jena, 35, 42; Lesser, 102, 123, 158; *Science of Logic*, 36, 72, 84, 159; symbolic, viii, 68; transition to Philosophy of Nature, 101ff.
Lonergan, B., 223
Lorenz transformations, 144
Louis XIV, 195f., 200
Love, 23, 25, 30, 234, 244; God as, 230
Lovelock, J., 151
Lukács, G., 44, **46–54**, 57, 61

McTaggart, J. McT. E., 82, 87f.
Malebranche, N., 107
Martin, R., 68, 74
Marx, K., 3, 9, 44 et seq., 50f., 57f., 61, 108, 114, 198
Marxism, viii, 2 et seq., 5f., 10, *44–66*, 190
Master-slave, 182
Materialism, 10, 50, 53, 56, 107, 114, 131; dialectical, 10, 57; historical, 44, 47; modern, **3–8**
Mathematics, 69, 72, 131
Matter, 53, 59, 137, 145, 161
Maxwell, J. Clerk, 144
Mechanics, 148f.; celestial, 107; Newtonian, 137
Mechanism, 52, 148

Mediation, 77, 111f., 162
Meinen, 126, 129
Mentality, 251, 256
Merleau-Ponty, M., 2, 174
Metabolism, 138, 152
Metaphysics, 5, 7, 118, 131; Aristotle's, 59, 64, 236; Hegel's, 256; Jena, 35, 42
Method, 78f.; dialectical, 47
Michelson-Morley experiment, 144
Michener, C. D., 175n. 3
Microcosm, 143, 147
Miller, A. V., 114
Milne, E. A., 137f.
Mind, 40, 83, 94, 97, 99ff., 107, 110ff., 115, 133; awakening in Nature, **163ff.**; embodiment of, **165ff.**; finite, 225; human, 104, 119, 159, 220, 235; inseparability from body, 165; self-conscious, 102, 128; the truth of Nature, 162; subjective, 160
Minerva, 221; owl of, 106n. 15, 221
Monarchy, 188, 190, 195f., 198
Monod, J., 150
Mood, 164f.
Moore, G. E., 82, 85f., 91
Moralität, 185
Morality, 12, 17, 23f., 40, 132, 184ff., 189, 229
Moses, 24
Motion, 115, 137, 144; absolute, 143; relative, 143
Mowrer, E. A., 193n. 10
Muirhead, J., 190
Mure, R. G., 117n. 1
Mysticism, 32, 233

Napoleon, 35, 49, 58ff., 210
National Socialism, 55
Natural selection, 136
Nature, viii, 10, 13f., 30f., 40, 53ff., 57f., 61ff., 94, 96, 120, 125, 133f., 141, 143, 153, **158–61**, 168, 210ff., 228, 230, 235f., 238ff., 252; and Mind, **110–13**, **160f.**, 217; human, 228f.; observation of, **125–29**; Philosophy of, *93–105*, *107–17*, 164; relation to God, 236; relation to Idea, 160, 235; second, 185; subjectification of, **178**; transition from Logic, **101–3**, 155; truth of, 162; weakness of, 103, 137, 153
Naturphilosophie, 58, 94ff., 104f., 113 et seq., 120, 133f.; updated, *141–54*
Nazism, 2, 5, 190, 218
Nebeneinandersein, 186
Needham, J., 154n. 8
Negation, 156, 218; significant, 250
Negative, 42, 69, 110, 132; prehension, 249f.
Negativity, 249
Nettleship, R. L., 45
Neural-identity theory, 173
Newton, Sir I., 16, 107, 116, 134f.
Nexus, 255
Nichtidentität, 55f.
Nietzsche, F., 17
Nirvana, 232
Nohl, H., 33n. 2
Nonidentity, 55; of subject and object, 55
Nothing, 70, 77
Notion. *See* Concept
Noumenon, 28

Object, 72, 105n. 11, 244
Objectification, **178**, 180; of the subjective, 240
Objective, 177
Objectivity, 125, 130
Obligation, 7
Observation, 124, 126; of Nature, *see* Nature; scientific, 6, 115
Ochlocracy, 198
Ohnmacht, 242; *der Natur*, 103, 137, 142
O'Malley, J., 206n. 7
Ontogenesis, 138
Ontological Argument, 36
Opposites, 38, 142, 145, 156f.; identity (synthesis) of, 31f., 143, 178
Opposition, 11, 17f., 27, 110, 146; of subject to object, 94
Organicism, 138
Organics, 148f., 152
Organism, 40, 58, 112f., 115, 127f., 160, 229, 253; Earth as, 115, 151; living, 128, 150, 180, 228; natural, 155; self-maintenance of the, 152; sentient life of the, 166; vegetable, 164
Organization, 30, 156. *See also* Principle: of organization
Original sin, **228f.**
Other, 229f., 241
Other-being, 40, 95, 159, 235, 242, 252

Pantheism, 226, 238
Pantheon, 243
Paradigm, 130, 248
Particle, 144ff.; elementary, 146ff.
Particular, 26f., 62, 68, 70, 76, 79, 123, 162
Particularity, 152, 159
Particularization, 62
Pasteur, L., 116
Paul, St., 220, 224, 228

Pauli, W., 147
Peace, 201f., 206
Perception, 38, 40, 87, 113, 120, 125f., 130, 217, 232; causal theory of, 113; immediacy of, 131; representative theory of, 113; the divine as immediate object of, 242
Perestroika, 4
Personality, 14, 63, 209, 211, 215, 220
Peter, St., 224
Petry, M., 114
Phenomena, 100, 112
Phenomenology, viii, 9, 40, 174; of mind, 78
Phenomenology of Spirit (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), *35–43*, *44–66*, 58f., 62, 70 et seq., 80, 94, 102, 104, 106n. 15, 114f., 120, 123f., 130, 132, 142, 159, 210, 217, 235f.; master-slave sequence in, 182
Philippians, 224
Philosophie der Natur, 113
Philosophie des Geistes, 96, 102, 113
Philosophie des Rechts, 96
Philosophy, 5, 27, 40f., 50, 99, 119ff., 133, 232, 238; and Religion, **234f.**, 237; history of, 49, 64; of History, 185, 212, 242; of Mind, 245; of Nature, *107–17*, 153, 155, 164, 239; of Religion, 223, 236, 242; of science, 118; of Spirit, 93f., 103, 133, 153, 175, 181; province of, 93; science and, **132–39**; speculative, 131. *See also* Analytic philosophy; Christian philosophy; Critical Philosophy
Phrenology, 127, 129
Physical alterations, 163f.
Physics, viii, 2, 147ff.; classical, 143f.; contemporary, 115, 248; Newtonian, 145
Physiognomy, 129
Physiology, 127
Place, 145
Planck, M., 16, 150
Planets, 134, 153
Plato, 2, 38, 45, 59, 74, 101, 157, 164, 184, 191, 193
Pneumatology, 161
Pöggeler, O., 190
Polarity, 132
Pole, 254; mental, 254, 256; physical, 256
Polis, 184, 193
Political theory, 35
Politics, 17; American, 2; international, 13; power, 202, 205
Popper, Sir K., 7, 45f., 195, 198f., 202
Positive, 132
Positivism, 46
Positivity, 23ff., 47
Possible worlds, 69, 74
Power, 13; balance of, 13 (*see also* Balance of power); nuclear, 8; political, 15, 192
Practice, 183f.
Predicate, 86
Preformation, 97
Prehension, 252; conceptual, 256; negative, 249f.
Principle, 13; Anthropic Cosmological, 256; explanatory, 13; of complementarity, 138; of Exclusion, 147, 150; of identity of indiscernibles, 89; of movement, life, and activity, 98, 111, 119, 156, 178, 182, 212 (*see also* Dialectic); of order, 144; of organization, 142, 150, 226; of structure, *see* Structure; of unity, 150; of wholeness, 142, 252f.; organizing, 76, 160, 163; structural, 111, 146, 162; universal, 26, 75, 144, 146, 153, 253
Process, 99, 101, 248f.; evolutionary, 111; natural, 113, 115; philosophy, 248
Progress, 208f., 210; idea of, **208f.**
Propaganda, 6
Proper names, 89
Property, 90; common, 68
Propositional form, 86
Proverbs, 224
Prussianism, 190
Pseudoscience, 118, 129
Psyche. *See* Self
Psychology, 16, 127ff., 161
Purpose, 52, 54

Quantity, 78
Quantum theory, 16, 255; immaterialism of, 161
Quine, W. Van O., 89, 140n. 29

Rational, 17; is the real, 17, 104; thinking, 94
Rationalism, 107, 209, 226, 238
Raven, C. E., 34n. 16
Real is the rational, 17, 104
Realism, 10, 256f.; economic, 46; Hegel's, *107–17*, 125; Platonic, 68f., 74; reconciliation with Idealism, 105
Realphilosophie, 35, 42
Reason, 5f., 12, 17, 20f., 23f., 26ff., 31ff., 40, 79, 120, 124, 137, 161, 183, 220, 223, 238; activity of, 214; cunning of, 14, **219ff.**; human, 234; in History, **212ff.**; self-conscious, 126; speculative, 5, 28, 32, 40, 83, 101, 225, 232, 234
Rebellion, 199f.

Rechtsphilosophie, 106n. 15, 178, 191, 198, 243
Reference, 85; frame of, 143
Reflection, 33, 40, 87f., 111, 181, 237
Reformation, 22, 209
Reinhold, K. L., 28
Relation, 87; diadic, 88; monadic, 88; triadic, 153
Relational thinking, 94
Relations, 144; external, 144
Relativism, 4, 12, 14; historical, 49; moral, 6f.
Relativity, 16, 135, 137, 144, 255; general, 144; immateriality of, 161
Religion, 20f., 23f., 35, 40, 48ff., 54, 132, 184, 216, 231ff., **234–48**; absolute, 231; as concept and representation, 245; concept of, 238; determinate, 244
Religionsphilosophie, 217, *234–46*, 255
Representation, 101, 183, 232, 238
Reproduction, 127
Res gestae, 212, 214, 218
Restlessness: absolute, 17; eternal, 248; infinite, 56, 110, 227, 255
Result, 122
Resultat, 55f.
Resurrection, 59
Revelation, 21, 237
Rights, 185f., 197, 214; natural, 25
Robespierre, M., 49, 55
Robinson Crusoe, 189
Roman Empire, 25
Romanticism, 47, 209, 247
Rome, 47
Roosevelt, T., 201
Rousseau, J.-J., 15, 22, 25, 188, 192, 196, 199
Royce, J., 1
Russell, Bertrand, 82, 85f., 89, 256
Russell Brain, W., 175n. 19

Salvation, **229ff.**
Sartre J.-P., 2, 5
Scale, 142; of dialectically related forms, 146; of forms, 157; of gradations, 142
Scheffler, I., 140n. 29
Schelling, F. W. J., viii, 33, 37, 48, 50, 96, 103, 108, 110, 134, 235
Schrödinger, E., 149f.
Schwarzenberger, G., 202
Sciama, D. W., 153n. 4
Science, 20, 59, 121, 132; and logic, **129–32**; and philosophy, **118ff.**; and Philosophy of Nature, **132–39**; as a stage in the development of consciousness, **122–25**; biological, 128; contemporary, 247; empirical, 40, 100, 103, 108, 113, 115, 120, 123ff., 127; Hegel and, *118–40*; natural, 93, 114, 141; Newtonian, viii; observational, 112; philosophy of, 118; physical, 127; the way of all, 244
Seelending, 161
Sein-für-Anderes, 87
Self, 55, 63, 213; in contradistinction from not-self, 170, 182; natural, 54, 109
Self-awareness: absolute, 125. *See also* Self-consciousness
Self-consciousness, 10, 39, 55, 58f., **98–101**, 102, 113, 120, 127, 146, 158, 228; of absolute Spirit, 239
Self-contradiction, 53
Self-determination, 215
Self-development, 75, 79, 83, 98, 119, 150
Self-differentiation, 63, 78, 158, 212, 230
Self-diremption, 56, 180, 245, 255; God's, **227f.**
Self-evolution: dialectical, 121. *See also* Self-development
Self-externality, 115, 159
Self-feeling, 163, 167
Self-generation, 113
Self-particularization, 62
Self-specification, 63, 110, 142, 228; of the Concept, 73
Self-transcendence, 64
Sensation, 112f., 130, 161; localization of, 169; manifold of, 167
Sense, 85, 123
Sense-certainty, 125
Senses, 168
Sensibility, 127, 163f.
Sentience, 40, 100, 112f., 120, 152, 160, 162f., **167–70**, 181f.
Set theory, 68
Sex, 165f.
Sichselbstwerden, 42, 75, 78, 83
Siemens, R., 82; reply to, *82–92*
Simultaneity at a distance, 143f.
Sittlichkeit, 186, 196, 206, 215, 243
Sleep, 165; and waking, 165 et seq.
Smith, Adam, 2, 49
Smith, A. J., 105n. 1
Socialism, 51. *See also* National Socialism
Society, 192; as objective Spirit, **184–88**; bourgeois, 50, 58, 186ff.; civil, 48, 186f.; classless, 58
Socrates, 38, 192
solar system, 146f.
Solipsism, 108
Soul, 40, 163; Actual, 163; dark night of

the 243; Feeling, 163, **170–73**; Physical, 163; world, 164
Soul-substance, 165
Sovereignty, 13, *195–207*, 219
Soviet Union, 190f., 205
Space, 115, 138, 145; absolute, 145
Space-time, 144
Species, 156; biological, 157
Speculation, 120
Spinoza, B. de, viii, 1f., 18, 25, 36, 52, 59, 62, 109, 200, 237, 250, 253
Spengler, O., 204
Spirit, viii, 3, 12, 15, 21, 30, 39f., 48, 52, 54, 57ff., 119f., 125, 137, 158, 177, 211, 239f., 254; absolute, 30, 54f., 58, 64, 79, 102, 119, 142, 146, 160, 210f., **215–18**, 226, 228, 235f., 238ff., 243, 246n. 10, 255; in History, *208–22*; dialectic of, 113, 210; finite, 55, 112, 115, 217; human, 243; Objective, 51, *177–94*, 215, 243, implicitly absolute Idea of Objective Spirit, 185, 188, 211, 215, 240; Philosophy of, 93f.; recapitulation (of logical categories) in, **181–84**; reobjectification of, **179**; self-conscious, 53, 209; self-generation of, 112; self-manifestation of, 63; subjective, 174, 239; transcendent, 63; transition from Nature, *155–76*; world, 210
Staatenbund, 202
Stace, W. T., 87
Standard, 14; moral, 208; objective, 14; universal, 14
Stapp, H., 154n. 4
State, 15, 25, 51, 59, 185 et seq., 196, 199 et seq., 204, 211, 213, 219; criticism of Hegel's account of, 190; Greek city, 25; Head of, 188, 192, 196; of Nature, 186, 195, 200, 205f.
Steiger, Hauptmann von, 21
Stoicism, 185, 243
Structure, 128. *See also* Principle: of structure
Subconscious, 166f.
Subject, viii, 11, 51, 79, 86, 121, 253; and object, 72, 111, distinction of object, 174, 181; identity (unity) of, 23, 37, 70, 95, 99, 100, 115, 215, 244; interdependence of, **179f.**; nonidentity of, 55; reconciliation of, 56, 180; knowing, 120, 132; self-conscious, 209; transcendental, 109
Subjective, 177; aim, 254
Subjectivism, 10, 113
Substance, 11, 36, 51, 121, 123
Sun, 135, 153
Superject, 253f.
Synthesis, a priori, 88, 100
System, viii, 38, 41, 83, 91, 110, 118, 121, 156, 163, 247f.; complex dynamic, 238; dialectical, 13; dynamic, 150; Fragment of a, 30; metaphysical, 248; organic, 30; organized, 150; physical, 150; self-differentiated, 158; self-elaboration of, 209; self-representative, 238
Systematicity, 108

Taylor, C., 221n. 3, 247
Teilhard de Chardin, P., 132
Teleological Judgement, Critique of, 37
Teleology, viii, 16, 51 et seq., 108, 127, 136, 148, 150, 181, 217
Teleonomy, 150
Terror, 49
Tertullian, 224
Tetrads, 242
Theology, 60, 132, 224, 236f.
Thesis, and antithesis, 156; opposition to antithesis, 108
Thing, 86, 89, 126; and its properties, 90
Thing-in-itself, 28, 108f.
Thinking: reflective, 158; relational, 94; systematic, 9
Thomas, L., 151
Thoreau, H. D., 186, 189
Thought, 115, 126, 129; activity of, 227; Laws of, 82, 84; movement of, 156; reflective, 26f., 100; systematic, 9; that thinks itself, 60
Thought-determination, 83, 100, 120, 181, 237
Thrasymachus, 192
Time, 39, 58 et seq., 64, 80, 115, 144f., 217f.; redeeming the, 220
Tipler, F., 256
Totalitarianism, 45f., 190, 198
Transcendence, 59, 62ff.
Treaties, 201f.
Triad, 42, 138, 142, 156
Trinity, 216, **231f.**, 236, 245
Truth, 7, 22f., 33, 40f., 51f., 78, 91, 101, 110, 119f., 126, 142, 216f., 227, 231, 237, 244; absolute, 159, 243f.; and correctness, 82ff.; as object of religion, 242; core of, 95; criterion of, 7; God as, **225ff.**; objective, 7. *See also* Whole
Tübingen, 20f., 223

Übergreiffen, 54, 226f.
Unconditioned, 21

Unconscious, **170–73**
Understanding, 9, 11, **24–29**, 31ff., 37f., 40, 69, 75, 78f., 82ff., 87, 90f., 94, 100, 111, 113, 120, 123, 126, 130, 135, 137, 139n. 10, 142f., 156, 227, 234, 238; categories of, 112, 125; finite, 225, 232; philosophy (philosophers) of, 84, 86, 88
United Nations, 202
Unity, 116; differentiated, 110; in and through difference, 116, 162; of apperception, 88, 253; of subject and object, 23, 25; of the knowing subject, viii; of the universe, 145, 153; organismic, 40; synthetic, 45
Universal, 14, 23, 27, 63, 68, 70, 76, 79, 123, 127, 142, 162, 251; abstract, 20, 27, 31; concrete, 20, 26, **29–32**, 56, 62, 69, 75f., 79, 126, 128, 142, 147, 156f., 159, 162, 226, 233n. 2; Idea, 112; identity of the universal with particulars, 232; ordering principle, 75
Universality, 152
Uranus, 134
Urteil, 56, 78
Utilitarians, 45

Value, 7f., 229; standard of, 8
Velocity, 144
Verfassung, 188
Vernunft, 124; *List der*, 220
Versöhnung, 215, 229
Verstand, 123f.
Vitalism, 161
Volition, 184
Voltaire, F.-M., 22
Vorstellung, 101, 183, 232, 237, 242

Wahrnehmung, 123f.
War, 13, **202–6**, 201; concept of, 200; nuclear, 8, 204
Wave, 148; electromagnetic, 144; -packet, 146; standing, 148
Weapons, nuclear, 204
Weltanschauung, 134
Weltgeist, 204
Weltgericht, 191, 204, 206
Weltgeschichte, 191, 204, 206
Wesen, 24
Whitehead, A. N., 57, 104, *247–57*
Whittaker, Sir E., 153n. 3
Whole, 14, 16, 23, 26, 28 et seq., 31, 33, 52, 56, 62, 72, 75f., 78f., 82f., 91, 101, 110f., 142, 163, 177, 226; and parts, 110; concept of, 111; four-dimensional, 144; influence of, 220; self-development of, 150. *See also* Truth
Wholeness, 17, 27, 40, 108; of life, 29
Wilson, W., 201
Wissenschaft, 16, 20f., 36, 39 et seq., 58, 83, 112, 114, **121ff.**, 226, 248; *der Logik*, 36, 72, 106nn. 15, 20, 113, 242, 252; *Gang der aller*, 244f.
Wissenschaftslehre, 48
Wittgenstein, L., 87, 114
Wolff, C., 85
Word, 104, 230
Worlds, possible. *See* Possible worlds

THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL

This comprehensive and illuminating collection of essays by Errol E. Harris covers the entire range of Hegel's philosophy, emphasizing Hegel's contemporary relevance, elucidating difficult and controversial questions, and revealing Hegel's insight into key philosophical problems. It presents Hegel's philosophy as consistent, credible, and prophetic in its anticipation of modern scientific developments.

Professor Harris concentrates on key points of controversy and attempts to resolve them by stressing the prevailing consistency of Hegel's thought, interpreted as realistic holism. In this context Harris explains Hegel's idealism as objective, in a way that reconciles the earlier oppositions of idealism to realism, rationalism to empiricism, and reason to revelation.

Much space and discussion is given to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as the crucial issue in judging whether Hegel is a pure idealist, or is a realist in the same sense and to the same degreee as A. N. Whitehead. The final chapter compares the philosophies of Hegel and Whitehead to throw light on this question and to underline the book's two main purposes: to highlight Hegel's contemporary relevance and to insist on the essential realism of this thought.

Key questions, such as those of the body-mind relationship, political liberalism, international relations, and the so-called end of history, are addressed in the course of what amounts to a general presentation of the character and scope of Hegel's philosophy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Errol E. Harris is John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy (Emeritus) at Northwestern University, Honorary Research Fellow at the Center for the Philosophy and History of Science, Boston University, and a former President of the Hegel Society of America. His many publications include *Cosmos and Anthropos*, *Cosmos and Theos*, *Atheism and Theism*, *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science*, *Spinoza's Philosophy: An Outline*, and *One World or None: Prescription for Survival*.